Arbitration Agreement – Non-Signatory to Arbitration Agreement – Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Referral of Non-Signatory to Arbitration Upheld – The petitioners sought appointment of a Sole Arbitrator to resolve disputes arising under a Family Arrangement Agreement (FAA), including the involvement of the SRG Group which was not a signatory to the FAA – Held: Even though the SRG Group was not a signatory to the FAA, their conduct and involvement in the performance of the FAA raised a prima facie case for them being bound by the arbitration clause – The referral court is required to conduct only a prima facie inquiry into the existence of an arbitration agreement, with the arbitral tribunal left to determine whether the non-signatory (SRG Group) is bound by the arbitration agreement – The involvement of the SRG Group in implementing the FAA provisions, such as share transfers in Millenium and Deegee companies, prima facie indicates their role in the FAA, warranting referral to arbitration [Paras 52-80].

Prima Facie Determination – Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Scope of Referral Court’s Jurisdiction Limited – Under Section 11(6A), the referral court's inquiry is confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement – Held: The referral court must avoid conducting a detailed inquiry into the facts and instead limit its examination to the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement – Any further detailed examination, including whether a non-signatory can be bound by the arbitration agreement, must be left to the arbitral tribunal – Referral of SRG Group to arbitration was prima facie justified based on their involvement in the execution of the FAA [Paras 60-63, 80].

Non-Signatory Bound by Arbitration Agreement – Consent and Conduct – Factors for Determining Non-Signatory’s Intent – A non-signatory may be bound by an arbitration agreement if there is evidence of consent, conduct, or involvement in the underlying contract – Held: In this case, email exchanges, involvement in performance, and negotiations involving the SRG Group raised questions about their intent to be bound by the FAA – The issue of whether the SRG Group is a veritable party to the arbitration agreement should be decided by the arbitral tribunal after evaluating the evidence [Paras 68-79].

Decision:

The Supreme Court allowed the petition, appointing Justice Akil Kureshi (Retd.) as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes under the FAA – The arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide the involvement of the SRG Group as a veritable party to the arbitration agreement based on the evidence – All contentions of the parties were left open for adjudication by the tribunal [Paras 81-84].

Land Acquisition – Payment of Compensation – The appellant (M/s Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd.) challenged the High Court’s direction to pay compensation under the Supplementary Award dated 02.05.2022 – High Court had ruled that the appellant should pay the compensation first and recover the amount from Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JAL) later – The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reliance on Clause 7.1 of the Scheme of Arrangement between the appellant and JAL was erroneous – The acquisition proceedings commenced before the Scheme's "Effective Date," and liabilities associated with the land remained with JAL – Held: JAL is liable for the compensation determined under the Supplementary Award [Paras 16, 20, 27, 32, 56].

Land Ownership – Liability of Payment – The subject land was acquired for a safety zone under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for JAL's cement project – The land was not transferred to Ultra-Tech Cement under the Scheme of Arrangement – Supreme Court clarified that ownership of the land and liabilities relating to the land acquisition, including compensation, remained with JAL – Hence, the appellant could not be directed to pay the compensation amount for land not transferred to it – Held: Compensation liability remains with JAL, not Ultra-Tech Cement [Paras 27, 29, 32].

Return of Acquired Land – Unutilized Land under Section 101 of the 2013 Act – JAL contended that the subject land had remained unutilized and should be returned to the original landowners – The Court rejected this contention, holding that the land was acquired as a safety zone and was being utilized for that purpose – The argument that the land was unutilized did not hold since the purpose of acquisition was being fulfilled – Held: The return of land under Section 101 is not applicable in this case [Paras 33, 36-38].

State's Role – Article 300-A of the Constitution – The Court emphasized the constitutional duty of the State to ensure fair compensation for landowners – The Himachal Pradesh government failed in ensuring timely payment of compensation, contrary to the welfare State principles under Article 300-A – The Court held that the State should have facilitated payment to the landowners rather than leaving them to seek compensation from corporate entities – Held: The State must compensate landowners and recover the amount from JAL [Paras 43-52].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – Respondent Nos. 7 (State of Himachal Pradesh) and 10 (Land Acquisition Collector) directed to pay compensation to the landowners and recover it from JAL – Compensation to be paid within 15 days with interest at 9% from the date of the Supplementary Award [Paras 56-58].

