Service Law – Recruitment – Essential Qualification – Relevant Date – Candidates who had not acquired their law degree as on the last date of submission of applications applied for posts of Assistant Prosecution Officer pursuant to Advertisement No. 19/2023-24 dated 07.03.2024 issued by RPSC – High Court, affirming the Single Judge, held that candidates who acquired qualification before the date of preliminary examination were eligible – Supreme Court disagreed – Held: The relevant date for possessing the minimum essential qualification is the date of submission of the application, not any subsequent date prior to interview or examination [Paras 3, 18].

Recruitment Rules – Deletion of Proviso – Legislative Intent – Rule 12 of the Rajasthan Prosecution Subordinate Service Rules, 1978 originally contained a proviso permitting candidates appearing in the final year of the qualifying examination to apply – Said proviso was deleted by notification dated 10.10.2002 – Held: The legislative intent underlying the deletion is clear and unambiguous — candidates who have not acquired the requisite qualification as on the relevant date are not eligible to apply — what cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly (aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum) [Paras 20, 21].

Press Note – Clarification – Validity – Press notes dated 19.11.2024 and 29.11.2024 issued by RPSC clarified that candidates not possessing the prescribed qualification as on the last date of application were ineligible and were directed to withdraw their applications – High Court held that the press notes altered eligibility conditions mid-process causing prejudice – Supreme Court held otherwise – Held: The press note dated 29.11.2024 is in complete consonance with the Rules and the advertisement and merely clarifies that eligibility must be determined with reference to the date of submission of the application [Paras 22, 25].

Interpretation of Advertisement – Beneficial Construction – Limits – High Court applied the principle that where two interpretations are possible, the one favourable to candidates ought to be adopted – Held: Such an approach cannot be invoked when the language of the advertisement admits of only one clear and unambiguous interpretation — acceptance of respondents' contention would introduce uncertainty into the selection process and impose unwarranted administrative burden on RPSC [Paras 23, 24].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Common judgment dated 12.08.2025 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 169 of 2025 and connected matters set aside – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 26–28].

Default Bail – UAPA – Acquiescence – Right to Default Bail Lost – Respondents arrested in connection with FIR for offences under IPC and UAPA arising out of arson, rioting and destruction of public property including a police station – Investigating agency moved application under Section 43D(2)(ii)(b) of UAPA for extension of time before expiry of 90 days – Trial Court extended time by 28 days after hearing accused's counsel – Chargesheet filed on 7th July, 2024 within extended period – Respondents' application for default bail rejected by trial Court on 3rd June, 2024 – Respondents approached High Court only in September, 2024, long after chargesheet had been filed – High Court allowed appeal and granted default bail – Held: By the time respondents approached the High Court, the right to seek default bail had been lost by their acquiescence – Impugned order set aside [Paras 9-15].

Default Bail – Extension of Time – Investigation – Adequacy – High Court's Finding Erroneous – High Court cast aspersions on the Investigating Officer holding that investigation proceeded sluggishly and that only 8 official witnesses and 4 public witnesses were examined in three months – Held: Finding was factually incorrect as statements of 65 witnesses had been recorded in the said period – Case involved widespread arson, rioting, use of petrol bombs, large number of accused and separate FIRs arising from similar incidents in nearby areas – Observation that investigation proceeded with lethargy was absolutely unreasonable in the facts and circumstances [Paras 13].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of the High Court granting default bail set aside – Respondents directed to surrender before the trial Court within two weeks, failing which trial Court to take stringent measures to take them into custody – Respondents at liberty to apply for regular bail, to be considered on its own merits [Paras 15-17].

