Facts:

The case revolves around the elections conducted by the State Bar Council of M.P. On June 29, 2014, a meeting was held where a Chairman was elected. Subsequently, an election was conducted to choose the representative member of the State Bar Council for the Bar Council of India ('BCI'). However, objections were raised regarding the validity of these elections. Special meetings were convened on July 16, 2014, and July 19, 2014, to address the disputes arising from the election process. On August 2, 2014, another election was held, resulting in Pratap Mehta ('PM') being declared as the representative member of the BCI.

Issues:

The procedural compliance of the elections conducted by the State Bar Council, specifically regarding the issuance of notice and agenda as required by the Bar Council of India Rules.

Held:

The court analyzed Rule 7 of the Bar Council of India Rules, which stipulates the requirement for notice and agenda to be issued by the Secretary of the State Bar Council for the election of a member to the Bar Council of India. The court observed that the notices for the special meetings held on July 16, 2014, and July 19, 2014, did not contain agendas for fresh elections. It was noted that the agenda issued for the meeting on June 29, 2014, did not cover the subsequent reconvened meeting where further elections were conducted. Consequently, the elections held on June 29, 2014, and August 2, 2014, were deemed invalid due to non-compliance with the statutory requirements.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the decision to conduct a fresh election for the representative member of the State Bar Council in the Bar Council of India. It emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory requirements and proper procedural norms in conducting elections within the legal framework.

Facts:

Mallikarjuna, an employee of North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation, died while on duty due to a heart attack.

His wife, Sujatha, filed a claim petition seeking compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation awarded compensation to Sujatha, which the employer appealed against in the High Court and later in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the appeal involved substantial questions of law.

Grant of interest on the awarded amount and the applicable date for such interest.

Held and Decision:

The Court held that the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law and upheld the Commissioner's order. It clarified that findings of fact by the lower courts are binding unless found to be perverse or arbitrary. The Court modified the Commissioner's order regarding the grant of interest, stating that it accrues from the date of the accident, not the adjudication of the claim.

Therefore, interest was awarded to Sujatha from the date of the accident, i.e., 06.04.1999. The Court directed the Commissioner to calculate the total amount payable by the appellant to Sujatha, including the awarded sum and interest, and instructed the appellant to deposit the same within one month for payment to Sujatha. The appeal stands accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The appellant, Management of Sri Ramnarayan Mills Ltd., sought permission to add "break in service" as a new ground for punishment in Clause 16 of the Chapter of Punishment in Certified Standing Orders.

The appellant's application was initially granted by the Joint Commissioner of Labour, but it was challenged by the Workers' Union and subsequently rejected by the Labour Court, the Single Judge, and the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras.

Issues:

Whether the Courts below were justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant to add "break in service" as a ground for punishment in Certified Standing Orders.

Held:

The Division Bench rightly concluded that "break in service" cannot be allowed as a ground for punishment in Certified Standing Orders for several reasons.

Firstly, the existing grounds specified in Clause 16 were deemed sufficient to address employee misconduct.

Secondly, permitting "break in service" as a ground for punishment could potentially be misused by employers to the detriment of employees' interests.

Thirdly, such a provision could conflict with the Payment of Gratuity Act, impacting employees' entitlement to gratuity.

Fourthly, allowing "break in service" as a ground for punishment would defeat the very object of the Payment of Gratuity Act, which is a beneficial legislation enacted for the benefit of employees.

Therefore, the Division Bench upheld the decision to reject the appellant's application, finding no merit in the appeal.

Facts:

The Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association (HPCA) was granted lease of land for the construction of a cricket stadium, along with additional land for a club house and a hotel for commercial purposes.

Two FIRs were filed against the appellants (HPCA and others) alleging illegal grant of land lease, invoking various sections of the IPC, Prevention of Corruption Act, and Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act.

Issues:

Whether there exists sufficient grounds to quash the FIRs against the appellants, considering the allegations of illegal land lease and construction activities.

Held:

The court noted that the lease for the cricket stadium was granted at a nominal rental as per the Himachal Pradesh Lease Rules, 1993, which was not contrary to law. The lease for commercial activities was also done in accordance with Lease Rules, 2011.

The court observed that while several senior government officials involved in the land lease were not charged or prosecuted, junior officers were made scapegoats. This indicated bias in the prosecution and raised doubts about the fairness of the case.

The court emphasized that there was no criminal act on the part of the appellants, especially considering that the officers involved in the decision-making process were not prosecuted. The conversion of the cricket association into a non-profit company was done as per the mandate of the BCCI.

The court criticized the High Court for dismissing the petition without thorough examination, emphasizing the need for caution in exercising judicial powers under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Based on the above analysis, the Supreme Court quashed the FIRs against the appellants, concluding that no criminal case was made out against them.

Facts:

The appellant, Babasaheb Maruti Kamble, was convicted for offenses under Sections 302, 376(2)(f), and 342 of the Indian Penal Code.

