Facts:

The appellant, a tenant, occupied two shop rooms - one on the ground floor and the other on the first floor, for textile business. The landlord filed eviction petitions based on arrears of rent, bonafide requirement, and material damage under relevant sections of the Kerala Rent Control Act. The trial court decreed eviction on the bonafide requirement ground. The Rent Control Appellate Authority reversed this decision. A revision petition was filed in the High Court, which interfered with the Appellate Authority's findings.

Issues:

Scope of enquiry under Section 11(8) of the Act

Effect of the availability of vacant rooms in other buildings owned by the landlord on the landlord's claim under Section 11(8) of the Act

Held:

The Appellate Authority found vacant rooms in the building owned by the landlord and in other buildings, indicating the tenant's lack of bonafide requirement. This finding of fact was not perverse.

The Appellate Authority's reliance on the Building Tax Assessment Register, which indicated vacant rooms owned by the landlord, is a factual finding that cannot be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction.

The tenant's possession of a room leased by the mother-in-law was temporary and lacked bonafide possession, a valid finding by the Appellate Authority.

The comparative hardship analysis by the Appellate Authority was a factual finding that cannot be interfered with, as it was not shown to be perverse.

The High Court's interference with the factual findings made by the Appellate Authority exceeded its revisional jurisdiction and was incorrect.

FACTS:

On 18.03.2004, an accident occurred resulting in the death of the claimant's son, who was allegedly a pillion rider on a motor vehicle driven by respondent No. 2. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) concluded that the accident was due to respondent No. 2's rash and negligent driving. The MACT determined compensation, and an appeal was filed before the High Court of Uttarakhand. The High Court set aside the MACT's judgment based on lack of eyewitness testimony and absence of evidence regarding a valid driving license for the deceased.

ISSUES:

Whether negligence needs to be proven under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act?

Validity of the deceased's driving license.

Appropriate multiplier for calculating compensation.

HELD:

The Supreme Court clarified that Section 163A does not require the claimant to prove negligence or default by the owner or any other person. Eyewitness status is not a prerequisite.

The High Court erred in using the absence of a valid driving license as a ground to disentitle the claimant, even though this point was given up by the insurance company before the MACT.

The Court noted a calculation error in the multiplier used for compensation and corrected it from 8 to 17 based on the victim's age.

The argument regarding maximum liability of Rs. 1 lakh was not entertained as it was raised for the first time in the Supreme Court.

DECISION: The appeal was allowed, and the insurance company was directed to pay the revised compensation amount to the claimant within three months.

Facts:

The case involves a fatal accident where a person on a cycle was hit by a bus owned by the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (UP SRTC).

The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) found the bus driver's rash and negligent driving to be the cause of the accident.

Compensation was awarded to the victim's family.

Issues:

The main issue was whether the liability for compensation rested solely with UP SRTC or if the insurance company was also liable.

Interpretation of the term "owner" under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Held:

The court referred to the definition of "owner" under Section 2(19) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It emphasized that this definition is not exhaustive and must be construed broadly in the given context.

The term "owner" can include the person who has actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose directions the driver operates the vehicle.

The liability of the "owner" is vicarious for the tort committed by its employee (driver) during the course of employment.

The court distinguished a previous case (Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation vs. Kailash Nath Kothari) and pointed out that it dealt with the old Motor Vehicles Act of 1939.

The court held that an agreement (Clause 10) between UP SRTC and the bus owner, which specified the owner's liability for driver's actions, did not bind parties not privy to the agreement.

In light of the above principles, the court concluded that the insurance company was liable to pay the compensation awarded by the MACT, along with interest.

The appeal was allowed, and the insurance company was directed to make the payment within three months.

Facts:

The appellant filed a suit on February 23, 2005, seeking a decree for a rendition of true and correct accounts in respect of interest/commission charged and deducted by the respondent-Bank. The Trial Court rejected the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, stating it was barred by the law of limitation.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's suit was barred by the law of limitation as per Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

Held:

The Court observed that the cause of action for filing a suit comprises a bundle of facts, and determining whether a suit is barred by limitation involves a mixed question of fact and law .

The Court further held that the exchange of correspondence between the parties could impact the accrual of the right to sue and extend the limitation period.