Criminal Law – Filing of False Proceedings – Misuse of Judicial Process – Appellants filed appeals in the name of Bhagwan Singh challenging orders of the Allahabad High Court – During proceedings, it was revealed that Bhagwan Singh had not authorized any such filings and had no knowledge of the SLPs in his name – Multiple advocates were involved in submitting forged documents, including a falsified 'Vakalatnama' purportedly signed by Bhagwan Singh – Court found that the entire proceedings were a fraud, orchestrated by respondents Sukhpal Singh and Rinki with the assistance of advocates【Paras 5-17, 20-25】.

Professional Misconduct – Role of Advocates in Fraudulent Proceedings – Advocates involved in the case were found to have knowingly filed false documents and misled the Court – Advocate-on-Record (AOR) attested signatures on the ‘Vakalatnama’ without Bhagwan Singh’s presence or consent – Advocates were directed to adhere to high standards of professionalism, as their actions directly impacted the integrity of the judicial process【Paras 9-10, 25-32】.

Judicial Process – Fraud on Court – Misuse of Legal System – The Court held that filing false proceedings using forged documents, with the involvement of advocates, constituted a fraud on the judiciary – The case reflected systemic abuse of the justice delivery process, where unscrupulous litigants and their counsel exploited procedural loopholes to file false claims【Paras 4, 20, 30-32】.

Witness Protection – Harassment of Key Witness in Nitish Katara Case – Respondent No. 2, Ajay Katara, a key witness in the Nitish Katara murder case, had been implicated in multiple false cases, including this one, as part of a larger effort to intimidate him for his testimony against high-profile convicts – The Court acknowledged the continuous threats and harassment faced by Katara, underscoring the vital role of witness protection in the justice system【Paras 16-18, 25-26, 28】.

Investigation Ordered – Involvement of CBI – The Court ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct an investigation into the fraudulent activities surrounding the filing of false proceedings – The CBI was tasked with identifying all individuals responsible for the fraud and submitting a report to the Court within two months【Paras 32, 43】.

Corrective Measures – Regulation of Professional Ethics and Procedures – The Court emphasized the need for strict adherence to professional ethics by advocates – It directed the Bar Council of India and the Government of India to take necessary actions based on this judgment – The Court also laid down guidelines for the proper marking of advocates' appearances in court records to prevent misuse【Paras 33-42】.

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Directions issued for CBI investigation and corrective measures for professional conduct – Matter listed for submission of CBI report on November 25, 2024【Paras 43】.

Labour Law – Kalelkar Award – Holidays on 2nd and 4th Saturdays – Overtime Compensation – The respondent-employees, who were employed in the Public Works Department, claimed entitlement to public holidays, including holidays on the 2nd and 4th Saturdays, and overtime pay for work performed on those days as per the Kalelkar Award – The Industrial Court allowed their complaint, granting the said benefits, which was affirmed by the High Court – Held: The Kalelkar Award explicitly provides for such benefits to all employees except daily-wage workers, and the respondents, being temporary employees, are entitled to these holidays and compensations – The appellants’ reliance on the Government Circular dated 27th May 1996 to deny these entitlements was misplaced – Appeal dismissed, and Industrial Court’s decision upheld [Paras 20-25].

Unfair Labour Practices – Denial of Holiday Benefits – Section 28, Maharashtra Act – The appellants-employer engaged in unfair labour practices by denying the respondent-employees their rightful entitlements under the Kalelkar Award – The Industrial Court held that the respondents were entitled to public holidays and overtime compensation for work performed on 2nd and 4th Saturdays – Held: The Industrial Court's order was justified, and the High Court rightly upheld it [Paras 8-9, 14-16].

