Civil Law - Electricity Act, 2003, Sections 2(17), 2(19) and 14 - Deemed Distribution Licensee (DDL) - Distribution vs. Self-Consumption - Appellant claimed DDL status under the third proviso to Section 14 based on Section 11 of the Railways Act - Held, a distribution licensee must mandatorily fulfill twin requirements: operating a distribution system and supplying electricity to consumers in its area of supply. Railways’ internal network for traction and signaling is a closed system for self-consumption and does not involve supply to third-party consumers for consideration. Conveyance of electricity within an internal network does not constitute "distribution". [Paras 15-37].

Electricity Act, 2003, Section 2(5) and 14 - Appropriate Government - Deemed status - Functional Test - Appellant contended it qualifies as "Appropriate Government" and thus automatically a DDL - Held, while Railways is an arm of the Central Government, mere classification as "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution or being an "Appropriate Government" under Section 2(5) does not dispense with the functional requirements of a distribution licensee. Deemed status requires the entity to actually perform distribution functions, similar to the Military Engineering Services (MES). [Paras 38-50].

Railways Act, 1989, Section 11 - Electricity Act, 2003, Section 173 - Non-obstante clause - Overriding effect - Appellant argued Section 11 of the Railways Act provides absolute authority to distribute electricity - Held, a non-obstante clause operates only in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. There is no conflict between the Railways Act (operational powers) and the Electricity Act (licensing framework); they must be read harmoniously. Section 11 does not grant blanket immunity from the regulatory framework of the Electricity Act. [Paras 26-34].

Electricity Act, 2003, Section 42(2) and 42(4) - Open Access - Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge (AS) - Rationale - Held, CSS is compensatory for the loss of high-revenue consumers who exit the DISCOM fold, ensuring subsidised tariffs for vulnerable categories (agriculture/low-income). Since Railways is a "consumer" under Section 2(15) procuring power for its own end-use, it is legally bound to pay CSS and AS when availing open access. [Paras 51-59, 66, 71].

Statutory Interpretation - Legislative History - Proposed Amendments - Reliance on Draft Electricity (Amendment) Bills 2014 and 2025 - Held, the fact that the Parliament proposed specific amendments to exempt Railways from CSS indicates that such exemption does not exist under the current prevailing statute. A legislative proposal for exemption confirms that the privilege is not currently covered by the existing framework. [Paras 60-70].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Judgment of APTEL dated 12.02.2024 upheld – Respondents directed to compute outstanding CSS and AS amounts – Appellant granted opportunity to respond to calculations before payment.

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 34 - Common Intention - Vicarious Liability - Prior Concert - Appellant was convicted for murder with the aid of Section 34 IPC - Evidence suggested Appellant arrived at the spot from a different direction after the commencement of the incident and after the fatal shot was fired - Held, Section 34 requires proof of a pre-arranged plan or prior meeting of minds, even if formed on the spur of the moment; mere presence at the scene without proof of active participation, facilitation, or shared intent to commit murder is insufficient for conviction; vicarious liability cannot be attracted in the absence of discernible material showing prior concert. [Paras 14-25].

Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 302 and 307 - Murder vs Attempt to Murder - Alteration of Offence - Appellant was present armed with a firearm - Testimony of injured witness (PW-6) revealed that he intervened and lifted the barrel of the Appellant's gun, directing it upwards - Held, while common intention for murder was not established, the Appellant's presence with a weapon and awareness of the serious nature of the incident justifies conviction under Section 307 IPC; where intention to cause death is not established but the act is done with knowledge of likely consequences, the offence falls under Section 307 IPC; conviction altered from Section 302/34 to Section 307. [Paras 26-28].

Sentence - Period undergone - Appellant already incarcerated for approximately 9 years and 9 months - Held, given the passage of time since the 1999 incident and the nature of the altered offence, the ends of justice are met by limiting the sentence to the period already undergone. [Para 29].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC set aside – Appellant convicted under Section 307 IPC and sentenced to the period already undergone – Appellant not required to surrender.

