Transfer of Suits – Patent Infringement vs. Groundless Threats – Section 25 CPC – Earlier suit under Section 106 Patents Act has independent cause of action – Delhi jurisdiction invoked via online purchase and delivery – Substantial overlap of parties, facts and issues – To avoid duplication and conflicting findings, infringement suit in Delhi transferred to Bombay – Cross transfer petition dismissed [Paras 9-14]

Transfer – Competing Petitions – Chronology and Overlap – Petitioner first filed Bombay suit (01.07.2025) for groundless threats; Respondent later filed Delhi infringement suit (07.07.2025) – Court notes substantial overlap in facts, law, and issues – Held appropriate to have both tried by the same forum to conserve judicial time and ensure consistency [Paras 10 & 12]

Patents – Groundless Threats (S.106) – Independence from Infringement Action – 1911 Act proviso negating groundless-threat action upon diligent prosecution of infringement suit was deleted in the 1970 Act – Hence, S.106 suit is an independent cause of action and can proceed irrespective of an infringement action [Para 9]

Jurisdiction – Patent Infringement – Online purchase and delivery at Delhi – Court records that Delhi jurisdiction was invoked by respondent through online purchase and delivery in Delhi, but transfers the Delhi suit to Bombay in the interests of justice given overlap and earlier Bombay filing [Para 10(ii), Para 12]

Precedents – Transfer to Avoid Conflicting Judgments – Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement, (2004) 3 SCC 85 – Applied – Where two suits between substantially the same parties arise out of the same transactions and evidence, separate trials may risk inconsistent findings; transfer allowed [Para 11]

Decision: Transfer Petition (C) No. 1983 of 2025 allowed – CS (COMM) No. 663 of 2025 (Delhi) transferred to Bombay High Court to be tried with Commercial IP (L) No. 19837 of 2025 – Injunction applications to be taken up and disposed of expeditiously – Transfer Petition (C) No. 2174 of 2025 dismissed [Paras 12-15]

Taxation – Business expenditure – Non-resident – Lull in business vs cessation – Assessee, a French drilling company with ONGC contract till 1993, maintained continuous correspondences and bid activity with ONGC during 1993–1998, ultimately securing a fresh contract in October 1998 (formalised January 1999) – Held: Such sustained efforts show intention to carry on business – Mere failure to procure a contract or maintain a permanent establishment in India does not imply cessation – Business expenditure (admin/legal etc.) undertaken wholly and exclusively for business is deductible and eligible for set-off under Section 71 [Paras 2, 4, 9, 11-17, 19-20].

Unabsorbed Depreciation – Section 32(2) – For the pre-2002 law, continuation of the business is relevant – On facts, business had not ceased; therefore, unabsorbed depreciation could be carried forward and set off in terms of Section 32(2) – Note: first proviso to Section 32(2) stood omitted w.e.f. 01/04/2002 by Finance Act, 2001 [Paras 10-12, 17].

Permanent Establishment (PE) – Not a statutory precondition under the Act for being “in business” in India – PE is relevant to DTAA benefits, not to charging or computation provisions under Sections 4, 5(2), 9(1)(i), and 28 – High Court erred in equating lack of PE/office or foreign-based correspondence with absence of business in India [Paras 11-12, 18-19].

Income Characterisation – Interest on income-tax refunds taxable under “Income from Other Sources” – Yet, business expenditure incurred for carrying on business can be set off against such income under Section 71, given the finding that business continued [Paras 5, 9, 11, 15-17].

Principles – The term “business” has a wide import, denoting real, substantial, systematic activity with a set purpose – “For the purpose of business” is broader than “for earning profits” and includes acts incidental to carrying on business, measures for preservation/protection, and statutory payments – “Lull in business” is distinct from “going out of business” [Paras 4, 14-16].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgment set aside – ITAT orders revived – Assessing Officer to pass fresh assessment orders for AYs 1996-97, 1997-98, and 1999-2000 in terms of ITAT orders [Paras 21].

