Facts:

Rule 115(7) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, requires all motor vehicles to carry a valid PUC Certificate issued by an authorized agency after one year of initial registration. Rule 116 empowers officers to direct vehicle owners to submit their vehicles for emission testing, and non-compliance results in penalties as per Rule 116(4) to (9).

Issues:

• Whether the NGT had the authority to pass orders directing the State Government to issue instructions to dealers and petrol pumps not to supply fuel to vehicles without PUC Certificates.
• Whether the NGT had the power to direct the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores to secure compliance with its order.

Held:

The NGT had the power to direct the State to implement compliance with Rules 115 and 116 of the 1989 Rules. The enforcement of statutory environmental obligations under these rules, which are related to emission standards, arises from the implementation of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, and the Environment Protection Act, 1986. Therefore, the NGT had jurisdiction to pass such orders.

However, the NGT lacked the authority to order the stoppage of fuel supply to vehicles without valid PUC Certificates. Such a penalty was not specified in the 1989 Rules or the NGT Act. The suspension of registration certificates and other prescribed penalties are the only consequences for non-compliance with PUC Certificate requirements.

The NGT had no power to direct the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores as security to secure compliance with its order, especially when the initial order did not contain any such direction. The penalty for non-compliance with an NGT order is governed by the NGT Act and does not include a monetary deposit.

Decision: The impugned orders of the NGT were set aside to the extent that they directed the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores and stop fuel supply to non-compliant vehicles. However, the State was required to strictly implement compliance with Rules 115 and 116 and penalize violators according to the provisions of the 1989 Rules.

Facts:

Rule 115(7) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, requires all motor vehicles to carry a valid PUC Certificate issued by an authorized agency after one year of initial registration. Rule 116 empowers officers to direct vehicle owners to submit their vehicles for emission testing, and non-compliance results in penalties as per Rule 116(4) to (9).

Issues:

Whether the NGT had the authority to pass orders directing the State Government to issue instructions to dealers and petrol pumps not to supply fuel to vehicles without PUC Certificates.

Whether the NGT had the power to direct the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores to secure compliance with its order.

Held:

The NGT had the power to direct the State to implement compliance with Rules 115 and 116 of the 1989 Rules. The enforcement of statutory environmental obligations under these rules, which are related to emission standards, arises from the implementation of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, and the Environment Protection Act, 1986. Therefore, the NGT had jurisdiction to pass such orders.

However, the NGT lacked the authority to order the stoppage of fuel supply to vehicles without valid PUC Certificates. Such a penalty was not specified in the 1989 Rules or the NGT Act. The suspension of registration certificates and other prescribed penalties are the only consequences for non-compliance with PUC Certificate requirements.

The NGT had no power to direct the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores as security to secure compliance with its order, especially when the initial order did not contain any such direction. The penalty for non-compliance with an NGT order is governed by the NGT Act and does not include a monetary deposit.

Decision: The impugned orders of the NGT were set aside to the extent that they directed the State to deposit Rs. 25 crores and stop fuel supply to non-compliant vehicles. However, the State was required to strictly implement compliance with Rules 115 and 116 and penalize violators according to the provisions of the 1989 Rules.

Facts:

The respondents filed a petition on 25.04.2018 under Section 7 of the IBC, claiming to be 'Financial creditors' and seeking the recovery of a principal amount of Rs.2.10 crores along with interest. The appellant company disputed this claim, stating that Rs.80,40,000/- was repaid to the respondents between 2003 and 2004. Moreover, the respondents requested the conversion of Rs.90,00,000/- from the outstanding loan as share application money, which was later treated as a loan from respondent no. 2. The appellant company also contended that it had paid Rs.43,25,000/- to the respondents between 2004 and 2006, fully liquidating the loan liability.

Issues:

Whether the debt claimed by the respondents is barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963.

Whether the respondents can be considered 'Financial creditors' under the IBC based on the evidence presented.

Whether the debt arising from payment received for shares, issued to a third party at the request of the payee, qualifies as a financial debt.