Civil Law - Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 28 - Specific Performance - Extension of time for deposit of purchase money - Power of Court after decree - Held, a decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree and the Court does not become functus officio after passing it. The power to rescind the contract or extend the time for payment under Section 28 is discretionary. There is no automatic rescission of the contract upon default unless the decree specifically provides for rescission or dismissal of the suit as a consequence of non-payment. The Court must adopt a justice-oriented approach, balancing equities and considering whether the delay signifies a positive refusal or willful negligence to perform the contract. [Paras 19, 24-27, 33, 40].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 2(2) - Doctrine of Merger - Adjudication on merits - Dismissal for non-prosecution - Held, the doctrine of merger applies only when a higher forum passes an order on merits, whether it set aside, modifies, or confirms the lower court's decree. Since Section 2(2)(b) CPC specifically excludes an order of dismissal for default from the definition of a 'decree', the dismissal of a first appeal for non-prosecution does not result in the merger of the trial court's decree with the appellate order. [Paras 21-22].

Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 28 - Procedure for applications - Maintainability before Execution Court - Held, an application for rescission of contract or extension of time must be decided as an application in the original suit. Even if filed in execution proceedings, if the Execution Court is the Court of first instance, it must transfer the application to the file of the suit and number it as an interlocutory application. A prayer for extension of time may be made even orally or treated as such when seeking permission to deposit the defaulted amount. [Paras 23, 28-31, 33].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XX Rule 12A - Specific Performance Decree - Duty of Appellate Court - Reasonable time for deposit - Held, the Appellate Court, while disposing of an appeal on merits, owes a duty to specify the time period for deposit of the balance consideration. If no time limit is fixed by the superior court, the decree-holder is expected to make the deposit within a reasonable period based on the facts of the case. [Paras 32-33, 50].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of the High Court and the Execution Court set aside – Execution Application and related applications restored to the Court of first instance for fresh consideration in accordance with the principles laid down – Applications to be treated and numbered as applications in the original suit.

Arbitration – Non-Signatory to Contract – Collaborator as Veritable Party – Appointment of Arbitrator under Section 11(6) – Appellant/Collaborator collaborated with the Contractor to satisfy eligibility criteria for a Coal Handling Plant project and executed a Deed of Joint Undertaking (DJU) in favour of the Employer – On the Contractor going into liquidation, the Employer called upon the Collaborator to fulfil joint and several obligations under the DJU – Collaborator's request for arbitration declined by the High Court on the ground of no privity of contract – Held: The DJU was an inextricable part of the contract between the Contractor and the Employer; the Collaborator bore joint and several liability and was a veritable party to the contract entitled to invoke the arbitration clause – High Court erred in rejecting the petition under Section 11(6) – Appeal allowed – Sole Arbitrator appointed [Paras 2–12].

Non-Signatory – Arbitration Clause – Inextricable Connection – Deed of Joint Undertaking – The bid document required the Contractor to demonstrate experience through collaboration, and the Collaborator executed DJUs as mandated – The tripartite agreement dated 05.04.2016 between the Employer, Contractor and Collaborator affirmed the Collaborator's responsibilities and provided for direct payments to the Collaborator – Subsequent communications by the Employer invoking the DJU and threatening execution of balance work at the Collaborator's risk and cost reaffirmed the Collaborator's inextricable role – Held: The tripartite agreement did not extinguish the earlier contract but was a measure to ensure performance in the wake of the Contractor's inability – Collaborator's consent sought in its notice dated 02.07.2022 was for the forum (Delhi International Arbitration Centre), not for the existence of arbitration as a mode of dispute resolution [Paras 3–11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court set aside – Petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 allowed – Justice (Retd.) Chakradhari Sharan Singh, former Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, appointed as Sole Arbitrator – All contentions left open – Arbitrator directed to make declaration under Section 12 within 15 days of receipt of judgment – Arbitrator's fees to be governed by the Fourth Schedule to the Act [Paras 12–15].

Electricity Law – Tariff Determination – Depreciation – Recovery of Capital Cost – Consumer Interest – Rithala Combined Cycle Power Plant – Section 61(d) of the Electricity Act, 2003 – Regulation 6.32 of DERC (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Generation Tariff) Regulations, 2011 – TPDDL established a 108-MW gas-based power plant at Rithala, Delhi as a short-term measure for a limited operational period of 5 to 6 years – Commission by order dated 31.08.2017 fixed capital cost at Rs.197.70 crores, determined technical useful life at 15 years, but restricted operational and recovery period to six years up to March 2018 under the PPA – Said order attained finality as it was not challenged by TPDDL – Commission by order dated 11.11.2019 allowed depreciation only for six years amounting to Rs.83.34 crores – APTEL set aside the Commission's order directing depreciation over entire 15-year useful life – Supreme Court allowed appeal, restored Commission's order, and answered all three substantial questions of law in favour of the Commission [Paras 1, 19, 23, 24].