Trademark Law – Interim Injunction – Intra-group Licensing – Scope of Restraint – Suit filed by respondent sought to restrain petitioner from creating third-party interest including license or assignment of ‘Kirloskar’ trademarks – Trial Court granted injunction on 09.01.2025 – High Court stayed the injunction on 25.07.2025 permitting limited licensing to group companies – Later, by order dated 10.10.2025, High Court modified earlier order to prohibit even such licensing – Held: Prima facie, modified order expanded restraint without proper consideration of earlier licensing practices and despite pendency of appeal – Operation of 10.10.2025 order stayed [Paras 2–10].

Trademark Ownership – Difference between Assignment and Licensing – Petitioner argued that licensing does not amount to transfer of ownership and is distinguishable from assignment – Court noted there was no dispute over ownership of the mark and no prior adjudication on internal licensing history – Modified restraint seen as excessive at interlocutory stage [Paras 5–8].

Judicial Discretion – Modification of Interim Orders – Supreme Court observed that expanding the scope of an interim injunction during pendency of appeal and without full factual analysis was not warranted – Ordered interim stay on modified order [Paras 8–10].

Decision: Notice issued returnable on 04.11.2025 – Effect and operation of High Court order dated 10.10.2025 stayed – Parties allowed to exchange affidavits/written submissions in the meantime

Criminal Law – Culpable Homicide – Sentence – Appellant convicted under Section 304 Part-II IPC for causing death of intervenor S by axe blow to the neck – Trial court sentenced him to 10 years’ RI – High Court reduced sentence to 8 years – Appellant sought further reduction on ground of young age (20 years) and absence of intention – Supreme Court held that deceased S was an innocent peacekeeper who suffered fatal injury without provocation – Act of appellant found not to be covered by Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC – Sentence of 8 years not excessive in the circumstances – Held: Sentence imposed by High Court appropriate and does not warrant interference [Paras 8–10, 22–23, 27–28].

Sentencing – Proportionality – Deterrence – Supreme Court emphasized balancing judicial discretion with societal interests and victim’s rights – Reiterated principles from Raj Bala v. State of Haryana and Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat – Undue sympathy and disproportionate leniency undermine faith in justice system – Sentence must reflect gravity of offence and protect social order – Held: No compelling reason to further reduce sentence in absence of mitigating circumstances [Paras 24–25, 27–28].

Premature Release – Remission – Appellant permitted to seek premature release under applicable State remission policy – Court noted that such statutory remedies remain open and independent of judicial sentence review [Paras 17, 30].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Sentence of 8 years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 304 Part-II IPC upheld – Appellant entitled to seek premature release as per remission policy of State of Karnataka.

Service Law – Medical Practitioners – Retirement Age – Parity Between Allopathy and AYUSH Doctors – Issue arose whether doctors practicing indigenous systems of medicine (AYUSH) are entitled to the same retirement age as allopathic doctors – Division Bench decisions in NDMC v. Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma (2021) 17 SCC 642, State of Gujarat v. Dr. P.A. Bhatt, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 503, and Dr. Solamon A. v. State of Kerala distinguished – Court observed that Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma turned on a policy decision of Union Cabinet extending parity in retirement age, while Dr. P.A. Bhatt upheld classification based on educational qualifications – Ambiguity persists in judicial approach [Paras 2–6].

Equality Before Law – Articles 14 and 16 – Classification Between Allopathy and AYUSH Practitioners – Court held that difference in qualifications, nature of work, duties, and responsibilities justifies separate treatment – Allopathic doctors perform critical care, trauma management, surgeries, and emergency procedures, unlike AYUSH practitioners – Distinction has rational nexus with public interest and sufficiency of qualified allopathy doctors – Classification constitutionally valid [Paras 7–9].

Judicial Discipline – Reference to Larger Bench – Divergent Judicial Views – Considering conflicting precedents and continuing ambiguity regarding parity of service conditions between allopathic and AYUSH doctors, matter referred to a Larger Bench for authoritative pronouncement [Para 9].

Interim Directions – Continuance of AYUSH Doctors – Pending reference, States permitted to continue AYUSH doctors beyond their prescribed retirement age up to the age applicable to MBBS doctors, on half pay and allowances – Such continuance optional; benefits subject to final outcome before Larger Bench [Paras 10–11].

Decision: Matter referred to Larger Bench – Interim arrangement for continuation of AYUSH doctors till Larger Bench decides issue – Directions regarding pay, allowances, and pension adjustments issued [Paras 9–12].

