Constitution of India – Article 233 – Appointment of District Judges – Eligibility – In-service Judicial Officers – Direct Recruitment – Interpretation of Clause (1) and (2) – Held: Both clauses form a complete code – Article 233(1) covers appointments, postings and promotions – Article 233(2) lays down qualification only for advocates/pleaders not in service – Judicial officers already in service are governed by Article 233(1) – No constitutional bar against their participation in direct recruitment – Textual and contextual reading must give effect to both clauses without rendering any part redundant [Paras 118–126].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Appointments – Article 233 – Eligibility of In-service Judicial Officers – Held: No constitutional bar against judicial officers competing in direct recruitment process for District Judges – Judicial officers having combined experience of seven years as advocate and judicial officer entitled to apply – Level playing field to be maintained between advocates and in-service candidates – Minimum age 35 years for both categories – Appointment to be based on merit through written examination and viva voce – No weightage to in-service candidates – Recruitment to Higher Judicial Service to continue in 50:25:25 ratio as per All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2010) 15 SCC 170 [Paras 155–161, 157–159, 172(i)–(v)].

Constitutional Law – Article 233(2) – Bar Quota – Reservation – Interpretation – The 25% direct recruitment under Article 233(2) is not an exclusive quota for advocates – Clause (2) only prescribes qualification for advocates/pleaders not in service – Reading it as a reservation for advocates would violate Article 14 and constitutional equality – Both advocates and judicial officers with requisite experience entitled to compete [Paras 164, 19–23 per Sundresh, J.].

Judicial Service – Independence of Judiciary – Article 50 – Separation of Powers – Held: Judicial officers are not “employees” of the State – They discharge sovereign judicial functions – To debar them from open competition would offend the constitutional principle of independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers – Recruitment and control over the judiciary is insulated from legislative and executive interference – Reliance placed on State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah, (2000) 4 SCC 640, and Registrar (Admn.), Orissa High Court v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy, (1999) 7 SCC 725 [Paras 8–13, 33–35 per Sundresh, J.].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation – Constitutional Silence – Doctrine Explained – Absence of express qualification for in-service candidates under Article 233(2) is a deliberate constitutional silence – Framers left it to the discretion of High Courts and Governors under Articles 233–235 – Such silence is not a gap but an intentional flexibility to preserve the independence and adaptability of the judiciary – Principle discussed in Bhanumati v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 1 [Paras 14–16 per Sundresh, J.].

Interpretation of Constitution – Textual and Contextual Reading – Harmonious construction required – Interpretation must give meaning to every word – Article 233(2) must be read so as not to render the words “not already in the service of the Union or of the State” redundant – Applying Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273, and RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co., (1987) 1 SCC 424 [Paras 114–125].

Constitutional Law – Equality Before Law – Article 14 – Exclusion of Judicial Officers from Direct Recruitment – Held: Such exclusion would amount to unconstitutional classification and deny equal opportunity – Would also amount to reservation in favour of advocates – Broader competition enhances merit and efficiency in judiciary [Paras 19–23, 153–155].

Judiciary – Efficiency and Merit – Object of Recruitment – Purpose of direct recruitment is to secure best talent for judicial service – Open competition between advocates and in-service judges fosters excellence and efficiency – Observations in Leela Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 4 SCC 159, and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2013) 4 SCC 540, relied upon [Paras 149–151].

Administrative Law – Shetty Commission Recommendations – Accepted – Commission found that allowing in-service judges to compete would promote efficiency, improve discipline and remove frustration – Recommended amendment to Article 233 to formalise such eligibility – Recommendations relied upon to interpret Article 233 in a progressive manner [Paras 128–134].

Professional Ethics – Rule 49, Bar Council of India Rules – Enrollment and Suspension – An advocate who joins judicial service only suspends right to practice; remains on Bar Roll – May resume practice after retirement – Such suspended status does not erase prior practice experience – Thus, judicial officers with pre-service Bar practice fulfil eligibility under Article 233(2) [Paras 140–145].

