Facts:

Hetchin Haokip, the appellant, challenged the order of preventive detention issued against her husband, Jangkhohao Khongsai, by the District Magistrate of Bishnupur, Manipur.

The detention was based on allegations of involvement in criminal activities related to being a member of the KLA organization and possession of firearms.

The appellant contended that the District Magistrate failed to report the detention to the State Government "forthwith," as required under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980.

Issues:

Whether the delay in reporting the detention to the State Government by the District Magistrate violated the requirement of reporting "forthwith" under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that "forthwith" under Section 3(4) means within a reasonable time and without undue delay.

While acknowledging that "forthwith" does not mean instantaneous action, any delay must be justified by unavoidable circumstances beyond the authority's control.

In this case, the District Magistrate took five days to report the detention to the State Government without providing any justification for the delay.

The Supreme Court found this delay unjustified and ruled that it vitiated the detention order.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and nullified the detention order.

Facts:

Currency Note Press & Anr (appellants), wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, employed the respondents at their printing press in Nashik, Maharashtra.

Respondents, former employees, filed applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming overtime wages for the period from 1986 to 1990.

The Labour Court initially dismissed the applications, prompting the respondents to file a writ petition before the High Court, which set aside the Labour Court's order and granted monetary relief to the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in granting monetary relief to the respondents by setting aside the Labour Court's order regarding overtime wages claimed for the period 1986 to 1990.

Held and Decision:

In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Court mentioned five factual reasons for dismissing the appeal:

All respondents were no longer in service, having either retired or passed away.

The amount involved was not substantial.

The period in question was from 1986 to 1990.

The amount had already been paid to the respondents pursuant to the High Court's order.

The overtime work claimed by the respondents was admitted to have been done while on duty.

The Court further stated in paragraph 12 that, considering these factual reasons, it declined to examine the legal issues raised by the appellants regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948, and the Factories Act, 1948. These issues were left open for consideration in a different case.

Therefore, in view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to grant monetary relief to the respondents for overtime wages.

Facts:

The case involves a boundary dispute between Assam and Nagaland. During the examination of PW 9 Md.Shafiqur Rahman from the Survey of India, the State of Assam sought the production of additional topographical maps to support its case. These maps were not in Assam's possession but were maintained in the Head Office of the Survey of India at Dehradun. Nagaland objected to the production of additional maps, citing a previous order allowing only certain maps to be produced.

Issues:

Whether the Court should allow the production of additional topographical maps requested by Assam, considering the objection raised by Nagaland based on a previous order permitting only certain maps.

Held:

The Court, after considering arguments from both parties, held that the production of the requested maps should be allowed. It emphasized that the documents were not in Assam's possession earlier, and the previous order did not preclude Assam from seeking production at this stage. However, the Court clarified that it did not address the relevance or admissibility of the documents, leaving it open for Nagaland to raise objections. Therefore, the application for production was allowed, and the Interlocutory Application was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant-wife, Usha Uday Khiwansara, and the respondent-husband, Uday Kumar Jethmal Khiwansara, got married on 07.02.1992.

The husband filed for divorce in 2004 citing cruelty and desertion as grounds.

The trial court dismissed the divorce petition, but the High Court allowed the husband's appeal and granted a decree of divorce based on desertion, without hearing the wife's side.

The wife appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's decision to grant divorce without hearing the wife's side was fair and just.

Whether a settlement between the parties could be reached to dissolve the marriage amicably.

Held:

The Court observed that the High Court's decision to grant divorce without hearing the wife's side caused prejudice to her rights.

The Court acknowledged the willingness of both parties to settle the matter mutually, considering the long separation, absence of any chance of reconciliation, and the wife's health condition and financial dependency.

Referring to previous judgments, the Court emphasized the need for a peaceful resolution in cases of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

The Court accepted the terms of settlement proposed by both parties. The husband was directed to pay Rs. 30 lakhs as permanent alimony to the wife within one month, with an additional Rs. 5 lakhs towards medical expenses. All allegations and pending cases were quashed.

The appeal was disposed of based on the settlement terms, with no costs imposed on either party.

Facts:

Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOC) terminated T. Natarajan's dealership agreement due to alleged breaches.

Natarajan invoked arbitration, which upheld the termination but granted him the liberty to seek reconsideration.

The High Court Division Bench directed the restoration of Natarajan's dealership, but the Supreme Court was approached by the IOC challenging this decision.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench was correct in overturning the Single Judge's decision and directing restoration of the dealership.

