Facts:

The appellant, a State Cooperative body, serves as the apex body of Cooperative Banks in Chhattisgarh. The first respondent is a District Central Cooperative Bank. The dispute centers around the appointment of the CEO of the first respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the appellant had no role in CEO appointments, and such power lay with the Registrar only after the District Central Cooperative Bank's failure to make the appointment within a specified period.

Issues:

Whether the appellant had the authority to appoint the CEO of the first respondent?

Whether the amendments brought about by the 2016 Amending Act altered the provisions of CEO appointments for Cooperative Banks?

How should the conflict between the provisions of Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) be resolved?

Held:

Section 54 deals with the appointment of Managers, Secretaries, and officers of societies. Sub-section (1) empowers societies to make appointments based on qualifications. Sub-section (2) requires Apex and Central Societies to maintain a cadre of officers as directed by the State Government.

Section 49-E pertains to CEO appointments under specific circumstances. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 49-E override contrary provisions and apply when the State Government has contributed to share capital, given loans, etc. CEO appointments are covered under this provision.

Central Societies under Section 49-E(2) appoint CEOs from the cadre if created under Section 54.

Section 54(3) empowers the State Government to specify societies for cadre officers' appointment by Apex or Central Societies. The notified class must appoint cadre officers as deputed.

The 2016 Amending Act inserted clauses (a) and (b) into Section 54(3), specifying CEO eligibility and the Registrar's appointment authority. Clauses (a) and (b) apply solely to Cooperative Banks, and their introduction does not negate Section 49-E.

Section 49-E(2) stipulates CEO appointment from cadre officers of Section 54 if applicable.

Notification under Section 54(3) operates regulatory control over Central Societies under Section 49-E(2), specifying CEO appointment sources.

Courts must harmonize conflicting provisions; both Section 49-E(2) and Section 54(3) must be upheld. Section 54(3) notifications grant State Government regulatory power.

The State Government can specify Cooperative Banks' CEO appointments from Apex Society's cadre. Notified Apex Society provides a panel; RBI eligibility criteria apply. CEO appointment from cadre is mandatory under Section 49-E(2).

First respondent is a Central Society under Section 49-E(2). Notification obligates Cooperative Banks to appoint CEOs from cadre created by State Cooperative Bank. The appointment of CEO by the appellant was ratified by the Registrar and BoD, aligning with Section 54(3).

Facts:

The case involves a writ petition challenging the detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The detention orders were made by a specially empowered officer. The detenues, represented by their counsel, contended that their right to representation against the detention orders had been violated.

Issues:

Whether the detenues had the right to make representations against the detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

Whether the Detaining Authority had the obligation to consider the representation independently or wait for the Advisory Board's report.

Whether the delay in considering the representation by the Detaining Authority violated the detenues' constitutional rights.

Held:

Majority Opinion (Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.):

The detenues have the right to make representations against detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. This right is in addition to the right to make representations to the State Government and the Central Government (Para 12).

The Detaining Authority is obliged to consider the representations without waiting for the opinion of the Central Advisory Board. The specially empowered officer has no statutory role to play at the stage when the Advisory Board's report is received. The report is meant for the appropriate Government's consumption, and confidentiality is mandated (Para 22-23).

In cases where the representation is received before or after the Advisory Board's reference, the Detaining Authority must consider the representation promptly. Inaction on the Detaining Authority's part to consider the representation causes prejudice to the detenues and violates their constitutional rights (Para 26-28).

Dissenting Opinion (Hemant Gupta, J.):

The Detaining Authority, whether the Central Government, State Government, or a specially empowered officer, has the jurisdiction to consider representations against detention orders independently of the Advisory Board's recommendation (Para 3).

The consideration for revocation of a detention order is distinct from the Advisory Board's assessment of sufficient cause for detention. The Detaining Authority should prudently defer the decision on the representation while the matter is being reviewed by the Advisory Board (Para 23).

FACTS:

The appellants had been granted compassionate appointments, but their appointments were canceled upon the discovery that they were made in contravention of the Karnataka Civil Services (Appointment on Compassionate Grounds) Rules, 1996, as amended from 01.04.1999. The amendments introduced a stipulation that a minor dependent of a deceased government employee must apply within one year from the date of death and must have attained the age of eighteen on the day of application. Prior to the amendment, a minor could apply within one year of attaining majority.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellants' appointments were valid under the unamended provisions of Rule 5.

Whether the amended provisions of Rule 5 were applicable to the appellants' cases.

Whether the appellants' claims could be considered under the transitory provision of Rule 9(3).

Whether the norms prevailing on the date of consideration or on the date of the government employee's death should apply to compassionate appointments.

Whether the appellants were entitled to continuation of their appointments.

