Facts:

The case involves a civil appeal regarding the amendment of pay scales for employees, specifically within the Prosecution Department. The respondent, Vijay Shankar Dubey, was initially appointed as an Assistant Public Officer and was later promoted to the position of Joint Director, Prosecution. The Fifth Pay Commission recommended revised pay scales, and the pay scale for the post of Joint Director, Prosecution, was increased from Rs. 3700-5000 to Rs. 12000-16500.

Issues:

Whether the cut-off date of April 1, 2001, for the amendment of pay scales was rational and valid.

Whether the respondent, who retired on January 31, 1997, was entitled to the benefit of the higher pay scale from January 1, 1996.

Held:

The Supreme Court considered arguments from both sides and concluded that the decision to fix the cut-off date for the benefit of amended pay scales was rational. The decision was based on the analogy of the CBI organization's pay scales. The Court held that when a benefit is extended for the first time, the State can set a reasonable cut-off date. The Court found that it was not obligatory for the State to extend the benefit based on the Fifth Pay Commission's recommendations, dated January 1, 1996. As the respondent was not covered by the Government order dated 02.02.2007 and had retired before the implementation date, the Court held that he was not entitled to the benefit of the amendment in the pay scale.

Facts:

In two separate civil appeals, candidates contested elections for seats reserved for backward class citizens in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act required candidates to submit caste validity certificates, failing which, the election would be deemed retrospectively terminated and the candidate disqualified.

Issues:

Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is ousted by the statutory scheme of Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act?

Whether the High Court has the authority to pass orders affecting the statutory fiction under Section 5B leading to disqualification?

Whether the interim orders issued by the High Court were within its jurisdiction under Article 226?

Whether the High Court's interim orders allowing candidates to continue were valid in light of the statutory scheme of Section 5B?

Held:

The Court held that the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts under Article 226 overrides any contrary provision in a statute, and this power cannot be taken away or abridged by any statutory provision.

The Court clarified that the High Court can pass orders interdicting the statutory fiction under Section 5B if the fiction had not yet come into operation. It emphasized the wide scope of Article 226 and its power to remedy injustice.

The Court concluded that the High Court's jurisdiction to issue interim orders is not limited to the one-year time frame mentioned in Section 5B. Interim orders can be granted to maintain the status quo and ensure that the relief sought in a writ petition does not become infructuous.

The deeming fiction of retrospective termination of election under Section 5B could not come into operation due to the interim orders passed by the High Court. The Court dismissed the argument that interim orders couldn't continue beyond the prescribed time frame.

The Court answered the formulated points as follows:

Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act does not oust the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226.

The High Court can pass orders interdicting the statutory fiction under Section 5B if it hasn't come into operation.

The interim and final orders of the High Court were within its jurisdiction under Article 226.

The interim orders and final judgment of the High Court were valid in light of the statutory scheme of Section 5B.

There is no merit in the appeals. All the appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

Akshay Kumar Singh, the appellant, filed a writ petition (criminal) under Article 32 challenging the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. The petitioner raised various grounds for review, including issues related to the consideration of the petition, alleged miscarriage of justice, solitary confinement, torture in prison, and influence of media interviews on the decision.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the mercy petition suffered from any procedural or substantive irregularities that warranted judicial review.

Whether subsequent events like the filing of divorce petitions were relevant grounds for reviewing the rejection.

Held:

The court began by stating that the exercise of judicial review over decisions made by the President of India in mercy petitions is limited. The scope of judicial review can be invoked based on specific grounds, such as lack of application of mind, mala fide, consideration of irrelevant factors, exclusion of relevant materials, and arbitrariness. The court referred to the importance of indicating reasons in pardon/remission orders and the power to withdraw such orders if relevant materials are not considered (Para 5).

The court rejected the petitioner's arguments that there was a miscarriage of justice, torture in prison, and that media interviews influenced the rejection of the mercy petition. The court held that the President's decision was based on the case records and no evidence indicated non-application of mind. Allegations of prison torture were not valid grounds for reviewing the rejection (Para 6-7).