Electricity Law – Depreciation – Useful Life vs. Regulatory Recovery Period – Distinction – Whether depreciation must be allowed over entire technical useful life irrespective of period of actual supply – Plant ceased to supply electricity after March 2018 – Consumers cannot be required to pay for a service they no longer received – TPDDL had obligation to supply electricity only for six years under the PPA – Commission had clarified that TPDDL was free to sell power as a merchant generator or sell the Plant itself after March 2018 – No legal impediment existed to such sale – Held: Depreciation cannot be allowed beyond the regulatory recovery period; first substantial question of law answered in the negative [Para 20].

Electricity Law – Regulation 6.32 of 2011 Regulations – Harmonious Construction – Absolute Right to Recover Depreciation – No provision can be read in isolation – Regulation 6.32 prescribing depreciation over useful life must be construed harmoniously with Regulation 4.1 which confines tariff entitlement to the period approved under the PPA – 2011 Regulations must be read in conjunction with Section 61(d) of the 2003 Act which places consumer interest at the centre of tariff regulation – Regulation 6.32 does not confer an absolute and unconditional right to recover depreciation from consumers even for a period when the asset is free to supply electricity but is not doing so – Held: Second substantial question of law answered in the negative [Para 21].

Electricity Law – APTEL – True-Up Proceedings – Regulatory Framework – Finality of Orders – Distinction between technical useful life of 15 years and regulatory recovery period of 6 years is not merely semantic but is clearly drawn by the tariff framework – True-up proceedings are intended to give effect to the tariff framework and not to reopen or reconfigure it – APTEL erred in disregarding the regulatory framework and approval conditions which had attained finality – Held: Third substantial question of law answered in the affirmative [Para 22].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment dated 10.02.2025 of APTEL set aside – Order dated 11.11.2019 of the Commission restored – No order as to costs.

Civil Procedure – Decree on Admission – Order XII Rule 6 CPC – Caretaker Declining to Vacate – Respondents-plaintiffs filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of an open plot, alleging defendant was inducted as caretaker/chowkidar — Trial court passed decree for possession on an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on the basis of complaint filed by the defendant himself in criminal proceedings (FIR No. 178/2009) wherein he had categorically admitted the ownership of the plaintiff and his own status as caretaker — All three courts below concurrently upheld the decree — Held: A decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed on the basis of admissions whether in pleadings or otherwise, oral or written; the admission must be clear and unequivocal; once ownership of plaintiff and caretaker status of defendant were admitted, there was no justification for defendant to continue in occupation after termination of licence — Concurrent findings of three courts not disturbed — SLP dismissed [Paras 12–18].

Order XII Rule 6 CPC – Scope – Admission Outside Pleadings – Held: No particular form of admission is required; the court may on its own motion pass a decree on admission at any stage of the suit; the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment to the extent of relevant admission; the provision is not to be narrowly construed [Paras 13–16].

Admission – Criminal Proceedings – Denial Not Established – Defendant contended that the FIR was not read over to him by police and that he was not conversant with the language — Held: There is a material difference between asserting that the FIR was not read over and denying its contents; the record of cross-examination contained not a whisper of denial of ownership of plaintiff or of defendant's induction as caretaker; voluntary statement in cross-examination that papers were not read over cannot amount to a denial of correctness of the contents of the complaint or FIR [Paras 26–31 of High Court judgment, Para 17].

Decision: Special Leave Petition dismissed — Stay on execution proceedings vacated — Execution Case No. 53 of 2021 to proceed expeditiously in accordance with law — Pending applications disposed of.

Property Law - Land Transfer – SC/ST Land Protection – Delay and Laches – Karnataka Act of 1978 – Section 4 – Original grantee received land in 1977 with grant certificate issued in 1981 under Schedule E of the Land Revenue Code, which prohibited alienation for 15 years – First transfer effected in 1997, after expiry of the 15-year prohibition period – Appellant purchased the land in 2003 – Proceedings initiated in 2006-07 under the Act of 1978, nine years after the first transfer – Authorities and High Court annulled the sale holding any transfer without prior Government permission to be null and void under Section 4 – Held: The proceedings were initiated by Respondent Nos. 4 and 5, sons of the original grantee, who were themselves parties to the first transfer in 1997 and were aged approximately 35 and 25 years respectively at the time — this distinguishing fact takes the case outside the protective ambit of the beneficial legislation invoked – Orders of authorities and High Court set aside [Paras 2–8].