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 29, 30, 33 read with BCI Rules – Continuous Experience – Candidate must have continuous seven years’ experience either as advocate or judicial officer, or combined, as on date of application – Discontinuous or interrupted practice not sufficient – Break in practice cannot be condoned [Paras 162–163].

Constitutional Law – Doctrine of Stare Decisis – Reconsideration of Long-standing View – Held: Doctrine not inflexible – Earlier rulings in Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Allahabad (1985) 1 SCC 225, and Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020) 7 SCC 401 misapplied Constitution Bench decisions in Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 123, and Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., 1966 SCC OnLine SC 35 – Earlier interpretation perpetuated injustice to judicial officers – Correct view restored – Satya Narain Singh and Dheeraj Mor expressly overruled [Paras 165–169, 172(vi)].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review – Prospective Application – New interpretation to operate prospectively – Past appointments and completed selections not disturbed, except where protected by interim orders [Para 170].

Appointment Rules – Directions – All existing State rules inconsistent with present interpretation quashed – States directed to frame or amend recruitment rules in consultation with High Courts within three months – Uniform criteria to include combined seven-year experience, minimum age 35, and common competitive examination for advocates and judicial officers [Paras 174–175].

Separate Opinion – Per M.M. Sundresh, J. – Concurred with CJI – Emphasised that Article 233(1) itself covers both promotion and direct recruitment – Clause (2) provides qualification only for advocates – Constitutional silence permits High Court to fix eligibility for in-service candidates – Judicial independence and Article 14 mandate equal opportunity – Interpreting Article 233 to exclude in-service judges would violate basic structure and reduce judicial quality – Advocated open competition to secure excellence in judiciary [Paras 1–23].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Questions answered – In-service judicial officers with combined experience of seven years eligible to compete in direct recruitment for District Judges – Satya Narain Singh (1985) and Dheeraj Mor (2020) overruled – Directions issued to States and High Courts for rule amendment – Prospective application – No retrospective disturbance of existing appointments [Paras 172–175].

Service Law – Termination – Eligibility Criteria – Vocational Subject Marks – Rules 4 and 21 of Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 – Termination of teachers on the ground of not securing 40% in Intermediate Examination and invalidity of graduation certificates – Held: Rule 21 governs merit list preparation and not eligibility – Rule 4 prescribes eligibility to appear in Teacher Eligibility Test and contains no bar on inclusion of vocational marks – Marks in vocational subjects, as per marksheet guidelines, are to be added to aggregate for determining overall percentage – Exclusion of such marks erroneous – Appellants were eligible and termination unsustainable [Paras 25–29, 36–37].

Principles of Natural Justice – Violation – Termination Without Fresh Notice – Show-cause notices alleged candidates failed to secure 45% marks, but termination based on exclusion of vocational marks reducing percentage below 40% – Held: Finding of guilt on a charge not contained in notice violates natural justice – Department’s action arbitrary and illegal – Termination vitiated [Paras 31–35].

Recruitment Rules – Interpretation – Rule 4 v. Rule 21 – Distinct Fields – Rule 4 (Eligibility) applies for determining who may appear in TET – Rule 21 (Merit List) applies post-TET for ranking – Both operate in separate spheres – Department and High Court erred in applying Rule 21 for eligibility determination [Paras 26–28].

Administrative Law – Procedural Fairness – Where an employee successfully rebuts charges in a show-cause notice, authorities cannot alter the basis of termination without issuing a fresh notice – Violation renders order void [Paras 32–34].

Relief – Reinstatement – Continuity of Service – Arrears – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) deemed in continuous service from initial appointment (December 2015) – Entitled to full arrears of pay and seniority benefits – However, period out of service not to count for experience-based promotion – Deceased appellant Surendra Munda’s termination quashed; heirs entitled to full arrears till date of death and eligible for compassionate appointment under scheme, if applicable [Paras 37–42].