Service Law – Promotion – Relaxation of Service Rules – Notional Promotion – Validity of Government Order – Appellant, initially appointed as Fitter in 1988 and promoted as Overseer on 01.12.1995 pursuant to High Court direction, acquired a B.E. (Civil) degree in 1996 and was directed to discharge duties of Junior Engineer from 05.11.1997 – Pursuant to successive High Court orders in W.P. Nos. 18493 of 2001 and 21461 of 2003, Government issued G.O. (D) No. 19 dated 18.01.2005 promoting him as Assistant Engineer with effect from 14.04.1997 notionally, with monetary benefits from 26.10.1998 – Division Bench set aside the said G.O. and directed fresh scrutiny – Held: G.O. (D) No. 19 was validly issued in compliance with prior High Court orders and in consonance with the merger policy under G.O. Ms. No. 237 dated 26.09.1996; impugned judgment set aside and G.O. (D) No. 19 restored [Paras 3, 7.6, 19, 27].

Inter Se Seniority – Merger of Departments – Engineering Department vs. Town Planning Department – G.O. Ms. No. 237 dated 26.09.1996 framed the Tamil Nadu Municipal Corporations Service Rules, 1996 merging the Engineering and Town Planning Departments – Annexure I thereto expressly directed that Assistant Engineers transferred from the Town Planning Department be placed below Assistant Engineers of the Engineering and Water Supply Department – Appellant belonged to Engineering Department; Respondent No. 1 to Town Planning Department – Placement of appellant above Respondent No. 1 in seniority held to be in strict conformity with the said instructions – Government Order never challenged by any party – Held: Inter se seniority as determined by G.O. (D) No. 19 is valid and binding [Paras 17, 20, 27].

Judicial Review – Division Bench – Interference with Government Order – Absence of Discussion on Merits – Division Bench appears to have been swayed by unsubstantiated assertions of violation of Service Rules without meaningful engagement with the factual record – Failed to notice that both appellant and Respondent No. 1 had already been promoted as Assistant Executive Engineers on 07.11.2007, and as Executive Engineers on 27.01.2016; Respondent No. 1 having retired on 30.09.2023 – No surviving contest on seniority subsisted at the time of the impugned judgment – Held: Interference with a two-decade-old Government Order, after retirement of the writ petitioner, was wholly unwarranted and would unsettle all promotions in the Corporation [Paras 22, 24].

Committee Report – Scrutiny of Promotions – Contempt Proceedings – Pursuant to directions issued in contempt and writ proceedings, Government constituted a Three-Member Committee which examined the promotions granted to the appellant and found no irregularity, malpractice, favouritism, nepotism or corrupt influence – Contempt Petition Nos. 499, 675, 762 of 2019 accordingly closed by order dated 22.01.2020 – Division Bench failed to notice this material subsequent development – Held: Direction to re-scrutinise files was unsustainable in view of the Committee's findings already accepted by the High Court [Paras 23, 24].

Laches – Fence-Sitter – Impleading Applicant – Seniority Dispute – Impleading applicant K. Saravanakumar was not a party to any proceedings before the High Court and sought impleadment only at the final stage before the Supreme Court – Disciplinary proceedings pending against him rendered him disentitled to promotion in any event – No enforceable legal right demonstrated – Held: Fence-sitters cannot be permitted to agitate stale seniority claims after rights of third parties have crystallised; relief declined [Para 25, 25.1, 25.2].

Decision: Civil Appeals allowed – Judgment dated 23.07.2024 in W.A. No. 996 of 2015 and Order dated 04.10.2024 in Review Application No. 249 of 2024 set aside – G.O. (D) No. 19 Municipal Administration and Water Supply (MC IV) Department dated 18.01.2005 restored – Subsequent promotions of the appellant as Assistant Executive Engineer and Executive Engineer held valid – Appellant entitled to further promotion from the date of eligibility – Impleading applications disposed of – No order as to costs

Consumer Law – Medical Negligence – Death of Opposite Party – Substitution of Legal Heirs – Survivability of Right to Sue – Doctor died during pendency of revision before NCDRC after having succeeded in appeal before SCDRC – NCDRC allowed substitution of legal heirs – Legal heirs challenged the order contending that no decree existed against the doctor on the date of his death and hence proceedings stood abated – Held: Upon death of the alleged medically negligent doctor, his/her legal heirs can be impleaded and brought on record; however, the extent of liability shall be confined to claims maintainable against the estate of the deceased as per Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, read with Order XXII Rules 2 and 4 of CPC [Paras 65–67].

