Impleadment – Transferee pendente lite – Appellant sought impleadment in an ongoing suit related to the property purchased during litigation – High Court dismissed the impleadment application citing Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Supreme Court held that Section 52 does not void such transfers but makes them subservient to the litigation outcome – Appellant’s right to defend his interest recognized [Paras 16-17].

Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Scope and application – High Court erroneously applied Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act to nullify the appellant’s sale deed – Supreme Court clarified that lis pendens merely subordinates the purchaser’s rights to the outcome of the pending suit and does not void the transaction [Para 17].

Discretionary Impleadment – Transferees pendente lite with notice of litigation – Supreme Court emphasized the discretionary nature of impleadment to protect purchasers’ interests, especially to prevent possible collusion between the original parties – Reiterated that impleadment can be allowed even without the transferee’s prior court permission [Paras 18-19].

Bona Fide Purchaser – Not a precondition for impleadment – Supreme Court held that knowledge of pending litigation does not bar impleadment – Emphasized the necessity to protect transferees’ interests where there is a potential collusion between parties and considerable delay in the filing of the underlying suit [Paras 19-20].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Impugned order and the trial court’s order set aside – Appellant directed to be impleaded as a party-defendant in the ongoing suit – Recognized the appellant’s registered sale deed and disputed question of fact regarding consideration payment to be determined by the trial court [Para 22].

Land Acquisition – Compliance with Section 5A – The Supreme Court analyzed whether the procedures under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were duly followed. It emphasized that the Collector must provide an opportunity for personal hearing to the objectors and consider their objections with due application of mind. The failure to do so can vitiate the acquisition proceedings. In this case, the High Court's finding of non-compliance was based on the ineffective notice to the landowners and mechanical rejection of objections, which the Supreme Court upheld for those who filed objections but did not accept compensation [Paras 13-24, 36-43].

Locus Standi – Acceptance of Compensation – The Court held that landowners who accepted compensation without protest waived their right to challenge the acquisition process. It also ruled that subsequent purchasers of the land post-Section 4 notification do not have locus standi to challenge the acquisition, as the title acquired is encumbered and void against the government. Therefore, objections by such purchasers were not entertained [Paras 25-35].

Intimation and Personal Hearing – The Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of serving notices to objectors, ensuring their right to personal hearing. The absence of proper notice and the ensuing failure to provide a meaningful hearing render the acquisition process non-compliant with Section 5A. The Court underscored the principle of audi alteram partem and statutory presumption in favor of regular performance of official acts unless convincingly rebutted [Paras 38-43].

Decision: Appeals partly allowed – The acquisition proceedings quashed for landowners who filed objections and did not accept compensation – Appeals of landowners who accepted compensation or purchased land post-Section 4 notification dismissed.

Civil Procedure – Impleadment of Transferee Pendente Lite – The appellant purchased land during the pendency of a suit for declaration and injunction regarding the same land. The trial court dismissed his application for impleadment, a decision upheld by the High Court based on the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the doctrine of lis pendens does not render the transfer void but subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. The Court emphasized that impleadment is discretionary and necessary to protect the transferee's interests, especially where collusion or failure to defend by the transferor is suspected [Paras 1-22]​​.

Doctrine of Lis Pendens – The Supreme Court clarified that the doctrine does not nullify the transfer but subjects it to the outcome of the pending litigation. The impleadment of a transferee pendente lite is permissible even with notice of the pending suit, as long as it helps protect the transferee's rights and interests [Paras 16-19]​​.

Collusion and Delay – The Court found a substantial delay in the filing of the underlying suit and potential collusion among the original parties, all relatives, which warranted the inclusion of the appellant to ensure a fair trial. The appellant's interest in the property, represented by a registered sale deed, further justified his impleadment [Paras 20-21]​​.

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned orders set aside – Appellant to be impleaded as a party-defendant in the underlying suit [Paras 22-23]​​.

