Facts:

The appellant, Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority, demanded betterment charges, building construction charges, etc., from the respondents, including Birla Super Bulk Terminal (now a unit of UltraTech Cement Ltd.), for land allotted by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) for the construction of a Bulk Cement Terminal. The respondents challenged this demand through a writ petition, arguing that as the land was allotted by the KIADB, they were not liable to pay development charges under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the Planning Authority under the KTCP Act has jurisdiction to levy betterment charges on development activities within industrial areas governed by the KIAD Act.

Whether there is any conflict between the provisions of the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act regarding the authority to regulate land use and development.

Held:

The Court examined the objects and scope of both the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act and found that they operate in different fields. The KIAD Act is focused on securing the establishment of industrial areas and promoting orderly development of industries, while the KTCP Act regulates planned growth of land use and development, including town planning schemes.

The levy of prescribed fees under Section 18 of the KTCP Act encompasses both changing land use and development of land or building.

The Planning Authority constituted under the KTCP Act is empowered to grant approval for development on land within its jurisdiction, including land acquired and allotted by the KIADB under the KIAD Act.

Both the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act must be harmoniously construed to give effect to their respective provisions, and there is no inconsistency or overlapping between them.

The High Court's findings regarding the applicability of the KTCP Act to industrial areas governed by the KIAD Act were contradictory, and the Planning Authority has the authority to levy betterment charges as per the law.

Decision: The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the respondents are directed to pay the demanded charges to the appellant authority with interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the demand, within the stipulated period.

Facts:

The case involves the selection process for Sub-Inspectors (Civil Police) and Platoon Commanders (Provincial Armed Constabulary or PAC) in Uttar Pradesh, with a total of 4010 posts advertised. Challenges were raised regarding the selection of certain candidates who used whitener or blade during the main examination. The final results were revised multiple times due to legal challenges.

Issues:

The eligibility of candidates who used whitener or blade during the main examination, the filling of vacant posts, and the adherence to selection criteria such as obtaining 50% or more marks in the written examination.

Held:

The court, considering various interventions and the presence of 607 vacant posts, directed that these posts be filled in the present selection itself as a one-time exception.

Additionally, it affirmed the correctness of the High Court's decision in Special Appeal No.416 of 2016.

Candidates must have obtained 50% or more marks in the main written examination to be eligible for selection, as per the court's directive.

Despite the discrepancy between the number of candidates called for group discussion (14256) and the notified vacancies (12030), the court found it inappropriate to eliminate the excess candidates from consideration. It directed the filling of the remaining 607 vacancies.

The court emphasized that the vacancies for candidates excluded due to the use of whitener or blade should be in addition to the total number of posts advertised (4010), resulting in a total selection of 4010+1022 candidates.

The court directed the State Government to make available 833 posts (607 + 226) in the present selection, strictly in order of merit and subject to fulfilling eligibility criteria.

The direction to fill up the 833 posts was specified as an addition to any previous directions issued.

Matters unrelated to the present selection, such as promotions for Head Constables or Constables to the post of Sub-Inspectors, were segregated for separate consideration.

Facts:

The appeals arose from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 6.2.2015, which dismissed writ appeals filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against the judgment of a learned Single Judge.

Employees M. Mangayarkarasi and M. Jayalakshmi were accused of admitting and sanctioning bills without proper verification, leading to misappropriation in the District Treasury at Salem.

The State Government issued orders of removal from service against them, challenged before the learned Single Judge.

The Single Judge substituted the punishment of removal with stoppage of increments for two years without cumulative effect.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's application of the principle of parity was justified in the disciplinary proceedings.

Whether the gravity of misconduct by the appellants was distinct and more serious compared to other employees.

Held:

The court establish that the Supreme Court found fault with the High Court's decision for several reasons:

The gravity of misconduct by the appellants was distinct and more serious compared to other employees, as evidenced by the amount involved and the extent of lack of verification.

The Division Bench erred in applying the principle of parity without recognizing the material distinction in the misconduct alleged against the appellants.

Judicial review in disciplinary matters should only interfere with the employer's discretion if the penalty is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved. In this case, the High Court substituted the penalty without proper justification.

Facts:

The respondent, Abhijit Singh Pawar, participated in the selection process for police posts in Madhya Pradesh in 2012.

He disclosed a pending criminal case against him involving charges under Sections 323, 325, 506, and 34 of the IPC.

A compromise was reached between the parties, and the charges were compounded under Section 320(2) of the CrPC.

Despite disclosure and the compromise, the respondent's candidature was rejected due to the importance of high moral conduct for police positions.

The respondent challenged the rejection in the High Court, which ruled in his favor, allowing his appointment based on merit but without back wages.

The State appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the respondent's candidature was justified despite the disclosure and subsequent compromise of the criminal case.

Whether the employer has the discretion to consider the suitability of candidates with criminal antecedents for police positions.

Held:

The Court upheld the rejection of the respondent's candidature, emphasizing the importance of maintaining integrity in the police force. It affirmed the employer's discretion to consider the suitability of candidates with criminal antecedents, even after disclosure and compromise of the case.

The decision was based on established principles outlined in relevant precedents such as Commissioner of Police, New Delhi v. Mehar Singh, Avtar Singh v. Union of India, and others. These precedents affirmed the employer's right to reject candidates with criminal antecedents if it is deemed necessary to maintain the integrity and credibility of the police force.

