Service Law – Correction of Date of Birth – School Records Prevail Over Horoscope – Respondent challenged adverse entry in service record changing date of birth from 01.10.1934 to 25.11.1931 – Trial Court upheld disciplinary authority’s finding based on school records – Appellate Court wrongly gave primacy to horoscope and reversed the decision – Held: School admission register has greater evidentiary value under Section 32(5) and 35 of Evidence Act – Horoscope not proved to be authentic – Trial Court’s dismissal of suit restored [Paras 5-9, 12-14].

Evidence – Admissibility of Horoscope – Weak and Unreliable Unless Proven – Supreme Court reiterated that horoscope is inherently weak evidence for proving age unless maker is available and authenticity established – Burden on party relying on horoscope is heavy – In contrast, school records maintained in official capacity are admissible and reliable under Section 35 Evidence Act – First Appellate Court erred in treating horoscope as decisive [Paras 10-11, 13].

Substantial Question of Law – Misappreciation of Legal Principles – High Court Erred in Dismissing Second Appeal – Supreme Court held that appellate court's reliance on inadmissible evidence and disregard of probative material (school record) constituted substantial question of law – High Court wrongly dismissed second appeal under Section 100 CPC without framing and addressing such legal question [Paras 6, 14-16].

Disciplinary Proceedings – Misrepresentation of Date of Birth – Penalty Justified – Departmental enquiry established that employee had suppressed actual date of birth at time of appointment – Appointing authority modified penalty after appeal – Held: Misconduct was proved, and disciplinary action was based on verified records – No reason to interfere with punishment [Paras 5, 9].

Final Decision – Appeal Allowed – Decree of Trial Court Restored – Judgment of High Court and first appellate court set aside – Respondent’s suit for declaration and benefits on basis of altered date of birth dismissed – No order as to costs [Paras 15-17].

Labour Law – Termination of Casual Workers – Ticca Mazdoors employed on need basis by RBI – Industrial Tribunal ordered reinstatement with back wages based on presumed completion of 240 days – Supreme Court held: Ticca Mazdoors not regular workers – Termination not illegal as workmen failed to prove continuous service – Tribunal wrongly placed burden on employer and erred in drawing adverse inference from non-production of old records – Findings based on no evidence and contrary to settled law [Paras 1, 16–21, 28–31, 39–40]

Industrial Disputes – Section 25F – Compliance Mandatory Only if 240 Days Worked – Workmen failed to produce documentary or oral evidence to establish they worked for 240 days in 12 months preceding termination – Employer's denial of claim and explanation for unavailable records accepted – Mere pleadings or representations not proof – Adverse inference not automatic – Tribunal erred in applying presumption without foundational evidence [Paras 16–20, 25–28, 34–36]

Employment Law – Effect of Acquittal – Acquittal in criminal case on benefit of doubt does not entitle reinstatement – Departmental or employment action still permissible – Forged documents at interview justified RBI’s refusal to regularize – Reinstatement not warranted solely on acquittal – Tribunal erred in relying on acquittal to negate misconduct [Paras 11–15]

Evidence – Burden of Proof – Initial burden to prove 240 days’ service lies on workmen – Tribunal misapplied law by shifting burden to employer – Affidavits without supporting evidence not sufficient – No legal presumption arises merely from failure to produce documents unless foundational facts are proved [Paras 29–32]

Service Law – Reinstatement and Regularisation – Direction for reinstatement does not automatically lead to regularisation – Ticca Mazdoors reinstated only to their previous temporary status – Settlement terms required three years' continuous service for regularisation – Mere reinstatement with back wages does not confer substantive rights [Paras 46–54]

Judicial Review – Tribunal’s findings held perverse – Misapplication of law, reliance on irrelevant factors, and failure to consider material aspects – Interference by High Court and Division Bench found unsustainable – Appeal allowed and Tribunal’s award set aside [Paras 40–45, 59]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of Industrial Tribunal and High Court set aside – Respondents not entitled to reinstatement or back wages – No costs.

