FACTS:

Appellant (Developer) and Respondent (Landowners) entered into an Agreement of Sale dated 17.11.2017 for agricultural land.

Sale consideration fixed at Rs. 46,00,000/- per acre.

Disputes arose over payment of the balance consideration for the land admeasuring 17 acres 31½ guntas ("suit property").

Appellant filed Suit for Specific Performance before Trial Court.

Interim Orders passed in I.A. No. 766/2018 and I.A. No. 767/2018 for Temporary Injunctions.

ISSUES:

Possession of the suit property - disputed facts on whether it was handed over to the Appellant.

Payment of part consideration - conflicting claims on the amount paid by the Appellant.

HELD:

The Court affirmed the High Court's decision, holding that the Orders dated 14.08.2019 do not warrant interference. The Temporary Injunction restraining the Respondents from interfering with the possession of the Appellant was vacated. However, the High Court had already granted a Temporary Injunction against alienation or creating third-party rights in the suit property.

Facts:

Marriage solemnized in 2000, parties engaged in legal battles for almost two decades.

Appellant alleges cruelty, abandonment, and mental torture by the respondent.

Respondent claims efforts for immigration, accuses appellant of abandonment, physical assault, and extra-marital affairs.

Various legal proceedings initiated by both families.

Issues:

Cruelty as a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia).

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage not recognized as a ground under the current divorce law.

Examination of the High Court's reversal of the trial court's decree of divorce.

Held:

The marriage found to be emotionally dead, beyond salvage, and irretrievably broken.

Recognition of the futility of continuing a failed marriage only on paper.

Exercise of powers under Article 142 to grant divorce.

The insistence of the respondent to stay together seen as an attempt to frustrate the divorce decree.

Both parties observed to be bitter and cynical about the relationship, no willingness to live together.

The judgment refers to the absence of legislation on irretrievable breakdown but acknowledges judicial precedents exercising powers under Article 142.

Maintenance of Rs. 7,500 per month ordered to be continued for the respondent.

Hope expressed that the end of legal proceedings would allow the parties to move on separately.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a clause in the advertisement for the appointment of Medical Officers, mandating that only work experience in State Government hospitals would be considered for granting marks for 'Work Experience.' The appellant's work experience in an Army Hospital was not initially considered.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term 'Government hospital' in Bihar Health Service Rules.

Challenge to the selection process and the principle of estoppel.

Applicability of constitutional values in interpreting rules.

Held:

1. Estoppel: The principle of estoppel was discussed, emphasizing that it prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after failing in it. However, it was differentiated in cases where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences. The appellant did not challenge the selection procedure but focused on the interpretation of 'work experience,' which the court deemed valid for consideration. Para 17-20

2. Interpretation of Statutes: The court emphasized the need for literal interpretation where the text is unambiguous but advocated for a purposive interpretation when there is ambiguity. It highlighted the importance of considering constitutional values and promoting equal opportunities. Para 21-29

3. Definition of 'Government Hospital': The term 'Government hospital' was analyzed, rejecting a strict application of Rule 2(a) and adopting an expansive interpretation. The court held that the experience gained in any hospital run by the State Government or its instrumentalities, Central Government, Municipalities, and Panchayati Raj Institutions within the territory of Bihar should be considered. Para 30-36

4. Held and Decision: Rules 5 and 6(iii) were construed to include the experience gained by a doctor in any hospital run by the Bihar Government or its instrumentalities, as well as any other non-private hospital within the territory of Bihar. The respondents were directed to rework the merit list accordingly. Para 37

Facts:

The appellant, Manju, was accused of murdering her newborn baby girl through strangulation. The prosecution alleged that the act occurred in the maternity ward of Lady Hardinge Medical College Hospital. The post-mortem report indicated the cause of death as asphyxia due to ante-mortem strangulation.

Issues:

Establishing a complete chain of circumstances based on circumstantial evidence to warrant the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC.

Held:

The court emphasized that the conviction was solely based on circumstantial evidence. The testimonies of staff nurses (PW-8 and PW-9) were crucial, stating that the baby girl was handed over to the mother around 4:30 p.m. and found dead by 6:30 p.m.( Paragraph 9)

The court analyzed the evidence, including the post-mortem report, and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish a motive for the appellant to commit the alleged murder. It highlighted the lack of concrete evidence and the unnatural aspect of the appellant killing her own child.( Paragraph 10)

The court held that, considering the totality of the evidence, it was not safe to convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The benefit of doubt was extended, leading to the acquittal of the appellant.( Paragraph 11)

Facts:

Plaintiff no.1, M/s Genentech Inc., claimed to be the innovators of the monoclonal antibody drug Trastuzumab, marketed in India by plaintiff no.2 under the brand names HERCEPTIN, HERCLON, and BICELTIS. The appellants sought to restrain respondent No.3, Reliance Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd., from launching the biosimilar version of their drug. The suit challenged the approval granted by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI) to Reliance. The appellants' patent for the drug had lapsed, but they contested the biosimilarity of Reliance's product, alleging non-compliance with regulatory norms.

Issues:

Whether respondent No.3 complied with applicable laws in launching the biosimilar drug?

Is the appellants' suit an abuse of process, filed to stifle competition?

Should the conditions imposed on Reliance's product by the learned Single Judge be upheld?

