Facts:

Dispute over ownership of land in Survey No. 493 of Patwari Halka No.76 at Village-Purani Chhabani, Guna.

Original landowners sold land to Urmila Devi, who later sold a portion to the appellants.

Plaintiff, Matadin, claimed adverse possession based on Khasra entries for 1960-1961.

Trial court decreed in favor of the plaintiff, but the first appellate court allowed the appeal by the appellants.

High Court, in a second appeal, reversed the first appellate court's order and restored the trial court's decree in favor of the plaintiff.

Issues:

Validity of the plaintiff's claim of adverse possession.

Corrections in Khasra entries and their impact on the claim.

Whether the High Court erred in re-evaluating the evidence.

Held:

The court observed that the plaintiff's claim of possession originating in 1960-1961 was questionable, especially considering the suspicious corrections in the Khasra entries. The court noted that the son and nephew of the plaintiff were clerks in the collectorate, and they faced departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution for making false entries. The court highlighted that the entries in the name of Urmila Devi, the purchaser, were in blue ink, while the entries in the name of the plaintiff were in red ink.

The court concluded that the first appellate court's finding on possession being with Urmila Devi, supported by the court commissioner's report and the subsequent sale deed to the appellants, did not require interference. The High Court's finding that Urmila Devi never acquired possession, and the plaintiff established adverse possession, was considered perverse. The court emphasized that the plaintiff failed to establish peaceful, open, and continuous possession demonstrating a wrongful ouster of the rightful owner.

In light of these findings, the court set aside the High Court's order, restored the first appellate court's order, and dismissed the suit in favor of the appellants. The appeals were allowed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the issuance and verification of caste certificates under the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes, and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000. A notification dated July 30, 2011, established district-level committees for verification, subsequently quashed by the High Court. Challenges were raised against Caste Validity Certificates, alleging fraud in obtaining them during the interregnum period between the said notification and the Rules notified on August 31, 2012.

Issues:

The validity of the Caste Validity Certificates, the discretionary powers of the Scrutiny Committee, and the mandatory requirement of verification by the Vigilance Cell.

The challenge also questioned the conformity of the notification with directions given in the Kumari Madhuri Patil case.

Held:

Composition of Scrutiny Committee:

The composition of the Scrutiny Committee was a point of contention, with the court emphasizing that, as long as the procedure adheres to legal requirements, strict adherence to previous directions is not necessary (Para 26).

The court rejected the challenge against the notification on the grounds of non-conformity with Kumari Madhuri Patil case, as such a challenge would not be sustainable (Para 26).

Requirement of Vigilance Cell Verification:

The court affirmed the mandatory requirement of verification by the Vigilance Cell, as established in the Kumari Madhuri Patil case (Para 27).

During the interregnum period, the input from the Vigilance Cell was obtained selectively, leading to a flawed exercise. The court directed a fresh exercise to be undertaken by the Caste Scrutiny Committee (Para 27).

Fresh Exercise and Timeline:

The court quashed the exercise conducted during the interregnum period, directing a fresh exercise to be completed within six months, i.e., on or before March 31, 2020 (Para 29, 31).

Existing certificates issued for the interregnum period would remain valid until the completion of the fresh exercise (Para 31).

Appeals and Vigilance Inquiry:

Individuals whose caste certificates were rejected without vigilance inquiry were granted the right to appeal as per Rule 7 of the 2012 Rules (Para 31).

Cases where an adverse report existed, yet a caste validity certificate was issued, were to be re-examined in the fresh exercise. The appeals are accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. (Para 31).

Facts:

The case involves a criminal complaint against an MLA, Satish Ukey, alleging the non-disclosure of two criminal cases in Form 26, as required by the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Issues:

The interpretation of Sections 33-A and 125-A of the 1951 Act, along with Rules 4A and Form 26 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.

The central question is whether the information to be furnished by a candidate under Section 33-A includes cases where cognizance has been taken by the court, in addition to cases where charges have been framed.

