Criminal Law – Prevention of Corruption – Demand and Acceptance of Bribe – Appellant, a Central Excise Inspector, convicted for accepting ₹1500 alleged as bribe for clearing export goods – Trial Court found him guilty under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act – High Court acquitted him under Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2), but upheld conviction under Section 7 – Supreme Court held that prosecution witnesses PW-10 and PW-2 gave inconsistent and contradictory statements – PW-10, the alleged bribe-giver, denied any demand and was declared hostile – PW-11, an official witness, did not corroborate the prosecution version – Post-trap mahazar (Exh. P-9) did not mention any demand – Held: Prosecution failed to prove the essential element of demand – Conviction unsustainable [Paras 8–14, 21–22]

Presumption under Section 20 – Rebuttal – Though tainted money was recovered from the appellant, the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act was rebutted by the explanation that the amount was repaid as a loan on behalf of PW-2 to Accused No. 1 – Supreme Court reiterated that presumption is rebuttable and not conclusive – It can be displaced by preponderance of probabilities – Mere recovery of tainted money, in the absence of evidence proving demand and corrupt intent, is insufficient to sustain conviction [Paras 15–20]

Acquittal – Evidence did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Appellant proved his defence by preponderance of probability – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appeal allowed – Bail bonds discharged [Paras 23–25]

Criminal Law – Appeal against Acquittal – Interference by Appellate Court – Principles Restated – Trial court acquitted the appellant on finding that prosecution failed to prove identity, recovery, and weapon connection – High Court reversed acquittal after 24 years and convicted under Sections 304 Part-II, 307, 324 IPC and Section 25 Arms Act – Held, unless the findings of trial court are perverse, unreasonable, or unsustainable, the High Court should not interfere with an acquittal – If two views are possible, one favouring acquittal must prevail – Rule of prudence requires restraint by appellate court [Paras 12.1–12.2, 27].

Evidence – Medical and Ballistic Evidence – Contradiction with Ocular Testimony – Benefit of Doubt – Prosecution alleged that a single bullet fired from .315 bore rifle caused injuries to four persons – Medical evidence showed each injured had distinct entry and exit wounds inconsistent with single shot theory – Ballistic Expert opined that the rifle examined (.302 bore) did not match the alleged weapon – Serious discrepancy between weapon examined and weapon allegedly used – Held, contradictions between ocular, medical, and expert evidence fatal to prosecution – Benefit of doubt to accused [Paras 18, 22–23, 27].

Criminal Procedure – Section 378 CrPC – Appellate Power in Acquittal Appeals – High Court failed to consider that trial court’s reasoning was plausible and based on material evidence – Findings of trial court not perverse – Held, High Court erred in reappreciating evidence to substitute its own view merely because another view was possible [Paras 21, 27].

Arms Act, 1959 – Sections 25 and 27 – Wrong Conviction under Section 25 – Appellant tried under Section 27 for using his father’s licensed rifle – High Court convicted under Section 25 which deals with manufacture, possession, or sale of arms without license – Held, conviction under Section 25 unsustainable as charge and evidence related only to Section 27 – Conviction set aside [Para 26].

Doctrine of Prudence – Rule of Two Possible Views – Where two views possible on evidence, one leading to acquittal and other to conviction, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted – High Court’s interference unjustified when trial court’s reasoning was reasonable and supported by record [Paras 12.1–12.2, 27].

Held: High Court’s reversal of acquittal was improper – Prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Serious inconsistencies between medical, ballistic, and ocular evidence – Trial court’s acquittal based on plausible reasoning restored – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith unless wanted in any other case [Paras 29–30].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court judgment dated 29.07.2005 set aside – Order of acquittal dated 09.10.1980 by Sessions Judge, Jhansi, restored – Appellant acquitted.

Technical Education – Bridge Course – AICTE Policy – Institute affiliated to State Board converted its four-year Post Diploma course (with 10+1 entry) into a four-year Advance Diploma course (with 10+2 entry) – Later upgraded to five-year B.Tech degree – Institute sought permission for one-year bridge course for diploma holders to obtain B.Tech – AICTE rejected request citing policy concerns and lack of enabling provisions – High Court directed approval of bridge course first for 10+2 diploma holders, later extended to 10+1 holders – Held: Grant of bridge course approval involves academic and technical policy decisions, within exclusive domain of AICTE – Courts cannot override academic standards or dilute entry qualifications through judicial directions [Paras 1–11, 12–17].