Maxim 'Actio Personalis Moritur Cum Persona' – Statutory Modification in India – The common law maxim 'a personal right of action dies with the person' has been statutorily modified in India by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, Legal Representatives' Suits Act, 1855, and Indian Succession Act, 1925 – The maxim, in its absolute form, is no longer applicable in India – Claims for pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased survive, while purely personal claims (defamation, personal injury not causing death) abate – Held: Exceptions under Section 306 of the 1925 Act must be strictly interpreted and confined to personal claims; estate claims survive [Paras 44–55, 64].

Section 306, Indian Succession Act, 1925 – Interpretation of First Exception – 'Personal Injuries Not Causing Death' – The first exception under Section 306 bars only causes of action that are purely personal in nature (such as defamation, assault, personal injury) and does not extend to claims representing pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased – Held: A distinction must be drawn between personal claims (which abate on death) and proprietary/estate claims (which survive) – Exception cannot be interpreted so broadly as to swallow the enabling provision [Paras 51, 55, 56, 59–61].

Consumer Protection Act, 1986/2019 – Procedure on Death of Party – Order XXII CPC – Section 13(7) of the 1986 Act and Section 38(12) of the 2019 Act mandate recourse to Order XXII of CPC in case of death of any party – Order XXII Rule 4 requires legal representatives to be brought on record where right to sue survives against the deceased – Rule 11 extends applicability to appeals/revisions – The 'right to sue' contemplated in Order XXII is a matter of substantive law governed by Section 306 of 1925 Act – Held: Procedural provisions under CPC and Consumer Protection Acts must be harmoniously construed with substantive law under the 1925 Act [Paras 34–40, 56–58, 67].

Proprietary Rights vs. Personal Rights – Classification – Proprietary rights (having economic/monetary value, transferable, forming the estate) survive the death of a party; personal rights (status-based, non-transferable, such as claims for pain, suffering, and reputation loss) do not survive – The legal representative of the deceased represents only the estate and cannot assert personal rights of the predecessor – Held: Estate claims in consumer proceedings survive; personal claims abate [Paras 59–61].

Balbir Singh Makol Case – Overruled – The five-judge bench judgment of NCDRC in Balbir Singh Makol v. Chairman, Sir Ganga Ram Hospital and Others, 2001 (1) CPR 45 (NC), applying the common law maxim without reference to statutory modifications and misreading the ratio of Melepurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan — Overruled — NCDRC erred in (a) failing to account for statutory modifications to the maxim; (b) misreading Melepurath Sankunni; and (c) treating the first exception under Section 306 of the 1925 Act as absolute, barring even estate claims [Para 66].

Decision: Appeals disposed of – Impugned orders dated 26.05.2010 and 24.05.2018 passed by NCDRC set aside – Revision petition restored to its original number – Matter remitted to NCDRC for adjudication of the revision on merits, confined to claims maintainable against the estate of the deceased doctor, within six months [Paras 72–73].

Company Law – Membership – Register of Members – Oppression and Mismanagement – Sections 397, 398 and 399, Companies Act, 1956 – Respondent invested substantial funds in the appellant company, was appointed Managing Director, and the hospital was rebranded reflecting his identity – Shares were alleged to have been allotted at a Board meeting on 15.07.1999, but no share certificates were issued and his name was not entered in the register of members – Company Law Board and High Court treated him as a deemed member – Held: Respondent was entitled to be treated as a member for purposes of maintaining proceedings under Sections 397 and 398 – Appeals dismissed [Paras 1, 31–32].

Definition of 'Member' – Section 2(27) vs. Section 41 – Scope and Interplay – Section 2(27) defines 'member' in wide and inclusive terms, excluding only bearers of share-warrants under Section 114 – Section 41 prescribes recognised modes of acquiring membership (subscribers to memorandum, persons agreeing in writing, entry in register, beneficial ownership in depository records) – Held: The requirement of written agreement under Section 41(2) was introduced to prevent fraudulent inclusion and protect companies from busy bodies, not to make entry in the register the sole and exclusive mode of membership – The expression 'member' in Sections 397 and 398 must be construed with reference to the broader framework of Section 2(27) and not confined to the technical requirements of Section 41(2) [Paras 21–23].

