Facts:

The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court under various sections of the Indian Penal Code for murder, causing grievous injuries, criminal intimidation, and house trespass. The High Court confirmed the conviction and awarded the death penalty. However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals and commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in confirming the death penalty without properly applying established legal principles.

Whether mitigating circumstances were adequately considered.

Whether the conduct of the appellant in prison and the possibility of reform were properly weighed.

Whether a psychological assessment was necessary.

Whether there was procedural impropriety in the sentencing process.

Held:

The High Court erroneously confirmed the death penalty without correctly applying the law laid down in previous cases such as Bachan Singh, Machhi Singh, Santosh Bariyar, and Shankar Kisanrao Khade.

Mitigating circumstances, including the appellant's lack of a significant criminal record and positive conduct in prison, were not adequately considered by the High Court.

The conduct of the appellant in prison, indicating the possibility of reform, should have been taken into account while deciding the appropriate punishment.

A proper psychological or psychiatric evaluation should have been conducted to assess the probability or possibility of the appellant's reform.

Procedural impropriety occurred as the Trial court failed to conduct a separate hearing for sentencing, denying the appellant an opportunity to present relevant evidence for mitigation.

Decision: The Supreme Court commuted the death penalty to life imprisonment, emphasizing that imprisonment for life was a suitable alternative and that the death penalty was not the only option in this case.

Facts:

The appellant lodged FIR No.35/2015 against the first respondent alleging harassment and abetment to suicide.

The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench at Nagpur quashed the proceedings instituted against the first respondent.

The appellant appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings against the first respondent.

Whether the investigation being incomplete and no charge-sheet filed justified the High Court's delve into the intention of the respondent.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court was not justified in delving into questions of the respondent's intention to abet suicide at that stage, especially when the investigation was incomplete and no charge-sheet had been filed. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the concerned authorities to complete the investigation promptly.

The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, leaving it to be considered at the appropriate stage. The appeal stands allowed in aforesaid terms.

Facts:

The case involved allegations of sexual assault by the respondent-accused on the prosecutrix, a minor girl aged about nine years.

The prosecutrix alleged that the accused, her cousin, had been sexually assaulting her for about three years.

The prosecutrix disclosed the incidents to her school teachers and the president of the Gram Panchayat.

The Trial Court convicted the accused based on the prosecutrix's testimony and medical evidence, but the High Court reversed the conviction on the grounds of lack of confidence in the prosecutrix's testimony and inconclusive medical evidence.

Issues:

Whether the prosecutrix's testimony inspires confidence and is reliable.

Whether the medical evidence is conclusive regarding the sexual assault.

Whether the non-examination of the prosecutrix's aunt is fatal to the prosecution's case.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the prosecutrix's testimony was credible and reliable, emphasizing that corroboration is not mandatory in rape cases if the victim's testimony is trustworthy.

The absence of injuries on the prosecutrix's private parts did not negate the possibility of sexual assault, especially considering her young age.

The Court dismissed the argument regarding the non-examination of the prosecutrix's aunt, stating that it was not fatal to the prosecution's case.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the conviction of the respondent-accused under Section 376 IPC was restored, along with the sentence of ten years' imprisonment.

The respondent-accused was directed to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence, failing which he would be taken into custody.

Facts:

The landowners executed a lease deed for 99 years, which expired on October 21, 1990.

The property housed a cotton mill. Subsequently, the property was vested in a public charitable trust, with the respondents being trustees.

'P' Mills continued to occupy the property as a protected or statutory tenant under the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, even after the lease expired.

Issues:

The retrospective impact of subsequent legislation, namely the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Laws (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2014, on the rights and liabilities of the parties involved, particularly regarding the enforceability of the decree against NTC.

Held:

The amended Section 3 of the Textile Undertaking (Nationalisation) Act, 1995, as per the 2014 Act, transferred the statutory or protected tenancy rights of 'P' Mills to the Central Government from April 1, 1994. Consequently, any decree against NTC, including its undertaking, became unenforceable by legal fiction.

The court clarified that any person considering themselves aggrieved can file a review petition, as per Section 114 and Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This remedy is not limited to parties in the original judgment but extends to third parties who consider themselves aggrieved.

Decision: The review petition is dismissed, affirming the retrospective impact of the legislative amendments on the rights and liabilities of the parties involved, particularly concerning the decree against NTC.

Facts:

The case involved multiple suits, including ones for partition of properties and specific performance of an agreement of sale. The appellants contested the validity of the Wills presented by the defendants, as well as the right of the defendants to alienate the properties they purchased from Veeraswamy. Additionally, challenges were raised against a specific performance suit, citing escalation in property prices.

Issues:

Validity of the Wills presented by the defendants.

Right of the defendants to alienate the properties purchased from Veeraswamy.

Challenges to the specific performance suit, including the escalation in property prices.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Wills presented by the defendants were valid, thereby conferring ownership of the properties to Veeraswamy. Since Veeraswamy was the owner of the properties, he had the right to alienate them, and the defendants who purchased properties from him were considered bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration. The challenges to the specific performance suit were dismissed, as the appellants lacked the right to question the agreement of sale and failed to prove hardship.

The court further held that due to the absence of legal representatives of deceased parties and deleted parties, the appeals could not proceed without the necessary parties.

Allowing the appeals to proceed could result in conflicting decrees, violating the principle of avoiding inconsistent decrees about the same subject matter. Therefore, the appeals were dismissed both on the ground of non-maintainability due to abatement and on the merits of the case.

