FACTS:

Accusation against the appellant, Mayank N Shah, for presenting fake invoices to a bank, leading to charges under various sections of the IPC and the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Accused no. 2 allegedly hatched a conspiracy to cheat the bank by presenting fake documents, and the appellant, accused no. 4, was a salaried employee relatively lower in the hierarchy of the firm owned by accused no. 2.

Accusations include presenting forged motor transport receipts and invoices, leading to a total cheating amount of Rs. 18,57,064.40.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant, being a salaried employee, had direct involvement in the fraudulent activities or was merely following instructions.

Whether the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant.

HELD:

The court, after evaluating the evidence, held that the appellant, Mayank N Shah, was aware of the fake and fabricated nature of the invoices presented to the bank and thereby cheated the bank. The conviction was confirmed, but considering the appellant's role as a salaried employee lower in the hierarchy, the sentence was modified. The sentences for various offenses were ordered to run concurrently, and the appellant was required to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining period of the modified sentence.

REFERRED CASES:

Bharati Telenet Ltd. vs. Subhash Jain & Ors. (2005) 11 SCC 599

Central Bureau of Investigation, Hyderabad vs. K. Narayana Rao (2012) 9 SCC 512

K.R. Purushothaman vs. State of Kerala (2005) 12 SCC 631

State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Udham and Others 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1378

FACTS:

The Appellant holds an F.L.-1 License for wholesale vending of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL).

Application filed by the Appellant to shift the licensed Liquor Shop from Mahe to Karaikal under Rules 163 and 209 of the Puducherry Excise Rules.

Objection filed by Respondent No. 1 opposing the shifting, citing previous judgments and public interest concerns.

Various legal proceedings, including writ petitions, were initiated in the Madras High Court challenging the permission granted for shifting.

ISSUES:

Whether the expression 'from one place to another' in Rule 209 of the Excise Rules restricts the shifting of a liquor shop within a particular local area or allows inter-region shifting within the Union Territory of Puducherry.

Interpretation of the term 'place' in the context of the Excise Act and Rules.

Compliance with statutory conditions and the legality of the granted permission to shift.

HELD:

The expression 'from one place to another' in Rule 209 is not restrictive, allowing the Licensing Authority to grant permission for inter-region shifting within the Union Territory of Puducherry, subject to specified conditions.( Para 20)

Interpreting the Act as a whole, a restrictive meaning to Rule 209 would be contrary to the legislative intent, especially considering the unique demography of Puducherry comprising four unconnected regions.( Para 21)

The Excise Act and Rules distinguish between 'local area' and 'place,' indicating that the intention was not to confine the shifting of a liquor shop to a specific locality. No express prohibition for inter-region shifting is found in Rule 209.( Para 22)

Previous approvals for shifting liquor shops from one region to another were cited, supporting the view that such inter-region shifting was permissible.( Para 23)

The Court accepted the State's submission that the Licensing Authority thoroughly assessed the pros and cons, seeking input from relevant authorities, before granting permission for inter-region shifting.( Para 24)

Permission to shift the Appellant's licensed premises from Mahe to Karaikal was granted legally and validly by the Licensing Authority, complying with all conditions.( Para 25)

The Court allowed the Civil Appeals, setting aside the Madras High Court's order that quashed the permission to shift the licensed shop. The Court found no prohibition in the Excise Act or Rules for inter-region shifting.( Para 27)

REFERRED CASES:

K. Murali vs. Commissioner (Excise)-cum-Secretary in W.P. (Civil) No. 39661/2002

Tamil Nadu vs. Balu, (2017) 2 SCC 281 : AIR 2017 SC 262 : 2017 (1) SCJ 586

Facts:

Incident occurred on the evening of 16.12.2012 involving the gang rape and brutal assault of the prosecutrix in a moving bus.

Accused misbehaved, committed gang rape, and subjected the victim to unnatural offenses.

Victim and her friend thrown out of the moving bus, leading to her critical condition and subsequent death.

Issues:

Conviction and death penalty imposed on the petitioner challenged in the review petition.

Various legal arguments presented, including flaws in investigation, lack of professional skills by the investigating agency, and allegations of false implication.