Judicial Review – Educational Policy – Role of Courts – Courts should not interfere in academic matters or substitute expert opinion of statutory educational bodies – Power of judicial review limited to examining legality, not wisdom, of policy decisions – High Court erred in granting relief by directing academic bodies to create or continue unauthorized academic programmes – Held: Entry-level qualification of 10+2 (PCM) for B.Tech must be strictly enforced – Courts cannot create equivalence through judicial fiat [Paras 13–15, 17–18].

Doctrine of Precedent and Estoppel – AICTE had earlier accepted Delhi High Court’s directions for one-time bridge course for 10+2 diploma holders – Later decisions extending benefit to 10+1 holders challenged – Held: Absence of appeal against earlier orders does not estop AICTE from resisting subsequent erosion of academic standards – No estoppel against statutory function to uphold quality of education [Para 16].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court orders permitting 10+1 Post Diploma holders to take bridge course set aside – Writ petitions dismissed – Clarified: Those who already completed bridge course and obtained degrees pursuant to High Court orders not affected by this judgment [Paras 18–19].

Criminal Law – NDPS Offence – Conscious Possession – Meaning and Scope – Conviction under Section 15 NDPS Act requires proof of conscious possession – Possession implies control with awareness of its nature – Once possession established, burden shifts to accused under Sections 35 and 54 NDPS Act to explain innocence – However, failure to question accused on possession under Section 313 CrPC vitiates conviction – High Court rightly acquitted respondents [Paras 10–18, 43–45].

Criminal Procedure – Examination of Accused – Section 313 CrPC – Mandatory Nature – Purpose is to afford opportunity to explain circumstances against accused – Not a mere formality – Failure to put vital question on possession amounts to violation of fair trial principles – Answers under Section 313 serve as substitute for testimony and must be personal unless exemption justifiably granted [Paras 18–21, 23–33].

Interpretation of Section 313 CrPC – Personal Examination and Exemption – Though general rule mandates personal questioning, in exceptional circumstances (hardship, incapacity, expense), the court may allow written responses verified by affidavit – Course permitted in Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka – Such pragmatic approach ensures substantial compliance without prejudice to accused [Paras 37–40].

Evidence – Use of Circumstances Not Put to Accused – Circumstances not confronted under Section 313 cannot be used for conviction – As held in Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab – Omission to question on possession fatally affects prosecution case [Para 44].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court’s acquittal upheld – Directions for departmental action against officials expunged [Para 45].

Service Law – Promotion – Reservation vs. Concession – Regional Rural Banks governed by NABARD Circulars – Circular dated 10.06.1997 providing concession to SC/ST candidates within the “zone of consideration” – Held: The circular did not create reservation of posts but only a concession allowing automatic promotion if the SC/ST candidate was within the number of vacancies and found not unfit – A candidate outside the vacancy range had to compete in selection process – High Court erred in treating the concession as reservation [Paras 16–17].

Administrative Law – Jurisdiction of State Reservation Policy – Regional Rural Banks governed by Central Act and NABARD circulars – State reservation policy inapplicable – Division Bench’s direction to promote respondent contrary to governing policy and circulars – Set aside [Paras 12, 16–18].

Service Law – Selection Process – Participation and Estoppel – Candidate having participated in the interview and failed cannot challenge selection process thereafter – Reliance placed on G.N. Nayak v. Goa University – Respondent not entitled to relief after unsuccessful attempt [Para 12].

Interpretation of Circulars – Expression “Reservation Posts” in NABARD Circular – To be construed as ‘concession’ not ‘quota’ – Concession operates only for SC/ST officers senior enough to fall within the number of vacancies – No independent right to appointment merely by belonging to SC/ST category [Paras 16–17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of Single Judge and Division Bench of Gauhati High Court set aside – No costs [Paras 18–19].

