Facts:

Dr. Sunil Purushottam Bhamre was transferred from the post of Civil Surgeon, Jalgaon, to Assistant Director, AIDS Control Society, Wadala, Mumbai.

Various allegations were made against Dr. Bhamre regarding his functioning, including financial irregularities and insubordination.

Past instances were noted where Dr. Bhamre did not join transferred positions promptly.

Dr. Nagorao Shivaji Chavan was transferred to replace Dr. Bhamre as Civil Surgeon, Jalgaon.

The transfer order was challenged before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, which ruled in favor of Dr. Chavan.

Issues:

Whether the transfer order of Dr. Bhamre was valid.

Whether the statutory provisions related to transfers applied in this case.

Held:

The Court held that while the normal tenure for a post was three years according to Section 3, Section 4 allowed for departures from this norm in cases of administrative exigencies. It emphasized that transfer is an incident of government service and must be exercised reasonably and in public interest.

The Court found no absolute bar on transfer, especially in cases of exceptional circumstances or administrative exigencies. Considering the allegations against Dr. Bhamre and his past record of not joining transferred positions promptly, the Court found no grounds for interference with the transfer order.

Consequently, the Court allowed Dr. Chavan's appeal, setting aside the orders of the tribunal and the High Court. It directed Dr. Bhamre to join his new post in Mumbai within 15 days, failing which the state government would initiate disciplinary proceedings against him.

Facts:

The case involves leases granted to the predecessor in title of the plaintiff by the erstwhile Zamindar for land forming part of the Tank Bund Side-Waste dry and Tank Bund-Upper dry.

The leases were for the period from November to June, aimed to expire before the rainy season due to the submergence of the land.

Plaintiff's predecessor claimed continued possession when the 1948 Act came into force, seeking Ryotwari Patta under Section 11.

Applications for Ryotwari Patta were rejected, and later, the land was handed over to the appellant (Salem Municipality) for constructing a new bus stand.

Plaintiff filed suits against the State Government, transport corporation, and the appellant seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction.

Issues:

• Whether the disputed land qualifies as ryoti land under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, and thus entitles the plaintiff to Ryotwari Patta.

• Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish continuous possession by the plaintiff's vendor or the plaintiff themselves after the abolition of the estate.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the disputed land did not meet the criteria of ryoti land under the Act, rendering the plaintiff or their predecessor ineligible for Ryotwari Patta.

There was a lack of evidence to establish continuous possession post the estate's abolition, weakening the plaintiff's claim.

Section 64 of the Act, dealing with temporary dispossession or discontinuance of possession, did not support the plaintiff's case.

The High Court's conclusion in favor of the plaintiff was deemed impermissible, unsustainable, and illegal, leading to the setting aside of its judgment.

The judgment of the first appellate court, which set aside the trial court's decree, was restored.

Due to the multiplication of proceedings, a cost of Rupees One Lakh was imposed upon the plaintiff, to be deposited with the Welfare Fund of Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association.

Facts:

P.E.C. Limited chartered MV "Rubin Halycon" from Austbulk Shipping Sdn Bhd for transportation of chickpeas from Australia to India. Disputes arose regarding demurrage charges, leading to arbitration.

Issues:

Validity of the arbitration agreement.

Interpretation of Section 47 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding the production of documents for enforcement.

Effect of non-signing of the Charter Party by P.E.C. Limited on the arbitration agreement.

Held:

The arbitration agreement between the parties was found to be valid, even though P.E.C. Limited did not sign the Charter Party.

The interpretation of Section 47 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding the production of documents for enforcement was that the word "shall" should be read as "may", allowing flexibility in the production of documents.

Non-signing of the Charter Party by P.E.C. Limited did not invalidate the arbitration agreement, as it could be inferred from correspondence and conduct between the parties.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, dismissing P.E.C. Limited's appeal and ordering the payment of the awarded amount to Austbulk Shipping Sdn Bhd.

Facts:

The complainant filed an FIR alleging abduction under Sections 363 and 366 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act against Natuji Bachuji Thakor.

During the trial, an application was filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C to proceed against additional accused (appellants) based on the victim's statement.

The trial court rejected the application, suspecting mala fide intentions behind naming the appellants.

The High Court allowed the revision, setting aside the trial court's order and directing to proceed against the appellants.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the trial court's order rejecting the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C?

What is the standard for summoning additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C?

Held and Decision: The Supreme Court held that:

The power under Section 319 Cr.P.C is discretionary and extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly and only when circumstances warrant it.

The threshold for invoking this power is more than establishing a prima facie case but falls short of satisfaction to the extent that unrebutted evidence would lead to conviction.

The evidence on record, including statements of the victim and her mother, lacked sufficient substance to implicate the appellants in the offence under the POCSO Act.

The High Court erred in setting aside the trial court's order without providing sufficient reasons for summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants.

Facts:

The case pertains to alleged illegalities in the mining lease of Sarda Mines Private Limited (SMPL) highlighted by the Central Empowered Committee (CEC).

SMPL was granted permission in 1999 to extract iron ore and its mining lease was renewed in 2001.

Environmental clearance was granted in 2004 for the expansion of production from 1.5 LTPA to 4.0 MTPA.