Administrative Fairness – Government Conduct – State acted arbitrarily and without due process in terminating teachers despite clear eligibility and valid degrees—Court strongly deprecated such action [Para 38].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgments of the Jharkhand High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 83/2019, 332/2021, and 331/2021 set aside – Termination orders dated 07.10.2016 quashed – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) reinstated with continuity and arrears – Legal heirs of deceased appellant (Surendra Munda) entitled to arrears till date of death and consideration for compassionate appointment – Compliance directed within three months.

Juvenile Justice – Claim of Juvenility – Retrospective Application – Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000 – Petitioner convicted for murder committed in 1981 when he was aged 12 years and 5 months – Sessions Court had extended benefit under the Children’s Act, 1960 and sent him to a children’s home – His conviction restored by Supreme Court in 2009 after High Court acquittal – Petitioner re-arrested in 2022 and in custody for more than 3 years and 10 months – Held: By virtue of Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000, the claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage even after final disposal – Petitioner entitled to benefit of the 2000 Act as per Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan – Detention beyond 3 years is contrary to Section 15(1)(g) and violative of Article 21 [Paras 3, 9–13].

Children’s Act, 1960 – Section 24 – Joint Trial of Child and Adult Accused – No justification shown by the State for breach of Section 24 which prohibits joint trial of a child with non-children – Court notes that legislative safeguards under the Children’s Act were ignored by the trial court [Para 8].

Juvenile Justice – Period of Detention – Illegal Custody – Once the petitioner is found to have been a juvenile on the date of offence, continued incarceration beyond three years amounts to deprivation of liberty not in accordance with procedure established by law – Detention beyond permissible period illegal [Paras 8, 13].

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Protection of Personal Liberty – Continued custody of a person entitled to juvenile justice protection is unconstitutional – Breach of fundamental right to life and liberty warrants immediate release [Para 13].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Petitioner directed to be released immediately if not required in any other case – Jail authorities to act on downloaded copy of judgment without insisting on certified copy [Paras 14–16].

Criminal Law – Rape and Murder of Minor – Conviction Set Aside – Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for kidnapping, raping, and murdering a 7-year-old girl – Trial court’s conviction confirmed by the High Court – Supreme Court set aside conviction due to glaring lapses in investigation, procedural violations, and unreliability of circumstantial evidence – Held: Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – Acquittal granted [Paras 1–85]

Fair Trial – Violation of Right to Counsel – Appellant was unrepresented when charges were framed – Legal aid counsel appointed only on 13.12.2017, four days before commencement of prosecution evidence – Trial completed within one and a half months – No real opportunity to prepare defence – Trial court ignored mandate under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 207 CrPC – Held: Trial conducted in gross violation of fair trial rights [Paras 34–38]

Sentencing – Death Penalty – Procedure Violated – Trial court sentenced appellant to death on same day as conviction without proper sentencing hearing – No psychological assessment, no jail conduct report, no analysis of aggravating or mitigating circumstances – High Court mechanically affirmed death penalty – Held: Sentencing process legally flawed and cannot be sustained [Paras 39–40]

Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Sole witness Murugan (PW-3) claimed he saw appellant with victim before disappearance – Did not disclose this fact to victim’s parents or police – Only mentioned to second IO nearly three months later – Held: Witness’s conduct unnatural and testimony unreliable – Theory of last seen together appears concocted and planted [Paras 44–46, 73]

CCTV Evidence – Alleged Suspicious Movement – CCTV footage from nearby temple allegedly captured appellant carrying a bag on a bike – Footage never collected or exhibited – Contradictions between PW-1 and PW-6 regarding who saw it and when – IO (PW-29) silent on CCTV – Held: CCTV theory appears fictional – Adverse inference drawn against prosecution for withholding evidence [Paras 47–51, 66]