Criminal Procedure Code – Section 195(1)(b)(ii) – Scope and Applicability – Private Complaint Maintainable – The Supreme Court held that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC applies only when the offence is committed after a document is produced or given in evidence in court – Where the offence such as forgery is committed before such production, a private complaint is maintainable – Decision in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493, affirmed – Contrary view in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533, overruled – Held: Procedural bar cannot deprive a victim of remedy where document is forged before it reaches court [Paras 6–8, 17, 25–26].

Criminal Law – Cognizance by Magistrate – Section 190 CrPC – Validity of Cognizance – Magistrate has power to take cognizance on a private complaint where a forged document was later filed in court – Section 195 CrPC is not a substantive bar but a procedural restriction – Held: A court’s complaint is only needed if forgery occurs after document is in court custody – Not otherwise [Paras 18–21, 25–26].

Statutory Interpretation – Penal vs. Procedural Statutes – Interpretation of Section 195 CrPC – Held: Section 195 CrPC is not a penal provision and hence need not be strictly construed in favour of the accused – Interpretation must promote justice and prevent impractical or absurd outcomes – Victims must not be left without remedy due to procedural formalities – Functional interpretation adopted [Paras 22–23].

Civil and Criminal Proceedings – Parallel Findings – Held: Civil findings do not bind criminal courts – Difference in standard of proof (preponderance vs. beyond reasonable doubt) explained – Possibility of conflicting findings not a ground to bar prosecution – Prompt criminal prosecution necessary to serve public interest [Para 24].

Final Decision – Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC Not Attracted – Forgery Alleged Before Production in Court – Private Complaint Maintainable – No Complaint by Court Needed – Appeals Dismissed – Earlier conflicting decision in Surjit Singh overruled – Sachida Nand Singh correctly decided [Paras 25–27].

Criminal Liability – Common Intention – Section 34 IPC – Applicability Justified – The appellants were convicted under Sections 323, 325, and 326 read with Section 34 IPC for inflicting injuries resulting in the death of the deceased – The Supreme Court upheld the application of Section 34, holding that common intention can be inferred from the facts and surrounding circumstances – Different individual acts may still fall under joint liability if actuated by the same common intention – Held: Conviction with the aid of Section 34 was proper [Paras 8–13].

Witness Credibility – Related Witnesses – Evidence Accepted – The Court rejected the contention that related witnesses are inherently unreliable – Held: There is no legal presumption against relatives as witnesses; in the absence of any motive to falsely implicate the accused, and with corroboration on material aspects, their testimony was rightly relied upon by the lower courts [Para 7].

FIR Delay – Explained Satisfactorily – No Suspicion Cast – The appellants argued that the FIR was delayed – The Court held that the delay was justified since the immediate priority was medical care for the injured – Held: Delay in filing FIR does not automatically discredit the prosecution case if adequately explained, as it was in this instance [Para 7].

Sentence Reduction – Custodial Sentence Modified – While upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC from 7 years to 4 years – Held: The modified sentence was sufficient considering the background facts – Other sentences imposed remained unaltered [Para 14].

Excise Valuation – Cost of Wooden Crates – Section 4 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 – Packing costs includible unless durable and returnable – Assistant Collector included cost of wooden crates in assessable value of glass sheets – Collector (Appeals) and CEGAT held otherwise – Allahabad High Court reversed, holding crates necessary for marketability and not durable/returnable – Held: Packing costs are includible under Section 4(1) unless falling within exception under Section 4(4)(d)(i) – First question answered against assessee; cost of crates includible [Paras 3–10].

Durable and Returnable Packing – Wooden Crates – Obligation to Accept Return Sufficient – Invoice clause obligated appellant to refund Rs. 140 per crate if returned intact – Legal principle is that actual return is irrelevant; only obligation to accept return matters – Wooden crates, even dismantled, could be reused – High Court erred in requiring evidence of actual return – Held: Wooden crates are durable and returnable packing; their cost not includible in assessable value – Appeal partly allowed; High Court judgment set aside on this point [Paras 11–18].

Decision – Appeal partly allowed – Costs of wooden crates held excludible from assessable value of glass sheets due to obligation of return – Impugned judgment of High Court set aside to this extent – No order as to costs [Paras 17–18].