Regarding subsequent events, such as the filing of divorce petitions by the petitioner's wife, the court ruled that these could not be considered grounds for judicial review of the President's decision. The court emphasized that the President had already gone through the case records and evidence in making the decision (Para 9).

The court concluded that the petitioner's grounds did not meet the criteria for judicial review, and there was no valid reason to warrant a review of the rejection of the mercy petition by the President (Para 10-11).

Writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that he, his mother, and sisters had equal shares in a land, which defendant No. 5 obtained through a Will. The Will was contested as fraudulent and misrepresented. The trial and the first appellate court rejected the suit, citing existing property partition and valid Will proof. However, the High Court, in a second appeal, decreed in favor of the plaintiff, alleging suspicious circumstances around the Will's execution.

Issues:

Whether the Will's execution was duly proved?

Whether secondary evidence of the lost original Will was admissible?

Whether the High Court's interference with the concurrent findings of lower courts was justified?

Held:

The Will's attesting witness and the scribe's statements confirmed its proper execution. The Will's exclusion of natural heirs didn't render it suspicious. The High Court's intervention was improper as it disregarded the consistent findings of the lower courts. (Para 11, 23, 30, 33)

Section 65 of the Evidence Act permits secondary evidence when the original document is lost. In this case, evidence showed the original Will was lost, and secondary evidence was appropriately admitted. There was no requirement to file an application for permission to lead secondary evidence under Section 65(c). (Para 15, 17, 20)

The High Court, under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, lacked jurisdiction to overturn findings of fact. The findings of fact could not be interfered with even in the absence of framing substantial questions of law. (Para 11)

Facts:

The appellants filed MAs seeking directions pertaining to the implementation of the Reservation Act 2018. The respondents argued that these applications were not maintainable since they essentially challenged the subsequent actions of the State government in implementing the Act, rather than seeking clarification or modification of the original judgment.

Issues:

Whether the MAs filed by the appellants were maintainable, considering they appeared to challenge the actions of the State government under the Reservation Act 2018.

Held:

The court held that the MAs were, in substance, a substantive challenge to the State government's actions in implementing the Reservation Act 2018. As the court had already upheld the constitutional validity of the Act in a previous judgment, the present applications were deemed not maintainable. The court emphasized that if the applicants were aggrieved by the State government's actions, they should pursue independent remedies available under the law.

Facts:

A notice inviting tender was issued by the appellant, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (BCCL), for hiring Heavy Earth Moving Machinery (HEMM) for coal extraction and transportation. The bidding was conducted online, and technical issues led to connectivity problems during the auction. The last bid by respondent No. 1 went unresponded for thirty minutes, resulting in the auction's automatic closure. The auction was later restarted due to technical issues and communicated to all bidders. Respondent No. 6 was ultimately declared the successful bidder.

Issues:

The scope of judicial review in tender matters.

Allegations of illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety.

Whether larger public interest was affected by the auction process.

The existence of technical problems and connectivity issues during the auction.

Interpretation of contractual terms and authority's decision-making process.

Held:

The scope of judicial review in tenders has been extensively discussed. Courts are concerned with lawfulness, not soundness, of decisions. Allegations of illegality and procedural impropriety warrant judicial intervention. The decision-making process is subject to scrutiny, but not the end result.

Writs are appropriate remedies when a constitutional right is infringed, such as treating all equally or challenging actions in contravention to trade and commerce freedom. Writs are impermissible when allegations concern contractual rights or duties.

The Division Bench of the High Court failed to evaluate whether larger public interest was affected. Respondent No. 1's interest was private and monetary, not a public law right.

After an inquiry report by the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), it was clear that BCCL and others acted bona fide. Technical issues and connectivity problems were established, and no fraudulent decisions were proven .

