Facts:

Annamalai University, established under the Annamalai University Act, 1928, faced financial difficulties despite receiving grants.

The Tamil Nadu Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1992, was enacted to regulate tuition fees, with an amendment in 2007 introducing sub-section (2-A) empowering a Committee on Fixation of Fee.

Issues:

The challenge raised by students regarding the high fees charged by Annamalai University for professional courses.

The applicability of the Fee Fixation Committee's decisions and statutory provisions.

Held:

The university cannot independently fix fees for professional courses without the intervention of the Fee Fixation Committee.

The concept of estoppel cannot justify actions contrary to statutory provisions.

The university was directed to submit all relevant documents to the Fee Fixation Committee for review.

The Committee was tasked with fixing appropriate fees for specific academic sessions.

The appeals were allowed, and the university was directed to comply with the Committee's decisions.

Facts:

The appellant claimed to have been using the mark 'MALABAR' for selling Biryani Rice since 2001.

A suit was filed for infringement and passing off against the respondent.

Initially, an interim injunction was granted in favor of the appellant, restraining the respondent from using the label mark 'MALABAR'.

Subsequently, modifications were made to the interim order, allowing the respondent to use the word 'MALABAR' in conjunction with 'BAROMA' with certain conditions regarding font size.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had exclusive rights over the use of the word 'MALABAR'?

Whether there was similarity between the label marks of the appellant and the respondent?

Whether the High Court's decision to allow the respondent to use 'MALABAR' in conjunction with 'BAROMA' was justified?

Held:

The appellant, despite being the registered owner of the label mark, had a disclaimer attached to the exclusive use of the word 'MALABAR', indicating that exclusive rights over the word were not granted.

Other registered marks containing the word 'MALABAR' with similar disclaimers were cited, further supporting the conclusion that exclusive rights over the word were not granted.

The label marks of the appellant and the respondent were found to be substantially different and not deceptively similar.

Considering the interests of both parties and the substantial turnover in their respective businesses, the High Court's decision to allow the respondent to use 'MALABAR' in conjunction with 'BAROMA' with the approved modifications was upheld.

The respondent was allowed to pursue their application for registration of their label, with the outcome of the suit determining the final resolution of the matter.

The appeal was dismissed, and all contentious issues were left to be resolved in the pending suit, with no costs imposed.

Facts:

The appellants, retired sailors who served in the Submarine Arm of the Indian Navy, sought inclusion of Submarine Pay in the computation of their Service Pension.

Appellants argued that Submarine Pay should be considered part of their basic pay due to its inclusion in their Last Pay Drawn Certificate and its specific grant to submariners for hazardous duties.

Respondents contended that Submarine Pay was categorized as an allowance and therefore should not be included in the calculation of pension.

Issues:

Whether Submarine Pay should be included in the computation of Service Pension for retired sailors of the Indian Navy.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Submarine Pay should be included in the computation of Service Pension for sailors who served in the Submarine Arm of the Indian Navy. The Court reached this conclusion based on several observations and legal analyses:

The Court noted that Submarine Pay was introduced for submariners through official instructions, which specified it to be treated as "pay for all purposes".

It was observed that Navy Instruction No. 2/S/74 dated August 17, 1974, which governed the appellants' cases, did not exclude Submarine Pay from the computation of "pay" for pension purposes.

The Court highlighted that Submarine Pay and Submarine Allowance were listed separately in the instructions, indicating they were distinct components.

The Court rejected the respondents' reliance on subsequent instructions that excluded Submarine Pay from basic pay, as these were issued after the appellants' retirement and were not applicable to their cases. As a result, the Civil Appeal was allowed, setting aside the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal that had denied inclusion of Submarine Pay in the pension calculation.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal arising from a judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay convicting certain appellants under various sections of the Indian Penal Code.

The incident in question occurred during an altercation between two political factions during which the deceased sustained fatal injuries.

The prosecution's case primarily relied on the testimony of eyewitnesses, who were relatives of the deceased, and corroborating evidence such as medical reports and weapon recovery.

The trial court acquitted all the accused, questioning the credibility of the witnesses and finding the prosecution's evidence lacking.

On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants based on the consistency of the witnesses' testimony and corroborating evidence.

Issues:

Whether the witnesses' reactions during the incident and their familial relationship with the deceased affect their credibility.

Whether the non-mention of witnesses' names in the First Information Report (FIR) undermines the prosecution's case.

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal.

Held:

Witness credibility cannot be solely determined by their reactions during a crime, and familial relationships do not automatically undermine witness testimony. The court emphasized that each case must be evaluated individually.

The omission of witnesses' names in the FIR does not discredit the prosecution's case, as FIRs are not expected to contain exhaustive details. Omissions in naming witnesses do not necessarily undermine the prosecution's case.

The High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal since the trial court's findings were deemed perverse. In cases where the trial court's findings are questionable, the appellate court has a duty to reassess the evidence.

Facts:

The case involves the review petition (Crl.) No. 570 of 2017, arising from Criminal Appeal No. 607 of 2017, concerning the Nirbhaya gang rape and murder incident.

Issues:

Whether the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as provided under Article 137 of the Constitution, applies in this case, and if so, what are the grounds for review?

Held:

The power of review of the Supreme Court under Article 137 of the Constitution is broader than review jurisdiction conferred by other statutes. The Court may review any judgment, subject to the provisions of law enacted by Parliament or rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution.

An application for review must meet the grounds specified in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. In criminal proceedings, review is permitted only for errors apparent on the face of the record.