Civil Writ - Article 12 – BCCI’s status as “State” – Tests from Pradeep Kumar Biswas applied – Petition under Article 32 dismissed (majority) – The Court held BCCI is not created by statute, receives no financial assistance, is not under deep and pervasive governmental control, and its monopoly in cricket is not State-conferred or State-protected – Mere regulatory permissions for foreign tours or hosting teams are not “pervasive control” – Hence BCCI is not “other authority” under Article 12 – Writ under Article 32 not maintainable [Paras 23–26, 30, 33, 36].

Fundamental Rights – Article 19(1)(g) – Enforceability only against “State” – Private regulation of a profession by BCCI does not convert it into “State” – Violation of Art. 19(1)(g) must be claimed against State; private bodies do not become “State” merely by impacting that right – Petitioners first must establish BCCI is “State” to invoke Art. 32; they failed [Para 28].

Public Function vs. Public Law Remedy – Writ under Article 226 against private body – Even if BCCI performs some public duties (team selection, discipline, organizing international fixtures), that does not ipso facto make it “State” for Article 12 – However, High Courts can issue writs under Article 226 to “any person or authority” performing public duties – Appropriate remedy against BCCI lies under Article 226 or ordinary civil law, not Article 32 [Paras 31–33].

Governmental Control – Nature and degree – “Regulatory” vs. “pervasive” – Need for financial, functional, and administrative domination – Government’s grant of permissions for foreign tours/hosting and its policy stance are regulatory; absence of deep, particular, and pervasive control over BCCI’s affairs means Article 12 not attracted [Paras 21–24, 30].

Comparative and Doctrinal References – Expansion of “State” concept – Courts traced evolution from Rajasthan SEB; Sukhdev; Ramana Dayaram Shetty; Ajay Hasia; Pradeep Kumar Biswas – Reiterated that Ajay Hasia tests are indicative, not conclusive; cumulative “pervasive control” remains key – Mere performance of some public functions is insufficient for Article 12 [Paras 18–22].

Dissent – Purposive and evolving interpretation of Article 12 – BCCI as “other authority” – Justice S. B. Sinha (dissent) reasoned that cricket’s unique national significance, BCCI’s de facto State recognition, exclusive control (de facto monopoly), power to select “Team India” using national symbols, regulation of livelihoods and speech, and “outsourced” public functions satisfy a broader public-function/monopoly/entwinement test – Concluded BCCI is a State actor and Article 32 petition is maintainable; law needs expansion to cover powerful private regulators performing public duties [Paras 55–104, 195–201, 230–281, 307].

Decision – By majority, BCCI is not “State” within Article 12; the Article 32 petition is dismissed – Court clarifies that remedies may lie under Article 226 against BCCI for public-duty violations – Dissent would have held BCCI to be “State” and Article 32 maintainable [Paras 33, 36; dissent Paras 280–281, 307].

Taxation Law - Sale vs Works-Contract – Installation of Lifts – Held to be Sale – Assessee entered into contracts for manufacture, supply, erection and installation of elevators – Claimed deduction under Sections 5F and 5G of the APGST Act treating transactions as works-contracts – Assessing authority treated it as sale under Entry 82 – Supreme Court held: Predominant intention was transfer of chattel for price – Installation merely incidental – Contracts constituted "sale", not "works-contract" [Paras 1–5, 11].

Interpretation of Composite Contracts – Principle of Substance Over Form – Reiterated that no standard formula exists to distinguish sale from works-contract – Must examine intention of parties, nature of obligations, and predominant object – If property passes after delivery of finished product, it is a sale – Held: In present case, materials were supplied in knocked-down condition and assembled at site – Labour and skill merely ancillary [Paras 5–6, 10–11].

Taxability Under Entry 82 – Lifts Treated as Goods – Inclusion under First Schedule – Contracts satisfied twin tests under Section 2(1)(n): transfer of property for consideration and in course of business – Assessee exhibited models, accepted custom orders and delivered finished goods – Installation followed supply – Held: Sale of lifts taxable under Entry 82 – Not entitled to benefit under Sections 5F or 5G [Paras 7–11].