Service Law – Work-Charged Employees – Time Bound Promotional Scales – Distinction between work-charged and regular service – Under the PSEB Scheme of 23.04.1990, only “regular service” counts for grant of time-bound promotional scales after 9/16 years and promotional increments after 23 years – Work-charged service cannot be equated or clubbed with regular service unless specifically provided – High Court erred in directing benefit to work-charged employees [Paras 7, 10, 13].

Work-Charged Establishment – Nature and Status – Work-charged employees are engaged for specific projects, paid from project funds, and their tenure ends with the project – They form a separate class from regular employees; hence, not entitled to parity in pay, seniority, promotion or other benefits – Applied Jaswant Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 115 and State of Rajasthan v. Kunji Raman, AIR 1997 SC 693 [Paras 7–10].

Service Law – Regularization – Effect – Upon regularization, employee becomes member of regular establishment from date of regularization – Past work-charged service cannot be counted for seniority or promotional benefits unless expressly provided by statute or scheme [Paras 7, 13].

Ad hoc Service – Not Equivalent to Regular Service – Even ad hoc service cannot be counted towards seniority or financial benefits like selection grade or time-bound scale – Applied State of Haryana v. Haryana Veterinary & AHTS Association, AIR 2000 SC 3020; State of Punjab v. Gurdeep Kumar Uppal, AIR 2001 SC 2691 [Paras 11–12].

Interpretation – “Regular Service” – Expression in PSEB scheme held to mean service rendered after regular appointment – If the Board intended to include all service irrespective of status, it would not have used the qualifying term “regular” repeatedly – Scheme to be applied as written [Para 13].

Administrative Instructions – Government Circulars – Circular dated 17.07.2002 issued by Haryana Government to implement High Court orders in Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana not binding on PSEB – State instructions cannot alter or interpret independent PSEB scheme framed under its own regulations [Para 15].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court orders set aside – Writ petitions dismissed – No costs [Para 16].

Civil Procedure – Jurisdiction of Civil Courts – Industrial Employment – Natural Justice – Interplay between Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Standing Orders Act, 1946 – Civil Court’s Jurisdiction not automatically barred – Conflict between Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant (1995) and Rajasthan SRTC v. Khadarmal (2006) referred for resolution – Held, civil court has plenary jurisdiction under Section 9 CPC to entertain all civil disputes unless expressly or impliedly barred by statute – A suit challenging termination for violation of constitutional or common law rights (e.g., natural justice or Article 14) is maintainable in civil court – However, where relief is based on rights or obligations under the Industrial Disputes Act or Standing Orders, exclusive jurisdiction lies with labour forums [Paras 9–23, 28].

Industrial Law – Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(k), 2A, 10, 11A – Enforcement of Rights under Industrial Law – Where dispute involves enforcement of rights under the Industrial Disputes Act or “sister enactments” like the Standing Orders Act, the only remedy is to seek adjudication before Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal – However, where the cause of action stems from violation of statutory regulations framed under another Act (e.g., Road Transport Corporations Act) or constitutional provisions, civil court retains jurisdiction [Paras 15–16, 21–23].

Labour Law – Standing Orders and Regulations – Certified Standing Orders do not oust Civil Court Jurisdiction – Certified Standing Orders, though statutorily binding, do not themselves create a special adjudicatory forum – Hence, unless the claim is exclusively for enforcement of Standing Orders, the civil court’s jurisdiction remains unaffected [Paras 15–17, 23].

Administrative Law – Violation of Natural Justice – Effect on Jurisdiction – Violation of principles of natural justice amounts to violation of Article 14 and renders the impugned order void – Civil court can entertain a suit alleging such violation even where the employer is a State instrumentality under Article 12 [Paras 22–23, 28].

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 14(1)(b) – Enforcement of Contract of Service – Exceptions – Ordinarily, a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced – Exceptions: (i) statutory employment protected by Article 309/311; (ii) statutory corporations acting in violation of statutory regulations; (iii) employees protected by statute; (iv) rights under Industrial Disputes Act – RSRTC being a statutory corporation must comply with its Regulations and principles of natural justice [Para 23].

