FACTS:

The erstwhile partnership firm, M/s. Chetak Enterprises, had an agreement with the Government of Rajasthan for road construction and toll collection. The firm was converted into a private limited company under Part IX of the Companies Act before the commencement of the relevant assessment year. The partnership firm had communicated its intention of conversion to the Chief Engineer, and the agreement with the government was executed with this understanding. The company was granted registration, and its properties were vested in it as per Section 575 of the Companies Act.

ISSUES:

• Whether the conversion of the partnership firm into a company met the conditions set by Section 80-IA, including:

• Whether the assessee fulfilled the condition of sub-Section (4)(i)(a) of Section 80-IA regarding ownership by a registered company.

• Whether the assessee fulfilled the condition of sub-Section (4)(i)(b) of Section 80-IA regarding entering into an agreement with the government.

HELD:

The Court analyzed the legal implications of the conversion of the partnership firm into a private limited company and the effect of the agreement with the government. It observed that the company's memorandum of association clearly indicated its intent to continue the partnership business and acquired its assets, movables, immovables, rights, debts, and liabilities. The agreement executed with the government was effectively transferred to the company after conversion. The Court concluded that the conditions of sub-Section (4)(i)(a) and (b) of Section 80-IA were met, as the company was owned by a registered company and had a valid agreement with the government for developing and maintaining the infrastructure facility.

In view of the above, the appeal stands dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Mankastu Impex Private Limited (Appellant) and AirVisual Limited (Respondent). The MOU pertained to the sale and distribution of air quality monitoring products. The arbitration clause in the MOU stated that disputes would be resolved through arbitration administered in Hong Kong.

Issues:

Whether the parties' choice of Hong Kong as the place of arbitration also signified the seat of arbitration?

Whether the laws of India or Hong Kong would govern the arbitration proceedings and judicial review of the award?

Held:

The Court delved into the interpretation of the arbitration clause and the related clauses in the MOU. It noted that the arbitration clause stated that disputes would be "referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered in Hong Kong." This phrase indicated the parties' agreement that the arbitration proceedings would be seated in Hong Kong, and the laws of Hong Kong would apply.

The Court emphasized the distinction between the "place of arbitration" and the "governing law" in the MOU. While the MOU was governed by Indian laws, the arbitration proceedings were seated in Hong Kong as explicitly mentioned in the arbitration clause.

The Court further referenced the importance of the seat of arbitration, which determines applicable laws, arbitration procedure, and judicial review. It noted that the term "place of arbitration" was used to indicate the seat, which indicated the intention of the parties to have Hong Kong as the seat of arbitration.

The Court addressed the argument that Clause 17.1 of the MOU specified the laws of India and New Delhi courts having jurisdiction. It held that this did not affect the application of Hong Kong law to the arbitration proceedings since the parties had chosen Hong Kong as the seat.

As per the Court's interpretation, Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not applicable in this case, as the seat of arbitration was in Hong Kong. The Indian courts lacked jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6).

Facts:

The appellant, Suborno Bose, was involved in proceedings related to a complaint under Section 16(3) of the FEMA Act initiated by the Enforcement Directorate. A show-cause notice was issued to the appellant based on allegations of contravention of various provisions of the FEMA Act in relation to foreign exchange transactions.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the Managing Director of the company in question, was liable for the contraventions alleged against the company. Additionally, the court had to interpret the relevant provisions of the FEMA Act, FEMA Regulations, and guidelines to decide on the matter.

Held:

The court examined the provisions of Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the FEMA Act, along with related regulations and guidelines. Section 10(5) required authorized persons to ensure that transactions involving foreign exchange do not contravene provisions of the FEMA Act or related rules. Section 10(6) deemed certain circumstances to be contraventions, including failure to use foreign exchange for the intended purpose, not surrendering it within the specified period, or using it for unauthorized purposes.

The court concluded that the contravention under Section 10(6) was a continuing offense, and that even though the appellant became the Managing Director of the company after the alleged contravention took place, he was responsible for taking corrective actions upon assuming office.

The court emphasized that the requirement to surrender foreign exchange within a specified period was a civil obligation, and the appellant's awareness of the contravention meant he should have taken steps to rectify it.

Accordingly, this appeal fails and the same is dismissed

Facts:

The case involves a search and seizure operation carried out by the Director of Income Tax (Investigation) under Section 132(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 at the residential and business premises of Shri Tejwant Singh and Shri Ved Prakash Bharti group of companies. A survey was also conducted under Section 133A at the business premises of M/s Super Mall (P) Limited. During the search, documents related to cash receipts on the sale of shops/offices at M/s Super Mall, Karnal were found in a pen drive seized from the vehicle of Shri Ved Prakash Bharti.