Confessional Statement – Disclosure and Recovery – Confession made allegedly in public park in presence of officials – Witness (PW-7) admitted police told her contents of confession before it was recorded – Complainant (PW-1) knew exact details of the crime even before confession – Held: Confession appears scripted and fabricated – Recovery of body and articles not in consequence of voluntary disclosure – Not admissible under Section 27 of Evidence Act [Paras 52–60]

Evidence – Confession Illegally Recorded – IO allowed to narrate entire confession in court, including details of sexual assault and murder – Held: Grossly illegal – Only discovery-related portions are admissible – Complete reproduction of confession violates Section 25 of Evidence Act – Highly prejudicial to accused [Paras 61–63]

Recovery – Undergarments and Ornaments – Recovery of victim’s undergarments and jewellery allegedly at appellant’s instance – No mention of blue bag in initial mahazar – No sealing of recovered articles – No Test Identification Parade – Held: Recoveries appear planted – No evidentiary value [Paras 55–56, 65]

Forensic Evidence – Chain of Custody Broken – No record of sealing, safe custody or transmission of samples – Malkhana In-charge not examined – Forensic officer (PW-28) admitted semen survives only 48 hours, but samples collected much later – Held: DNA evidence unreliable due to compromised integrity of samples – Cannot be relied upon [Paras 69–71, 75–79]

Investigation – Serious Procedural Flaws – IO failed to search appellant’s flat promptly – No attempt to verify appellant’s office attendance records – No identification parade conducted – No call detail records procured – Contradictions in timing of arrest and confession – Held: Investigation not fair or impartial – Evidence tainted [Paras 54, 66, 72–74]

Presumption under Section 114 Evidence Act – Not Attracted – Jewellery allegedly belonging to victim recovered from appellant – No proper identification process – Recovery itself suspicious – Held: No presumption can arise under Section 114 due to doubtful recoveries [Paras 55, 56]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgments of Trial Court and High Court set aside – Conviction and death sentence of appellant quashed – Appellant acquitted – Directed to be released from custody forthwith if not wanted in any other case [Paras 83–85]

Electricity Act – Theft of Energy – Presumption under Section 39 – Use of Artificial Means Not Established – Reversal of Acquittal Unwarranted – Accused, a company director, was convicted by High Court under Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act on the basis of alleged tampering with the meter box and abnormal electricity consumption – Supreme Court held: Presumption under Section 39 arises only when existence of artificial means is proved – Evidence by prosecution witnesses including MSEB officials lacked certainty – Witnesses relied on approximations and inferences – No direct proof of tampering or dishonest abstraction of energy – Presumption under Section 39 not triggered – Conviction not sustainable [Paras 13–15].

Electricity Act – Meter Tampering – Section 44 – Insufficient Proof – Conviction Reversed – High Court invoked Section 44(c) against accused based on existence of holes in meter box – Supreme Court held: No evidence that holes were made or used by accused or his company – No witness saw accused or staff interfering with meter – No conclusive evidence of fraudulent alteration or use of energy – Charge under Section 44 not established beyond reasonable doubt – Benefit of doubt must go to accused [Paras 16–17].

Criminal Law – Reversal of Acquittal – Standards for Interference – High Court Must Show Perverse Findings or Miscarriage of Justice – Supreme Court reiterated that reversal of acquittal requires strong reasons such as perversity or grave miscarriage of justice – Trial Court had correctly evaluated lack of concrete evidence – High Court erred in reversing acquittal without compelling grounds – Appeal allowed, acquittal restored [Paras 11–12, 17].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgment dated 15/10/2010 convicting appellant under Sections 39 and 44 of the Electricity Act, 1910 set aside – Appellant acquitted – Bail bonds discharged – All pending applications disposed of [Para 17].

Stamp Duty – Nature of Instrument – Mortgage vs. Security Bond – The instrument executed by the appellant-company in favour of Meerut Development Authority (MDA) styled as a “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” held, in substance, to be a mortgage deed and not a security bond – Appellant transferred interest in specified plots (2,934.45 sq. m.) to MDA to secure performance of contractual obligations relating to colony development and payment of external development charges – On default, MDA entitled to sell mortgaged property to realise dues – Essential ingredients of a mortgage under Section 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act satisfied – Substance prevails over form or nomenclature [Paras 14–17].