The Court interpreted the term "when the right to sue accrues" in Article 113 of the Limitation Act to include instances where the right is reinforced, revived, or becomes enforceable, not just its initial accrual.

Considering the various letters and legal notices exchanged, the Court concluded that the appellant's right to sue accrued at different points due to the bank's responses, which affected the limitation period.

The Court held that the suit filed on February 23, 2005, was within the limitation period prescribed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act.

The Court emphasized that applying Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was inappropriate since the issue of limitation involves mixed questions of fact and law.

Facts:

The case revolves around the reimbursement of sales tax on works contracts executed by M/s. B. Engineers & Builders Ltd. The State of Orissa had levied sales tax on the taxable turnover of these contracts for 1998-99 to 2000-01. The contractor claimed reimbursement based on Circular dated 04.11.1986, which allowed reimbursement on proof of payment. However, another Circular suspended reimbursement until further clarification.

Issues:

Whether the Circular dated 04.11.1986 obligates reimbursement for completed items of work?

Whether the State Government's change of view in Circular dated 07.11.2001 is valid?

Applicability of Clauses 13.3 of Instructions to Bidders (ITB) and 45.1 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC) to the reimbursement claim.

Held :

The Court notes the vacillating understanding of the State Government reflected in Circulars dated 04.11.1986 and 07.11.2001. Such understanding cannot determine contractual obligations, which must be assessed based on legal principles and terms of the contract.

The Constitution's Forty-sixth Amendment introduced Article 366(29-A), allowing States to levy sales tax on goods/materials used in works contracts. The works contract is divided into sale of goods/materials and supply of labor/services, enabling sales tax on goods/materials involved.

Amendments to the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, expanded the definition of "Sale" to include goods in works contracts. Taxable turnover for works contracts includes gross value minus labor and service charges. "Completed item of work" in Clause 45.2 of GCC signifies reimbursement after completion.

"Completed item of work" distinguishes completed and incomplete work for reimbursement. The clause's context indicates reimbursement post-completion, not sales tax on completed work.

The Court rejects the State's claim that reimbursement doesn't apply to works contracts. The second part of Clause 45.2 allows deductions, confirming its applicability to works contracts.

Contractual terms are binding, and the State must honor the reimbursement claim. Grounds to resist reimbursement based on "completed item of work" and contractual clauses are untenable.

The Circular dated 04.11.1986 reflects the State's obligation for reimbursement and its awareness of existing contracts. Subsequent doubts and contrary decisions do not negate this obligation.

Facts:

The appellants claimed deduction under Section 80-O of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for income received from providing services to foreign enterprises engaged in purchasing frozen seafood and marine products. The appellants argued that the services rendered involved technical guidance, advice, and information.

Issues:

Whether the services provided by the appellants qualify for deduction under Section 80-O of the Income Tax Act.

How the terms "expert information and advice," "analysis," and "technical guidance" in the agreements should be interpreted in the context of eligibility for the deduction.

Whether the burden lies on the assessee to prove the applicability of the deduction provision and whether any ambiguity in the provision should be strictly interpreted in favor of the revenue.

Held:

The Court analyzed the agreements and found that the appellants primarily acted as procuring agents responsible for ensuring the supply of goods to the foreign principals.

The terms like "expert information and advice," "analysis," and "technical guidance" were deemed to be within the context of the procuring agent's responsibilities.

The burden to prove the applicability of the deduction provision lies on the assessee, and any ambiguity should be interpreted strictly in favor of the revenue.

The Court emphasized that eligibility for the deduction under Section 80-O must be strictly interpreted, while other requirements, once eligibility is established, can be interpreted more liberally.

Decision: The services provided by the appellants, being those of a procuring agent, did not qualify for deduction under Section 80-O of the Income Tax Act (Para 32). The Court dismissed the appeals, confirming that the income earned from the services provided by the appellants was not eligible for deduction under Section 80-O.

FACTS:

The appellants, wife, and mother of the deceased, appealed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras that enhanced the compensation awarded by a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

The accident occurred on 21 June 2012. The deceased, a BSc graduate, was employed in a private company. The appellants provided salary certificates and bank statements to support their claim for compensation.

ISSUES:

Whether the High Court was justified in discarding the salary certificate for May 2012

whether the compensation awarded by the High Court should be enhanced.

