Facts:

The case involves retired employees of Railways, who withdrew all superannuation benefits, including the full amount in their Provident Fund account. Subsequently, they were re-employed on a retainer basis with a private limited company. The question arose whether they should be covered under the Provident Fund Scheme or treated as 'excluded employees' as per the Scheme's provisions.

Issues:

Whether the retired railway employees, having withdrawn all superannuation benefits, are to be treated as 'excluded employees' under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952.

Held:

Background of the Act : The Employees’ Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, aimed to provide compulsory contributory provident funds for the future security of industrial workers. The Act allowed for the continuation of other provident funds offering equal or more advantageous terms.

Definition of "Excluded Employee" : The term "excluded employee" is not defined in the Act of 1952 but finds definition in the Scheme of 1952, specifically in clause (f) of paragraph 2.

Scheme and Structure : The Act of 1952 mandates the framing of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme by the Central Government, and a Fund is established under this Scheme. The term "Fund" refers to the provident fund established under the Scheme.

Exemption under Section 17(1) Section 17(1) allows establishments to be exempted from the Scheme's provisions under certain conditions, emphasizing equivalent or more favorable benefits for employees.

Exclusion Criteria : Clause (i) of Paragraph 2(f) excludes an employee who was a Fund member and withdrew the full amount on retirement, including various retirement scenarios.

Specific Reference to "The Fund" : The usage of "the Fund" in Paragraphs 2(f), 26, and 69 indicates reference to the Fund created under the Scheme of 1952. To be an "excluded employee," one must be a member of this specific Fund.

Application to Retired Railway Employees: Retired railway employees, having withdrawn from a different fund, couldn't be considered "excluded employees" since they were never members of the Fund under the Scheme of 1952.

Mandatory Nature of Act and Scheme : The provisions of the Act and the Scheme are mandatory. Exemptions are allowed only under specific conditions mentioned in Section 17 and Paragraph 26.

Application Regardless of Age The Act and Scheme's operation is not restricted by the age of the employee. The argument concerning the age of the employees is baseless.

Application for Exemption : The plea that the appellants applied for exemption and received no decision was rejected. The liability to make contributions persisted until an exemption order was issued.

Single Judge's Observations : The Single Judge's suggestion regarding the application of clause (i) of Paragraph 2(f) was deemed unwarranted. The exclusion from the Scheme is limited to the categories mentioned in Paragraph 2(f).

Framework of the Scheme : The Scheme's framework is clear; a person withdrawing from the Fund created under the Scheme of 1952 may be considered an "excluded employee." This ensures continued financial security for employees.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming that the retired railway employees, having withdrawn from a different fund, could not be treated as "excluded employees" under the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952.

Facts:

The complainant (PW-3) alleged that the appellant entered her house, threatened her with a pistol, and committed rape.

No medical examination of the complainant was conducted after the incident.

Prosecution did not present any doctor in the trial to support their case.

Past instances of false complaints by the complainant against others were not disputed.

Enmity between the appellant and the complainant's husband was acknowledged.

The prosecutrix had a habit of making false allegations in disputes.

No eyewitness to the incident; PW-2, a cited witness, was a chance witness.

PW-1, the complainant's husband, admitted being away during the incident.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution has proved the case of rape against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The prosecution failed to prove the rape case against the appellant.

Lack of medical examination of the complainant, absence of supporting medical evidence, and a history of false complaints weakened the prosecution's case.

Enmity between the parties and the complainant's habit of making wild allegations were crucial factors.

No eyewitness and the cited witness (PW-2) being a chance witness were significant drawbacks.

The husband's admission of being away during the incident further weakened the case.

Consequently, both lower courts were unjustified in convicting the appellant under Section 376 IPC.

The appeal was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

Facts:

The respondent, M/S Prasoon Enterprises, was engaged in the trading of spare parts of mining machinery, including steel wire ropes.

The Commercial Tax Officer (CTO) conducted a survey and found that the respondent was charging VAT at the rate of 4% on "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes."

The dispute arose regarding the proper Entry for taxing these goods under the Rajasthan Value Added Tax Act, 2003.

Issues:

Whether "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes" should be taxed at the rate of 4% or 12.5% under the VAT Act.