Held:

The applicant invoking the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process must prima facie show the existence of a legally recoverable debt, and the respondents failed to demonstrate that the debt was not barred by limitation (Para 36).

Under Clauses (19) to (21) of Part II of the Schedule of the Limitation Act 1963, the limitation period for a suit for the recovery of money lent is three years from the date of loan payment. In this case, the debt was likely barred by limitation as early as 2012 when winding up proceedings were initiated in the Madras High Court (Para 37).

The NCLT rightly refused to admit the application under Section 7 of the IBC, holding it to be barred by limitation. The Appellate Tribunal erred in reversing the earlier decision and admitting the application (Para 38).

Evidence, including forensic evidence, is required to adjudicate disputes about forged signatures or fabricated records, and such matters should be addressed in a regular suit rather than in IBC proceedings (Para 40).

The application under Section 7 of the IBC was not maintainable, as there was no financial debt in existence. The payment received for shares issued to a third party at the payee's request cannot be considered a debt, let alone a financial debt (Para 42).

The judgment and order of the Appellate Tribunal are set aside, and the Adjudicating Authority's order dismissing the application is restored (Para 43).

Facts:

The University Grants Commission (UGC) issued guidelines dated 06.07.2020 directing universities and colleges to complete terminal semester/final year examinations by 30.09.2020. The Ministry of Human Resource Development also issued an Office Memorandum (OM) on the same date, and the Ministry of Home Affairs permitted the conduct of examinations. However, the State of Maharashtra and the Maharashtra State Disaster Management Authority decided not to hold examinations for final year courses and to promote students based on previous performance and internal assessment. A writ petition was filed challenging the UGC Guidelines, the orders of ministries, and the decisions of the State authorities as ultra vires Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Are the UGC Guidelines, issued under Section 12 of the UGC Act, beyond the domain of UGC and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution?

Can the State Disaster Management Authority's decision to promote students without holding examinations override the UGC Guidelines?

Can the UGC Guidelines, being statutory, prevail over any inconsistent decision taken by the State authorities under the Disaster Management Act, 2005?

Is it mandatory for the UGC to consult all universities before issuing guidelines under Section 12 of the UGC Act?

Held:

The UGC Guidelines, being issued under Section 12 of the UGC Act, are statutory and not beyond the domain of UGC. They are in compliance with Section 12 and are not violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Guidelines show concern for the health of stakeholders and are reasonable.

The State Disaster Management Authority's decision to promote students without examinations cannot override the UGC Guidelines. The decision falls outside the jurisdiction of the Disaster Management Act, 2005.

The UGC Guidelines, being referable to Entry 66 of List I, shall prevail over any contrary decision taken by the State authorities under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, regarding the conduct of examinations.

Section 12 of the UGC Act does not mandate consultation with all universities in every case. The expression "in consultation with the Universities or other bodies concerned" should be read to mean where consultation is necessary.

The writ petition challenging the UGC Guidelines and the State authorities' decisions to promote students is dismissed. The UGC Guidelines prevail over any contrary decision taken under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, and the State is at liberty to seek an extension of the deadline for conducting examinations.

All writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. The Special Leave Petition No.10042 of 2020 is dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves the supply of pipes and measurement equipment (SKID equipment) by the respondent (M/S. Adani Gas Ltd.) to its industrial, commercial, and domestic consumers under the head of 'gas connection charges'. The respondent considered this supply as a service related to 'tangible goods' for the consumers' use without transferring the right of possession and effective control over the goods.

Issues:

whether the SKID equipment provided by the respondent to its consumers fell within the ambit of Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994, which deals with the taxability of supply of tangible goods for use without transferring possession or effective control of such goods.

Held:

Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994, levies tax on the supply of tangible goods for use without transferring possession and effective control. This provision was introduced to tax activities where the customer uses the service provider's goods without acquiring possession or effective control, making it a taxable service rather than a 'deemed sale' under Article 366(29-A)(d) of the Constitution of India.