Held:

The review petition sought a re-examination of the conviction and death penalty. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, stating that the scope of review is limited and can only be entertained in cases of error apparent on the face of the record. The Court emphasized that the petitioner merely repeated arguments already considered and rejected. Grounds such as flaws in the investigation, media pressure, and general contentions against capital punishment were deemed insufficient for a review.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute arising from a railway electrification contract. The appointment of an arbitrator becomes a contentious issue, leading to a legal challenge.

Issues:

The appropriate procedure for appointing an arbitrator as per the modified Clause 64 of the General Conditions of Contract and the relevance of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The modified Clause 64(3)(a)(i) applies when the total value of claims does not exceed one crore rupees, necessitating the appointment of a sole arbitrator, as specified in the Railway contract.

Clause 64(3)(a)(ii) deals with cases exceeding the specified value, outlining the procedure for appointing an arbitrator from a panel of three retired railway officers.

The court emphasizes that the High Court erred in appointing an independent sole arbitrator, deviating from the agreed-upon clauses in the General Conditions of Contract.

The respondent's request for a sole arbitrator contradicts the contract terms, which mandate the appointment of a panel of three arbitrators for disputes exceeding the specified value.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the High Court's appointment of an independent sole arbitrator is set aside. The court directs adherence to the procedure outlined in Clause 64(3)(b) of the General Conditions of Contract for the appointment of three arbitrators.

Facts:

The Chandigarh Housing Board (CHB) invited bids for a project, awarded it to M/S. Parasvanath Developers Pvt. Ltd.

Disputes arose regarding the construction timeline, leading to a complaint by a flat buyer.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (National Commission) directed CHB and the Developer to pay compensation to the buyer.

Issues:

Whether the National Commission erred in fixing liability on CHB for mental harassment and litigation costs.

Whether the increase in the interest rate from 9% to 10% was justified.

Held:

The Court upheld the National Commission's order on the division of liability between CHB and the Developer in a 70:30 ratio.

The Court found that Clause 9(c) of the Tripartite Agreement (compensation clause) did not apply to the case as conditions under Clause 9(a) were not fulfilled.

The Court affirmed the National Commission's decision on mental harassment and litigation costs, stating they were not covered under Clause 9(c) and upheld the 70:30 split.

The increase in the interest rate from 9% to 10% was upheld by the Court as within the National Commission's discretionary power.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the National Commission's order on liability division, rejecting the argument of the inapplicability of Clause 9(c) and affirming the interest rate increase.

Facts:

The appellant challenged a clause in the advertisement for the appointment of Medical Officers, mandating that only work experience in State Government hospitals would be considered for granting marks for 'Work Experience.' The appellant's work experience in an Army Hospital was not initially considered.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term 'Government hospital' in Bihar Health Service Rules.

Challenge to the selection process and the principle of estoppel.

Applicability of constitutional values in interpreting rules.

Held:

1. Estoppel: The principle of estoppel was discussed, emphasizing that it prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after failing in it. However, it was differentiated in cases where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences. The appellant did not challenge the selection procedure but focused on the interpretation of 'work experience,' which the court deemed valid for consideration. Para 17-20

2. Interpretation of Statutes: The court emphasized the need for literal interpretation where the text is unambiguous but advocated for a purposive interpretation when there is ambiguity. It highlighted the importance of considering constitutional values and promoting equal opportunities. Para 21-29

3. Definition of 'Government Hospital': The term 'Government hospital' was analyzed, rejecting a strict application of Rule 2(a) and adopting an expansive interpretation. The court held that the experience gained in any hospital run by the State Government or its instrumentalities, Central Government, Municipalities, and Panchayati Raj Institutions within the territory of Bihar should be considered. Para 30-36

4. Held and Decision: Rules 5 and 6(iii) were construed to include the experience gained by a doctor in any hospital run by the Bihar Government or its instrumentalities, as well as any other non-private hospital within the territory of Bihar. The respondents were directed to rework the merit list accordingly. Para 37

Facts:

The appellant, Manju, was accused of murdering her newborn baby girl through strangulation. The prosecution alleged that the act occurred in the maternity ward of Lady Hardinge Medical College Hospital. The post-mortem report indicated the cause of death as asphyxia due to ante-mortem strangulation.

Issues:

Establishing a complete chain of circumstances based on circumstantial evidence to warrant the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC.