Facts:

The case involves the selection process for Sub-Inspectors (Civil Police) and Platoon Commanders (Provincial Armed Constabulary or PAC) in Uttar Pradesh, with a total of 4010 posts advertised. Challenges were raised regarding the selection of certain candidates who used whitener or blade during the main examination. The final results were revised multiple times due to legal challenges.

Issues:

The eligibility of candidates who used whitener or blade during the main examination, the filling of vacant posts, and the adherence to selection criteria such as obtaining 50% or more marks in the written examination.

Held:

The court, considering various interventions and the presence of 607 vacant posts, directed that these posts be filled in the present selection itself as a one-time exception.

Additionally, it affirmed the correctness of the High Court's decision in Special Appeal No.416 of 2016.

Candidates must have obtained 50% or more marks in the main written examination to be eligible for selection, as per the court's directive.

Despite the discrepancy between the number of candidates called for group discussion (14256) and the notified vacancies (12030), the court found it inappropriate to eliminate the excess candidates from consideration. It directed the filling of the remaining 607 vacancies.

The court emphasized that the vacancies for candidates excluded due to the use of whitener or blade should be in addition to the total number of posts advertised (4010), resulting in a total selection of 4010+1022 candidates.

The court directed the State Government to make available 833 posts (607 + 226) in the present selection, strictly in order of merit and subject to fulfilling eligibility criteria.

The direction to fill up the 833 posts was specified as an addition to any previous directions issued.

Matters unrelated to the present selection, such as promotions for Head Constables or Constables to the post of Sub-Inspectors, were segregated for separate consideration.

Facts:

The appellant, Bangalore International Airport Area Planning Authority, demanded betterment charges, building construction charges, etc., from the respondents, including Birla Super Bulk Terminal (now a unit of UltraTech Cement Ltd.), for land allotted by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) for the construction of a Bulk Cement Terminal. The respondents challenged this demand through a writ petition, arguing that as the land was allotted by the KIADB, they were not liable to pay development charges under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether the Planning Authority under the KTCP Act has jurisdiction to levy betterment charges on development activities within industrial areas governed by the KIAD Act.

Whether there is any conflict between the provisions of the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act regarding the authority to regulate land use and development.

Held:

The Court examined the objects and scope of both the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act and found that they operate in different fields. The KIAD Act is focused on securing the establishment of industrial areas and promoting orderly development of industries, while the KTCP Act regulates planned growth of land use and development, including town planning schemes.

The levy of prescribed fees under Section 18 of the KTCP Act encompasses both changing land use and development of land or building.

The Planning Authority constituted under the KTCP Act is empowered to grant approval for development on land within its jurisdiction, including land acquired and allotted by the KIADB under the KIAD Act.

Both the KIAD Act and the KTCP Act must be harmoniously construed to give effect to their respective provisions, and there is no inconsistency or overlapping between them.

The High Court's findings regarding the applicability of the KTCP Act to industrial areas governed by the KIAD Act were contradictory, and the Planning Authority has the authority to levy betterment charges as per the law.

Decision: The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, and the respondents are directed to pay the demanded charges to the appellant authority with interest at the rate of 6% from the date of the demand, within the stipulated period.

Facts:

The complainants had booked residential flats in a project named "White Spring Building" in Mumbai.

The possession of the flats was delayed beyond the agreed date.

The agreement between the parties contained Clause 17 specifying various contingencies that would extend the possession date.

The original allottees transferred their allotment within the family to the present respondents.

The appellant cited delays due to mandatory requirements such as resubmission of plans and obtaining fresh NOC for fire safety permission.

The appellant also claimed a reduction in the availability of sand due to restrictions on sand mining activities.

Issues:

Whether the complaints filed by subsequent transferees within the family were maintainable.

Whether the appellant was entitled to an extension of the possession period due to mandatory requirements and reduced availability of sand.

Held:

The court held that the complaints filed by subsequent transferees within the family were maintainable, distinguishing the case from instances where transfers were made to strangers (referring to Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Raje Ram, (2008) 17 SCC 407).

The court accepted the appellant's argument regarding delays due to mandatory requirements, granting a six-month extension for the period from 21.12.2012 to 07.05.2013.

While acknowledging the appellant's claim regarding the reduced availability of sand, the court did not fully accept the argument.

The court modified the directions issued by the Commission, ordering a lump sum compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to each respondent in respect of each case, in addition to other directions regarding payment and interest. With these directions civil appeals stand disposed of. No costs.

Facts:

Kamala (PW-1), the mother of the deceased Sankar, witnessed the brutal murder of her son. On August 19, 1996, while visiting her elder son's newborn baby in Harikesavanallur, Kamala and Sankar were attacked by a group of individuals armed with weapons. The attackers, including the appellant, inflicted fatal injuries on Sankar, leading to his death.

Issues:

The primary issue revolved around the credibility of Kamala's testimony as the sole eyewitness to the murder.

The defense challenged her account, citing various factors such as the location and circumstances of the attack.

Additionally, concerns were raised regarding the delay in lodging the complaint and registering the FIR, as well as alleged discrepancies between the oral and medical evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Kamala's testimony was credible and consistent, supported by medical evidence and other corroborative evidence. Despite attempts by the defense to discredit her account, the severity of the victim's injuries lent weight to her testimony. The court also found the delay in lodging the complaint and registering the FIR reasonable given the circumstances of the incident.

Furthermore, the court emphasized that motive, while relevant, was not essential in cases where eyewitness testimony was strong and supported by other evidence. The defense's arguments regarding discrepancies between the oral and medical evidence were deemed insignificant, as such variances did not undermine the prosecution's case.

Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's conviction and sentence were upheld. The appellant was directed to surrender within two weeks to serve the remainder of his sentence if he had not already done so.