Facts:

The Jharkhand Public Service Commission (JPSC) issued an advertisement on 19.07.2006 for the Jharkhand Eligibility Test (JET).

The test, known as the State Level Eligibility Test (SLET), is conducted to determine the eligibility of candidates for the appointment as lecturers.

The test comprises three papers, and the advertisement indicated that only candidates obtaining 50% marks in Paper I and II would be eligible for Paper III.

Issues:

The main issue revolved around the fixation of minimum marks for Paper III in the eligibility test.

The writ petitioner obtained 50% marks in Papers I and II but did not meet the 60% cut-off fixed by JPSC for Paper III.

The High Court allowed the writ petition, asserting that fixing the qualifying marks amounted to changing the rules mid-selection process.

Held:

The Division Bench held that the moderation committee, constituted as per the UGC scheme, is responsible for deciding the cut-off marks for each subject.

Emphasized that there was no need to fix qualifying marks for Paper III at the advertisement stage.

Disagreed with the High Court's view that the rules were changed mid-process, asserting that no minimum marks for Paper III were specified initially.

Concluded that the High Court erred in holding that JPSC couldn't fix the minimum marks for Paper III.

Civil Appeal No. 9441 of 2019 by JPSC was allowed, and Civil Appeal No. 9442 of 2019 filed by the writ petitioner was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants, drivers in different government departments, claimed entitlement to Selection Grade and Special Grade pay scales. The High Court rejected their claim, asserting that they were not lawfully entitled to these scales.

Issues:

The appellants' claim for parity, the lawfulness of their entitlement to the claimed pay scales, and the interpretation of Article 14 in this context.

Held:

The court highlighted that the dismissal of Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) by the Supreme Court does not affirm the lower court's decision. The High Court had misread a previous decision, leading to a different conclusion. Judicial discipline suggests a referral to a larger Bench in such situations, but for expeditious disposal, remand to the High Court is deemed inappropriate.

The appellants failed to justify their entitlement to the claimed pay scales. The court traced the pay scales through various revisions applicable to government drivers. The determined pay scales were Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000, not the claimed Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000.

The court reiterated that Article 14 cannot be invoked to claim a benefit unlawfully, emphasizing positive equality. The jurisdiction of a higher court cannot be based on a wrong order from a lower forum.

The appellants are not entitled to the claimed pay scales solely based on earlier court decisions. They are only entitled to the pay scales of Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 as per G.O. Ms. No. 162.

Regarding another set of civil appeals, the drivers concerned, not entitled to promotional avenues, are directed to receive benefits under Schedule II of the 1998 Rules at Rs. 3200-4900, Rs. 4000-6000, and Rs. 4300-6000.

Facts:

The case originated from the cancellation of 'S's promotion to Assistant Accountant, resulting in the termination of the appellant's appointment as Junior Accounts Clerk. Legal battles ensued through writ petitions filed by both 'S' and the appellant.

Issues:

The validity of the appellant's appointment, the consequences of the cancellation of 'S's promotion, and the impact of the dismissal of 'S's writ petition on the appellant's right to continue in the Junior Accounts Clerk position.

Held:

The appellant's appointment, made by a Selection Committee following procedures outlined in the 1985 rules, was deemed valid. No challenges were raised by candidates or the appointing authority.

The dismissal of the appellant's writ petition on 04.12.1992 did not affect his right to continue, as it occurred without knowledge of the stay order on the cancellation of 'S's promotion. The order became inoperative due to the interim order in the appellant's favor.

The letter dated 01.01.1993 was not a re-appointment but a reinstatement, extending the appellant's tenure in line with the interim order and previous appointment. The Education Authorities recognized this continuity.

The dismissal of 'S's writ petition on 15.09.2001 as infructuous, due to efflux of time without determining any issues, did not terminate the appellant's right to the Junior Accounts Clerk position. 'S' continued in his promotional role until retirement.

Facts:

Dispute over two bank guarantees provided by the appellant bank in favor of the 1st respondent-plaintiff, related to the supply of plant and equipment by the 2nd respondent (defendant no. 2).

Appellant Bank claimed that the invocation of bank guarantees was not in accordance with their terms and, therefore, not liable to make payment.

Issues:

Whether the invocation of the bank guarantees was in accordance with their terms?

Could the appellant Bank dispute the invocation once the demand was made in compliance with the bank guarantees?

Held:

The bank guarantee is an independent contract, and the bank is obliged to honor it as long as it is unconditional and irrevocable.

Dispute between the beneficiary and the party at whose instance the bank gave the guarantee is immaterial.

Exceptions to interference by the Court: fraud, irretrievable injustice, or special equities.

Once demand is made in compliance with bank guarantees, the bank is obligated to pay unless falling within exceptions.

The appellant Bank's defense did not fall within the exceptions; hence, the Court should not interfere with invocation or encashment of the bank guarantee.

The appeal was dismissed.

FACTS:

The Appellant holds an F.L.-1 License for wholesale vending of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL).

Application filed by the Appellant to shift the licensed Liquor Shop from Mahe to Karaikal under Rules 163 and 209 of the Puducherry Excise Rules.

Objection filed by Respondent No. 1 opposing the shifting, citing previous judgments and public interest concerns.

Various legal proceedings, including writ petitions, were initiated in the Madras High Court challenging the permission granted for shifting.

ISSUES:

Whether the expression 'from one place to another' in Rule 209 of the Excise Rules restricts the shifting of a liquor shop within a particular local area or allows inter-region shifting within the Union Territory of Puducherry.

Interpretation of the term 'place' in the context of the Excise Act and Rules.

Compliance with statutory conditions and the legality of the granted permission to shift.