He was awarded the death penalty for the offense under Section 302 by the trial court, which was confirmed by the High Court.

The appellant filed a review petition seeking a review of the order dismissing the special leave petition in limine.

Issues:

Whether special leave petitions challenging death sentences should be dismissed without providing reasons.

The necessity of affording a hearing to the accused on the question of sentencing, particularly in cases involving the death penalty.

The procedural fairness and the thorough examination of cases involving capital punishment.

Held:

The Court acknowledges the importance of providing reasons when dismissing special leave petitions, especially in cases involving death sentences.

It emphasizes the need for an independent examination by the Supreme Court in cases where death sentences are awarded, unbound by the findings of the lower courts.

The Court reiterates the significance of affording a hearing to the accused on the question of sentencing, considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

It holds that special leave petitions challenging death sentences should not be dismissed without providing reasons, at least concerning the death penalty.

The Court allows the review petition and recalls the order dismissing the special leave petition in limine, restoring the special leave petition to its original number for further consideration.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act regarding the maintainability of an application by a borrower before the actual possession of secured assets is taken by banks/financial institutions.

Issues:

Whether an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act, initiated by a borrower, is maintainable before physical or actual possession of secured assets is taken by banks/financial institutions .

Held:

The Court held that the scheme of Section 13(4) read with Rule 8(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, allows for the borrower to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal at the stage of the possession notice referred to in Rules 8(1) and 8(2).

Possession under Section 13(4)(a) includes both constructive possession (as in Rules 8(1) and 8(2)) and physical possession (as in Rule 8(3)). Section 17(3) empowers the Debts Recovery Tribunal to provide reliefs, including restoration of possession. The Act provides recourse to borrowers against wrongful actions of secured creditors.

The Act aims to enable secured creditors to recover debts outside the court process, subject to statutory conditions. Borrowers can approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal if secured creditors fail to adhere to the Act's provisions.

Appendix IV-A recognizes that Rules 8(1) and 8(2) refer to constructive possession, while Rule 8(3) refers to physical possession. Borrowers can approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal at the stage of the possession notice as per Rules 8(1) and 8(2) .

Decision: The Court held that an application under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act is maintainable by a borrower before the actual possession of secured assets is taken by banks/financial institutions. This is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the relevant Rules. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

Facts:

Mr. Sanjay Jain, the appellant, had joined Air India Ltd. in 1992 and resigned in 2006 after completing his mandatory five-year service period.

Dispute arose when Air India did not accept his resignation, claiming it was not effective.

Mr. Jain filed a writ petition in the High Court, seeking payment of pending dues.

Issues:

Whether Mr. Jain's resignation became effective upon completion of the notice period, as per Standing Orders.

Whether acceptance of resignation by Air India was necessary.

Held:

The court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, particularly Standing Orders 17 and 18 framed by Air India. The court held that:

"It is right of a workman to serve and resign also by serving notice of 30 days. The bond to serve was only for five years as stipulated in the order of his appointment.

"No disciplinary proceeding was pending or contemplated against an employee in the case when he resigned. The resignation became effective on the lapse of 30 days period.

"In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law and on consideration of the provisions contained in Standing Order 18 in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that appellant has rightly terminated the relationship by serving the requisite notice for resignation.

The court allowed Mr. Jain's appeal, quashed the High Court's judgment, and directed Air India to pay him the pending dues, including provident fund and gratuity, with applicable interest rates.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal against a judgment passed by the High Court affirming the appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC and other related offenses.

The incident took place on 03.01.1986, where the appellant, along with other accused individuals, was alleged to have been involved in the murder of the victim. The charges framed against the accused included Sections 302, 302/34, 323, and 323/34 IPC.

Issues:

The absence of a specific charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the appellant and whether this absence caused prejudice or failure of justice to him.

Held:

The Court held that the absence of a charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC did not vitiate the appellant's conviction unless it resulted in prejudice or failure of justice. The appellant's understanding of the gist of the charges against him was evident from his defense throughout the trial.

Despite the absence of a specific charge, the appellant was well-aware of the allegations and had a fair opportunity to defend himself.

Therefore, no prejudice or failure of justice was shown to have been occasioned. The Court relied on various precedents, including Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab, emphasizing that technicalities should not override the substance of justice. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, Jangir Singh, was accused of shooting and killing Jaswant Singh, a colleague in the Punjab Home Guard, during an altercation over a borrowed sum of money. Initially acquitted by the trial court, the High Court reversed the decision, leading to this appeal.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted legitimate self-defence or exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defence, leading to the death of the deceased.

Held:

The appellant's actions, while prompted by a perceived threat, exceeded the legitimate exercise of the right to self-defence, resulting in the death of the deceased. Therefore, the conviction under Section 302 IPC was set aside and converted to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, considering the excessive use of force.

Decision: The appeal stands disposed of with the modified conviction, and the appellant is directed to be released immediately if not required in any other case.