Whether the arbitration award entitled Natarajan to automatic restoration of the dealership.

Held:

The held that the Division Bench erred in assuming that the arbitration award automatically entitled Natarajan to restoration without considering the nature of the breaches and the IOC's discretion.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Division Bench's order and reinstating the Single Judge's decision. It emphasized the importance of contractual terms, administrative discretion, and the limited scope of judicial review in such matters.

Facts:

The case involved allegations against the respondents, who were public servants, of demanding and accepting illegal gratification for expediting certain permissions related to a business venture. The prosecution relied on evidence provided by witnesses, particularly PWs 1 and 3, who testified regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe money. Additionally, the presence of anthracene powder, used in trap operations, was found on the accused and the bribe money.

Issues:

Whether the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification were adequately proven by the prosecution,

Whether the accused provided satisfactory explanations to rebut the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Held:

The Court observed that the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification were proved by the consistent testimony of PWs 1 and 3, corroborated by the presence of anthracene powder on the accused and the bribe money. The High Court's decision to acquit the accused was deemed incorrect, as it disregarded the evidence provided by the prosecution. The Court noted that the accused failed to provide any explanation to rebut the presumption under Section 20. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and affirmed the conviction of the accused under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. However, considering the long passage of time since the occurrence of the incident, the Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment from two years to one year.

Facts:

The case revolved around the interpretation of provisions in the Homoeopathy Central Council Act, 1973, particularly regarding the power to appoint a team of Medical Inspectors for the purpose of inspecting homoeopathy colleges.

Issues:

Whether the power to appoint Medical Inspectors for inspection lies with the Central Government or the Central Council of Homoeopathy (CCH)?

Whether Regulation 3(5) of the Homoeopathy Central Council (Minimum Standards Requirement of Homoeopathy Colleges and attached Hospitals) Regulations, 2013, empowers the Central Government to appoint inspectors?

Held:

The Court held that the power to appoint Medical Inspectors for inspection lies with the Central Council of Homoeopathy (CCH), not with the Central Government. It emphasized that the Act does not confer upon the Central Government the power to appoint a team of inspectors or visitors at examinations. The interpretation of Regulation 3(5) of the Regulations, 2013, must be made in harmony with the provisions of Section 17 of the Act, which exclusively vests the power to appoint inspectors with the CCH. The Court concluded that any other interpretation would go against the legislative mandate.

The appeals were allowed, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench was set aside, and the judgment of the Single Bench was restored.

Facts:

The writ petition (Civil) No. 754 of 2016 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking immediate and necessary action against cow protection groups engaging in violence. The petitioner raised concerns about incidents of lynching and mob violence perpetrated by such groups.

Issues:

The court was to determine the legality of lynching and mob violence and to establish the obligations of the state authorities in preventing and addressing such acts.

Held:

The court unequivocally states that lynching is unlawful and violates fundamental rights and human dignity protected by the Constitution.

The state authorities have the primary obligation to maintain law and order and prevent vigilantism of any form, including cow vigilantism. Vigilantism undermines the legal institutions of the state and leads to chaos and disorder.

The court lays down guidelines for preventive measures, including the designation of nodal officers in each district to prevent incidents of mob violence and lynching.

In case of incidents, immediate lodging of FIRs is mandated, with personal monitoring of investigations by the designated nodal officers. Additionally, a victim compensation scheme is to be prepared by state governments.

Disciplinary action is to be taken against officials who fail to prevent incidents or promptly apprehend the culprits. The court recommends the creation of a separate offense for lynching with adequate punishment.

Decision: The court emphasizes the importance of timely implementation of the prescribed measures by both central and state governments to curb mob violence and lynching and to protect the rights and dignity of citizens.

Facts:

Annamalai University, established under the Annamalai University Act, 1928, faced financial difficulties despite receiving grants.

The Tamil Nadu Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1992, was enacted to regulate tuition fees, with an amendment in 2007 introducing sub-section (2-A) empowering a Committee on Fixation of Fee.

Issues:

The challenge raised by students regarding the high fees charged by Annamalai University for professional courses.

The applicability of the Fee Fixation Committee's decisions and statutory provisions.

Held:

The university cannot independently fix fees for professional courses without the intervention of the Fee Fixation Committee.

The concept of estoppel cannot justify actions contrary to statutory provisions.

The university was directed to submit all relevant documents to the Fee Fixation Committee for review.

The Committee was tasked with fixing appropriate fees for specific academic sessions.

The appeals were allowed, and the university was directed to comply with the Committee's decisions.