In conclusion, the appeal was allowed, and the decisions of the Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court were set aside. The respondent's writ petition was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The plaintiffs, residents of Dubai, filed a suit in the High Court of Madras as a derivative action on behalf of defendant No. 2, a Dubai-based company, regarding the ownership of shares in an Indian company held by defendant Nos. 3-7.

The plaintiffs claimed beneficial interest in the shares held by defendant No. 2, while defendant Nos. 3-7 contested this claim. The dispute primarily concerned affairs of the Dubai-based company, and the cause of action did not arise in India.

Issues:

Whether the High Court of Madras had jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiffs.

Whether the dispute between the parties warranted litigation in India or Dubai.

Whether the principles governing derivative actions and beneficial interests were applicable to the case.

Held:

The High Court rightly held that the mere existence of the registered office of an Indian company does not confer jurisdiction on Indian courts when the dispute primarily involves entities from other jurisdictions.

The dispute between the parties pertained to the affairs of the Dubai-based company, and the cause of action did not arise in India. Therefore, the High Court of Madras lacked jurisdiction.

The High Court correctly observed that the relief sought against the Indian company was consequential, and the main dispute needed resolution first, which would be more appropriately handled by a court in Dubai.

The court highlighted the principles governing derivative actions, emphasizing that they must have legal sanction and are not obliged to foreign entities. In this case, defendant No. 2 was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

The definition of "Beneficial interest" under the Trust Act, 1882 was discussed, indicating that the ownership vests with the registered owner but the beneficial owner may include a person acting as a trustee, legal representative, or agent.

The court reiterated that the issue of territorial jurisdiction over a suit initiated to protect beneficial interests could only be decided if such interests were amenable to such jurisdiction. Defendant No. 2 was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

Facts:

The Monitoring Committee appointed by the Supreme Court reported the breaking or tampering of a seal by Shri Manoj Tiwari, an elected Member of Parliament, on a property in Delhi. This action was considered a violation of the Court's orders and interference in the administration of justice.

Issues:

Whether Shri Manoj Tiwari's actions amounted to contempt of court and if the Monitoring Committee had any role in the sealing of the premises.

Held:

The court found that while the sealing of the premises was not directed by the Monitoring Committee, Shri Manoj Tiwari's involvement in breaking the seal was confirmed. His explanation of succumbing to pressure from a mob was deemed unacceptable, highlighting the importance of elected representatives upholding the rule of law.

The court decided not to take action against Shri Manoj Tiwari for his statements against the Monitoring Committee but strongly condemned the use of the court for political propaganda. The proceedings against Shri Manoj Tiwari were closed.

Facts:

The appellant, a medical officer, and the complainant, an assistant nurse, were involved in a relationship where the appellant allegedly promised to marry the complainant.

The complainant alleged that the appellant failed to fulfill his promise and subsequently married another woman.

A First Information Report (FIR) was filed against the appellant under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.

Issues:

Whether the allegations made by the complainant constitute offences under the relevant laws.

Whether the FIR and chargesheet against the appellant should be quashed.

Held:

We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained...

The FIR nowhere spells out any wrong committed by the appellant under Section 420 of the IPC or under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and quashing the FIR and chargesheet filed against the appellant.

Facts:

The appellant(s) challenged an order of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Matrimonial Appeal Nos. 737, 955, and 956 of 2015. Despite unsuccessful mediation attempts, the parties appeared before the Supreme Court, engaging in prolonged interactions. Eventually, a settlement was reached on monetary aspects, with minor disputes mediated by senior counsel Mr. V. Shekhar. The deed of settlement was presented and incorporated into the decree.

Issues:

The primary issue involved resolving the matrimonial dispute between Dr. Benoy Idicula Babu and Dr. Nisha Saira Benoy, including divorce by mutual consent and related matters.

Additionally, the court addressed the status of pending cases before various courts and the processing of a passport application for the minor child involved.

Held:

The court allowed the application under Section 10-A of the Divorce Act, granting divorce by mutual consent based on the settlement reached by the parties. It emphasized the conscious decision of the parties to part ways, eliminating the need for regular divorce proceedings. Furthermore, it ruled that the alimony paid by the husband to the wife should not be considered taxable income. The court directed the Passport Officer to process the mother's application for the minor child's passport, notwithstanding any pending litigation, and ordered the refund of a certain amount deposited with the Regional Passport Officer to the mother.

Various cases filed before different courts were disposed of, with pending proceedings quashed or dismissed, and all proceedings under the Indian Passport Act dropped. The court appreciated the efforts of Mr. V. Shekhar and counsels from both sides for their role in settling the dispute and acknowledged the cooperation of the parties involved. Pending applications were also disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The South Delhi Municipal Corporation (SDMC) challenged an order passed by the High Court of Delhi in favor of SMS AAMW Tollways Private Ltd under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The dispute arose from an agreement between SDMC and SMS AAMW regarding the collection of toll tax. An issue emerged concerning expenses incurred by SMS AAMW due to the dismantling of a toll plaza.

Issues:

Whether Clause 16.3 of the Agreement between SDMC and SMS AAMW constitutes an arbitration clause or merely provides for a departmental appeal.

Held:

In analyzing the clause, the Court determined that it did not constitute an arbitration clause but rather a departmental appeal. The Commissioner's role was administrative oversight, not that of an impartial adjudicator.

The Court referred to legal principles and precedents to support its interpretation. As Clause 16 did not contain a provision for reference to an arbitrator, the Court concluded that it did not constitute an arbitration clause.

Therefore, the Court set aside the High Court's order and allowed the appeal.