HELD:

The expression 'from one place to another' in Rule 209 is not restrictive, allowing the Licensing Authority to grant permission for inter-region shifting within the Union Territory of Puducherry, subject to specified conditions.( Para 20)

Interpreting the Act as a whole, a restrictive meaning to Rule 209 would be contrary to the legislative intent, especially considering the unique demography of Puducherry comprising four unconnected regions.( Para 21)

The Excise Act and Rules distinguish between 'local area' and 'place,' indicating that the intention was not to confine the shifting of a liquor shop to a specific locality. No express prohibition for inter-region shifting is found in Rule 209.( Para 22)

Previous approvals for shifting liquor shops from one region to another were cited, supporting the view that such inter-region shifting was permissible.( Para 23)

The Court accepted the State's submission that the Licensing Authority thoroughly assessed the pros and cons, seeking input from relevant authorities, before granting permission for inter-region shifting.( Para 24)

Permission to shift the Appellant's licensed premises from Mahe to Karaikal was granted legally and validly by the Licensing Authority, complying with all conditions.( Para 25)

The Court allowed the Civil Appeals, setting aside the Madras High Court's order that quashed the permission to shift the licensed shop. The Court found no prohibition in the Excise Act or Rules for inter-region shifting.( Para 27)

REFERRED CASES:

K. Murali vs. Commissioner (Excise)-cum-Secretary in W.P. (Civil) No. 39661/2002

Tamil Nadu vs. Balu, (2017) 2 SCC 281 : AIR 2017 SC 262 : 2017 (1) SCJ 586

Facts:

The respondent was granted a lease of a plot in 1981.

The State government formulated a scheme in 2003 for the conversion of residential leasehold plots to freehold.

The respondent applied for conversion in 2003, but issues arose due to alleged encroachment on government land.

Various communications and inspections took place over the years, addressing the encroachment concerns.

The State eventually granted permission for conversion in 2014, conditional on a specified payment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was correct in directing the State to recompute the conversion charges based on the rate applicable in 2003.

The relevance of encroachment on government land in the conversion process.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court was in error in directing the State to recompute the conversion charges based on the rate applicable in 2003. The Court emphasized that the application for conversion must comply with the governing provisions of the policy set by the State government, and compliance is necessary for the right to claim conversion. The respondent was directed to pay the conversion charges on the date when a final decision was taken, considering the absence of encroachment.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from a railway electrification contract. The appointment of an arbitrator becomes a contentious issue, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

The appropriate procedure for appointing an arbitrator as per the modified Clause 64 of the General Conditions of Contract and the relevance of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The modified Clause 64(3)(a)(i) applies when the total value of claims does not exceed one crore rupees, necessitating the appointment of a sole arbitrator, as specified in the Railway contract.

Clause 64(3)(a)(ii) deals with cases exceeding the specified value, outlining the procedure for appointing an arbitrator from a panel of three retired railway officers.

The court emphasizes that the High Court erred in appointing an independent sole arbitrator, deviating from the agreed-upon clauses in the General Conditions of Contract.

The respondent's request for a sole arbitrator contradicts the contract terms, which mandate the appointment of a panel of three arbitrators for disputes exceeding the specified value.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the High Court's appointment of an independent sole arbitrator is set aside. The court directs adherence to the procedure outlined in Clause 64(3)(b) of the General Conditions of Contract for the appointment of three arbitrators.

Facts:

The Chandigarh Housing Board (CHB) invited bids for a project, awarded it to M/S. Parasvanath Developers Pvt. Ltd.

Disputes arose regarding the construction timeline, leading to a complaint by a flat buyer.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission) directed CHB and the Developer to pay compensation to the buyer.

Issues:

Whether the National Commission erred in fixing liability on CHB for mental harassment and litigation costs.

Whether the increase in the interest rate from 9% to 10% was justified.

Held:

The Court upheld the National Commission's order on the division of liability between CHB and the Developer in a 70:30 ratio.

The Court found that Clause 9(c) of the Tripartite Agreement (compensation clause) did not apply to the case as conditions under Clause 9(a) were not fulfilled.

The Court affirmed the National Commission's decision on mental harassment and litigation costs, stating they were not covered under Clause 9(c) and upheld the 70:30 split.

The increase in the interest rate from 9% to 10% was upheld by the Court as within the National Commission's discretionary power.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the National Commission's order on liability division, rejecting the argument of the inapplicability of Clause 9(c) and affirming the interest rate increase.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a clause in the advertisement for the appointment of Medical Officers, mandating that only work experience in State Government hospitals would be considered for granting marks for 'Work Experience.' The appellant's work experience in an Army Hospital was not initially considered.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term 'Government hospital' in Bihar Health Service Rules.

Challenge to the selection process and the principle of estoppel.

Applicability of constitutional values in interpreting rules.

Held:

1. Estoppel: The principle of estoppel was discussed, emphasizing that it prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after failing in it. However, it was differentiated in cases where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences. The appellant did not challenge the selection procedure but focused on the interpretation of 'work experience,' which the court deemed valid for consideration. Para 17-20

2. Interpretation of Statutes: The court emphasized the need for literal interpretation where the text is unambiguous but advocated for a purposive interpretation when there is ambiguity. It highlighted the importance of considering constitutional values and promoting equal opportunities. Para 21-29

3. Definition of 'Government Hospital': The term 'Government hospital' was analyzed, rejecting a strict application of Rule 2(a) and adopting an expansive interpretation. The court held that the experience gained in any hospital run by the State Government or its instrumentalities, Central Government, Municipalities, and Panchayati Raj Institutions within the territory of Bihar should be considered. Para 30-36

4. Held and Decision: Rules 5 and 6(iii) were construed to include the experience gained by a doctor in any hospital run by the Bihar Government or its instrumentalities, as well as any other non-private hospital within the territory of Bihar. The respondents were directed to rework the merit list accordingly. Para 37