Equitable Jurisdiction – Sections 397 and 398 – Minority Shareholders – The jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 is equitable in character and the expression 'member' must be construed in a manner consistent with the remedial and protective purpose of the legislative scheme – It would be contrary to settled principles of interpretation to construe 'member' in a restricted technical sense so as to frustrate substantive rights of genuine investors who have been treated as shareholders by the conduct of the company – Held: Equity and justice must prevail over procedural technicalities when a person has been consistently recognised as a stakeholder [Paras 22–23, 28].

Deemed Membership – Recognition Through Conduct – Cumulative factual circumstances including: (i) letter by appellant no. 2 describing respondent as "co-owner"; (ii) conciliation proceedings and conciliator's letter acknowledging respondent's entitlement to 30% shareholding; (iii) respondent's induction as Managing Director; (iv) hospital renamed after respondent's trading concern; (v) share application money accepted, utilised and reflected in company's financial records; (vi) appellants admitting allotment as a fact before the civil court — collectively demonstrated consistent recognition of respondent's proprietary interest – Held: Respondent was in substance a member whose interest stood recognised by the company over a considerable period [Paras 14–16, 29–30].

Company Cannot Take Advantage of Own Default – The entry of a person's name in the register of members is a statutory obligation cast upon the company – The appellant company having received substantial investment, utilised it in business, and repeatedly recognised the respondent's stakeholder status, cannot thereafter be permitted to rely upon its own failure to make the formal entry so as to deny the respondent locus standi under Sections 397 and 398 – Held: Such a hyper-technical interpretation cannot be countenanced [Para 13.2–13.3].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Findings of Company Law Board affirmed by High Court upheld – Amount deposited before Supreme Court along with accrued interest to be released in favour of respondent Dhananjay Pande – No order as to costs [Para 32].

Bail Cancellation – Non-Compliance of Bail Conditions – Real Estate Fraud – Petitioner, Director of Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (BIIPL), granted bail by the Supreme Court in 2019 in multiple FIRs filed by allottees of the 'Grand Venice' project for non-delivery of units, siphoning of funds, and impropriety in allotment – Bail subject to conditions including deposit of Rs. 50 crores, settlement of allottee claims, and non-commission of similar offence – Allottees filed Miscellaneous Applications seeking cancellation of bail for violation of all three conditions – Held: Petitioner failed to comply with conditions of bail imposed upon him; bail cancelled; petitioner directed to surrender within one week [Paras 1–3, 125–126].

Bail Condition – Deposit of Rs. 50 Crores – Section 185, Companies Act, 2013 – Deposit Condition Violated – Bail condition required the petitioner, in his personal capacity, to deposit Rs. 50 crores as a pre-condition for grant of bail – Petitioner sourced the entire amount from BIIPL and related group entities without passing any board resolution or special resolution as mandated by Section 185 of the Companies Act, 2013 – Not a single rupee was deposited from the petitioner's personal funds; amount of Rs. 24 crores sourced from group companies and Rs. 26 crores from BIIPL – Held: Deposit made through corporate funds in complete disregard of statutory requirements cannot be sustained; condition treated as violated; IRP's objections under Sections 49 and 66 of IBC (no time limit for transactions intended to defraud creditors) rightly applicable [Paras 41–53].

Construction Incomplete – Bail Condition of Settlement Not Complied With – Despite multiple opportunities spanning over five years from the grant of bail, the Grand Venice project remained substantially incomplete as confirmed by three independent reports: UPSIDA Report (01.05.2025), Observer's Report (15.05.2025), and Court-appointed Committee Report (23.01.2026) – Reports revealed non-functional lifts, absence of fire NOCs, incomplete units on 9th floor and above, no fire hydrants or firefighting equipment, and inadequate basic amenities – Total claims of allottees exceeded Rs. 1400 crores with approximately 670 creditors; petitioner proposed only Rs. 5 crores towards settlement – Held: Petitioner made no genuine or bonafide effort at settlement; bail condition violated [Paras 54–57, 66–67, 122–123].