Beneficial Legislation – Laches – Distinction from Precedents – While the Act of 1978 is a beneficial legislation designed to protect SC/ST grantees from being enticed into parting with their lands, the protection cannot be invoked by persons who were themselves knowing and willing parties to the alienation – Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner held an 8-year delay not fatal where villagers initiated proceedings against illegal transfers; Shakuntala recognised that even where no limitation is prescribed, proceedings must be initiated within a reasonable time – Present case distinguishable as the initiators of proceedings were adult parties to the very transfer sought to be annulled, not uninformed legal representatives or the village community [Paras 6–7].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned orders of the authorities and the High Court set aside – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 8–9].

Land Acquisition – Compensation – Deduction for Development and Smallness – Exemplar Sale Value – Section 4 Notification dated 04.08.1995 for acquisition of approximately 98 acres for construction of a 400/220 KV Sub-Station at Kartarpur near Jalandhar — LAO awarded Rs.3,00,000/- per acre; Reference Court enhanced the same; High Court adopted exemplar sale (Exh.P-3) at Rs.15,68,000/- per acre and applied 60% deduction for development and smallness, arriving at compensation of Rs.6,27,200/- per acre — Appellants challenged the 60% deduction as excessive; Held: No error in applying 60% deduction, which is within the permissible upper benchmark of 75% laid down in Chandrashekar's case [Paras 8-9, 19].

Development Charges – Rationale – Two Components – Deduction for development charges comprises two components: (i) area/space to be kept apart for roads, pavements, sewers, parks, electricity lines, civic amenities etc.; and (ii) expenditure likely to be incurred for raising such infrastructure — Both components exist in the present case as a whole township including office complex, residential colonies, roads, parks and civic amenities was to come up alongside the Sub-Station — Standard deduction towards development cost ranges from 20% to 75% depending on facts and circumstances [Paras 14-17].

Land Acquisition – Development Deduction – Upper Benchmark – A combined deduction for development and smallness cannot exceed 75% — Development charges alone may go up to an upper benchmark of 67%; deductions for other factors including smallness may vary depending on facts, provided the cumulative deduction does not cross 75% — Where deduction in excess of 75% is necessary, the exemplar itself would be rendered incomparable and inapplicable [Para 15].

Decision: Appeals dismissed — High Court's order applying 60% deduction on exemplar value and fixing compensation at Rs.6,27,200/- per acre upheld — No order as to costs.

Criminal Law - Constitution of India, Article 142 - Condonation of Delay - Jail Appeals - High Court dismissed a criminal appeal involving a life sentence on the ground of a 3157-day delay - Held, the High Court ought to have taken a practical and sympathetic view considering the appeal was filed through jail and the petitioner had already undergone significant incarceration. Given that the petitioner has now completed 22 years of sentence with satisfactory conduct and no prior release on parole, remanding the matter for a merit hearing would be a futile exercise. Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 as an exceptional case to grant bail. [Paras 1-13].

Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 302 and 201 - Life Imprisonment - Remission of Sentence - Petitioner convicted in 2006 and incarcerated since 2004 - Conduct certificate from Senior Superintendent, Circle Jail, Koraput confirmed satisfactory behavior and work in the jail laundry - Held, Petitioner directed to be released on bail on a personal bond of Rs. 10,000. District Legal Services Authority (DLSA), Koraput directed to assist the petitioner in filing a representation for remission of sentence under the prevailing or most beneficial policy. [Paras 11-15].

Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 - Condonation of Delay - Criminal Appeal - Significant delay of 9 years - High Court’s refusal to condone delay in a jail appeal described as "disturbing" by the Supreme Court - Held, the fact that a convict is undergoing a long sentence and filing through jail is sufficient reason for a practical approach towards delay condonation to ensure an opportunity to argue the appeal on merits. [Paras 1-7].

Decision: Bail granted – Petitioner to be released on executing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000 to the satisfaction of the Jail Superintendent – DLSA directed to assist in remission representation – Compliance to be reported on 28-05-2026.