Held:

The relevant Entry, Entry 155 of Schedule IV, specifically includes "Hydraulic excavators (earth moving and mining machinery), Mobile Cranes and Hydraulic Dumpers (including parts thereof)," taxed at 4%.

The expression "including parts thereof" was added by an amendment, indicating that parts were taxable at 4% only after 09.05.2006.

The principle that a thing is a part of another if the other cannot function without it was applied. Wire ropes were deemed an essential part of Mobile Cranes, falling under Entry 155 and taxed at 4%.

The literature and specifications submitted by the respondent supported the indispensability of wire ropes for the effective functioning of Mobile Cranes.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed that "Mobile Crane Wire Ropes" should be taxed at 4% under Entry 155 of Schedule IV of the VAT Act based on their essential role in the functioning of Mobile Cranes. The decision aligns with the principle that a part is integral if the whole cannot operate without it.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 142(2A) and (2C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessing officer had directed the assessee to get the accounts audited, and a dispute arose regarding the extension of time for submitting the audit report.

Issues:

The primary issue was whether, before the amendment, the assessing officer had the authority to extend time for the submission of the audit report without the assessee's application.

Held:

Sub-section (2A) of Section 142 empowers the assessing officer to direct the assessee to get the accounts audited. Sub-section (2C) imposes an obligation on the assessee to furnish the audit report within the period specified by the assessing officer. The overall time limit appears in the proviso, capping at 180 days.

The proviso allows the assessing officer to extend time on the assessee's application for valid reasons. The discretion to extend time is not absolute but subject to "good and sufficient reason."

The assessing officer, while fixing time initially, has the authority to extend it without an application. The overall ceiling of time is applicable. An interpretation otherwise would lead to absurd consequences.

The proviso creates a remedy for the assessee to seek an extension for genuine reasons. However, this does not diminish the assessing officer's authority to extend time without an application by the assessee.

The amendment was clarificatory, intended to remove ambiguity. The assessing officer's authority to extend time existed before the amendment.

The interpretation doesn't enable the assessing officer to extend the period of limitation for making an assessment under Section 153B. Explanation (iii) clarifies the exclusion of time.

Interpretation depends on the context, general scope, former state of the law, and legislative history. The amendment clarified the existing authority.

The provisions of Section 142(2C) before the amendment did not preclude the assessing officer from extending time without an application. The amendment was clarificatory in nature.

Facts:

Robbery of a police officer's service weapon and walkie-talkie on 20.12.2005.

Murder of Bhima Waghmare on 04.01.2006, using the same stolen service weapon.

Accused No.1 and Accused No.2 apprehended during the investigation of a kidnapping case.

Accused No.1 found with the stolen service weapon and two cell phones, including the one belonging to the murder victim.

Issues:

Identification of Accused No.1 and Accused No.2 in the absence of a Test Identification Parade.

Connection between the stolen mobile phone and the accused.

Establishing the link between the accused and the murder using the stolen service weapon.

Held:

The prosecution failed to establish a conclusive link between Accused No.1 and the murder. Lack of a Test Identification Parade, inconsistencies in mobile phone ownership, and gaps in the chain of evidence led to doubts. Applying the principles of circumstantial evidence, the Court gave the benefit of doubt to the Appellant (Accused No.1) and acquitted him of all charges.

The absence of a Test Identification Parade raised doubt on the identification of the accused (Para 13a).

Inconsistencies in mobile phone ownership created uncertainty regarding its connection to the accused (Para 13c).

Insufficient evidence to conclusively link the accused to the murder using the stolen service weapon (Para 15).

Benefit of doubt given, and the appellant acquitted of all charges (Para 18).

Facts:

Appellant, Mahavir Road and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., undertook road construction in Nashik and obtained an insurance policy covering 'material damage.'

The insurance claim was filed citing abnormal rainfall and water logging between June 25, 2007, and July 5, 2007, resulting in damage to the roads.

The insurer rejected the claim, attributing the damage to defective workmanship and materials, and failure to provide an alternative traffic route.