Conduct Before Court-Appointed Committee – Lack of Bonafides – Petitioner's conduct before the Court-appointed Committee was obstructive: he left the site visit midway; submitted a list of 1764 allottees before this Court on affidavit but only 774 allottees before the Committee; repeatedly failed to furnish a comprehensive list of allottees despite directions – Held: Such conduct reflects absence of bonafide intention to settle with allottees and is inconsistent with the obligations attached to the grant of bail [Paras 57, 97–98].

Fabrication of Documents – Allotment Agreement and Stamp Paper – Prima Facie Finding – Allotment agreement dated 15.04.2015 contained a GST clause, whereas GST was enacted only in 2017, pointing directly at fabrication – Petitioner's explanation that inclusion was "anticipatory" rejected as GST reference appeared only in one clause and not throughout – Further, Assignment Deed dated 10.04.2023 was accompanied by stamp paper (FV 836192 dated 06.03.2023) which RTI revealed was actually sold to a bank on 29.04.2024, establishing post-dated fabrication – Petitioner thereby created third-party rights over 4,25,154 sq. ft. at the expense of genuine allottees and for his own commercial benefit – Held: Prima facie fabrication established; conduct demonstrates lack of bonafide and further justifies cancellation of bail [Paras 100–105].

Commission of Similar Offence – Siphoning of Funds During Moratorium – Section 14, IBC – Bail Condition (i) Violated – After admission of GVCTPL into CIRP by NCLT order dated 04.12.2023 and imposition of moratorium under Section 14 of IBC, an amount of Rs. 74,68,21,277/- was transferred from GVCTPL's account to three entities — Niche Builders, Vinamr Infrastructure, and Bewealthy Properties — prima facie controlled by persons closely related to the petitioner – Petitioner explained transactions as "commercial advances" or "repayment of dues" but produced no loan agreements or financial instruments in support – Held: Transfer of funds during moratorium, without documentary basis and in absence of compliance with Section 186 of the Companies Act, 2013, prima facie amounts to commission of a similar offence; conduct not consistent with obligations of bail; conclusive finding deferred to appropriate proceedings [Paras 107–121].

Jurisdiction – Two-Judge Bench Modifying Three-Judge Bench Order – Clubbing of FIRs – Petitioner contended that the present two-judge Bench lacked jurisdiction to modify orders on clubbing of FIRs passed by a three-judge Bench – Court noted that two-judge Benches have, on occasions, modified three-judge Bench decisions, citing precedent – Held: Question of clubbing/de-clubbing of FIRs left open; any party at liberty to move an appropriate application which shall be decided on its own merits [Para 124].

Forfeiture of Deposited Amount – Direction to IRP and NALSA – Upon finding that bail conditions were intentionally violated, Condition (ix) of the bail order triggered – Held: Entire Rs. 50 crores plus accrued interest forfeited; Rs. 5 crores plus proportionate accrued interest directed to be transmitted to National Legal Services Authority (NALSA); remaining amount with proportionate interest to be transmitted to IRP for purposes of IBC proceedings; Registrar (Judicial) to ensure immediate compliance by the concerned Trial Court [Paras 128–129].

Principles – Cancellation of Bail – Distinction from Appeal Against Grant of Bail – Court reiterated that cancellation of bail operates on different grounds from an appeal against the order granting bail – Grounds for cancellation include: subsequent conduct of the accused, non-compliance with bail conditions, commission of similar offence, and misuse of liberty of bail – Merits of prosecution evidence are not to be gone into at the stage of cancellation [Para 40].

