Facts:

Daffodills Pharmaceuticals Ltd., a pharmaceutical supplier, participated in a tender process initiated by the State of U.P. to supply pharmaceutical products to various hospitals. Despite winning the bid, the State, on the basis of a criminal case against the former director, Mr. Surender Chaudhary, issued an order directing a halt to local purchases from Daffodills.

Issues:

Legality of the State's decision to stop local purchases from Daffodills.

Violation of principles of natural justice in not providing Daffodills with an opportunity to be heard before the decision.

Held:

The court identified the impugned order as a debarring and preventing directive against Daffodills for an indefinite duration, surpassing the typical finite lifespan of blacklisting orders.( Paragraph 13)

Citing precedents, the Court emphasized the necessity of providing an opportunity of hearing before proposing drastic adverse actions like debarring or blacklisting.( Paragraph 14)

The Court criticized the State's assumption of complicity by Daffodills and stressed that unilateral action without giving an opportunity of hearing was a violation of principles of natural justice.( Paragraph 15)

The Court acknowledged the limited scope of judicial review in public contract matters but highlighted the flagrant violation of natural justice by the state's action.( Paragraph 16)

Considering the time elapsed since the impugned order, the Court quashed the directive and set aside the High Court's judgment in the overall interest of justice.( Paragraph 17)

Facts:

The Special Land Acquisition Officer issued notifications for acquiring land for the Hubli Ankola Broad Gauge Railway Line. The Land Acquisition Officer's initial award was contested by the appellant(s), leading to a Reference Court enhancing compensation. The High Court later reduced the compensation, citing the nature of the acquired land as 'dry land' and applying an annual depreciation of 15%.

Issues:

Validity of the High Court's decision reducing compensation.

Delay in filing the appeal by the present appellant(s).

Entitlement to interest during the period of delay.

Held:

The Court, relying on prior judgments, held that identically situated appellants should not be treated differently due to delays in filing appeals. It emphasized a pragmatic approach in compensation matters, condoning the delay in filing and restoring parity in compensation. The appellant(s) were entitled to the same compensation awarded by the Reference Court, but not to interest for the period of delay.

The appeal was allowed in part, setting aside the High Court's decision, restoring the Reference Court's award, but denying interest for the delay in filing the appeal.

Facts:

The case pertains to the Main (Written) Examination of Civil Judge conducted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. Out of 1195 candidates, only 9 cleared the exam. Unsuccessful candidates challenged the entire selection process, alleging discriminatory and malafide practices, and sought the quashing of the result.

Issues:

Whether there were discriminatory or malafide practices in the selection process and evaluation method.

The appropriateness of disclosing Main Exam marks before viva-voce.

The validity of the plea for re-evaluation by an Independent Expert Committee.

Held:

Justice Sikri critically examined the selection process and evaluation method, concluding that the procedure was 'uniform.' The method of evaluation, with one evaluator examining and marking one question in all answer scripts, ensured uniformity. Adequate security measures were in place, and no discriminatory or malafide practices occurred.

Considering the strict marking but non-discriminatory nature, the court discusses the remedy of moderation. The court distinguishes the use of scaling and moderation, favoring the latter to remove the effect of examiner variability. It refers to Sanjay Singh's case, where scaling was considered inappropriate for Judicial Services Examinations.

Justice Sikri's report suggests alternatives for awarding grace marks. The court adopts Alternative II, awarding 20 marks in Civil Law–I and 10 marks in Civil Law–II. The court rejects the plea for 50 grace marks, emphasizing the need for reasonableness.

The court acknowledges the need for viva–voce and rejects the alternative plea for re-evaluation by an Independent Expert Committee. It cites the delay in filling vacant posts and the absence of provisions for re-evaluation in the Recruitment Rules.

Regarding the plea to disclose Main Exam marks before viva–voce, the court rejects the practice, stating it may invite bias or favoritism, affecting impartial evaluation during the viva–voce.

The court directs the respondents to award 20 grace marks in Civil Law–I and 10 grace marks in Civil Law–II to all candidates, prepare fresh results of the Main (Written) Examination of Civil Judge, and complete the selection process within a stipulated period.

Facts:

Appellants were appointed on an ad-hoc basis in the Ambedkar Nagar Judgeship.

Initial appointment for a period of three months extended from time to time.

Advertisement for direct recruitment in 2001 led to writ petitions and a subsequent selection process.

Selection process canceled, appellants continued in service on an ad-hoc basis.

Committee recommended regularization in 2012, and the District Judge regularized appellants' services.

Successor District Judge annulled regularization orders in 2014, leading to termination in 2017.

Issues:

Validity of the regularization of ad-hoc appointments.

Cancellation of regularization orders by the successor District Judge.

Violation of principles of natural justice.

Applicability of amended Rules in 2016 with a cut-off date of 31.12.2001.

Held:

The appellants are entitled to regularization under the exception carved out in the Umadevi case.

The cancellation of regularization orders without giving an opportunity of being heard violates principles of natural justice.

