Facts:

The respondent, Mahendra Construction, filed a complaint after the insurer repudiated an insurance claim for damage to an excavator. The claim was initially allowed by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission ("SCDRC") and partly upheld by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission ("NCDRC").

Issues:

The duty of the insured to make a full, true, and complete disclosure of material facts, specifically regarding previous insurance claims, as required by the proposal form. The insurer contended that such disclosure was not made, leading to the repudiation of the claim.

Held:

The court held that the duty of disclosure is fundamental in insurance contracts and is governed by the principle of utmost good faith. The insured, as the proposer, is obliged to disclose all material facts, and any breach of this duty empowers the insurer to avoid the contract. The court emphasized that the mere disclosure of a previous insurance policy did not discharge the duty, and the proposer must specifically disclose claims lodged in the preceding three years.

The NCDRC's reasoning that the insurer could have discovered the claims through further inquiry or by returning the proposal was deemed flawed. The court emphasized that the burden of establishing misrepresentation and suppression of material facts lies with the insurer, and the insured's duty is to make a clear and specific disclosure.

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the NCDRC's decision, and dismissed the complaint filed by the respondent.

Facts:

The respondent contractor invoked the arbitration clause in the agreement by sending a notice to the appellant due to a dispute regarding outstanding dues. The appellant rejected the request, asserting that the "No Due Certificate" had been signed, implying no dispute for arbitration.

Issues:

The rejection of the respondent's request for an arbitrator based on the "No Due Certificate" and the subsequent application by the respondent under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act for the appointment of an independent arbitrator.

Held:

The contractor signs a "No Claim" certificate as per Clause 43(2) of the Contract, but the respondent contested this by filing an application to refer the matter to arbitration. The conditions under Clause 64(1) and 64(3) dictate the referral of disputes to arbitration if amicable settlement is not achieved.

The judgment clarifies that the provisions of the Amendment Act, 2015, do not apply retroactively to arbitral proceedings initiated before its enforcement, in accordance with Section 21 and Section 26 of the Principal Act, 1996.

Requests made by the respondent were prior to the enforcement of the Amendment Act, 2015. The court emphasizes examining the applications under the Principal Act, 1996, without invoking the Amendment Act.

Each case must be considered based on its facts. The court acknowledges the challenges faced by small contractors and highlights the need for a fair examination of claims in arbitral proceedings.

Respondent contractors, seeking refund of security deposits or challenging unilateral reductions in escalation costs, are entitled to have their claims examined in arbitral proceedings. The dispute persists, and the contract is not discharged as claimed by the appellants.

Clause (c) of sub-section (6) of Section 11 emphasizes the importance of giving precedence to the agreed procedure before resorting to alternative arrangements. The court encourages exhausting the agreed remedy before turning to the court.

The court stresses the duty to adhere to agreed terms and procedures for settling disputes under the contract through the appointment of a designated arbitrator.

While the independence and impartiality of the arbitrator are paramount, in cases where doubts arise, or the appointed tribunal fails to function, a fresh appointment may be necessary, as per Section 11(6) of the Act.

The High Court's appointment of an independent arbitrator without following the contract's prescribed procedure is deemed unjustified. The appellants are directed to appoint an arbitrator in terms of Clause 64(3) of the agreement within the stipulated period.

FACTS:

The appellant and respondent Nos. 4-6 approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) against respondent Nos. 1-3 (Ordinance Factory Board & Ors.) seeking regularization of their services.

The CAT dismissed the Original Application (OA) filed by the appellant and respondent Nos. 4-6.

The High Court at Calcutta upheld the dismissal, stating that the remedy lies in approaching the Central Government for an industrial reference to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

ISSUES:

Whether the Tribunal and the High Court were justified in dismissing the OA and writ petition.

Jurisdiction of the Central Government in industrial disputes.

