Facts:

The case involved an appeal against a judgment passed by the High Court affirming the appellant's conviction under Section 302 IPC and other related offenses.

The incident took place on 03.01.1986, where the appellant, along with other accused individuals, was alleged to have been involved in the murder of the victim. The charges framed against the accused included Sections 302, 302/34, 323, and 323/34 IPC.

Issues:

The absence of a specific charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the appellant and whether this absence caused prejudice or failure of justice to him.

Held:

The Court held that the absence of a charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC did not vitiate the appellant's conviction unless it resulted in prejudice or failure of justice. The appellant's understanding of the gist of the charges against him was evident from his defense throughout the trial.

Despite the absence of a specific charge, the appellant was well-aware of the allegations and had a fair opportunity to defend himself.

Therefore, no prejudice or failure of justice was shown to have been occasioned. The Court relied on various precedents, including Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Gurbachan Singh v. State of Punjab, emphasizing that technicalities should not override the substance of justice. The appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, Jangir Singh, was accused of shooting and killing Jaswant Singh, a colleague in the Punjab Home Guard, during an altercation over a borrowed sum of money. Initially acquitted by the trial court, the High Court reversed the decision, leading to this appeal.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted legitimate self-defence or exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defence, leading to the death of the deceased.

Held:

The appellant's actions, while prompted by a perceived threat, exceeded the legitimate exercise of the right to self-defence, resulting in the death of the deceased. Therefore, the conviction under Section 302 IPC was set aside and converted to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, considering the excessive use of force.

Decision: The appeal stands disposed of with the modified conviction, and the appellant is directed to be released immediately if not required in any other case.

Facts:

On 22 March 2007, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court disposed of a reference made under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 by the 3rd Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence of death imposed on certain accused, while sentencing others to imprisonment for life. Appeals were filed before the Supreme Court, resulting in the dismissal of some appeals and the enhancement of sentences for others. Review petitions were subsequently filed, leading to the reopening of the review petitions based on the decision of the Constitution Bench in Mohd. Arif v Registrar, Supreme Court of India, 2014 (9) SCC 737.

Issues:

The denial of an opportunity for certain accused to be heard by the Bench before their appeals were decided, leading to a violation of their rights to legal representation and fair trial.

Held:

The Court recalled the judgment and order dated 30 April 2009, which awarded the death sentence to certain accused and confirmed the sentence of death imposed by the High Court on others.

The Court also recalled its earlier judgment dismissing the appeals filed by certain accused. It held that the accused who were not represented by counsel during the hearing were deprived of an opportunity to be heard, necessitating the recall of the judgment. Consequently, the criminal appeals were restored to the file of the Court for fresh hearing. The Court granted permission to the concerned accused to file appeals against the judgment of the High Court convicting them, if advised.

The execution of the death sentence imposed by the High Court was suspended pending the disposal of the appeals. The Court directed the Registry to call for the records and disposed of the criminal miscellaneous petitions accordingly.

Facts:

Ghanshyam Sharma claimed to have worked as a casual helper for Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. from June 10, 1976, to July 30, 1977.

He alleged that his services were orally terminated on July 31, 1977.

The dispute led to a reference to the Labour Court under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The Labour Court ruled in Sharma's favor, ordering his reinstatement with continuity of service.

Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. challenged this decision in the High Court, leading to conflicting judgments at the Single Judge and Division Bench levels.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in reinstating the Labour Court's award.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after considering the facts and circumstances, modified the Labour Court's award.

It found that reinstating Sharma with back wages and continuity of service was not appropriate due to the short duration of his employment and lack of evidence regarding his subsequent employment status.

Instead, the Court directed Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. to pay Sharma a lump sum compensation of Rs. 50,000 under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.

This compensation was deemed reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case, including the monthly salary paid to Sharma during the legal proceedings.

The company was instructed to pay the compensation within three months from the date of the Supreme Court's order.

Facts:

The case involved the allotment of land by the State to a private educational institution to facilitate its relocation from a Waqf property, following an eviction order by the Waqf Authority.

Out of the total 4 kanals of land allotted, the State charged the institution for 2 kanals at a specified rate, while granting the remaining 2 kanals free of cost.

Writ petitions challenging this allotment were initially dismissed by a Single Judge but were later quashed by a Division Bench of the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the State's allocation of land to the educational institution was in line with constitutional principles, particularly Article 14 and Article 39(b).

Whether the free allotment of 2 kanals of land by the State was justified.

Held:

The Court held that while the usual practice involves auctioning or tendering for land allocation, deviations from this practice may be warranted in certain circumstances, especially when public interest and welfare are at stake.

An executive action is not deemed arbitrary solely due to a lack of explicit reasoning, as long as a reasonable underlying principle is discernible.

The Court emphasized that the State's action was backed by a welfare purpose, evident from the urgent need to ensure continuity of education for children and maintain peace in the locality.

Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution emphasize the State's obligation to promote the welfare of its people, including aspects like education.

The Court acknowledged the importance of education as a fundamental aspect of democratic governance, underscoring the need for state support in this realm.

While the Court upheld the overall allocation of land, it found the free allotment of 2 kanals unjustified, causing a loss to the public exchequer.