The definition of taxable service under Section 65(105)(zzzzj) requires certain elements to be fulfilled, such as the provision of a service in relation to the supply of tangible goods, with no transfer of possession, and the goods being supplied for use by the recipient.

The General Service Agreement (GSA) between the respondent and its purchasers stipulated that there was no transfer of ownership or possession of the pipelines and measurement equipment (SKID equipment) to the consumers. The equipment was installed for measuring and recording the volume and pressure of the gas delivered, ensuring safe operations at the buyer's facilities. Therefore, the condition of not transferring ownership or possession, as per Section 65(105)(zzzzj), was satisfied.

The term "use" does not have a fixed meaning and must be contextually interpreted. In the present case, "use" of the SKID equipment encompasses its application for fulfilling the purpose of the contract, ensuring the correct quantity of gas supply, and enabling the safe and regulated delivery of gas, which is beneficial to both the seller and the buyer.

The refund of gas connection charges collected from consumers was not a refundable security deposit, as evidenced by the varying percentage of funds refunded to consumers based on their usage.

The Court upheld the decision of the Adjudicating Authority that the SKID equipment provided by the respondent to its consumers constitutes a taxable service under Section 65(105)(zzzzj) of the Finance Act, 1994. The Tribunal was erroneous in interfering with the findings and order of the Adjudicating Authority.

Facts:

The case involved a suit for declaration of ownership and possession of a property. The plaintiff claimed ownership of half of the property based on a purchase made by his father, while the defendant, who was in possession of the entire property, denied the plaintiff's ownership claim and asserted absolute ownership. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the first appellate court partially decreed it, granting ownership to the plaintiff for his half share but denying possession. The first appellate court, however, awarded the plaintiff mesne profits for the portion he owned. The plaintiff and the defendant both filed a second appeal before the High Court, which allowed the plaintiff's appeal and granted him relief of recovery of possession. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

• The nature and scope of a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
• Whether adverse possession was established by the defendant, thereby extinguishing the plaintiff's right to possession.
• The applicability of the maxim "possession follows title" in the case.

Held:

A second appeal is not an absolute right but a right conferred by statute. Section 100 of the CPC restricts the right of second appeal to cases where a substantial question of law is involved. A substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law, and must have a material bearing on the case's decision or the parties' rights. It is the duty of the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law in a second appeal, and without such a question, the appeal cannot be entertained. A second appeal does not allow re-agitation of facts or re-analysis of evidence. Section 100 of the CPC mandates the existence of a substantial question of law for a second appeal.No substantial question of law was involved in the second appeals before the High Court.

Adverse possession applies when a person is in possession of property in the assumed character of an owner and exercises ordinary ownership rights. If the rightful owner does not assert their possession rights within the limitation period, the possessory owner acquires absolute title. The defendant's defense, even though not explicitly claiming adverse possession, implied the assertion of ownership through continuous possession. The maxim "possession follows title" applies only when there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court were restored.

Facts:

The State Government of Punjab issued a circular providing that out of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, fifty per cent of the vacancies would be offered to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs. The circular was struck down by the High Court, and the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition (S.L.P.) against the same. Subsequently, the Punjab Act was notified in 2006, and Section 4(5) of the Act made similar provisions as the earlier circular, which was also struck down by the High Court. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for consideration, as it involved interpretation and interplay between Articles 16(1), 16(4), 338, and 341 of the Constitution.

Issues:

• Whether sub-classification within socially and educationally backward classes is permissible under the Constitution, specifically for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
• Whether the sub-classification under Section 4(5) of the Punjab Act is violative of Article 14.

Held:

In the case of Indra Sawhney, it was held that sub-classification within socially and educationally backward classes is permissible. This principle would also apply to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as they fall under Article 16(4).

The sub-classification made under Section 4(5) of the Punjab Act is permissible on a rationale basis to provide benefits to all and ensure equality. It does not exclude any class (caste) from reservation entirely.

There are differences within the list of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and socially and educationally backward classes. Making sub-classifications is necessary to ensure equal treatment and distribution of benefits to uplift the deprived sections of society.