Doctrine of Prospective Overruling – Application in Jurisdictional Questions – Doctrine of prospective overruling cannot apply to cases where the court lacked inherent jurisdiction; such orders are void ab initio – Earlier use of prospective overruling in Krishna Kant disapproved [Paras 29–30].

Interpretation – Presumption in favour of Civil Court Jurisdiction – Where doubt exists, presumption lies in favour of civil court jurisdiction – Ouster not to be readily inferred [Paras 10, 24].

Held: Civil Court’s jurisdiction not barred in cases where an employee of a statutory corporation challenges termination on grounds of violation of constitutional rights, statutory regulations or natural justice – Only where rights flow solely from the Industrial Disputes Act or Standing Orders Act is such jurisdiction barred – Reference answered accordingly and cases remitted to Division Bench for decision on facts [Paras 31–32].

Decision: Question of law answered – Civil court jurisdiction upheld in cases based on violation of statutory regulations or constitutional provisions – Matters remitted to Division Bench for disposal in light of legal findings.

Abetment of Suicide – Section 306 IPC – Mere cruelty or harassment without proof of direct or indirect instigation not sufficient – Letters proved dowry demand and cruelty – Conviction under Section 306 IPC set aside – Convictions under Section 498A IPC and Section 3 Dowry Prohibition Act upheld – Sentence under DP Act reduced to three years – Appeal partly allowed [Paras 10–15].

Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 306, 107, and 109 – Abetment of Suicide – Meaning of “Instigation” – Proof and Mental Element – Abetment involves active mental process of instigating, provoking, or aiding commission of suicide – Mere cruelty or harassment without proof of direct or indirect incitement not sufficient to attract Section 306 IPC – Courts must be cautious in cases of domestic discord; hypersensitivity of victim cannot justify conviction – Held: No material to show any direct instigation or aiding by appellant – Conviction under Section 306 IPC unsustainable [Paras 8–13].

Penal Code, 1860 – Section 498A – Cruelty – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Section 3 – Demand for Dowry – Evidence including letters written by accused demanding ₹40,000 for purchase of house established persistent harassment and dowry demand – Such conduct constitutes cruelty within meaning of Section 498A IPC and offence under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act – Convictions under these provisions sustained – However, sentence under Section 3 of the Act reduced from five years to three years [Paras 3, 14–15].

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 209 – Commitment of Case – Properly invoked where offences under IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act were triable exclusively by Sessions Court – No procedural infirmity in trial process [Para 3].

Judicial Approach – Abetment of Suicide – Evaluation of Evidence – Courts must carefully assess whether cruelty in domestic setting was of such nature as to induce suicide – Mere marital discord or ordinary domestic friction not sufficient – Reference made to State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal, AIR 1994 SC 1418; Kishori Lal v. State of M.P., (2007) 10 SCC 797; Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2004 SC 5097; Sohan Raj Sharma v. State of Haryana, AIR 2008 SC 2108 [Paras 10–13].

Decision: Conviction under Section 306 IPC set aside – Convictions under Section 498A IPC and Section 3 Dowry Prohibition Act upheld – Sentence under Section 3 of Dowry Prohibition Act reduced to three years – Appeal partly allowed [Paras 14–15].

Judicial Service – Departmental Proceedings – Natural Justice – Bias – Appellant, a Judicial Officer, was dismissed from service on recommendation of the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court of Gujarat based on inquiry findings – Same judge who was a member of that Disciplinary Committee also later sat on the bench hearing the appellant’s writ petition challenging his dismissal – Held: Impermissible – Participation of a judge in adjudication of a matter in which he had earlier acted in an administrative or disciplinary capacity creates a reasonable apprehension of bias – Order of High Court set aside – Matter remitted for fresh consideration by a different bench [Paras 6–10].

Principles of Natural Justice – Nemo judex in causa sua – Person cannot be a judge in his own cause – Test is not actual bias but reasonable likelihood of bias – Justice must not only be done but also appear to be done – Applied from Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417 [Paras 9–10].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Impugned order of Gujarat High Court set aside – Case remitted to High Court for fresh decision in accordance with law [Para 10].