Held:

The court emphasized that the conviction was solely based on circumstantial evidence. The testimonies of staff nurses (PW-8 and PW-9) were crucial, stating that the baby girl was handed over to the mother around 4:30 p.m. and found dead by 6:30 p.m.( Paragraph 9)

The court analyzed the evidence, including the post-mortem report, and concluded that the prosecution failed to establish a motive for the appellant to commit the alleged murder. It highlighted the lack of concrete evidence and the unnatural aspect of the appellant killing her own child.( Paragraph 10)

The court held that, considering the totality of the evidence, it was not safe to convict the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The benefit of doubt was extended, leading to the acquittal of the appellant.( Paragraph 11)

Facts:

Plaintiff no.1, M/s Genentech Inc., claimed to be the innovators of the monoclonal antibody drug Trastuzumab, marketed in India by plaintiff no.2 under the brand names HERCEPTIN, HERCLON, and BICELTIS. The appellants sought to restrain respondent No.3, Reliance Life Sciences Pvt. Ltd., from launching the biosimilar version of their drug. The suit challenged the approval granted by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI) to Reliance. The appellants' patent for the drug had lapsed, but they contested the biosimilarity of Reliance's product, alleging non-compliance with regulatory norms.

Issues:

Whether respondent No.3 complied with applicable laws in launching the biosimilar drug?

Is the appellants' suit an abuse of process, filed to stifle competition?

Should the conditions imposed on Reliance's product by the learned Single Judge be upheld?

Held:

The Division Bench set aside the learned Single Judge's order, allowing Reliance to market their product without biosimilarity claims. The Court acknowledged DCGI approval but doubted proper testing. The Division Bench erred by not considering analogous appeals and interim applications as directed by the Supreme Court. The interim order from the Single Judge, imposing conditions, was reinstated, and the High Court was urged to expedite the final decision on the suit within 12 months.

FACTS:

'H' applied for a two-room accommodation.

'H' passed away, and his wife was issued an allotment letter for the tenement.

'H's wife also passed away, leaving four children: two daughters ('R' and 'P') and two sons ('S' and 'M').

'R' filed a suit for partition, claiming 1/4th share in the tenement for each sibling.

'S' contested the suit, presenting a registered Will dated 02.01.1992, bequeathing the tenement to him absolutely.

ISSUES:

Validity and proof of the registered Will presented by 'S.'

Ownership rights and partition of the tenement among the siblings.

HELD:

The Trial Court passed a preliminary decree, ruling that 'S' failed to prove the Will, as he did not examine any attesting witnesses.

The High Court set aside the Trial Court's judgment, relying on the registration of the Will as proof under s. 71 of the Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the Will was attested by two witnesses, namely 'RK' (husband of 'R') and 'MN' (Advocate).

The Court emphasized that s.71 of the Evidence Act comes into play only if all attesting witnesses deny or do not recollect the execution of the document.

Since 'RK' was not summoned and examined, s.71 could not be invoked, making the High Court's finding unacceptable.

'S' had not referred to the Will in his reply to a legal notice, and the defense of the Will was raised for the first time in his written statement.

The Court observed doubts about the execution of the Will, given that the testator was illiterate, and 'other evidence' suggested a lack of understanding by the family members.

Execution of the Will was not proved by "other evidence" as required by Section 71 of the Evidence Act.

REFERRED CASES :

Benga Behera and Anr. v. Braja Kishore Nanda and Ors. (2007) 9 SCC 728

Dharam Singh v. Aso and Anr. 1990 Suppl SCC 684

H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma and Ors. AIR 1959 SC 443

Jagdish Chand Sharma v. Narain Singh Saini (Dead) Through L.Rs. and Ors. (2015) 8 SCC 615

Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam (2003) 2 SCC 91

Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur and Ors. (1977) 1 SCC 369

M.B. Ramesh (Dead) by L.Rs. v. K.M. Veeraje Urs. (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. (2013) 7 SCC 490

Mt. Manki Kaur v. Hansraj Singh and Ors. AIR 1938 Pat 301

Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Anr. v. Panchanan Banerjee (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 459

Surendra Pal and Ors. v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora and Anr. (1974) 2 SCC 600

Vishnu Ramkrishna v. Nathu Vithal and Ors. AIR 1949 Bom 266