HELD:

The Court considered the contentions of the parties and the relevant legal principles in making its decision. The Court held:

The appellants' claims could not be considered under the unamended provisions of Rule 5 as they applied for compassionate appointments well beyond one year from the date of their respective parents' deaths, and the amended provisions had become operational.

The norms applicable on the date of consideration of the application should be the basis for compassionate appointment, and a dependent cannot demand consideration based on the norms prevailing on the date of the government employee's death.

The transitory provision of Rule 9(3) did not cover the appellants' cases as their applications were filed in contravention of Rule 5 as amended in 1999.

Compassionate appointment is a concession and not a right, and the criteria laid down in the rules must be satisfied by all aspirants.

The appellants were ineligible for compassionate appointment under the amended provisions of Rule 5, and their appointments were justifiably canceled.

Facts:

The case revolved around a dispute between New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. The central issue concerned the interpretation of Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which dealt with the time frame for the opposite party to file responses to complaints. The dispute also involved considering whether this provision was mandatory or directory.

Issues:

Whether the District Forum has the authority to extend the time for filing a response to a complaint beyond the stipulated period.

Whether the provision in Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act is mandatory or directory.

What is the starting point of the limitation period of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act?

Held:

The court's analysis of Section 13(2)(a) established that the copy of the complaint sent to the opposite party should include a direction to respond within 30 days, extendable by the District Forum for up to 15 days. The court ruled that this provision does not grant the District Forum the power to extend the response time beyond the total of 45 days (30 days + 15 days). (Para 8-17)

The court determined that the provision in Section 13(2)(a) is mandatory, not directory. The legislature's intent was clear, and the provision's violation could lead to consequences as laid out in Section 13(2)(b)(ii). The court emphasized that the objective of the Consumer Protection Act was to achieve speedy resolution of consumer disputes. (Para 20-21)

The court clarified that the limitation period of 30 days under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act starts from the date of receipt of the notice accompanied by a copy of the complaint by the opposite party. Mere receipt of the notice without the complaint is insufficient to trigger the limitation period. (Para 37-40)

Facts:

The appellant's husband owned a vehicle insured by the respondent. The vehicle was involved in an accident, leading to the death of the appellant's husband and daughter. The respondent rejected the claim, asserting that the driver did not possess a valid driving license. The appellant filed consumer complaints seeking compensation.

Issues:

Whether the insurance company's liability is absolved due to the driver's invalid/fake driving license.

What level of care/diligence is expected of the employer/insured when hiring a driver with a driving license.

Held:

The court referred to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, specifically Section 149(2)(a)(ii), which addresses the conditions of driving licenses. The court discussed the extent of care an employer should exercise when hiring a driver, and whether the insurance company can avoid liability due to the driver's invalid license.

The court cited the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 and the case of Pepsu RTC vs. National Insurance Co., (2013) 10 SCC 217, emphasizing that the insurer cannot avoid liability merely on the ground of the driver's invalid license. The insurer must prove negligence or failure on the part of the insured to fulfill policy conditions regarding driver competence.

The court ruled that while hiring a driver, the employer must verify the driver's license and assess their competence. If the driver presents a seemingly genuine license, the employer need not further investigate its authenticity unless there's reason to doubt. The court deemed it unreasonable to place the onus on the insured to verify licenses with transport authorities across the country.

The court held that if the insurer proves that the insured was aware of the fake license but still allowed the person to drive, the insurer's liability ceases. In this case, the driver's license was purportedly issued by a licensing authority, but its authenticity couldn't be verified. The court found the insured had not been negligent and allowed the appeals, holding the insurer liable to indemnify the appellant.

REFERRED CASES:

National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran Singh & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 297 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 733

Pepsu RTC vs. National Insurance Co., (2013) 10 SCC 217

United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Lehru & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 338 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 641

Facts:

The appellant challenged the grant of moderation/grace marks to certain candidates appointed on March 30, 2009, in the context of filling up six posts in the Higher Judicial Service through direct recruitment. The appellant sought his own appointment as a District Judge. The High Court set aside the moderation marks, leading to the recasting of the select list. The appellant was ultimately appointed as a District Judge.

Issues:

The appellant's claim for notional seniority and whether he should be granted seniority from the date of appointment of other candidates who were appointed through the same selection process.