Service Law – Class IV Appointment – Validity of Appointments Beyond Advertised Vacancies – Rule 12, U.P. Rules – “Reasonable Dimension” of Waiting List – Appellants appointed against Class IV posts were terminated in 2008 on the ground that appointments exceeded notified vacancies – Advertisement of 2000 mentioned 12 vacancies “subject to increase or decrease” – Court held that Rule 12 permits maintenance of a waiting list of reasonable dimension to fill vacancies arising within the same or succeeding recruitment year – Reliance placed on Naseem Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2011) 2 SCC 734 – Held, appointments made from such waiting list were valid when vacancies arose subsequently – Termination unjustified [Paras 6–10].

Service Jurisprudence – Delay and Relief – Equitable Directions – Appellants were out of employment for 17 years – Two appellants had crossed superannuation age – Court directed reappointment of those still within age limit to existing or supernumerary posts in Ambedkar Nagar Judgeship – Those who crossed superannuation to be granted minimum pension – Intervening period not to count for seniority or pension computation – Directions confined to peculiar facts and not to be treated as precedent [Paras 11–12].

Interpretation of Rules – Rule 12, U.P. Rules – “Reasonable Dimension” – Expression construed to mean a waiting list adequate to cover vacancies likely to arise within the year of recruitment or the next year, in reasonable proportion to advertised vacancies – Ensures fairness and prevents arbitrariness in recruitment [Para 7].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Termination orders set aside – Reappointment or pension benefits granted as per directions – Relief restricted to appellants – Not to be treated as precedent [Paras 11–12].

Civil Writ - Transgender Rights – Indirect horizontality – Omissive discrimination – Reasonable accommodation – Private school recruitment – Second School denied employment after disclosure of gender identity; violation of Arts. 14, 15, 21 and ss. 3, 9 of 2019 Act – First School’s intentional discrimination not proved though grievance redressal deficient – Public law compensation under Art. 32 awarded against Union, States and private school – Article 142 directions: Welfare Boards, Protection Cells, Complaint Officers, SHRC as appeal forum, national helpline, 3-month compliance – Expert Advisory Committee constituted with funding and timelines – Continuing mandamus issued [Paras 150–163, 165–177, 199–200, 201–213, 214–221].

Transgender Rights – Horizontal Application – Omissive Discrimination – Reasonable Accommodation – Employment Discrimination – Public Law Compensation – Structural Directions under Art. 142 – Advisory Committee – Continuing Mandamus – The 2019 Act operationalises indirect horizontality by imposing non-discrimination and accommodation duties on “establishments” including private unaided schools – State inaction in enforcing grievance redressal and equal opportunity obligations amounts to omissive discrimination – Second School’s refusal to appoint after discovering petitioner’s transgender identity held discriminatory; First School’s conduct not proved as intentional discrimination though deficient in redressal – Public law compensation awarded against State actors and the Second School – Comprehensive directions issued to set up Welfare Boards, Protection Cells, Complaint Officers, an appeal forum (SHRC), and a national helpline; Expert Advisory Committee constituted with timelines and funding – Continuing mandamus issued [Paras 131–146, 150–163, 165–177, 178–213, 199–200, 214–221].

Equality & Non-Discrimination – Articles 14, 15 & 21 – “Sex” includes gender identity – The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 (“2019 Act”) extends constitutional guarantees to private spheres through Section 3 (broad non-discrimination) and Section 9 (employment) with Rule 12 (equal opportunity policy) and Section 11/Rule 13 (Complaint Officer & timelines) – Held: Act manifests indirect horizontal effect; failure to operationalise framework violates substantive equality and dignity [Paras 29–35, 39–42, 131–146].

Reasonable Accommodation – Positive obligation inherent in substantive equality – Though explicit in disability law (RPwD Act), it applies to transgender persons to remove structural barriers; undue hardship is the limiting standard – Indian jurisprudence (NALSA; Vikash Kumar; Kabir Paharia) and comparative materials (Canada/US/EU) relied upon [Paras 43–65, 48–55].