Order II Rule 2(3) CPC – Leave to Sue Separately – Respondent sought leave under Order II Rule 2(3) CPC for filing a separate suit for recovery of arrears and damages – Trial Court and High Court found no relinquishment or omission in the first suit to bar the second suit – High Court affirmed separate causes of action for the two suits – Appeal dismissed – Court held that the object of Order II Rule 2(3) CPC is to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent defendants from being vexed twice for the same cause. However, it does not bar suits based on different causes of action, as was the case here. The respondent had specifically reserved its right to claim arrears and damages in the first suit and had taken leave to file a separate suit. [Paras 4-12, 17-18].

Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Rejection of Plaint – Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by appellant for rejection of respondent’s claim for arrears and damages – High Court found no merit in the application – Distinction between relinquishment and omission of claims under Order II Rule 2 CPC emphasized – Appeal dismissed – Court observed that the appellant’s application for rejection of the plaint was based on a misinterpretation of the principles under Order II Rule 2 CPC. The respondent had neither relinquished its claims nor omitted to claim the reliefs sought in the second suit, thus the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was rightly dismissed by the lower courts [Paras 7, 12].

Leave and License Agreement – Termination and Subsequent Litigation – Original agreement dated 25.11.2008 superseded by another agreement dated 01.12.2010 – Dispute arose due to default in payment of storage charges – Legal notice issued by respondent on 27.11.2014 – Respondent instituted suit for permanent injunction and possession in O.S. No.101 of 2015 – Appellant filed a commercial suit for declaration regarding extent of the warehouse area – Respondent granted leave under Order II Rule 2(3) CPC to file a separate suit for arrears and damages – Multiple suits filed by both parties leading to the present appeal [Paras 4-11].

Commercial Suit – Separate Causes of Action – High Court’s observation that suits were based on different causes of action – First suit related to possession and permanent injunction – Second suit related to recovery of arrears and damages – No relinquishment or omission of claims – Respondent had reserved its right to claim arrears and damages in the first suit and sought leave to file a separate suit – Distinction between causes of action and claims for different reliefs highlighted [Paras 12, 17].

Precedents and Judicial Reasoning – Reliance on Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. ATM Constructions Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC Online SC 1614 – Court reiterated that suits for possession and suits for claiming damages for use and occupation are based on different causes of action and can be separately maintained – Application of legal principles regarding Order II Rule 2(3) CPC and Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Affirmation of High Court’s detailed reasoning and dismissal of appellant’s contentions [Paras 16-18].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Held – The second suit filed by the respondent was maintainable – No infirmity found in the impugned order – Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view that both suits were based on different causes of action – Pending applications disposed of [Para 19-20].

Divorce – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Exercise of Article 142 Powers – Appeal by husband challenging the High Court’s order dismissing his divorce petition – Husband and wife lived together for only 43 days in total – Separation period of over 22 years – Continuous legal battles and acrimonious relationship – Supreme Court exercises powers under Article 142 to dissolve marriage, emphasizing that continuation of the legal relationship is unjustified given the complete failure of the marriage [Paras 1-20].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Constitutional Powers – Court refers to precedents where it exercised Article 142 powers to dissolve marriages in similar circumstances – Highlights recent Constitution Bench ruling in Shilpa Shailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan which affirms the Court’s discretion to grant divorce on grounds of irretrievable breakdown even if one spouse opposes [Paras 13, 18-19].

Cruelty and Legal Battles – Husband alleges cruelty due to refusal of marital obligations and initiation of false criminal proceedings by wife – Supreme Court finds that actions and prolonged separation indicate a failed marriage beyond repair – Acknowledges continuous disputes and legal harassment by the wife post-separation [Paras 2-17].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Marriage dissolved under Article 142 – No permanent alimony awarded as both parties are qualified professionals with sufficient earnings – High Court’s order set aside [Para 20].

Criminal Law – Maintenance for Divorced Muslim Women – Appeal challenging reduction of interim maintenance from INR 20,000 to INR 10,000 per month – Appellant argued applicability of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 over CrPC – High Court upheld maintainability of maintenance under CrPC – Supreme Court affirmed, highlighting the continued existence of rights under both statutes, emphasizing the harmonious construction of the laws [Paras 1-41].

Section 125 CrPC vs. 1986 Act – Interpretation and Applicability – Court reiterated that Section 125 CrPC remains applicable to divorced Muslim women – The 1986 Act provides additional and not exclusive remedies – Clarified that rights under CrPC are independent and can be invoked simultaneously [Paras 10-37].