Held:

The appellant was entitled to be appointed along with other candidates. The appellant was excluded from the original appointment due to certain circumstances. As the select list was revised, the appellant was deemed to be part of the appointment along with other candidates.The actual date of the appellant's appointment was recognized as February 24, 2011. Although the appellant couldn't be treated as appointed on March 30, 2009, he was entitled to notional appointment from that earlier date and consequential seniority.( Para 36)

The delay in deciding the seniority claim by the High Court could not defeat the appellant's right to claim seniority from the date other candidates in the same selection process were appointed.( Para 41)

The interpretation of rules and quotas for appointments and seniority was discussed. The Full Bench judgment clarified that there is a quota for in-service candidates, contrary to the High Court's erroneous interpretation.( Para 43)

The argument that some candidates were granted selection grades earlier than the appellant did not confer better legal or equitable rights. Appointments made beyond the prescribed quota meant for appointment by transfer were not protected.( Para 44)

The appeals are allowed

Facts:

The plaintiffs (respondents) filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration of ownership over a property, survey entry No. 11/1 of a village, and the removal of the 'Forest department' name from the records. The State of Goa (defendants) opposed the claim, asserting that the property belonged to the Forest Department.

Issues:

Whether the recording of the plaintiffs' names alongside the Forest Department's in the survey entry was legally valid.

Whether the plaintiffs' failure to disclose the 1975 records correction proceedings in their suit affected their claim.

Whether the evidence presented by the State regarding the property's status as forest land was sufficient to support their counter-claim.

Held:

The Court observed that despite one of the plaintiffs withdrawing their claim in 1975, their names were recorded alongside the Forest Department's name, which was deemed illegal.

The plaintiffs' failure to disclose the relevant 1975 records correction proceedings in their suit was noted as a failure to justify the continuation of their claim.

The additional evidence presented by the State indicated that only the Forest Department's name was recorded regarding the property. The Court concluded that the counter-claim by the State was well-founded.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal by the State, directing the removal of the plaintiffs' names from the survey entry No. 11/1 of the village

Facts:

The case involves a dispute over the classification of a specific parcel of land described as 'Shamlat Patti Dhera & Khubi'. The appellant, Patram, argued that the land, though described as 'shamilat' land, was actually a patti owned by his ancestors for over a century. The land was not being utilized for common village purposes, and thus, according to him, it should not be categorized as 'shamilat deh' under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the land in question qualifies as 'shamilat deh' under the definition provided in Section 2(g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.

Held:

The court analyzed the definitions and provisions in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, particularly focusing on Section 2(g) which defines 'shamilat deh'. The court noted that terms like 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola' represent different divisions within a village based on caste, religion, occupation, etc. The court discussed the absence of a comma after the word 'shamilat' in a specific section and concluded that this was likely a typographical error. The court interpreted that 'shamilat deh' should be read along with 'taraf', 'patti', 'panna', and 'thola'. A land could only be considered 'shamilat deh' if it met one of these conditions. If the term 'shamilat' was missing from any of these descriptions, the land could not be categorized as 'shamilat deh'.

Based on the evidence presented, including historical records and the fact that the land was not utilized for the common benefit of the village community, the court held that the land in question did not qualify as 'shamilat deh' under the Act. As a result, the court allowed the appeal, setting aside previous judgments, and ordered that the appellant's name be entered in the ownership column with the entry 'shamlat patti'.

Facts:

The respondents exchanged land with a Scheduled Tribe member using a registered exchange deed. The exchange involved the respondents giving 4½ Muthi of land in return for 12 Nali of agricultural land. The Assistant Collector declared the exchange void under Section 161(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as it violated the provisions of the Act.

Issues:

Whether the exchange violated Section 161(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Whether the land in question is an "agricultural land" as defined in Section 3(14) of the Act.

Whether the restrictions on land transfer in Sections 157-B and 157-A apply to the case.

Whether the exchange could be upheld based on grounds of equity.

Held:

The exchange between the respondents and the Scheduled Tribe member was executed in violation of Section 157-B of the Act, which prohibits transfer of land from a Scheduled Tribe member to a person not belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. As per Section 166 of the Act, transfers in contravention of its provisions are void. Thus, the exchange was held void, and the land was deemed to be vested in the State Government. The absence of a declaration as stipulated in Sections 143 and 144 meant the land remains "agricultural land" as per Section 3(14), and the Act's provisions are applicable.

Section 161 of the Act deals with land exchange and requires prior permission from an Assistant Collector. This permission is mandatory for valid exchanges. In this case, no such permission was sought, making the exchange void. The language in Sections 157-B and 157-A indicates a clear prohibition on transferring land in any manner from a Scheduled Tribe member to another person.

The contention that prior permission under Section 161 is unnecessary is unfounded. The requirement for calculating rental value clearly implies that permission is a prerequisite for a valid exchange.

The respondents failed to explain the drastic difference in land size exchanged, raising suspicions about the exchange's genuineness. The exchange deed also lacked mutuality in mutation, undermining its validity.

The U.P. ZA & LR Act is a beneficial legislation to safeguard rural interests. The exchange deed dated 16.03.1994 being in contravention to the Act is void. No justification exists to consider respondents' requests based on their hotel operations or equity. The High Court's interpretation is contrary to the Act and constitutional empowerment provisions, thus unsustainable.