Issues:

Whether the Assessing Officer complied with the conditions under Section 153C before initiating proceedings against the appellant, M/s Super Malls Private Limited.

Held:

The court considered the provisions of Section 153C and the related case law. It noted that the requirement of Section 153C can be satisfied by a single satisfaction note if the Assessing Officer of the searched person is the same as the Assessing Officer of the other person (the assessee). In this case, the satisfaction note recorded by the Assessing Officer clearly stated that the seized documents belonged to the assessee, and the Assessing Officer was the same for both the searched person and the assessee. Therefore, the court held that the requirements of Section 153C were met and the proceedings initiated were valid.

Facts:

The appellant sought recovery of a loan amount from the respondent corporation (NTC) and the Ministry of Textiles, which was a guarantor. The dispute arose from the takeover of Shree Sitaram Mills Ltd. by NTC and the subsequent question of liabilities.

Issues:

Whether the liabilities of Shree Sitaram Mills Ltd. were included in the takeover process.

Whether secured assets related to the loan transaction were taken over or retained by Shree Sitaram Mills Ltd. after the takeover.

Whether the liability for dues of Shree Sitaram Mills Ltd. could be attributed to NTC and whether the Union of India could be held liable as a guarantor.

Held:

The court emphasized the need to determine whether the liabilities of Shree Sitaram Mills Ltd. were included in the takeover process. The aspect of secured assets and the fate of liabilities were important considerations.

The court concluded that the liability issue could not have been definitively decided in the writ proceedings or the appeal. The complexity of the issue required a thorough examination and the provision of an opportunity for the parties to present evidence.

While the arbitration notice issued under the Permanent Machinery of Arbitrators (PMA) could be quashed, the determination of liability needed a more comprehensive examination. The court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the conclusion that the respondents were not liable for the claimed amount.

The court ordered the revival of relevant recovery proceedings and permitted the appellant bank to include the respondents in those proceedings to ascertain their liability. The determination of liability was to be made by the Recovery Officer/Presiding Officer independently and without being influenced by any prior observations.

Facts:

The case pertains to a dispute regarding the application of pay upgradation benefits under the MACP Scheme. The respondents were granted beneficial pay upgradation under the MACP Scheme but sought the benefit of Grade Pay from the next promotional hierarchy based on the former ACP Scheme.

Issues:

The distinction between the MACP and ACP Schemes, the intent behind the introduction of the MACP Scheme, and the interpretation of relevant terms within the MACP Scheme.

Held:

The MACP Scheme was recommended by the Sixth Central Pay Commission to address disparities caused by varying promotional hierarchies across departments. The objective was to ensure uniform benefits for employees irrespective of their existing hierarchical positions within their organizations or cadre (Para 9, 26).

The terms used in the MACP Scheme, specifically "placement in the immediate next higher Grade Pay in the hierarchy of the recommended revised pay bands," do not include the term "Grade Pay in the next promotional post." The argument that the benefit of the MACP Scheme is tied to the promotional post is inconsistent with the language and intent of the scheme (Para 27).

The MACP Scheme and ACP Scheme have distinct features. While both aim to provide relief against stagnation, the MACP Scheme offers financial upgradations at regular intervals, without requiring traditional promotions, and aims to incentivize efficiency despite the lack of promotions (Para 27).

The expert body, the Sixth Central Pay Commission, recommended the MACP Scheme after comprehensively examining issues, representations, and disparities arising from different promotional hierarchies (Para 28, 29).

Raj Pal's case, cited as precedent, was dismissed on technical grounds and thus should not have been considered a valid precedent for the present case (Para 42).

Law declared by the Supreme Court is binding as a precedent. A principle laid down by the court after examining the matter on merits constitutes the binding precedent. The court criticized the reliance on Raj Pal's case without assessing its merits (Para 44, 51).

The government accepted the recommendations of the Sixth Central Pay Commission and introduced the MACP Scheme to address stagnation and anomalies caused by varying promotional hierarchies (Para 28, 29).

Decision: The impugned orders were set aside, and the court ruled in favor of the Union of India and others. The court emphasized that the MACP Scheme's implementation should not be interfered with, as it was based on expert recommendations and accepted by the government (Para 35).