Interpretation of Government Circular – Applicability of Benefits – The appellants relied on a Government Circular dated 27th May 1996 to argue that the respondents were ineligible for public holidays and overtime compensation – Held: The Circular did not apply to the respondents, who were on the Converted Temporary Establishment under the Kalelkar Award, which clearly granted them such benefits – The Circular was limited to cases disposed of or pending before the Industrial Court at Bombay and did not override the Kalelkar Award [Paras 22-23].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Judgment of the Industrial Court and High Court affirmed – Appellants directed to comply with the order within eight weeks – No order as to costs [Paras 25-26].

Motor Accident Claims – Contributory Negligence – Reversal of Findings – The appellants, survivors, and legal heirs of passengers involved in a collision with a parked truck, contested the reduction of their compensation due to contributory negligence – The parked truck was abandoned in the middle of a highway at night, without any warning signs – Held: The deduction of 50% of compensation on the grounds of contributory negligence was unjustified – Full compensation to be awarded – The vicarious liability of the car driver could not be attributed to the passengers – Compensation reinstated to full amount [Paras 3-5, 16-42].

Vicarious Liability – Passengers Not Liable for Driver’s Negligence – The contributory negligence attributed to the driver of the car was improperly extended to the passengers and their legal heirs – This imputation of liability was inconsistent with established tort principles – Held: The passengers were not responsible for the driver's negligence and thus, their compensation should not have been reduced – Compensation to be restored to the full amount [Paras 17-20, 36-39].

Highway Safety – Parking Regulations Violated by Stationary Truck – The offending truck was abandoned in the middle of the highway at night without any illumination or warning indicators, creating a traffic hazard – The truck's driver was found in violation of various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Rules of Road Regulation, 1989 – Held: The full responsibility for the accident rested on the truck's owner and driver – No contributory negligence can be imputed to the car driver under such circumstances [Paras 21-33].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Deduction of 50% of compensation on account of contributory negligence set aside – Full compensation to be paid as awarded by the Tribunal and modified by the High Court – Respondent No. 2 (Insurer of the offending truck) held jointly and severally liable with the truck's owner to indemnify the compensation – No costs [Paras 42-44].

Property Law – Common Passage – Right of Access – The plaintiff-respondents claimed use of the entire common passage marked X-Y, Y-Z, and Z-Z1 in the map attached to the sale deeds – Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that only passage X-Y was designated for joint use, as per the sale deeds – The High Court, however, decreed the suit, granting the plaintiff-respondents the right to use the entire passage – Held: The sale deed of the plaintiff-respondents only granted a right of use over the passage X-Y, and there was no stipulation that they could use the passage Y-Z and Z-Z1 in portion B owned by the defendants-appellants – High Court’s interpretation was incorrect – The Trial Court's judgment restored [Paras 1, 10, 20-24].

Interpretation of Sale Deeds – No Right over Defendants' Portion – The sale deed executed in favor of the plaintiff-respondents only stipulated the right to a 15 feet wide common passage (X-Y) for access to the defendants-appellants' back portion (B) – The defendants-appellants’ sale deed did not mandate leaving any passage for the plaintiff-respondents' use – Held: The High Court erred in granting the plaintiff-respondents’ claim over the Y-Z and Z-Z1 passages in portion B, which exclusively belongs to the defendants [Paras 14-16, 22].

Literal Interpretation of Contracts – No Ambiguity – The language in both sale deeds is clear, and there is no ambiguity requiring inference beyond the literal meaning – Courts should give effect to the express terms of a contract where the wording is unambiguous – Held: The plaintiff-respondents' right to a common passage is limited to X-Y, and no further access is permissible through portion B [Paras 18, 22].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment and order of the First Appellate Court set aside – Trial Court’s judgment restored, dismissing the plaintiff-respondents' suit – No order as to costs [Paras 24-25].

Criminal Law – Acquittal Reversed by High Court – Conviction Set Aside by Supreme Court – Appellants convicted by the High Court under Sections 302, 148, and 120B read with Section 149 IPC for conspiring to murder the deceased, Babureddy, and attacking him with deadly weapons – Trial Court had acquitted the appellants, finding that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Supreme Court held that the High Court’s reversal of acquittal was not justified – Trial Court’s reasoning based on contradictions in witness testimonies and lack of corroborative evidence was cogent – Appellants' conviction set aside, acquittal restored [Paras 3, 14-16].