The Division Bench erred in holding no technical difficulties existed, contrary to the findings of various entities. Multiple bids were received after the resumption of the auction process, indicating technical issues

The uniform communication about the extension of the auction time placed all bidders on equal footing. Respondent No. 1's interpretation was moot since they did not object to the email's wording during the resumed auction .

Courts must defer to the authority's interpretation of contractual terms unless it is patently perverse or mala fide. BCCL's interpretation was plausible, and mere differences in interpretation are not grounds for finding illegality.

Facts:

On 21st April, 2007, during a marriage ceremony, the appellant fired celebratory gunshots that resulted in injuries to five individuals, leading to the deaths of two. The appellant's defense was accidental firing caused by a ball hitting the gun. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's act constituted 'culpable homicide' or 'murder'?

Whether celebratory firing with unintended consequences falls under Section 304 Part-2 of the IPC?

Held:

The appellant's act of firing towards the roof during the marriage ceremony, although unintentional, was found to be an act of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 of the IPC, punishable under Section 304 Part-2. The appellant carried a loaded gun in a crowded event, aiming towards the roof, which resulted in injuries and fatalities. While he may not have intended to kill, his actions invited risk and likely consequences. The sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC was reduced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, and the conviction under Section 307 IPC was altered to Section 308 IPC. The fine remained unchanged.

The Court referred to the case of Kunwar Pal vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2014) 12 SCC 434, wherein the intention to kill was not proven, and the accused was given the benefit of doubt, resulting in a lesser conviction.

Facts:

The appellant, Ex-Gunner Virender Prasad, was found guilty of murdering Gunner-Sushil Kumar while posted in a sensitive area during a time of heightened terrorist threats. The appellant claimed he had shot the deceased under the belief of a militant attack.

Issues:

Whether Section 433-A of the CrPC applies to a case tried under Section 69 of the Army Act, regarding the minimum imprisonment term before release for a life convict.

To determine an appropriate sentence for the appellant considering factors such as the nature of the offence, circumstances, prior criminal record, age of the offender, rehabilitation prospects, and community needs.

Held:

The Court confirmed the appellant's guilt but focused on the sentence.

The Court referred to previous cases, such as Santa Singh v. The State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190, which established that a proper sentence involves considering multiple factors.

The Court acknowledged that Section 433-A of the CrPC, which mandates a minimum imprisonment term before release for life convicts, applies to cases under Section 69 of the Army Act. However, the appellant had already served over 16 years and 6 months in prison, exceeding the 14-year requirement.

Taking into account the appellant's conduct, the circumstances, and the time served, the Court found that the sentence served was proportionate to the offence. As a result, the Court ordered the appellant's immediate release.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant's release was directed.

FACTS:

Respondent No. 1, a judicial officer, was appointed as Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate. During the probationary period, allegations of misdemeanour and corruption in discharge of judicial functions were received. The Registrar (Vigilance) of the Rajasthan High Court submitted a report detailing these allegations. The Full Court evaluated probationary judges' suitability, based on integrity, knowledge, conduct, and behaviour. Respondent No. 1's services were not confirmed based on overall assessment.

ISSUES:

• Whether the termination during the probationary period was punitive or due to unsatisfactory performance?

• Whether specific allegations or overall performance were the basis for the termination?

• Whether principles of natural justice apply in this case of non-confirmation?

HELD:

The purpose of probation is to evaluate suitability for a position, and probationers do not have an indefeasible right to continue in employment.

The High Court's role in judicial review of administrative decisions is cautious and should not substitute for an appellate role.

Termination based on overall performance during probation, rather than specific misconduct, may not be treated as punitive.

In this case, the termination was based on an overall assessment of performance, not specific misconduct.

The Court can consider overall suitability and relevant factors when assessing probationers' performance.

DECISION:

The appeals are allowed. The High Court's judgment is set aside, and the order of discharge of Respondent No. 1's services during probation is approved.