Doctrine of Stare Decisis – Supreme Court bound by previous decisions – Reiterated principles from Danial Latifi and Shamim Bano cases – Upheld that divorced Muslim women are entitled to maintenance under CrPC despite provisions of 1986 Act [Paras 24-37].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – High Court’s order reducing interim maintenance upheld – Appellant allowed to seek state government remission considering mitigating factors and time served [Para 40-41].

Adverse Possession – Limitation and Burden of Proof – Appellant-State claimed ownership based on adverse possession since 1958 following the donation of land for constructing a Veterinary Hospital – Trial Court decreed possession in favor of plaintiff due to lack of proof of donation – First Appellate Court reversed, acknowledging adverse possession – High Court restored Trial Court’s judgment, noting the absence of detailed adverse possession claims – Supreme Court found the suit barred by limitation, upholding appellant’s continuous possession as proof of adverse possession and ownership [Paras 1-33].

Vague Pleadings – Rejection of Suit – High Court failed to consider that plaintiff’s vague plaint lacked specific dates and details regarding construction awareness, allowing circumvention of the limitation law – Supreme Court criticized the vague plaint for lacking material particulars necessary for the case [Paras 15-18].

Ownership Presumption – Section 110 of Indian Evidence Act – Burden of proof for ownership lies on the respondent challenging the appellant’s possession – Possession since 1958 indicated ownership, supported by documentary evidence – Plaintiff’s inability to rebut this presumption resulted in the dismissal of the suit [Paras 30-32].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court judgment set aside – First Appellate Court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit confirmed [Paras 33-34].

Constitutional Law – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Determination of whether the Army Welfare Education Society qualifies as a “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution – Supreme Court analyzes the nature of the society and its functions, concluding that it does not meet the criteria for a “State” – Writ petition under Article 226 is not maintainable against purely private educational institutions not receiving government funds [Paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22].

Service Law – Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Staff members had a legitimate expectation that their service conditions would not be altered to their detriment upon transition to new management – Supreme Court highlights that while the doctrine of legitimate expectation is applicable, it cannot override the lack of statutory backing for enforcing the same against a private body [Paras 27, 28].

Public Law – Nature of Public Duty – Discussion on whether the imparting of education by the appellant society constitutes a public duty – Supreme Court reiterates that purely private educational institutions performing public functions do not automatically become subject to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 [Paras 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgment set aside – Writ petitions dismissed – Supreme Court rules that the appellant society does not qualify as a “State” under Article 12 and is not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 [Paras 38, 39, 40].

Consumer Law – Definition of Consumer – Appeals centered on whether vehicles purchased by a company for the use of its directors fall within the definition of "commercial purpose" under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act – National Commission held that purchases for the personal use of directors did not amount to "commercial purpose" – Supreme Court upheld this interpretation, confirming that such purchases are not for profit-generating activities and hence do not exclude the buyer from being a consumer [Paras 1-17, 26-29].

Commercial Purpose – Dominant Purpose Test – The Court reiterated that the determination of "commercial purpose" depends on the facts and circumstances of each case – Emphasized that the dominant purpose of the purchase must be examined – Purchases for personal use of directors not linked to profit generation are not considered "commercial purpose" [Paras 11-16, 29].

Defects in Goods – Deficiency in Service – Respondents-complainants reported defects in vehicles, particularly overheating issues – National Commission found the appellants liable for deficiencies in service – Supreme Court upheld the finding, directing compensation to the complainants [Paras 18-25, 30-37].

Unfair Trade Practice – Misrepresentation – National Commission found that appellants misrepresented the safety features of the vehicles, constituting an unfair trade practice under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act – Supreme Court agreed, awarding compensation for unfair trade practice [Paras 31, 34, 39].

Decision – Appeals Partly Allowed and Dismissed – Supreme Court modified the National Commission's order to permit the respondent to retain the vehicle and directed the appellant to refund a reduced amount considering the long usage of the vehicle – Other appeals dismissed, confirming the National Commission's orders on deficiencies and unfair trade practices [Paras 40-40(II)].