Witness Testimony – Contradictions in Eyewitness Accounts – Key prosecution witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3) provided contradictory versions of the events, including who accompanied the deceased to the hospital and when the police recorded the Spot Mahazar – Delayed recording of statements of key witnesses (PW-2 and PW-3) further cast doubt on their credibility – Trial Court’s reliance on these contradictions was valid – Supreme Court noted that the High Court failed to address these discrepancies sufficiently before reversing acquittal [Paras 6-10, 14-15].

Appellate Interference in Acquittal – Parameters for Reversing Acquittal – Supreme Court emphasized the principle that appellate courts must be cautious while overturning acquittals, as there is a double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused – High Court failed to provide clear findings to overturn the Trial Court’s detailed judgment – Held: High Court’s interference was unjustified without addressing key contradictions and offering firm reasons for discarding Trial Court findings [Paras 15-16].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Conviction and sentences under Sections 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC and Section 120B IPC set aside – Appellants acquitted – Bail bonds and sureties discharged [Paras 16].

Criminal Law – Murder Conviction – Acquittal – Appellants (Accused Nos. 3 and 5) convicted by the Trial Court for the murder of Madhavrao Krishnaji Gabare – High Court sustained their conviction under Sections 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC and Section 148 IPC – Appellants challenged the conviction before the Supreme Court – Court found discrepancies and contradictions in the sole testimony of PW-1 (widow of the deceased), the key prosecution witness – Held: Prosecution failed to prove the appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Appellants acquitted [Paras 1, 6, 12-13].

Witness Testimony – Reliability of Sole Eye-Witness – PW-1 (widow of the deceased) was the only credible witness, as other alleged eye-witnesses (PW-4, PW-5, and PW-8) were disbelieved by the High Court – PW-1's testimony was riddled with inconsistencies between her initial complaint and deposition in court – She added details regarding the involvement of the accused, raising reasonable doubt about the certainty of her identification of the attackers during a power cut at the time of the incident – No other evidence substantiating her claim of moonlight visibility was presented – Court found her testimony unreliable for conviction [Paras 5, 7-10, 12].

Circumstantial Evidence – Power Cut and Visibility – Incident occurred during a power cut, with no corroboration regarding the availability of sufficient moonlight for proper identification of the accused – Court found that the identification of the assailants in such circumstances lacked clarity – Further, PW-1’s claim that the assault occurred for two hours was implausible, raising doubts about the prosecution’s version – Lack of clarity on weapon attribution further weakened the case [Paras 7, 8, 11].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Conviction and sentences under Sections 148 IPC and 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC set aside – Appellants acquitted – Bail bonds discharged, and any fines paid to be refunded [Paras 13].

Armed Forces – Prosecution of Army Personnel – Protection Under AFSP Act – Section 6 of AFSP Act – Proceedings Stayed – The petitioners sought to quash FIRs filed against their husbands, who are Army personnel, without obtaining the mandatory prior sanction from the Central Government as required under Section 6 of the AFSP Act, 1958 – The Court found that the FIRs and proceedings could not continue without such sanction – Held: The proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIRs shall remain closed in the absence of sanction from the Central Government, with liberty for the proceedings to continue if sanction is later granted [Paras 2, 3, 4, 6].

Sanction for Prosecution – Section 6 of AFSP Act – Requirement of Prior Sanction – It was submitted that sanction for prosecution of the Army personnel was declined by the competent authority – The Court emphasized that prosecution or legal proceedings against Army personnel for actions taken under the AFSP Act require prior sanction from the Central Government – Held: The proceedings cannot continue without the Central Government's sanction [Para 6].

Decision – Writ Petitions Allowed – The court allowed the writ petitions, quashing the impugned FIRs against the Army personnel due to the absence of prior sanction from the Central Government as required under Section 6 of the AFSP Act – It was clarified that if the sanction is granted at any later stage, the proceedings can resume in accordance with the law [Para 6].