The amended Rules in 2016 with a cut-off date of 31.12.2001 should have been considered by the High Court.

The appellants are entitled to reinstatement with continuity in service, but not entitled to back wages.

Facts:

The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, particularly the last seen together theory and an extra-judicial confession, to convict the appellants under various sections of the IPC, Arms Act, and Explosives Act. The trial court acquitted the accused, citing doubts in witness testimonies and inconsistencies in evidence. The High Court reversed the acquittal, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Reliability of the last seen together theory.

Credibility of the extra-judicial confession.

Adequacy of circumstantial evidence to establish guilt beyond doubt.

Time gap between last seen together and the alleged time of death.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, emphasizing the importance of a complete chain in circumstantial evidence cases. The court highlighted the unexplained contradictions in witness testimonies, the time gap between last seen together and the alleged time of death, and the questionable extra-judicial confession. The judgment reinforced the need for a conscientious approach in cases based on circumstantial evidence and reiterated the principle that extra-judicial confessions are weak pieces of evidence. The court held that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt beyond doubt, leading to the acquittal of the appellants.

Facts:

Multiple rounds of litigations between the parties involving several suits.

Settlement agreement in Suit No. III 509 of 2001 between Ruias and MGG.

MHL filed Suit No. IV-2410 of 2008 challenging the settlement and claiming ownership of shares.

Appellants raised a preliminary issue of limitation under Section 9A CPC.

Dispute reached the Supreme Court in Nugen Machineries Limited vs. Minal A. Goswami & Anr.

Issues:

Whether Suit No. IV-2410 of 2008 filed by MHL is barred by limitation?

Effect of the settlement agreement between Ruias and MGG on the ownership of shares.

Held:

The judgment emphasized the repeal of Section 9A CPC (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1977, and the subsequent interpretations in Nusli Veville Wadia vs. Ivory Properties & Ors. (2019) 13 SCALE 620. The court held that the question of limitation should be considered along with other issues in Suit No. IV-2410 of 2008, and the trial should proceed independently on its merits. The orders of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench on the limitation issue were set aside.

Facts:

The appellant was appointed on an ad-hoc basis as a Junior Engineer in 1987. The appointment was made after a selection process and without the concurrence of the U.P. Public Service Commission. The appellant possessed the required degree, and despite various representations seeking promotion, the promotion was denied. The issue revolved around the relaxation of the service condition and the appellant's entitlement to promotion.

Issues:

Validity of the appellant's appointment without the concurrence of the U.P. Public Service Commission.

Entitlement of the appellant to promotion based on the relaxation of the service condition and possession of the required degree.

Held:

The Court held that the appellant's appointment, while irregular, was not illegal. It emphasized the distinction between irregular and illegal appointments. The irregularity did not bar the appellant from being considered for promotion. The Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment, stating that continuous officiation after appointment must be considered for determining seniority. The relaxation provided in the office memorandum dated 11.03.1994 was crucial, and the appellant was entitled to promotion immediately after its issuance. The Court declared the appellant's entitlement to promotion from the date his junior with the required degree was promoted.

Provides the final order allowing the appeal and quashing the previous orders.

Facts:

Appellants are defendants in the suit T.S. 10 of 2000.

Plaintiffs filed the suit for a declaration of title, recovery of possession, and mesne profits.

Trial Court dismissed the suit on 19.08.2002.

First Appellate Court allowed the appeal on 30.06.2006.

Defendants challenged the judgment before the Guwahati High Court in R.S.A No. 45 of 2006.

The appeal was listed for hearing on 21.01.2015, but the counsel for the appellants was absent.

Issues:

Whether the High Court is justified in dismissing the second appeal on merits in the absence of the learned counsel for the appellants?

Held:

Order 41 Rule 17(1) read with its explanation clarifies that the Court cannot dismiss the appeal on merits when the appellant remains absent on the date fixed for hearing.

The Explanation to sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 was added in 1976 to eliminate conflicting views among different High Courts regarding the court's power to dismiss an appeal on merits in the absence of the appellant.

The High Court cannot go into the merits of the case when there is non-appearance of the appellant.

The Court set aside the impugned judgment, remitting the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law.

The opportunity for the appellant to convince the appellate court of sufficient cause for non-appearance is lost if the appeal is decided on merits without representation.

Facts:

The appellant poured kerosene on his wife, subsequently setting her ablaze.

Accused questioned her fidelity without provocation, leading to the brutal act.

Accused claimed being under the influence of liquor during the incident.

Issues:

Whether the accused's act qualifies as culpable homicide under Section 300 IPC.

The role of intoxication as a defense and the applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.

Held:

The Court rejected the defense of intoxication, emphasizing the accused's conscious and deliberate actions. The act of pouring kerosene, followed by setting the victim ablaze, was held as a conscious act intending to cause death. Even if the accused lacked specific intent, the act fell under Section 300 fourthly, as it caused injuries imminently dangerous to life. The subsequent act of pouring water was deemed an attempt to cloak guilt, not a mitigating factor. Dismissal of the appeal based on the above analysis.