Applicability of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

HELD:

The High Court was justified in stating that the remedy of the appellant and respondent Nos. 4-6 lies in applying to the Central Government for an industrial reference to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, rather than pursuing their remedy through an OA before the Tribunal or a writ petition in the High Court. (Para 8)

The nature of the controversy raised by the appellant and respondent Nos. 4-6 suggests that their remedy lies in settling their alleged dispute through the Industrial Tribunal in a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. (Para 10)

If a reference is eventually made to the Industrial Tribunal at the instance of the appellant and respondent Nos. 4-6, the issue in question shall be decided strictly in accordance with the law by the Industrial Tribunal, uninfluenced by any observations made by the Tribunal, the High Court, and the Supreme Court in these proceedings. (Para 13)

The appeal is dismissed accordingly.( Para 14)

Facts:

An FIR was filed against three co-accused individuals, including the petitioner, under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the SC/ST Act. The petitioner sought anticipatory bail, but the District Principal Judge dismissed the application. The petitioner approached the Madras High Court, where the Registry refused to number the petition, questioning its maintainability under the SC/ST Act.

Issues:

Whether the Madras High Court Registry had the authority to question the maintainability of the anticipatory bail petition.

The impact of the 2018 amendment to the SC/ST Act, specifically Section 18-A.

Held:

The nature of judicial function is distinguished from administrative functions. Judicial function involves the duty to act judicially, applying objective standards to facts and declaring rights or imposing obligations affecting civil rights. The Madras High Court Registry's objection to maintainability requires judicial application of mind and, as such, cannot be delegated to the Registry. The order rejecting numbering/registration is unsustainable.( Para 9)

The determination in this case is a judicial function, and the High Court Registry erred in rejecting the numbering. The Registry is directed to number the petition and place it before an appropriate bench.( Para 10)

The Supreme Court has not expressed any views on the nature of the amendment, the standard of judicial review, or the justiciability under Section 18-A of the SC/ST Act. These aspects are left open for the appropriate Bench to consider.( Para 11)

The Supreme Court has not expressed any views on the merits of the case, and the High Court is requested to consider the matter uninfluenced by the observations made in the judgment.( Para 12)

Facts:

The accused sought to marry the complainant, already married to the victim.

Multiple attempts were made to sever the relationship between the complainant and her husband.

The victims were abducted by the accused, released, and later the husband was murdered to facilitate the accused's desire to marry the complainant.

Separate complaints and trials were conducted for the incidents of abduction and murder.

Issues:

The unity of purpose and design between the abduction and murder offenses.

Admissibility and reliability of circumstantial evidence.

Validity and weight of DNA and superimposition tests.

Separate first information reports (FIRs) for abduction and murder.

Held:

Unity of Offenses: The abduction and murder were distinct offenses with different times, places, and motives. No continuity of action existed between the two, justifying separate investigations and trials.

Circumstantial Evidence: The reliance on circumstantial evidence was deemed valid. The detailed deposition of PW-1 and the consistent support from PW-2 provided a strong case. Minor variations in PW-1's testimony did not undermine the prosecution's version.

Expert Evidence - DNA: DNA evidence, though valuable, was considered advisory. Its absence didn't lead to adverse inferences, given the presence of other reliable evidence supporting the prosecution's case.

Superimposition Test: The superimposition test was accepted as corroborative evidence, enhancing the reliability of PWs 1 and 2 identification of the deceased. The scientific methodology used in the test was deemed sound.

Confession and Recovery: The recovery based on the confession of Accused No.6, including a wallet identified by PW-1, was deemed valid under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The recovery of the deceased's body and its identification stood proven.

Corroborative Evidence: The bill book and cash book from a petrol pump, along with consistent testimonies of PWs 1 and 2, supported the prosecution's case. No embellishments or exaggerations were found in their evidence.

Facts:

The appellant, Hanuman Laxman Aroskar, appealed against a decision related to the grant of Environmental Clearance (EC) under the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986. The case involved non-disclosure of material information in Form 1, as required by the 2006 notification.