Consequently, the appellant was directed to compensate for the free allotment by paying for the two kanals at the prevailing auction price, along with interest.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services Interconnection (Addressable Systems) Regulations, 2017, and the Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Eighth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2017.

Issues:

Whether the regulations and tariff order are within the jurisdiction of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI).

Whether the regulations infringe upon the rights of broadcasters under the Copyright Act.

How the TRAI Act and the Copyright Act should be harmonized in case of any conflict.

Held:

The provisions of the TRAI Act must be interpreted in the light of protecting the interests of both service providers and consumers. Section 11(1)(a)(iv) of the TRAI Act empowers the Authority to facilitate competition and promote efficiency in telecommunication services. The fixing of rates under Section 11(2) of the TRAI Act includes rates for broadcasting services.

The regulations and tariff order aim to strike a balance between the rights of broadcasters and the interests of consumers. They do not seek to regulate the content of TV channels but focus on regulating pricing to ensure fair competition.

The regulations were formulated after extensive consultations with stakeholders and aim to provide a level playing field for both broadcasters and consumers. While TRAI regulates broadcasting services, it does not impinge upon the rights of broadcasters under the Copyright Act.

Both the TRAI Act and the Copyright Act are central enactments, and in case of any clash, they should be harmonized to give effect to both. TRAI's regulatory functions prevail over the Copyright Act to the extent of any inconsistency, particularly concerning compensation payable to broadcasters.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, affirming the validity of the regulations and tariff orders under the TRAI Act.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the accused, residing in the neighborhood of the prosecutrix, raped her on July 28, 1997, around 9:00 PM.

Issues:

The reliability of the prosecutrix's testimony and the corroboration of evidence.

The validity of the High Court's directive to lodge complaints against police officials.

The proper application of Sections 391 and 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Held:

The testimony of the prosecutrix is corroborated by medical evidence and the FSL report, indicating the presence of human semen on her clothing.

The prosecutrix had no motive to falsely implicate the accused. The accused failed to provide evidence to support their claim that they had lodged complaints against the prosecutrix, justifying their implication.

The power under Section 391 Cr.P.C. must be exercised with caution, and additional evidence should be considered only if it was recorded as provided by law.

Even if the prosecutrix had a promiscuous reputation, it did not justify sexual assault. The High Court's reliance on complaints against the prosecutrix introduced during the appeal was deemed erroneous.

The trial court's assessment of the prosecutrix's testimony, corroborated by various pieces of evidence, was deemed reliable. The High Court's reliance on complaints against the prosecutrix was criticized.

The High Court's reliance on complaints against the prosecutrix and its directive to lodge complaints against police officials were considered inappropriate.

The High Court's disparaging remarks against police officials, without affording them a hearing, were deemed unjust. The directive to initiate proceedings under Sections 193 and 195 IPC against the police officials was set aside.

Initiating proceedings under Section 340 Cr.P.C. must be done with care and caution, with findings of expedience in the interest of justice. The High Court's directive to lodge complaints against police officials without proper consideration was criticized.

Prosecution for perjury should only be sanctioned in cases where it appears deliberate and expedient in the interest of justice. The High Court's directive without affording a hearing to police officials was deemed improper.

Decision: The Court affirmed the conviction of the respondents and emphasized the importance of meticulous consideration of evidence and due process in legal proceedings. The appeal preferred by them is allowed.

Facts:

An order was passed by the Collector of Central Excise in 1970 regarding the release of gold to an individual for investment in gold bonds, with a penalty imposed for failure to declare the gold as required by law.

A show cause notice was subsequently issued in 1971 under the Defence of India Rules, seeking to confiscate the gold items and enhance the penalty.

The Gold Control Act, 1968, under which the proceedings were initiated, was repealed in 1990 without a saving clause.

Issues:

Whether the repeal of the Gold Control Act, 1968, without a saving clause, affects the validity of pending proceedings and show cause notices.

Held:

The repeal of the Gold Control Act, 1968, without a saving clause, indicated a clear intention contrary to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.

The statement of objects and reasons for the repeal highlighted the dissatisfaction and hardships caused by the Act, indicating a contrary intention to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.

The Court referenced past cases where specific intentions were expressed in instances of repeal, leading to different interpretations of the General Clauses Act, supporting the conclusion that the show cause notice issued under the Act no longer survived.

Therefore, the appeals were allowed, and the impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside. Liberty was granted to both parties to amend the questions in the Wealth Tax Reference within a specified period, and the High Court was requested to expedite the hearing of related writ petitions.

Facts:

The case involves the death of an individual named Satheesan, allegedly tortured and killed by a group of individuals. The prosecution's case is based on witness statements, notably CW 1 Narayanan, a security guard at the scene.

Issues:

Whether the discretion exercised by the Additional Sessions Judge under Section 231(2) of the CrPC to defer cross-examination of witnesses was valid and legally sustainable.

Held and Decision:

The court emphasized that discretion under Section 231(2) of the CrPC must be exercised judiciously, considering statutory framework and consequences. It cannot be asserted as a right and must be supported by sufficient reasons. Factors such as undue influence on witnesses, threats, loss of memory, and trial delay must be considered. The court provided practice guidelines for conducting criminal trials, emphasizing adherence to schedules and protection against undue influence.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge due to lack of reasons provided by the High Court for the reversal. However, it clarified that its observations would not affect the merits of the case during trial.