Decision: Miscellaneous Applications allowed – Bail granted to the petitioner vide order dated 06.11.2019 cancelled – Petitioner directed to surrender within one week – Petitioner at liberty to apply for regular bail afresh after twelve months subject to full compliance with orders passed in insolvency proceedings – Passport of petitioner not to be released by the Trial Court without leave of this Court – Entire Rs. 50 crores plus accrued interest forfeited; Rs. 5 crores plus proportionate interest transmitted to NALSA; remaining to IRP – Complete management and affairs of BIIPL to be handed over to IRP at the earliest – Pending applications disposed of.

Waqf Act, 1995 — Sajjadanashin and Mutawalli — Distinct Offices — Civil Court Jurisdiction — The High Court held that Section 3(i) of the Waqf Act, 1995 subsumes the office of Sajjadanashin within the definition of Mutawalli and that disputes relating to appointment of Sajjadanashin fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Waqf Board under Section 32(2)(g) — Held: The offices of Mutawalli and Sajjadanashin are not the same; a Sajjadanashin is the spiritual superior of a Dargah in charge of spiritual affairs, while a Mutawalli's functions are purely administrative; Section 64(2) of the Waqf Act itself preserves a person's rights as Sajjadanashin even upon removal from the office of Mutawalli, confirming the independent and distinct character of the two offices — Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a dispute relating to the office of Sajjadanashin [Paras 20–31, 42].

Waqf Act, 1995 — Section 32(2)(g) — Scope — Powers of Waqf Board — Board's power to appoint and remove Mutawallis under Section 32(2)(g) is confined to the administrative office of Mutawalli — Held: A Sajjadanashin of a Waqf can discharge the functions of Mutawalli if additionally appointed under Section 32(2)(g), but a Mutawalli cannot function as Sajjadanashin — Declaration of a Sajjadanashin is a religious affair over which the Waqf Board has no jurisdiction — Even the Karnataka Waqf Board (Respondent No. 24) conceded this position; the Board has never appointed any Sajjadanashin [Paras 29, 42].

Jurisdiction — Belated Plea — Second Appeal — The contesting respondent raised the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court for the first time in the second appeal before the High Court, having not raised it before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court — The dispute had also been transferred to the Waqf Tribunal in 2002, but the Tribunal returned the matter to the Civil Court holding it not maintainable, and this order was never challenged — Held: The High Court was not justified in entertaining the belated plea of lack of jurisdiction raised for the first time in second appeal, particularly after 37 years of litigation and after concurrent findings had been rendered [Paras 32–34, 41].

Sajjadanashin — Nature of Office — Succession by Nomination — Khilafatnama — Concurrent Findings — The grandfather of the appellant nominated him as Jan-Nasheen Sajjada through Khilafatnama (Ex. D-1) at a public religious function on 26.02.1981 — Both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after a 31-year trial, held the nomination valid and decreed the counter-claim in favour of the appellant — Held: The High Court having set aside the decrees solely on the ground of jurisdiction without going into merits, the concurrent decrees of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court are restored; the matter is remitted to the High Court to decide the second appeals on merits in accordance with law [Paras 8–13, 43].

Decision: Appeals partly allowed — Impugned judgment and order of the High Court in RSA Nos. 1004, 1064, 1069 and 1141 of 2023 quashed and set aside — Judgment and decree dated 20.12.2019 of the Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Channapatna in O.S. No. 92/1988 and judgment and decree dated 27.02.2023 of the Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Channapatna in R.A. No. 16/2020 restored — Matter remitted to High Court for decision on merits, excluding the question of jurisdiction, with a request to decide preferably within nine months.

Public Employment – Selection Process – Physical Endurance and Measurement Test – Absence of Candidate – No Enforceable Right to Rescheduling – Respondent qualified in the first tier of selection for the post of Constable in Delhi Police but remained absent on the scheduled date of the PE&MT (14.01.2024), citing cold, cough, fever, headache, body pain and dizziness – Three representations seeking rescheduling were submitted (13th, 14th and 25th January, 2024), none bearing acknowledgment of receipt – Advertisement expressly stipulated that the PE&MT schedule was final and could not be altered under any circumstances – Held: Non-communication of any decision on the representations, on facts and in the circumstances, did not confer an enforceable right on the respondent to seek rescheduling, nor did it clothe the Tribunal with jurisdiction to direct a fresh opportunity [Paras 5, 6, 8].