Held:

The highlight that Section 33-A, as initially drafted, required information about convictions and cases where charges had been framed but excluded cases where cognizance had been taken. However, the court emphasizes that Form 26 mandates disclosure not only for cases where charges have been framed but also for cases where cognizance has been taken by the court.( Paragraph 8 and 9)

address the crucial question of whether the word 'information' in Section 125-A includes information beyond what is mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1). The court notes the requirement of providing information in Form 26 under Section 33-A(2).( Paragraphs 12 and 13)

Discuss the amendments made to Form 26 in 2012, explicitly mandating the disclosure of information about cases where cognizance has been taken. The court stresses that the new Form 26 requires information on both framed charges and cases where cognizance has been taken.( Paragraphs 15, 16, and 17 )

Refers to letters from the Election Commission emphasizing that candidates must furnish information on cases where a competent court has taken cognizance, along with cases where charges have been framed.( Paragraph 18)

Concludes that the information to be furnished under Section 33-A includes not only the information in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1) but also information required under the Act or the Rules, to be provided in Form 26.( Paragraph 19 )

Declares that the trial court's order, upheld by the High Court, is legally untenable. The complaint will be reconsidered afresh by the trial court.( Paragraph 20 )

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the orders of the lower courts are set aside. The complaint will be reconsidered afresh by the trial court.

Facts:

The petitioner, Sudam @ Rahul Kaniram Jadhav, filed Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.401-402 of 2012 challenging his conviction under Section 302 IPC based on circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

The scope of review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the correctness of the death sentence, and the petitioner's conduct in prison.

Held:

The scope of review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings is limited to correcting miscarriages of justice caused by an error apparent on the face of the record, guided by Article 137 of the Constitution and Order XL Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules. The court cannot re-appreciate evidence in its entirety during the review (Para 1 to Para 6.5).

The petitioner's conviction under Section 302 IPC based on circumstantial evidence was upheld, and there were no grounds for interference with the findings on the "last seen" circumstance, extra-judicial confession, and motive. The chain of circumstances established the guilt beyond reasonable doubt (Para 10 to Para 17).

Though evidence being circumstantial may be a relevant consideration in sentencing, there is no bar on awarding the death sentence. The decision depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case, considering both aggravating and mitigating factors (Para 18.1 to Para 18.2).

The death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to a mitigating circumstance in the nature of circumstantial evidence. Incorrect observations regarding the deceased's facial injuries affected the decision. Life imprisonment alone would be inadequate, and the petitioner was ordered to remain in prison for life with restrictions on remission (Para 20 to Para 22.1).

FACTS:

The case involved a dispute over the allotment of land, particularly Survey No. 129/45/D, to Andhra Prabha Publications under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976.

A learned Single Judge directed a survey to determine if the allotted land was indeed Survey No. 129/45/D.

The Division Bench initially set aside the Single Judge's judgment, but the Supreme Court disagreed in its judgment on 16.08.2017, restoring the Single Judge's direction for a survey.

Despite subsequent orders, the demarcation of Survey No. 129/45/D had not taken place as directed.

ISSUES:

Whether the land allotted to Andhra Prabha Publications was the same as Survey No. 129/45/D.

HELD:

In light of the extraordinary facts and the reluctance of authorities to part with the valuable land, the Court, using powers under Article 142, rejected the second Survey Report. The Court declared that the land marked as Survey No. 19/P, specifically 'PQRS' in the map, is actually Survey No. 129/45/D. The allotment to Andhra Prabha Publications was set aside, and they were directed to deliver the land to the government within eight weeks. The miscellaneous application is accordingly disposed of. ( Para 13)

All amounts paid by Andhra Prabha Publications to the Government were ordered to be refunded within twelve weeks, along with simple interest at 6 percent per annum.( Para 14)

Facts:

The case involves a review petition challenging the guidelines issued in the case of Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra. The guidelines pertained to arrests under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, specifically requiring approval for the arrest of public servants and a preliminary inquiry by a Dy.S.P for non-public servants.

Issues:

The validity of the guidelines issued in the Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan case.

The impact of the guidelines on the rights and protections afforded to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the 1989 Act.

Held:

The court holds that Section 18 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is not violative of Article 21. The court emphasizes the historical discrimination faced by these communities and the need for protective discrimination. The existing provisions regarding arrests are analyzed, and the court concludes that the guidelines in question restrict the right to arrest.

The court discusses the right to live with dignity and the concomitant provision of compensation for human rights violations under Article 21. It emphasizes that the Act of 1989 is in essence aligned with various facets of Article 21, providing protections and compensation. The court rejects the notion of a presumption that members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the law and argues against discrimination in procedures.

The court refutes the idea that the caste of a person is the cause for lodging false reports under the Act. It highlights the vulnerable position of these communities and the need for special protections. The court dismisses the argument that the high number of cases registered in 2016 indicates misuse of the Act and stresses that such misuse can be addressed through existing legal mechanisms.

The court addresses concerns related to the approval of arrests by the appointing authority for public servants. It argues that Section 197 of the Cr.PC already provides protection, and requiring appointing authority approval at the arrest stage would be discriminatory and encroach upon legislative territory.