Constitutional Validity – Relevance of Article 366(29A) – Background of 46th Constitutional Amendment discussed – Held: Explanation VI to Section 2(1)(n) inserted to align with Article 366(29A) to tax deemed sales – However, not every transaction involving supply and service is a works-contract – Substance of contract must reveal dominant intention – On facts, intention was to transfer goods, not perform service [Paras 8–9].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court Judgment Reversed – Supreme Court held that the transactions entered into by Kone Elevators were contracts for sale, not works-contracts – Taxable under Entry 82 of the First Schedule – Orders of Sales Tax Tribunal and High Court set aside – No costs awarded [Para 12].

Compromise Decree – Order 23 Rule 3 CPC – Mandatory Procedure Not Followed – First appellate court reversed trial court decree by relying on compromise (Exhibit D1) allegedly executed at police station – Held: Since compromise was made during pendency of suit, court could have acted on it only by following mandatory procedure under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC – No such compliance or satisfaction recorded – Compromise cannot be treated as legally binding without judicial endorsement – Matter remitted for fresh decision [Paras 3, 6].

Pleadings and Procedural Compliance – Absence of Proper Pleadings and Issues – High Court and appellate court erroneously held that plaintiff failed to plead against compromise – Held: Defendant’s written statement only made a bald reference to compromise – No specific issue framed at trial – Plaintiff deemed to have denied allegations – Appellate court failed to notice procedural lapses and drew adverse inference unjustly [Para 6].

Validity of Compromise – Document Executed in Police Station – Legal Scrutiny Required – Compromise allegedly executed on plain paper in police station – No registration or stamping discussed – Held: Courts below failed to consider legal implications of such informal documents – Additional scrutiny required when compromise affects substantive property rights [Para 6].

Final Decision – Orders Set Aside – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s dismissal of second appeal and judgment of first appellate court set aside – Matter remanded to District Judge, Panipat, for fresh adjudication on merits in accordance with law – No costs awarded [Paras 7-8].

Labour Law - Industrial Disputes – Trainee / Apprentice terminated on closure of scheme – Section 6N, U.P. Industrial Disputes Act – Award upholding retrenchment restored – Respondent appointed as trainee under State-sponsored scheme; scheme withdrawn; notice pay and retrenchment compensation tendered and received – Held: Even assuming respondent was a ‘workman’, termination was a simple retrenchment in full compliance with Section 6N; Labour Court’s findings on facts could not be displaced – High Court erred in interfering [Paras 1–7, 12, 16–17, 23].

Apprentice vs. Workman – Apprentices Act, 1961 – No right to absorption – Court reiterates that an apprentice is not a “workman” and has no statutory right to regularisation; if Apprentices Act applies, labour laws do not – On facts, even on the assumption of “workman” status, employer complied with Section 6N [Paras 14–16; cases cited: Mukesh K. Tripathi; U.P. SEB v. Shiv Mohan Singh].

Regularisation – Completion of 240 days – No automatic right – Appointments under a scheme/daily wages and not per rules cannot be regularised merely for 240 days’ work – High Court’s reliance on alleged parity with 11 trainees misplaced; those were selected in 1986 after interview; respondent did not qualify; services of all remaining trainees ended with scheme closure [Paras 9–13, 17–21; cases cited: A. Umarani; Pankaj Gupta; Executive Engineer ZP Engg. Divn. v. Digambara Rao; Mahendra L. Jain].

Unfair Labour Practice – No discrimination proved – Letter dated 7.11.1987 showed call to resume duty due to absence, not interview; termination letter dated 16.11.1987 recorded scheme withdrawal – High Court’s inference of victimisation and unfair labour practice unsustainable against Labour Court’s factual findings [Paras 10–13, 17].

Relief – Reinstatement – Co-terminus scheme – Even where Section 6N breach is alleged, reinstatement is ordinarily not directed if employment is co-terminus with a scheme – All the more so when Section 6N is complied with – Award restored; no costs [Paras 22–23].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court judgment set aside; Labour Court award upholding termination sustained – No order as to costs [Para 23].