The court distinguished Raj Pal's case (Decision of Supreme Court dated 15.04.2013 in SLP (C) No. CC 7467 of 2013), noting that it did not examine the overall features of the MACP Scheme and was dismissed on procedural grounds (Para 42, 45).

Facts:

The petitioner participated in the revival bid for Super Bazar, investing Rs. 504 crores. The bid was accepted, and the winding-up order was suspended. The petitioner's management period saw the issuance of summons under the Employees' Provident Fund Act, followed by a committee's report indicating issues with the revival scheme's implementation.

Issues:

The petitioner's conduct in reviving Super Bazar, its claims for a refund of the investment amount, adherence to winding-up principles and statutory provisions, and the priority of claims in the distribution of assets.

Held:

The court discusses the purpose of appointing an auditor to verify income and expenditure, and it highlights that the petitioner's conduct lacked genuine efforts for revival.( Para 26 and 27)

The court clarifies that the petitioner is accountable for its management period and should be held to account based on the verification by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).( Para 30)

The court emphasizes the importance of adhering to statutory provisions and winding-up principles, rejecting the petitioner's claim for a full refund of investment.( Para 31)

The court references Section 11 of the Employees' Provident Fund Act, highlighting the priority of payment of dues towards employees' provident fund in winding-up proceedings.( Para 33)

The court concludes that the CAG's verification is final and binding, and the liquidator must evaluate claims based on statutory priorities.( Para 34)

The court directs the liquidator to evaluate claims in accordance with statutory priorities and addresses the claims of the EPFO and the Union Government.( Para 35)

The contempt petitions shall stand dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant challenged the grant of moderation/grace marks to certain candidates appointed on March 30, 2009, in the context of filling up six posts in the Higher Judicial Service through direct recruitment. The appellant sought his own appointment as a District Judge. The High Court set aside the moderation marks, leading to the recasting of the select list. The appellant was ultimately appointed as a District Judge.

Issues:

The appellant's claim for notional seniority and whether he should be granted seniority from the date of appointment of other candidates who were appointed through the same selection process.

Held:

The appellant was entitled to be appointed along with other candidates. The appellant was excluded from the original appointment due to certain circumstances. As the select list was revised, the appellant was deemed to be part of the appointment along with other candidates.The actual date of the appellant's appointment was recognized as February 24, 2011. Although the appellant couldn't be treated as appointed on March 30, 2009, he was entitled to notional appointment from that earlier date and consequential seniority.( Para 36)

The delay in deciding the seniority claim by the High Court could not defeat the appellant's right to claim seniority from the date other candidates in the same selection process were appointed.( Para 41)

The interpretation of rules and quotas for appointments and seniority was discussed. The Full Bench judgment clarified that there is a quota for in-service candidates, contrary to the High Court's erroneous interpretation.( Para 43)

The argument that some candidates were granted selection grades earlier than the appellant did not confer better legal or equitable rights. Appointments made beyond the prescribed quota meant for appointment by transfer were not protected.( Para 44)

The appeals are allowed

Facts:

The case involves a writ petition challenging the detention orders issued under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. The detention orders were made by a specially empowered officer. The detenues, represented by their counsel, contended that their right to representation against the detention orders had been violated.

Issues:

Whether the detenues had the right to make representations against the detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act.

Whether the Detaining Authority had the obligation to consider the representation independently or wait for the Advisory Board's report.

Whether the delay in considering the representation by the Detaining Authority violated the detenues' constitutional rights.

Held:

Majority Opinion (Uday Umesh Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.):

The detenues have the right to make representations against detention orders made by a specially empowered officer under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act. This right is in addition to the right to make representations to the State Government and the Central Government (Para 12).

The Detaining Authority is obliged to consider the representations without waiting for the opinion of the Central Advisory Board. The specially empowered officer has no statutory role to play at the stage when the Advisory Board's report is received. The report is meant for the appropriate Government's consumption, and confidentiality is mandated (Para 22-23).

In cases where the representation is received before or after the Advisory Board's reference, the Detaining Authority must consider the representation promptly. Inaction on the Detaining Authority's part to consider the representation causes prejudice to the detenues and violates their constitutional rights (Para 26-28).

Dissenting Opinion (Hemant Gupta, J.):

The Detaining Authority, whether the Central Government, State Government, or a specially empowered officer, has the jurisdiction to consider representations against detention orders independently of the Advisory Board's recommendation (Para 3).

The consideration for revocation of a detention order is distinct from the Advisory Board's assessment of sufficient cause for detention. The Detaining Authority should prudently defer the decision on the representation while the matter is being reviewed by the Advisory Board (Para 23).