Omissive Discrimination – Legislative/administrative omission – Absolute and relative legislative omissions recognised; failure to establish mechanisms under the 2019 Act/2020 Rules (e.g., Complaint Officers, Protection Cells, policy under Rule 11) breaches equality code; courts may fill vacuums to the extent necessary (Vishaka line) [Paras 66–86, 115–130].

Stereotypes, Stigma & Substantive Equality – Anti-stereotyping principle reiterated; popular morality yields to constitutional morality (Navtej; Sabarimala; Babita Puniya; Nitisha; X2) – Formal neutrality that entrenches disadvantage is impermissible [Paras 88–96].

Employment Discrimination – First School v. Second School – First School: record showed accommodation efforts (hostel/washroom access; re-hire test), no intentional discrimination proved though handling of harassment inadequate – lack of internal redressal noted [Paras 153–158]. Second School: denial of appointment after identity disclosure; Section 9 prohibits discrimination in recruitment; St. Mary’s distinguished; violation found [Paras 160–163].

Article 32 – Public Law Compensation – Maintainability against Private Parties in appropriate cases – Relief distinct from tort damages – Rudul Sah; Bhim Singh; Nilabati Behera; M.C. Mehta; Jeeja Ghosh; CERC followed/applied – Held: compensation payable by Second School (private) and by Union/States for omissions [Paras 165–173, 176–177].

Quantum – Compensation of ₹50,000 each directed from Union of India and two States (Respondents 1–3) and ₹50,000 from Second School (Respondent 4) – Total ₹2,00,000 to petitioner; payable within four weeks [Paras 177, 214( i–iii)].

Structural Shortcomings of 2019 Act – Identification documentation hurdles; lack of workable grievance architecture; absence of reasonable accommodation norms in practice; suggestions issued (gender-neutral toilets, confidentiality, inclusive forms, curricula, security screening, medical curriculum updates) [Paras 178–198].

Directions (Article 142) – Comprehensive Structural Directions (IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING & POLICY) – HELD:

(i) Appellate authority under Rule 9 designated in every State/UT [Para 199(i)].

(ii) Welfare Boards for transgender persons under Rule 10(1) in every State/UT [Para 199(ii)].

(iii) Transgender Protection Cells at district (DM) and State (DGP) levels under Rule 11(5) in every State/UT [Para 199(iii)].

(iv) Every “establishment” to designate Complaint Officer under Section 11 and Rule 13(1) – States/UTs to ensure compliance [Para 199(iv)].

(v) SHRC designated as forum to hear objections/appeals against head of establishment’s decision under Rule 13(3) [Para 199(v)].

(vi) Dedicated nation-wide toll-free helpline to receive violations of the 2019 Act/2020 Rules and immediately alert Protection Cells – wider scope than Rule 13(5) mechanism [Para 199(vi)].

(vii) Union of India and States to ensure strict compliance with above directions within three months from judgment [Para 200].

(viii) Continuing mandamus – Union to ensure compliance in all States and report; matter to be relisted after six months with Committee report [Paras 218, 221].

Advisory Committee – Constitution, Funding & Timelines – Court constituted expert Advisory Committee chaired by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Asha Menon (Retd.) with trans-rights activists and experts; ex-officio Secretaries of key Ministries as advisory members; MoSJE to fund and provide logistics; initial ₹10,00,000 to be deposited with Registry in two weeks; Committee to submit report/model Equal Opportunity Policy within six months; Union to consider and bring its policy within three months thereafter [Paras 201–213, 215–217].

Registry/Communication – Circulation of judgment to all High Courts and State/Union authorities; relist after six months with policy draft/report [Paras 220–221].

Decision: Petition disposed of with directions – Discrimination by Second School established – Public law compensation of ₹2,00,000 awarded (₹50,000 each by Union and two States; ₹50,000 by Second School) – Comprehensive structural directions issued under Art. 142 – Advisory Committee constituted with timelines and funding – Continuing mandamus for compliance and monitoring [Paras 160–177, 199–221].

Property Law – Agreement to Sell – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Whether agreement to sell executed during lifetime of deceased transfers ownership – Held: No – Agreement to sell does not create interest or title in immovable property; ownership transfers only upon execution and registration of sale deed – As no conveyance existed during lifetime, the property remained vested in deceased and formed part of matruka property – Reliance placed on Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, and Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614 [Paras 7–10].