The court rejects the idea that approval of the SSP is necessary for the arrest of non-public servants, emphasizing that it may cause delays and is not statutorily envisaged.

The court concludes that requiring the Magistrate to scrutinize reasons for further detention is unnecessary when approval from the appointing authority or SSP has not been granted. It emphasizes that this process may delay proceedings under the Act of 1989.

The court recalls guidelines (iii) and (iv) issued in the Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan case, stating that they encroach upon legislative territory and are against the concept of protective discrimination under Article 15(4). As a result, direction No.(v) also becomes irrelevant.

Facts:

Appellants and private respondents applied for the post of Technical Assistant.

U.P. Reservation Act prescribed specific reservation percentages for different categories.

The State Government identified a wrongful calculation in category-wise vacancies and revised the requisition in August 2014.

UPPSC declared results based on the revised requisition, and an O.M. dated October 12, 2014, revised the vacancies for different categories.

Private respondents challenged the O.M. and the result in the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the revised requisition and O.M.

Absorption of diploma holders.

Challenge to the selection process by private respondents who participated in the interview.

Filling of unfilled horizontal reservation vacancies.

Doctrine of res judicata.

Held:

Revised Requisition and O.M. Validity: The revised requisition and O.M. were valid as they rectified wrongful calculations and complied with the U.P. Reservation Act, 1994. The correction aimed to achieve the reservation quota without prejudicing the General category candidates. (Para 32)

Absorption of Diploma Holders: Diploma holders were wrongly counted against the OBC quota, and rectifying this mistake in the revised requisition was justified. The variation in vacancies against the "General quota" resulted from the absorption of diploma holders against the "General quota." (Paras 37, 38)

Challenge by Private Respondents: Candidates participating in the interview without objection cannot later challenge the modified vacancies; estopped by the principle of estoppel. (Para 50)

Filling of Unfilled Horizontal Reservation Vacancies: Filling unfilled horizontal reservation vacancies by candidates of vertical reservation is in accordance with the government's policy. (Para 56)

Doctrine of Res Judicata: The decision of the Supreme Court is binding on all writ petitioners before the High Court, even if they were not parties in the appeal before the Supreme Court. (Para 63)

Appointment Issues and Article 142: Selected candidates do not have an indefeasible right to be appointed. Power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to direct the State to issue appointment orders to 906 candidates. (Para 76)

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the interpretation of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, specifically regarding the definition of "commercial site."

The appellant, K.H. Nazar, sought exemption for his quarry under Section 81(1)(q), arguing that a quarry qualifies as a "commercial site."

Conflicting views from earlier judgments of the Kerala High Court on whether quarrying is a commercial operation added complexity to the case.

Issues:

Whether a rocky land used for quarrying purposes can be treated as a "commercial site" under Section 81(1)(q) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

The interpretation of the term "commercial site" in the context of the Act and its application to quarries.

Held:

The Court rejects the appellant's contention that quarrying constitutes a manufacturing activity, citing a previous judgment that breaking rocks into pieces does not amount to manufacturing (Paragraph 18).

The majority opinion emphasizes the restrictive meaning of the term "commercial site" in Section 81, stating that a commercial site involves land with a structure used for industrial or commercial purposes (Paragraph 15).

The Court dismisses the dissenting view that sought support from Section 81(1)(k), emphasizing that it deals with a different type of land belonging to an industrial or commercial undertaking (Paragraph 17).

The wider construction of the words "commercial site" would defeat the laudable object of the Act, which aims to restrict concentration of large swathes of land in favor of a few individuals (Paragraph 19).

The Appeals are dismissed, affirming the majority opinion of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court (Paragraph 20).

Facts:

The case involves appellants Sagar Sharma and another against respondents Phoenix ARC Private Limited and another. The impugned judgment erroneously stated that the I&B Code's coming into force on 1st December 2016 triggered the right to apply under Section 7, and the application was not barred by limitation.

Issues:

The misapplication of the limitation period concerning applications under Section 7 of the IBC, particularly in reference to the I&B Code's enforcement date.

Held:

It is clarified that the I&B Code's enforcement on 01.12.2016 is irrelevant to triggering any limitation period for the Code. The court sets aside the impugned judgment and directs a fresh determination, emphasizing that Article 137 of the Limitation Act alone applies to applications under Section 7. The NCLT order dated 29.01.2019 remains stayed until further orders from the NCLAT. Senior Counsel Rakesh Dwivedi expresses intent to raise a plea based on Section 22 of the Limitation Act before the NCLAT.