Facts:

The appellants invested in a company run by the respondent, who failed to return their share. The respondent issued a promissory note and two cheques towards their dues, which were later dishonoured.

Issues:

Whether the cheques were issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt.

Whether the respondent successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court reinstated the Trial Court's decision, holding the respondent guilty. The Court found that:

The respondent failed to produce credible evidence to rebut the statutory presumption under Section 139.

The promissory note clearly stated it was issued for a loan, and the respondent's defense regarding 10 blank cheques issued in 1995 was disbelieved.

The High Court erred in overturning the conviction, as the respondent couldn't prove the cheques were solely issued as security.

Thus, the Appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's decision and restoring the Trial Court's order of conviction and fine against the respondent.

Facts:

The appellant, Surinder Kumar Khanna, was convicted under Section 21(c) read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act based on the interception of a car carrying narcotic drugs.

The prosecution's case relied heavily on the statements of the co-accused, implicating the appellant in the drug trafficking.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the conviction primarily on the basis that there was insufficient evidence against him, apart from the statements of the co-accused.

Held:

The Court accepted the appeal and acquitted the appellant. It held that the confessional statements of the co-accused cannot be considered as substantive evidence against the appellant. Without any substantive evidence, the conviction of the appellant solely based on the statements of the co-accused was deemed inappropriate.

The law laid down in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar was followed. These cases establish that a confession of a co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence against another accused. It can only be used to lend assurance to other evidence against the accused. The Supreme Court reiterated that this principle should be applied unless there is a specific provision in the law making such confession admissible against another accused.

Facts:

The case involved a motor vehicle accident where the deceased, Satish, and the appellant, Anand, were injured in a collision with a speeding lorry.

Separate claim petitions were filed for compensation by the legal representatives of Satish and by Anand.

The Tribunal found the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the lorry driver.

Issues:

The liability of the insurance company to pay compensation, considering the lack of a valid permit for the offending vehicle to operate in Karnataka.

Held:

The High Court modified the compensation amount for Satish's legal representatives, increasing it based on a higher notional income assumption.

However, the High Court absolved the Insurance Company from liability for compensation.

The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, directing the Insurance Company to first pay the compensation amounts to the claimants, with liberty to recover from the owner of the offending vehicle.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's increase in notional income for Satish and maintained the compensation at the original amount determined by the Tribunal.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation and application of Section 34(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether Section 34(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is mandatory or directory.

What are the consequences of non-compliance with Section 34(5)?

The importance of timely disposal of applications under Section 34.

Held:

The court held that Section 34(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a procedural provision and its violation does not lead to any legal consequence. It should be construed as directory to ensure the advancement of justice.

It was emphasized that interpreting Section 34(5) as mandatory would defeat the objective of justice and fairness, as it would dismiss applications for procedural errors without considering the merits of the case.

Courts are encouraged to dispose of applications under Section 34 within one year from the date of service of notice to the opposite party, in line with the objective of expeditious disposal of commercial disputes.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, affirming the above principles.

Facts:

Ruby Tour Services Pvt. Ltd. applied for registration as a Private Tour Operator (PTO) for Haj Pilgrimage-2018.

The applications were rejected by the Government citing various grounds such as non-compliance with turnover requirements and submission of unclear documents.

Ruby Tour Services Pvt. Ltd. filed writ petitions seeking mandamus to register them as PTOs for Haj Pilgrimage-2018.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of registration applications by the Government was justified.

Whether the grounds for rejection were substantial or trivial.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to compensation for the rejection of their application.

Held:

The rejection of the first application was deemed justified as the turnover document submitted belonged to a different entity. The Court held that the Government cannot be estopped from raising issues of ineligibility even if they were overlooked in previous years.

The rejection of the second application was considered trivial and insignificant. The Court set aside the rejection and awarded compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to the petitioner.

The rejection of the third application was upheld as the petitioner failed to provide a proper explanation for the mismatch in the submitted documents. The petitioner was not entitled to any relief.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the interpretation of an exemption notification in the context of taxation.

Issues:

Whether exemption notifications should be interpreted strictly, and where the burden of proof lies regarding their applicability.