Issues:

Whether the failure to disclose material information in Form 1, as per the 2006 notification, affects the objective of balancing development with environmental protection?

Can an applicant claim EC based on substantial or proportionate compliance with the 2006 notification terms?

What is the burden of establishing environmental compliance for a project proponent?

Is the Court required to determine the bona fides of the appellants invoking its jurisdiction?

Held:

Address the significance of full disclosure and strict compliance with the terms of the 2006 notification. The court emphasizes that the notification establishes a code to balance development with environmental protection. The burden of environmental compliance lies with the project proponent, and any breach renders the process vulnerable to challenge.

Specifically discuss the importance of addressing material environmental concerns, making changes in the draft EIA and EMP, and the submission of a supplementary report. Non-compliance with these elements can lead to challenges based on the absence of full disclosure, inadequate analysis of concerns, and failure to account for significant environmental issues.

The Court records a finding on the bona fides of the appellants and dismisses the respondents' claim of a personal agenda.

Decision: The appeal is allowed in favor of the appellant.

Facts:

The High Court of Punjab & Haryana disposed of second appeals without framing substantial questions of law, which is a prerequisite under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeals arose from a judgment of the First Appellate Court related to property disputes.

Issues:

Whether the High Court has the jurisdiction to allow second appeals without framing substantial questions of law.

The correctness of the judgment of the First Appellate Court in the context of property entitlement.

Held:

The High Court, in allowing second appeals, erred in not framing substantial questions of law as required by Section 100 of the Code.

Remanding the cases to the High Court for fresh disposal on merits, emphasizing the mandatory nature of framing substantial questions of law.

The High Court must adhere to the proper procedure and frame substantial questions before deciding second appeals.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act against the appellant.

Judicial Magistrate found the appellant guilty, imposing imprisonment, fine, and compensation.

Appellate Court allowed the appeal, remanding the case for fresh evidence.

High Court, in revision, awarded imprisonment and compensation, questioning the legality of the remand.

Issues:

Legality of the Appellate Court's decision to remand the case.

Jurisdictional error by the High Court in deciding the complaint on merits instead of addressing the remand issue.

Held:

The High Court erred in allowing the revision and sentencing the appellant without addressing the legality of the remand.

The Appellate Court also erred in remanding the case, as there was enough material to decide the appeal on merits.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's order and the Appellate Court's remand decision.Criminal Appeal No. 7/2005 is restored to its original file.The Appellate Court is directed to decide the appeal afresh on merits within six months, without being influenced by prior observations.

Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Achal Industries, challenged the levy of turnover tax on the total turnover as per Section 6-B(1) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. The appellant contended that turnover tax should apply only to the "taxable turnover" and not the entire "total turnover." Assessments for the years 1990-91 to 1999-2000 were disputed, and the appellant argued that the interpretation of Section 6-B(1) was a misconstruction.

Issues:

The interpretation of the term "total turnover" in Section 6-B(1) and whether turnover tax could be levied on the entire turnover or only on the "taxable turnover."

Held:

The Court examined the pre-amendment version of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act and noted that the expression "total turnover" under Section 6-B(1) was for the identification and classification of dealers for prescribing tax rates. The first proviso provided an exhaustive list of deductions, emphasizing that nothing else could be deducted from the total turnover for the purpose of turnover tax.( Para 8)

Referring to M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and Others case (1983), the Court highlighted the economic superiority principle for levying turnover tax. The Court emphasized that the interpretation of the statute should not depend on contingency and applied a strict rule of interpretation, especially in taxation statutes.( Para 10)

The Court reiterated that the term "total turnover" in Section 6-B(1) was meant for the identification and classification of dealers, and the provisos made it clear that only deductions mentioned therein were allowed. The argument that "total turnover" should be read as "taxable turnover" was deemed unsustainable.( Para 12)

The Court dismissed the appeals, stating that the submissions lacked substance. The decision was in line with the interpretation that turnover tax applied to the entire "total turnover" as defined in Section 2(u-2) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act.( Para 13)