Issues:

Validity of the environmental clearance granted to SMPL.

Legality of iron ore extraction by SMPL without/in excess of the environmental clearance.

Held:

The environmental clearance cannot have retrospective effect and is operational from the date it is granted. SMPL cannot claim retrospective benefit from the date of mining lease renewal.

The environmental clearance was granted for extraction of iron ore ROM, not specifically for iron ore (lump) as argued by SMPL.

The extraction of iron ore ROM inherently includes the extraction of iron ore (lump) as a by-product. SMPL cannot claim exclusive rights to extract iron ore (lump) without adhering to environmental clearance limitations.

The Central Empowered Committee is directed to reassess the quantum of excessive or illegal mining conducted by SMPL and determine the penalty accordingly, considering all relevant records provided by SMPL and concerned authorities. The substantive applications are disposed of to the above extent and in terms of the above directions.

Facts:

The case involves allegations of fake encounters and extra-judicial executions by Manipur Police and Armed Forces. The Supreme Court previously directed investigations by the CBI into these allegations. Subsequently, police personnel from Manipur Police filed writ petitions seeking to quash certain oral observations made by the court and requested recusal of the bench from hearing the case.

Issues:

Whether the bench should recuse itself from hearing the case due to alleged bias or violation of rights guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court dismissed the recusal petitions, finding no merit in them. It emphasized the need for fair investigations by the CBI and integrity in the judicial process. The court clarified that its observations during the continuing mandamus proceedings were not intended to compromise the independence, integrity, and fairness of the investigations or the judiciary.

The court held that there was no reason for the petitioners to doubt the fairness of the investigations or the judiciary. It reaffirmed the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and dismissed the recusal petitions.

The court also emphasized the role of continuing mandamus in ensuring fair investigations and judicial independence. It stated that any observations made during such proceedings should not be construed as compromising the integrity of the investigative process. We see no merit in these applications and they are accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Management of Sri Ramnarayan Mills Ltd., sought permission to add "break in service" as a new ground for punishment in Clause 16 of the Chapter of Punishment in Certified Standing Orders.

The appellant's application was initially granted by the Joint Commissioner of Labour, but it was challenged by the Workers' Union and subsequently rejected by the Labour Court, the Single Judge, and the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras.

Issues:

Whether the Courts below were justified in rejecting the application filed by the appellant to add "break in service" as a ground for punishment in Certified Standing Orders.

Held:

The Division Bench rightly concluded that "break in service" cannot be allowed as a ground for punishment in Certified Standing Orders for several reasons.

Firstly, the existing grounds specified in Clause 16 were deemed sufficient to address employee misconduct.

Secondly, permitting "break in service" as a ground for punishment could potentially be misused by employers to the detriment of employees' interests.

Thirdly, such a provision could conflict with the Payment of Gratuity Act, impacting employees' entitlement to gratuity.

Fourthly, allowing "break in service" as a ground for punishment would defeat the very object of the Payment of Gratuity Act, which is a beneficial legislation enacted for the benefit of employees.

Therefore, the Division Bench upheld the decision to reject the appellant's application, finding no merit in the appeal.

Facts:

Mallikarjuna, an employee of North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation, died while on duty due to a heart attack.

His wife, Sujatha, filed a claim petition seeking compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

The Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation awarded compensation to Sujatha, which the employer appealed against in the High Court and later in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the appeal involved substantial questions of law.

Grant of interest on the awarded amount and the applicable date for such interest.

Held and Decision:

The Court held that the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law and upheld the Commissioner's order. It clarified that findings of fact by the lower courts are binding unless found to be perverse or arbitrary. The Court modified the Commissioner's order regarding the grant of interest, stating that it accrues from the date of the accident, not the adjudication of the claim.

Therefore, interest was awarded to Sujatha from the date of the accident, i.e., 06.04.1999. The Court directed the Commissioner to calculate the total amount payable by the appellant to Sujatha, including the awarded sum and interest, and instructed the appellant to deposit the same within one month for payment to Sujatha. The appeal stands accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association (HPCA) was granted lease of land for the construction of a cricket stadium, along with additional land for a club house and a hotel for commercial purposes.

Two FIRs were filed against the appellants (HPCA and others) alleging illegal grant of land lease, invoking various sections of the IPC, Prevention of Corruption Act, and Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act.

Issues:

Whether there exists sufficient grounds to quash the FIRs against the appellants, considering the allegations of illegal land lease and construction activities.

Held:

The court noted that the lease for the cricket stadium was granted at a nominal rental as per the Himachal Pradesh Lease Rules, 1993, which was not contrary to law. The lease for commercial activities was also done in accordance with Lease Rules, 2011.

The court observed that while several senior government officials involved in the land lease were not charged or prosecuted, junior officers were made scapegoats. This indicated bias in the prosecution and raised doubts about the fairness of the case.

The court emphasized that there was no criminal act on the part of the appellants, especially considering that the officers involved in the decision-making process were not prosecuted. The conversion of the cricket association into a non-profit company was done as per the mandate of the BCCI.

The court criticized the High Court for dismissing the petition without thorough examination, emphasizing the need for caution in exercising judicial powers under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Based on the above analysis, the Supreme Court quashed the FIRs against the appellants, concluding that no criminal case was made out against them.