NCDRC dismissed the complaint, citing inconsistencies in the appellant's statements, delayed reporting, lack of evidence supporting flood damage, and minimal rainfall data on alleged damage dates.

Issues:

Consistency in appellant's statements regarding the date of damage.

Delayed reporting of damage to the insurer.

Lack of evidence supporting flood damage.

Appellant's failure to present expert testimony regarding the alleged damage cause.

Held:

The NCDRC found inconsistencies in the appellant's statements regarding the date of damage, impacting the credibility of the claim.

The delayed reporting of damage was a breach of the insurance policy obligation, as immediate notice was required.

Lack of evidence supporting flood damage: Meteorological data showed minimal rainfall on alleged damage dates, undermining the claim of abnormal rainfall and water logging.

The absence of expert testimony on the cause of damage weakened the appellant's case.

The insurance policy specifically excluded normal wear and tear, and the evidence did not substantiate the claim of damage due to abnormal rainfall.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the NCDRC decision.

Facts:

The respondent filed a consumer complaint seeking possession of a Row House or, in the alternative, refund with interest and compensation.

The appellant claimed completion certificate received in 2016, seven years beyond the extended possession date.

The primary relief sought was possession, but a prayer for refund was also present.

The NCDRC modified the SCDRC order, reducing compensation from Rs. 5 lakhs to Rs. 2 lakhs.

Issues:

Whether the delay in possession was reasonable.

The buyer's right to seek a refund after a significant delay.

The applicability and fairness of the Buyer's Agreement clauses.

Held:

The Buyer's Agreement was one-sided, providing for interest on the developer's default at a much lower rate than on the buyer's default.

A seven-year delay is beyond a reasonable period; the buyer can't be expected to wait indefinitely for possession.

The Court modified the NCDRC order, directing the appellant to pay interest at 9% per annum instead of 12% to the respondent.

The order for a refund of money was justified considering the unreasonable delay.

The amount outstanding to be released from the deposited money, with the balance, if any, refunded to the appellant.

Facts:

Consumer complaint filed by the appellant, an association representing buyers.

Complaint seeks various reliefs, including possession of flats, common amenities, and restraining respondents from charging additional amounts.

Appellants claim that the second respondent, Three C Universal Developers Private Limited, is the main promoter of the project.

Issues:

Whether the direction for the deletion of the second respondent was warranted.

Held:

The NCDRC directed the deletion of the second respondent based on the argument that the consumers did not hire or avail services from the first respondent.

The Court, at this stage, found it inconclusive that the second respondent is unconnected with the project.

The issue of relief to be granted will be determined during the course of the hearing.

Order for deletion not warranted at this stage, and the second respondent is restored as a party.

Complaint admitted against both respondents for final disposal, keeping all rights and contentions open.

Appeal allowed, setting aside the NCDRC's order, and restoring the second respondent as a party.

Facts:

The case revolves around a dispute over the construction of a common wall between two houses. The appellant, Nandlal Baviskar, was convicted under Section 302 IPC for murdering Lakhichand, the deceased. The altercation arose from frequent quarrels between the appellant and Dilip Waman Baviskar, due to expenses related to the construction of the common wall.

Issues:

Whether the act falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, indicating a sudden fight in the heat of passion, justifying modification of the appellant's conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC.

Held:

To fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, the act must be without premeditation, in a sudden fight, without the offender taking undue advantage, and not acting in a cruel or unusual manner. Disproportionate retaliation or undue advantage would disqualify the application of this exception.( Para 12)

The scope of Exception 4 was reiterated, emphasizing the need for the act to be committed in a sudden fight without premeditation and without undue advantage. The fight must be with the person killed.( Para 13)

The court analyzed the facts, emphasizing the proximity of the two incidents, the exchange of abuse, and the subsequent stick blow by the deceased's brother. The court concluded that the act was part of the same sudden quarrel, falling within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.( Para 14)

Despite the use of a dangerous weapon (gupti), the appellant inflicted a single injury in the heat of passion. The court held that the case falls under Exception 4, and the conviction under Section 302 IPC is liable to be modified under Section 304 Part II IPC.( Para 15)

The appeal was partly allowed, modifying the appellant's conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, and the appellant was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for twelve years.( Para 16)