Clarification on the distinction between interpreting charging provisions and exemption clauses in taxation statutes.

The role of the court in interpreting statutes, particularly tax statutes, and the tools available for interpretation.

Held:

The interpretation of exemption notifications should be strict, with the burden of proving applicability resting on the assessee. Ambiguity in such notifications favors the Revenue, overturning the decision in the Sun Export case.

There exists a clear distinction between interpreting charging provisions and exemption clauses, with strict interpretation mandated for charging provisions but not necessarily for exemption clauses.

Principles of interpretation aim to discern legislative intent, with a focus on plain meaning and strict interpretation, especially in taxation matters.

Decision: The court ruled in favor of interpreting exemption notifications strictly, placing the burden of proof on the assessee and giving the benefit of ambiguity to the Revenue. The decision clarified the distinction between interpreting charging provisions and exemption clauses in taxation statutes and emphasized the importance of strict interpretation in tax matters.

Facts:

The case involved an incident where the accused allegedly assaulted the deceased and his brother with weapons, resulting in the death of the brother. The accused were charged under several sections of the IPC and the Arms Act.

Issues:

The assessment of evidence, particularly medical evidence, to determine the culpability of the accused in the assault and the intent behind the actions leading to the death of the deceased.

Held:

The Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, dismissing the appeal. The Court observed that while the primary accused had caused the gunshot injury, there was insufficient evidence to establish the intent to commit murder.

Therefore, the Court agreed with the High Court's decision to convict the primary accused under Section 304 (Part I) of the IPC for culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

Facts:

Karnataka Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. (hereafter referred to as the respondent) adopted the trademark 'NANDINI' in 1985 for milk and milk products. On the other hand, NANDHINI DELUXE (hereafter referred to as the appellant) adopted the mark 'NANDHINI' for its restaurants in 1989.

The appellant applied for trademark registration for 'NANDHINI' for various food products, including milk and milk products. The respondent opposed this registration, citing deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion.

The Deputy Registrar rejected the respondent's objections and granted registration to the appellant. However, the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) allowed the respondent's appeals, leading to writ petitions filed by the appellant, which were subsequently dismissed.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to seek registration of the mark 'NANDHINI' in respect of the goods it deals with and whether such registration would infringe the rights of the respondent.

Held:

The Court found that not only were the visual appearances of the two marks different, but they also related to different products. Furthermore, the manner in which they were traded by the appellant and respondent respectively made it unlikely for an average person to associate the goods of one with the other.

It was noted that the appellant operated restaurants under the trademark 'NANDHINI' and had applied the mark for goods like coffee, tea, sugar, etc., which are used in restaurant services, not milk or milk products.

Disagreeing with the reasoning of the IPAB and the High Court, the Court held that there was hardly any question of confusion or deception as the goods belonging to the appellant and the respondent, although different, were not in the same class under the Trade Mark Rules, 2002.

The Court found no convincing evidence to suggest that the appellant adopted the trademark to take unfair advantage of the respondent's mark. It noted that the use of 'NANDHINI' by the appellant would not harm the distinctive character or reputation of the respondent's mark.

Consequently, the Court restored the order of the Deputy Registrar granting registration to the appellant, with the modification that registration would not be given for milk and milk products for which the appellant had abandoned its claim.

Facts:

The appellant, Central Board of Trustees, issued summons to the respondent, Indore Composite Pvt Ltd, for non-payment of Provident Fund contribution.

The appellant ordered the respondent to deposit a certain amount within a specified time and later directed them to pay damages for delayed payments.

The respondent appealed against the order, leading to a dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court without adequate consideration of the issues and arguments.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's dismissal of the writ petition was justified.

Whether there was adequate consideration of the issues and arguments by the High Court.

Held:

Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the Division Bench of the High Court for deciding the writ petition afresh on merits in accordance with law.

We, however, make it clear that we have refrained from making any observation on merits of the controversy having formed an opinion to remand the case to the High Court for the reasons mentioned above. The High Court would, therefore, decide the writ petition, uninfluenced by any of our observations, strictly in accordance with law.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, the High Court's order is set aside, and the case is remanded to the Division Bench of the High Court for fresh consideration on merits.