HELD:

The High Court enhanced the compensation without properly considering the evidence, including the salary certificate for May 2012 (Para 4).

The salary certificate for May 2012, showing the net pay of the deceased as Rs 23,419, should not have been discarded (Para 5).

The Tribunal's finding that the deceased was employed with a different company was not properly substantiated (Para 6).

The compensation must be recomputed based on the salary certificate for May 2012, future prospects, and legal principles (Para 7).

The total compensation awarded to the appellants is Rs 45,28,981, with interest at nine percent per annum from the date of filing the claim petition (Para 9).

REFERRED CASES:

National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680

Facts:

The case pertains to a contract of sale of a commodity between M/S. Centrotrade Minerals and Metals Inc. and Hindustan Copper Ltd. The contract contained an arbitration clause providing for a two-tier arbitration process, with the first tier to be held in India and the second tier by the ICC in London. A dispute arose between the parties, and the appellant invoked the arbitration clause. The first arbitrator ruled against the appellant, leading them to invoke the second part of the arbitration agreement. The ICC arbitrator ultimately ruled against the respondent.

Issues:

The enforceability of the foreign arbitral award under Section 48 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The respondent raised objections to the enforceability, claiming that they were unable to present their case before the ICC arbitrator.

Held:

The court, composed of R. F. Nariman, S. Ravindra Bhat, and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ., deliberated on the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. The court noted that the ICC arbitrator had provided the respondent with numerous opportunities to submit documents and legal submissions. The timeline of events was examined, including various extensions granted to the respondent to present their defense.

The court found that despite the respondent's claims, the ICC arbitrator had been extremely fair in conducting the proceedings. The respondent had been given ample time and extensions to submit their response and evidence. The court emphasized that the arbitrator's conduct was reasonable and impartial throughout the process.

Ultimately, the court held that there was no fault with the conduct of the arbitral proceedings, and as such, the foreign arbitral award would be enforced.

FACTS:

The respondent, an auction-purchaser, acquired a unit owned by M/s. SB Beverages Private Limited through an auction conducted by Syndicate Bank under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The previous owner had failed to pay electricity dues, leading to the auction. The question at hand was whether the liability for the past electricity dues could be imposed on the respondent.

ISSUES:

Whether the liability for previous electricity dues of the last owner could be transferred to the respondent, the auction-purchaser.

Whether the auction notice and relevant clauses impose the responsibility of paying electricity dues on the respondent.

HELD :

The court examined various legal provisions, including the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, Electricity Act, 1910 (Sections 2(c), 24), and the Electricity Act, 2003 (Section 56), as well as the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 and the General Terms & Conditions of Supply of Distribution & Retail Supply Licensees in AP. It established that electricity dues, being statutory in nature under the Electricity Act and as per the terms and conditions of supply, cannot be waived. The court emphasized that when an auction notice explicitly mentions liabilities, including electricity dues, and the sale is conducted on an "AS IS WHERE IS, WHATEVER THERE IS AND WITHOUT RECOURSE BASIS," the purchaser is liable to pay the electricity dues. The court also noted that the distinction between connection and reconnection does not apply in cases where both aspects are covered by the terms and conditions of supply.

Based on this analysis, the court allowed the appeal and held that appellant No.1 (Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Company Limited) has the right to demand the arrears due from the last owner, which should be paid by the respondent-purchaser.

REFERRED CASES:

Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. vs. Paramount Polymers (P) Ltd., (2006) 13 SCC 101

Haryana State Electricity Board vs. Hanuman Rice Mills, Dhanauri & Ors., (2010) 9 SCC 145

Hyderabad Vanaspathi Ltd. vs. A.P. State Electricity Board & Ors., (1998) 4 SCC 470

Isha Marbles vs. Bihar State Electricity Board & Anr., (1995) 2 SCC 648

Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited & Ors. vs. DVS Steels and Alloys Private Limited & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 210

Southern Power Distribution Company of Telangana Limited (through its CMD) & Ors. vs. Gopal Agarwal & Ors., (2018) 12 SCC 644

Special Officer, Commerce, North Eastern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa (NESCO) vs. Raghunath Paper Mills Private Limited & Anr., (2012) 13 SCC 479