Held:

The Division Bench set aside the learned Single Judge's order, allowing Reliance to market their product without biosimilarity claims. The Court acknowledged DCGI approval but doubted proper testing. The Division Bench erred by not considering analogous appeals and interim applications as directed by the Supreme Court. The interim order from the Single Judge, imposing conditions, was reinstated, and the High Court was urged to expedite the final decision on the suit within 12 months.

Facts:

The writ petition filed by the University of Delhi, challenging the change in land use for the Delhi Metro Rail project, was dismissed on grounds of delay and laches. The Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) filed after a delay of 916 days was also dismissed by the Division Bench.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the writ petition and LPA could be condoned, considering the explanation provided by the appellant.

Held:

The court emphasized a liberal approach in matters of condonation of delay, irrespective of the status of the party. However, condonation should not be automatic, and the accrued rights of the opposite party must be considered.

The delay in filing the LPA was 916 days, and condonation could only be considered with a reasonable explanation. The reasons provided, including the non-availability of the Vice-Chancellor and the decision-making process of the Executive Council, were deemed insufficient.

The court found the appellant's explanation for the inordinate delay unconvincing, especially when the Vice-Chancellor, who was involved in the writ petition, was available for a sufficient period after its dismissal.

Approval from the Executive Council was obtained in 2017, yet the appeal was filed in 2018, indicating a casual approach without a proper explanation for the delay.

The appellant was aware of the land's conversion to residential use in 2005, and despite filing the writ petition belatedly, no steps were taken to file the appeal for 916 days after its disposal.

The cumulative effect of delay and laches could not be ignored, and the contention of public interest did not justify the lackadaisical approach in prosecuting the matter before the court.

Condoning the delay would be contrary to public interest, considering the manner in which the respondent, Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), had proceeded, utilizing funds for public transport projects.

The Single Judge and Division Bench were justified in holding the writ petition and LPA were hit by delay and laches, and the decision did not warrant interference.

Facts:

The case involves recruitment for the post of Technician Grade-II in Uttar Pradesh. The qualification requirement initially included a CCC certificate issued by DOEACC and was later amended to include CCC certificate or its equivalent computer qualification.

Issues:

Validity of qualifications and equivalence of CCC certificate.

Scrutiny process for verifying candidates' computer qualifications.

Deletion of names from the select list.

Held:

The CCC certificate is a well-known certificate issued under the Government of India, and there is no evidence of it being granted by any other body. The CCC certificate mentioned in the advertisement refers to CCC certificate issued by DOEACC/NIELIT.( Para 42)

The advertisement did not permit candidates to self-certify or declare equivalence of their computer qualification to CCC. Scrutiny of qualification is the responsibility of the recruiting agency/employer.( Para 52)

In the absence of guidelines or criteria for equivalence, the recruitment process without scrutiny of candidates' qualifications is an abdication of duty by the Corporation and the Commission.( Para 60)

The Division Bench erroneously restored the select list without considering cases where deletions were upheld by an earlier Division Bench.( Para 65)

Impleadment of every candidate is unnecessary when the challenge is based on an arbitrary or illegal process. Few selected candidates were impleaded in the writ petitions.( Para 75)

Facts:

The appellant, accused No. 3, sought exemption from personal appearance before the Trial Court due to business commitments and the inconvenience of traveling from Delhi to Hyderabad every Friday. The application under Section 205 Cr.P.C. was opposed by the CBI.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's grounds for dispensation with personal appearance were valid, considering the seriousness of the charges.

Held:

The Court, referring to Bhaskar Industries Ltd. case, allowed the appeal, quashing the High Court and Trial Court orders. The appellant was granted exemption with conditions:

An undertaking that the appellant won't dispute his identity, his counsel will appear on each hearing, no objection to evidence recording in his absence, and no adjournments requested.

The appellant to appear for framing charges and when the Trial Court insists on his presence.

Failure of counsel to appear or adjournment requests may lead to the Trial Court exercising powers under Section 205(2) Cr.P.C.

FACTS:

The minor daughter was born on 21.08.2007 and was over 12 years old.

The father filed a Guardianship Petition, seeking custody, citing the mother's Paranoid Schizophrenia and cruelty towards the child.

The mother resisted, accusing the father of sexual abuse, making it unsafe for the child to be in his custody.

Various counsellors' reports indicated the child's comfort with the father, and the mother's video clippings did not support her allegations.

ISSUES:

Custody determination based on the welfare and well-being of the child.

Validity of the allegations of sexual abuse by the mother against the father.

HELD:

The Court, considering parens patriae jurisdiction, emphasized the welfare of the child. After individual interviews, the minor girl, over 12 years old, expressed a definite desire to reside with her father. The Court affirmed the Family Court's Order granting custody to the father and specified visitation rights for the mother.

In Nil Ratan Kundu & Anr. vs. Abhijit Kundu (2008) 9 SCC 413, the Court established that while exercising parens patriae jurisdiction, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. The Court is not bound by statutes, rules of evidence, procedure, or precedent.

The Order is prima facie in nature and made at an intermediate stage of the proceedings.

This Special Leave Petition is disposed of accordingly.

Referred C:ases

Nil Ratan Kundu & Anr. vs. Abhijit Kundu (2008) 9 SCC 413 : 2008 (11) SCALE 437