Security Bond – Applicability of Article 57 – Article 57 confined to cases where deed is executed “by a surety to secure due performance of a contract” – Requires presence of three distinct parties: surety, principal debtor, and creditor – Not attracted where principal debtor itself executes the deed to secure its own obligations – Appellant-company being the principal developer executed mortgage in its own name; hence Article 57 inapplicable [Paras 21–25].

Contract of Guarantee – Tripartite Nature – Section 126, Contract Act – “Surety” means one who undertakes to discharge the liability of another in case of default – Contract of guarantee inherently tripartite – Absence of independent surety in the deed fatal to claim under Article 57 – Director signing on behalf of company cannot be treated as a distinct surety for purposes of stamp classification [Paras 22–25, 29].

Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes – Principle of Substance Over Form – It is settled that the nomenclature of a document is not decisive for determining stamp duty liability; courts must look to substance, recitals, operative clauses and legal effect – The “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” created an enforceable security interest by way of mortgage, satisfying the criteria of Article 40 – Merely describing it as a “Security Bond” cannot alter its character [Paras 14–18, 27–28].

Mortgage Deed – Definition and Applicability – Section 2(17), Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Includes every instrument transferring a right over specified property to secure money advanced, a debt, or performance of an engagement – The appellant’s deed transferred rights in immovable property to MDA and to Allahabad Bank (in companion appeal) for securing payment and performance – Held: falls squarely under Article 40 of Schedule 1-B [Paras 16–17, 27–28].

Multiple Instruments – Consistent Interpretation – In both appeals (Meerut Development Authority and Allahabad Bank cases), the so-called “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed”/“Security Bond or Mortgage Deed” involved direct security by principal debtor without a surety – Uniformly held to be chargeable under Article 40 – High Court orders upholding this view affirmed [Paras 27–30].

Fiscal Interpretation – Strict yet Rational Construction – Courts must adopt strict construction of charging provisions but may not disregard the legal effect of the instrument – Since the instrument transfers an interest in property to secure an engagement, its classification as a mortgage under Article 40 accords with both letter and spirit of the statute [Paras 18–20, 26].

Judicial Review – Limited Interference under Article 136 – Concurrent findings of stamp authorities and High Court that instrument chargeable under Article 40 found well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of law – No manifest illegality or perversity shown – Appeals dismissed [Para 30].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Instruments executed by appellants chargeable under Article 40 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Findings of the High Court of Allahabad affirmed – No interference warranted under Article 136 – No order as to costs [Para 30].

Criminal Law – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Anticipatory Bail – Bar under Section 18 – Applicability to Accused Added under Section 319 CrPC – Jurisdiction of High Court – Respondent added as accused under Section 319 CrPC in case involving offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act – High Court granted anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC – Held: Once summoned under Section 319 CrPC, the respondent assumes status of an accused for all offences in the case, including those under the 1989 Act – Bar under Section 18 on consideration of anticipatory bail applies – High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain or grant anticipatory bail in absence of a finding that no prima facie case under the 1989 Act was made out – Order granting anticipatory bail unsustainable [Paras 4–10].

Criminal Procedure – Section 319 CrPC – Effect of Summoning Order – Scope – Where the order summoning the accused under Section 319 CrPC was not under challenge before the High Court, its validity could not be tested incidentally in anticipatory bail proceedings – High Court erred in overlooking the binding nature of the summoning order [Paras 5, 10].

Judicial Review – Scope under Section 438 CrPC – Limits in presence of Statutory Bar – In offences under the SC/ST Act, anticipatory bail is impermissible unless the Court first records a finding that no prima facie case under the Act exists – Mere allegations of false implication insufficient to dilute the statutory bar [Paras 7, 10].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail set aside – Respondent at liberty to appear before Trial Court and seek regular bail, to be considered expeditiously in accordance with law [Paras 10–11].

