Facts:

Parvez Khan died in a road accident while driving a vehicle insured by Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.

Compensation was claimed by Abdul Khalid, father of the deceased, before the Workmen Compensation Commissioner.

The High Court set aside the compensation award, questioning whether Parvez Khan was an employee of the defendant.

Issues:

Whether the liability of the insurer ceases when a vehicle is transferred to another person.

Whether Parvez Khan was an employee of the defendant.

Interpretation of relevant sections of the Motor Vehicles Act and Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after hearing arguments from both parties, upheld the decision of the Workmen Compensation Commissioner. It emphasized that the liability of the insurer does not cease even if the vehicle is transferred to another person, as long as the vehicle was insured at the time of the accident.( Paragraph 16)

The court referred to Section 157 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which states that the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been transferred in favor of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with effect from the date of transfer.( Paragraph 17)

In conclusion, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and restoring the compensation awarded by the Workmen Compensation Commissioner to the claimants. The court directed the Commissioner to ensure payment of the compensation to the claimants.( Paragraph 18)

Facts:

The appellant, an 84-year-old, and the respondent, a 62-year-old, were involved in a dispute regarding their relationship.

The respondent initiated proceedings under the Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005, claiming to be the appellant's wife/companion.

Various legal proceedings were initiated by the respondent seeking relief under the D.V. Act, including appeals and petitions before the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the interim order permitting the respondent to occupy the appellant's premises was justified.

Whether the transfer of proceedings from the lower court to the High Court was appropriate.

Held:

The Court found that the interim order allowing the respondent to occupy the appellant's premises couldn't be sustained as the parties had never lived together in that household (Para 18).

The Court concluded that there was no merit in transferring the proceedings from the lower court to the High Court, as it deprived the appellant of valuable rights (Para 23).

The orders permitting the respondent to occupy the premises and transferring the proceedings to the High Court were set aside. The Chief Justice of the High Court was directed to nominate any Additional Sessions Judge in Bangalore to hear the appeal expeditiously (Para 26).

The appeals were allowed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs (Para 27).

Facts:

The appellant, heir of Mukhtiar Singh (since deceased), appealed against his conviction under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The original accused, a police officer, was alleged to have demanded and received bribes from the complainant in exchange for favoring him in an ongoing investigation.

The prosecution alleged that the accused demanded Rs. 3,000 initially and later Rs. 2,000 to file a report of exoneration.

The trial court convicted the accused, and the conviction was affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution successfully proved the charge against the original accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the evidence presented established the essential elements of the offense under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Held:

The court analyzed the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense and scrutinized the legal precedents related to proving demand for illegal gratification. It found inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the charge against the original accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court were set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Facts:The Special Judge hearing criminal cases related to illegal allocation of coal blocks directed to frame charges against the appellant. The appellant challenged this before the High Court, which dismissed the petition citing non-maintainability due to a previous order dated 25.07.14 passed by the Supreme Court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court seeking to recall or revisit the said order, claiming denial of access to justice.

Issues:

Whether the order passed by the Supreme Court restricting jurisdiction of the High Court is valid.

Whether the appellants' right to file a revision petition is unduly restricted by the said order.

Whether the order violates Article 14, Article 21, and the principles of natural justice.

Whether the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, prohibit granting stays of proceedings.

Held:

The Supreme Court, invoking its powers under Article 136 read with Article 142, passed an order limiting the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters related to coal block allocation cases. This order was upheld in a previous case, and considering the width and ambit of the investigation and the larger public interest, such a restriction was deemed permissible.

The order effectively shifts the forum for seeking relief from the High Court to the Supreme Court. While this may restrict the appellants' entitlement to file revision petitions in the High Court, it does not deny them remedies altogether. The appellants can approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 for redressal.

The classification of coal block allocation cases as a separate category is justified, considering their unique nature and the large-scale corruption involved. Such differential treatment does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.

The order does not violate Article 21, as no procedural safeguard has been denied to the appellants. Their right to life and liberty is not curtailed, but rather placed in the proper perspective, considering the seriousness of the allegations against them.

The order does not impinge on the appellants' right to access justice under Article 32 and Article 142. While the forum for seeking relief may have changed, their rights remain intact.

The restrictions on granting stays of proceedings are upheld, given the specific provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, aimed at expediting trials related to corruption cases.