Mohammedan Law – Matruka Property – Definition and Devolution – “Matruka” means property (movable or immovable) left behind by a deceased Muslim – Held: Such property devolves first to satisfy debts and legacies (limited to one-third of estate) and remainder distributed among heirs as per Quranic injunctions and Mulla’s Principles – Wife being a sharer entitled to one-fourth share in absence of child or grandchild; balance devolves on residuaries – Cited Jamil Ahmad v. Vth ADJ, Moradabad, (2001) 8 SCC 599 and Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738 [Paras 8–15].

Inheritance – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Principle – Held: A person cannot transfer a better title than he possesses – Widow who held only one-fourth share could not convey ownership of entire estate – Sale deed executed beyond her legal share invalid to that extent [Para 15].

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – When no substantial question of law arises, High Court must dismiss appeal in limine with reasons – Though High Court examined merits after so finding, no prejudice caused as conclusion consistent with law – Referred Surat Singh v. Siri Bhagwan, (2018) 4 SCC 562; Hasmat Ali v. Ameena Bibi, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1142 [Para 5].

Language of Judgments – Translation Quality – Observed with concern the poor translation of trial court judgment from vernacular to English – Emphasized need for accuracy since words and punctuation bear decisive legal implications – Concern earlier echoed in Chairman, Managing Committee v. Bhaveshkumar Manubhai Parakhia (Order dated 18.03.2025) [Para 17].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – View taken by First Appellate Court and High Court upheld – Property in question forms part of matruka property – Wife entitled to 1/4th share; remaining 3/4th to devolve per Mohammedan inheritance law – No interference warranted – No order as to costs [Paras 15–18].

Constitutional Law – Power of High Court – Direction for CBI Investigation – Limits of Jurisdiction – High Court, while hearing an intra-court appeal against a Single Judge’s order in recruitment matters, converted the appeal into suo motu PIL and directed CBI to conduct a preliminary inquiry – Held: High Court exceeded its jurisdiction – Exercise of power to order CBI inquiry under Article 226 permissible only where sufficient material exists disclosing prima facie commission of offence – Power to be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and in exceptional circumstances where fairness of investigation or public confidence is at stake – No such material existed here – Directions unsustainable [Paras 9–14, 18–24].

Public Employment – Recruitment Irregularities – Challenge to selection process for various posts in Legislative Council and Assembly Secretariat of U.P. – Allegations of favoritism and manipulation by private recruiting agencies – Writ petitions contained no prayer for CBI inquiry – Division Bench acted suo motu without foundation or pleading – Held: Ordering CBI inquiry based on “doubts” or “assumptions” violates settled principles – Directions quashed [Paras 15–21, 23].

Judicial Review – Suo Motu Public Interest Litigation – Scope – High Court, while exercising appellate jurisdiction, could not convert pending special appeal into suo motu PIL – Such action not in consonance with rules or judicial propriety – Matter left to Chief Justice of High Court to examine procedure and registry’s action in this regard [Paras 18–19, 25].

CBI Inquiry – Principles Reiterated – Direction for CBI investigation to be last resort – Permissible only when: (i) prima facie material discloses cognizable offence, (ii) local police incapable of impartial probe, (iii) involvement of high-ranking officials or systemic failure, or (iv) case has national ramifications – Mere allegations or administrative irregularities do not justify CBI inquiry – High Court’s assumption-based approach deprecated [Paras 10–14, 21–23].

Recruitment Process – Role of Specialized Agency – Following Sachin Kumar v. DSSSB (2021) 4 SCC 631, Single Judge directed future Class III recruitments in U.P. Legislative Assembly/Council to be conducted by U.P. Subordinate Services Selection Commission and not private agencies – Division Bench should have confined adjudication to legality of that direction – CBI inquiry beyond pleadings and scope of appeal [Paras 3–5, 17, 24–25].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s orders dated 18.09.2023 and 03.10.2023 set aside – Direction for CBI preliminary inquiry and registration of suo motu PIL quashed – Division Bench requested to hear Special Appeal Defective No. 485 of 2023 on merits in accordance with law – No opinion on merits expressed – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 24–25].