Motor Accident Claim - Motor Vehicles Act – Insurer’s Right of Recovery – Fake Driving Licence – Owner’s Due Diligence – High Court’s Finding of Collusion Set Aside – Driver of appellant’s truck involved in fatal accident allegedly held fake licence – High Court allowed insurer to recover compensation from vehicle owner based on inference of collusion and breach of policy conditions – Supreme Court held: Mere production of licence by owner or absence of driver’s testimony insufficient to infer collusion or breach – Tribunal rightly found no willful breach or lack of due diligence – Evidence showed owner had produced licence and certificate of renewal – Insurer failed to prove owner knew licence was fake or failed to verify credentials – No pleading or proof of absence of due care by employer – Precedents (Lehru, Swaran Singh, PEPSU RTC, Geeta Devi) reiterated – Held: Insurer liable to pay compensation without right of recovery from vehicle owner [Paras 1–3, 7–10, 11–17].

Motor Accident Claims – Composite Negligence – Liability Apportionment – Truck and Matador Van Found Negligent – Tribunal’s finding of 75:25 composite negligence between truck and Matador upheld – Compensation apportioned accordingly – Findings not interfered with – Supreme Court confined its interference to “pay and recover” direction [Paras 1, 5–6].

Insurance Law – Burden of Proof – Policy Breach – Requirement of Pleading and Evidence – Insurer must establish breach of condition by insured with cogent evidence – No statutory or contractual obligation on vehicle owner to verify authenticity of driving licence with RTO – In absence of proof of lack of due diligence or deliberate entrustment to unlicensed driver, insurer cannot claim recovery from insured – High Court’s approach found flawed [Paras 10, 13–17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s direction granting right of recovery to insurer set aside – Compensation to be paid and borne by insurer – Other directions including quantum of compensation remain undisturbed [Paras 18–19].

Town Planning – OSR Charges – Sub-division prior to 1975 proved by registered gifts and separate pattas – Site area 2229 sq. m. squarely within Annexure XX “first 3000 sq. m. – Nil” slab – Demand set aside and refund with 8% interest upheld – No interference under Article 136 with concurrent, non-perverse findings [Paras 14–17, 20–21].

Open Space Reservation (OSR) – Basis of Computation – Parent Tract vs. Independent Parcel – CMDA’s attempt to club respondent’s parcel with erstwhile 21-ground estate rejected – Documentary chain (1949 partition; 1972 & 1973 gift deeds; separate pattas; 1984 gift) shows long-standing, identifiable holding prior to 05.08.1975 – Fresh sub-division plea in 2008 termed ipse dixit and unsupported [Paras 14–16].

Revenue Records & Registered Instruments – Evidentiary Value – Separate pattas, though not title per se, corroborate possession/demarcation—read with unimpeached registered deeds, they establish a separate holding; once produced, burden shifts to authority to dislodge pre-1975 recognition—no contrary material produced [Para 15–16].

Regulatory Exemption – Annexure XX – “For the first 3000 sq. m. — Nil” – Respondent’s plot being 2229 sq. m. entitled to full exemption—Notional recombination with parent estate impermissible—Text of regulation cannot be defeated by retrospective enlargement of liability [Para 17].

Layouts vs. Individual Development – No layout formation by respondent—Provisions aimed at layout promoters inapplicable—Hospital construction on individual site cannot trigger layout-based OSR levy [Para 18].

Appellate Review – Article 136 – Interference confined to manifest illegality/perversity—Concurrent findings of Single Judge and Division Bench, resting on public documents and proper appreciation of evidence, warrant no interference [Para 20].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court’s direction to refund ₹1,64,50,000/– with 8% p.a. interest affirmed – Payment to be made within six weeks – No order as to costs – All pending applications disposed of [Para 21].