The petitioner's submission regarding the circumstances of his arrest and detention does not invalidate the conviction and trial process.

Arguments pertaining to the petitioner's driving license were deemed irrelevant to the affirmed conviction.

Challenges to the dying declarations of the victim were previously considered and rejected in the earlier judgment.

The evidence of witnesses, including PW-1, was extensively examined and found reliable; thus, the petitioner cannot re-agitate the matter.

The arguments regarding the recovery of articles were found untenable, as they had been addressed in the judgment.

The petitioner cannot re-argue the appeal on the merits of the case, as all relevant submissions were already considered.

The petitioner's claim of non-involvement in the offense was dismissed since his involvement had been established in prior court proceedings.

Decision: The review petition is rejected.

Facts:

The Government of NCT of Delhi issued a circular requiring respondent-hospitals, including Moolchand Khairati Ram Trust, to implement the judgment of the Delhi High Court regarding providing free treatment to economically weaker sections. Land & Development Officer (L&DO) directed hospitals allotted land by them to strictly follow the policy of providing free treatment to economically weaker sections. The respondent-hospitals challenged these conditions imposed by the Government of NCT of Delhi and L&DO.

Issues:

Whether the imposition of the condition of providing free treatment to economically weaker sections on hospitals amounts to a restriction on their rights under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution?

Whether the conditions imposed by the Government of NCT of Delhi and L&DO are valid and enforceable?

Whether the judgment in Social Jurists case is applicable to the present case?

Whether the hospitals in question and other similarly situated hospitals must adhere to the conditions framed by the Government regarding free treatment?

Held:

The Court held that the obligation to provide free treatment to economically weaker sections by hospitals does not constitute a restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. It is in line with the charitable purpose for which the hospitals were established.

Executive orders can be issued in the absence of legislation, provided the State has the authority to legislate on the subject. Thus, the conditions imposed by the Government of NCT of Delhi and L&DO are valid.

The judgment in Social Jurists case is applicable to the present case, as it pertains to the obligation of hospitals to provide free treatment to economically weaker sections.

The respondent-hospitals and similarly situated hospitals must scrupulously observe the conditions framed by the Government regarding free treatment. Non-compliance may lead to cancellation of lease. The Government of NCT of Delhi must file a periodical report on compliance.

Facts:

The case pertains to the review petitions filed by Vinay Sharma & Anr. in relation to the Nirbhaya gang rape and murder case. The trial court convicted all four accused and sentenced them to death, a decision upheld by the High Court. The Supreme Court also dismissed the appeals filed by the accused, affirming the death penalty.

Issues:

Whether grounds exist for the review of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the criminal appeals.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that the review jurisdiction should not be lightly entertained and can only be exercised upon grounds provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. This allows for review in a criminal proceeding only on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.

The Court emphasized that the review petitions cannot seek to re-hear the appeals on merits, as submissions made during the original appeals had already been noted, considered, and rejected.

The submission that the bus was falsely implicated was rejected, as it had already been considered and rejected during the original appeals.

All contentions regarding the three dying declarations of the victim were considered in detail, and the Court held that all three declarations were true, voluntary, and consistent.

The plea of alibi put forth by one of the petitioners was elaborately considered and found not acceptable by the Court.

The Court considered evidence, including footprints lifted from the bus and video clippings, which established the presence of one of the petitioners in the bus at the time of the incident.

Both petitioners' claims of juvenility were considered by the trial court and rejected based on the evidence on record.

The criminal appeals filed by the appellants were heard by the Court giving them sufficient time for raising all possible submissions, which were duly considered in the main judgment.

Decision: The review petitions were dismissed by the Court as no grounds were found to review the judgment.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of the role of the Chief Justice of India in allocating cases and constituting benches in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The extent of the administrative authority of the Chief Justice in preparing rosters for case allocation.

Whether the expression 'Chief Justice' in the Supreme Court Rules should be interpreted as 'Collegium' of the first five Judges.

Held:

The Chief Justice, in his individual capacity, is recognized as the Master of the Roster, possessing the prerogative to constitute benches and allocate subjects to them.

The Constitution doesn't explicitly define the role of the Chief Justice; however, legal conventions and practices affirm his administrative authority, which is enshrined in the Supreme Court Rules.

The Chief Justice's role encompasses both exercising judicial power on par with other judges and assuming responsibility for the administration of the Court, including the distribution of judicial workload.

The power of the Chief Justice to allocate cases stems from Article 145 of the Constitution and is reflected in the Supreme Court Rules.

Once a case is assigned to a particular bench, that bench holds complete authority over it, free from interference from the Chief Justice or others.

The Chief Justice's primary functions are to exercise judicial power and administer the Court, including determining the distribution of judicial workload.

Decision: The Chief Justice, acting as the Master of the Roster, retains the authority to allocate cases and constitute benches. This prerogative is upheld based on constitutional provisions, legal precedents, and established conventions.

Facts:

The petitioner was convicted under Sections 376 and 342 IPC and sentenced accordingly. The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the High Court. The victim's identity was disclosed in the judgments of both the trial court and the High Court, which is inconsistent with Section 228-A of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner's conviction and sentence should be upheld.

Whether the disclosure of the victim's identity in the judgments is in accordance with the law.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the conviction and sentences imposed on the appellant. However, it noted the disclosure of the victim's identity in the judgments and directed the High Court Registry to make appropriate changes to protect the victim's identity in compliance with Section 228-A IPC.