Conduct of Candidate – Duty to Report – Respondent's own representation dated 25.01.2024 disclosed that he had reported to the recruitment venue on the morning of 13.01.2024, the day preceding the scheduled PE&MT – Held: Having been mobile on 13.01.2024, the respondent was obligated, at the minimum, to present himself on 14.01.2024, cite his inability, and request rescheduling in person – Abstaining entirely and expecting a second chance demonstrates a lack of drive and initiative, particularly for a candidate aspiring to join the police force – Respondent was rightly marked "ABSENT" [Paras 7, 9, 10].

Discretion in Public Employment – Backward Community – Not a Decisive Factor – Argument that the Tribunal and High Court rightly exercised discretion in favour of the respondent on account of his belonging to the backward community – Rejected – Held: Mere membership of a backward community cannot be the decisive factor for tilting the scales – Grace, charity or compassion ought to stay at a distance in matters of public employment if a fair level playing field is to be secured – Boundaries for exercise of discretion are well carved out and adjudicatory fora ought not to trench beyond them [Para 11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dated 07.07.2025, as upheld by the High Court of Delhi vide order dated 03.09.2025, set aside – Parties to bear their own costs.

Contempt of Courts – Criminal Contempt – Safety of Judicial Officers – SIR of Electoral Rolls – Suo Motu Action – Seven judicial officers, including three women, were gheraoed by anti-social elements at the BDO office, Kaliachowk, Maldah District, West Bengal, while discharging duties relating to adjudication of objections under the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls — Officers were held without food or water from 3:30 p.m. until after midnight — Their vehicles were pelted with stones and attacked with bamboo sticks and bricks upon release — Held: Such conduct amounts to criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and constitutes a brazen challenge to the authority of this Court — Judicial officers deputed for SIR adjudication function as an extension of this Court [Paras 2, 9, 10, 11].

Judicial Officers – Extension of Supreme Court – Protection of Authority – This Court's order dated 20.02.2026 in W.P.(C) No. 1089/2025 makes clear that judicial officers assigned to adjudicate objections in the SIR process discharge their duties for and on behalf of the Supreme Court — Any obstruction of or intimidation to such officers is, in essence, a challenge to the authority of this Court — The incident is a calculated, well-planned and deliberate act intended to demoralise judicial officers and obstruct the ongoing adjudication process [Paras 9, 10].

State Administration – Failure of Duty – Show Cause – The Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Director General of Police, District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police, Maldah, failed to take effective action despite being informed of the gherao at 3:30 p.m. — No effective evacuation measures were taken; senior officials arrived at the Chief Justice's residence only after midnight — The Chief Secretary could not be contacted as he had not shared a mobile number with WhatsApp facility — Held: Such conduct is highly deplorable; officials directed to show cause as to why action should not be taken against them [Paras 7, 11, 12, 13(vii)].

Interim Directions – Security of Judicial Officers – ECI and State Government – Pending further hearing, the following directions issued: (i) ECI directed to requisition and deploy adequate central forces at all places where judicial officers are deputed; (ii) adequate security to be provided at residences and hotels where officers and their families are staying; (iii) threat perception of family members to be assessed and remedial measures taken; (iv) not more than 5 persons to be permitted at any premises where objections are filed or adjudicated; (v) compliance report to be submitted by the Chief Secretary, Director General of Police and Chief Electoral Officer; (vi) ECI directed to entrust investigation of the incident to an independent agency such as the CBI or NIA, with a preliminary inquiry report to be submitted directly to this Court [Para 13].

Decision: Suo motu cognisance taken — Interim directions issued for immediate compliance — Show cause issued to Chief Secretary, Director General of Police, District Magistrate, Maldah and Superintendent of Police, Maldah — All concerned officials directed to remain present virtually on 06.04.2026 — Registry directed to forward D.O. letter of the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court to all concerned authorities.