The State has the competence to grant reservation benefits to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under Articles 15(4), 16(4), 341(1), and 342(1) of the Constitution. It can provide preferences based on rational criteria within the lists to ensure upliftment.

There is no vested right to claim a particular percentage of reservation, and the State can allocate reservation percentages based on the ground reality and need.

The interpretation of Articles 14, 15, 16, 338, 341, 342, and 342A is a matter of immense public importance, and the decision in E.V. Chinnaiah needs to be revisited by a larger Bench.

Decision: The matter is referred to a Bench of 7 Judges or more as considered appropriate for further consideration.

Facts:

The State Government of Punjab issued a circular providing that out of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes, fifty per cent of the vacancies would be offered to Balmikis and Mazhabi Sikhs. The circular was struck down by the High Court, and the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition (S.L.P.) against the same. Subsequently, the Punjab Act was notified in 2006, and Section 4(5) of the Act made similar provisions as the earlier circular, which was also struck down by the High Court. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for consideration, as it involved interpretation and interplay between Articles 16(1), 16(4), 338, and 341 of the Constitution.

Issues:

Whether sub-classification within socially and educationally backward classes is permissible under the Constitution, specifically for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Whether the sub-classification under Section 4(5) of the Punjab Act is violative of Article 14.

Held:

In the case of Indra Sawhney, it was held that sub-classification within socially and educationally backward classes is permissible. This principle would also apply to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as they fall under Article 16(4).

The sub-classification made under Section 4(5) of the Punjab Act is permissible on a rationale basis to provide benefits to all and ensure equality. It does not exclude any class (caste) from reservation entirely.

There are differences within the list of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and socially and educationally backward classes. Making sub-classifications is necessary to ensure equal treatment and distribution of benefits to uplift the deprived sections of society.

The State has the competence to grant reservation benefits to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under Articles 15(4), 16(4), 341(1), and 342(1) of the Constitution. It can provide preferences based on rational criteria within the lists to ensure upliftment.

There is no vested right to claim a particular percentage of reservation, and the State can allocate reservation percentages based on the ground reality and need.

The interpretation of Articles 14, 15, 16, 338, 341, 342, and 342A is a matter of immense public importance, and the decision in E.V. Chinnaiah needs to be revisited by a larger Bench.

Decision: The matter is referred to a Bench of 7 Judges or more as considered appropriate for further consideration.

Facts:

The case involved a suit for declaration of ownership and possession of a property. The plaintiff claimed ownership of half of the property based on a purchase made by his father, while the defendant, who was in possession of the entire property, denied the plaintiff's ownership claim and asserted absolute ownership. The trial court dismissed the suit, and the first appellate court partially decreed it, granting ownership to the plaintiff for his half share but denying possession. The first appellate court, however, awarded the plaintiff mesne profits for the portion he owned. The plaintiff and the defendant both filed a second appeal before the High Court, which allowed the plaintiff's appeal and granted him relief of recovery of possession. The defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The nature and scope of a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Whether adverse possession was established by the defendant, thereby extinguishing the plaintiff's right to possession.

The applicability of the maxim "possession follows title" in the case.

Held:

A second appeal is not an absolute right but a right conferred by statute. Section 100 of the CPC restricts the right of second appeal to cases where a substantial question of law is involved. A substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law, and must have a material bearing on the case's decision or the parties' rights. It is the duty of the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law in a second appeal, and without such a question, the appeal cannot be entertained. A second appeal does not allow re-agitation of facts or re-analysis of evidence. Section 100 of the CPC mandates the existence of a substantial question of law for a second appeal.No substantial question of law was involved in the second appeals before the High Court.

Adverse possession applies when a person is in possession of property in the assumed character of an owner and exercises ordinary ownership rights. If the rightful owner does not assert their possession rights within the limitation period, the possessory owner acquires absolute title. The defendant's defense, even though not explicitly claiming adverse possession, implied the assertion of ownership through continuous possession. The maxim "possession follows title" applies only when there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else.

Decision: The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court were restored.