Facts:The dispute arose from an ex-parte decree sought to be set aside under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC. It involved a residential house in Munger, District Bihar, originally owned by Hira Mistry, the appellant's father. Eviction proceedings were initiated against a tenant, Surendra Narayan Sinha, which went through various stages of litigation. An agreement to sell the property between Hira Mistry and Vijay Kumar was allegedly made in 1983, during the eviction proceedings. Subsequently, a specific performance suit was filed by Vijay Kumar, resulting in an ex-parte decree in 1987. Despite efforts made by the courts, Vijay Kumar was not found to be present either in court or at the property.

Issues:

Whether the ex-parte decree should be set aside under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC considering the peculiar circumstances and doubts regarding Vijay Kumar's existence and intentions.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside previous court orders and the ex-parte decree, directing that the original suit be heard on its merits and disposed of within one year. Status quo as to possession was ordered to continue until the suit was finally decided.

The court, after considering the facts and circumstances, concluded that Vijay Kumar's actions seemed to be aimed at obstructing the final decree of eviction obtained by the landlord, and hence, it was just to set aside the decree.

The judgment highlighted the court's commitment to ensuring justice and fairness in resolving disputes, even in cases with complex and unusual circumstances.

Facts:

The case involves acquisitions made by the appellant in 2014 and whether they were exempt from open offer obligations under Regulation 10 of the SEBI Takeover Regulations of 2011.

Issues:

Whether the acquisitions made by the appellant in 2014 were exempt from open offer obligations and the interpretation of Regulation 10 in this context.

Held:

The Court examined Regulation 10(1)(a) and emphasized that acquisitions must be pursuant to inter se transfers among qualifying persons, specifically named as promoters in the shareholding pattern filed by the target company. The Court rejected the appellant's argument to consider the object of the regulation, emphasizing that clear statutory language should prevail unless there is ambiguity.

Ultimately, the Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tribunal, dismissing the appeals on the grounds that the literal language of Regulation 10 did not exempt the acquisitions made by the appellant in 2014 from open offer obligations.

Facts:

The claimant, Gajender Yadav, a Security Officer, met with an accident resulting in the amputation of his left leg below the knee. The Tribunal and the High Court had awarded compensation, which was disputed.

Issues:

The assessment and modification of compensation, considering the claimant's permanent disability and loss of future earnings.

Held:

The Court held that the compensation for future loss of earnings should be computed based on principles outlined in relevant judgments. The Court noted the claimant's 85% permanent disability and his occupation as a Security Officer. It applied a multiplier of 15, considering his age, and arrived at a compensation amount of Rs. 15,12,000/- for future earnings (Paragraph 7).

The Court adjusted the High Court's award, finding a duplication in the compensation awarded for physical disability and future loss of earnings. It reduced the total compensation to Rs. 15,12,000/- for future earnings, maintaining the rest of the High Court's order (Paragraph 8).

Additionally, the Court awarded an extra amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- for the claimant's claim for changing the artificial limb at least once in two years (Paragraph 9).

Facts:

The Supreme Court had issued directions on December 15, 2016, to address the dangers posed by drunken driving on national and state highways.

The Chandigarh Administration issued a notification on March 16, 2017, reclassifying certain roads within the city from state highways to major district roads.

The reclassification was challenged before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which upheld the validity of the notification.

Issues:

Whether the reclassification of roads by the Chandigarh Administration violated the Supreme Court's directions on the ban on liquor sale along highways.

Held:

The Supreme Court, in its judgment dated July 11, 2017, held that the reclassification of roads by the Chandigarh Administration did not breach the directions issued by the Court regarding the ban on liquor sale along highways. The Court clarified that the purpose of its directions was to address liquor sale along highways connecting cities, towns, and villages, not licensed establishments within municipal areas. The reclassification did not violate the terms or purpose of the Court's directions. Therefore, the Special Leave Petition challenging the notification was dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent, a chartered accountant, was subjected to disciplinary action for issuing certificates for the consumption of raw materials, inaccurately representing the value of imported raw materials to the units without proper verification.

The Disciplinary Committee found the respondent guilty of professional misconduct under relevant provisions of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, and recommended reprimand by the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).

The High Court set aside the findings of the Disciplinary Committee and the Council, citing insufficient evidence to establish wrongdoing.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the findings of the Disciplinary Committee and the Council.

Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish professional misconduct by the respondent.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the arguments and reviewing the judgment of the High Court, upheld the decision to set aside the findings of the Disciplinary Committee and the Council. The Court found no error in the High Court's reasoning regarding the insufficiency of evidence to establish professional misconduct. The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's order. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.