Medical Evidence Trumps False Alibi: Allahabad HC Upholds Conviction In Matrimonial Murder Where Strangulation Was Masked By Post-Mortem Burning

"The cause of death was due to asphyxia on account of strangulation," observed the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court while dismissing a criminal appeal and upholding the conviction of a husband under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The Court found that the medical findings, specifically the fracture of the hyoid bone and the absence of soot in the respiratory tract, conclusively established that the victim was murdered before being set ablaze to simulate a case of suicide or accidental fire.

The Court held that in cases resting on circumstantial evidence, the medical jurisprudence regarding post-mortem burns versus ante-mortem burns provides an immutable link in the chain of circumstances that cannot be rebutted by a weak plea of alibi. The Bench further clarified that a plea of alibi must be proved with such strictness that it completely excludes the possibility of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime. Relying on the "Panchsheel" principles of circumstantial evidence established in the landmark case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, the High Court concluded that the husband and his relatives failed to provide any plausible explanation for a death occurring within the privacy of the matrimonial home, especially when their presence was admitted in the initial information provided to the police.

The factual matrix involved the death of a young woman within five years of marriage following persistent demands for a dowry of Rs. 1,000. While the defense argued that the deceased died of accidental burning while holding a kerosene lamp, the medical testimony of P.W. 4, Dr. Ashok Kumar, proved pivotal. The post-mortem examination revealed that the inner and middle coats of the carotid arteries were lacerated with extravasation of blood, and the hyoid bone was fractured, a condition the Court noted could not occur through the mere pressure of burning. Integrating the medical evidence into the legal reasoning, the Court emphasized that "if the dead body is burnt of a living person, then certain particles of carbon necessarily go in the wind pipe," yet the absence of sooty particles in the trachea or bronchus confirmed that the respiratory process had ceased prior to the fire.

Regarding the plea of alibi, the husband and mother-in-law claimed they were in a different village at the time of the incident. However, the Court highlighted that the father-in-law’s own initial written information to the police (Ex-Ka-16) explicitly stated that the husband was sleeping outside the house when the incident occurred. The Bench observed that the testimony of defense witnesses was contrary to the earlier admissions of the family, rendering the alibi a mere "afterthought" lacking credibility. The Court underscored that the burden of proof for an alibi lies heavily on the accused under Section 103 of the Evidence Act, and when such a plea is found to be false, it serves as an additional link in the chain of circumstances pointing toward the guilt of the accused.

On the legal implications of remission under Article 161, the Court addressed the status of the appellant who had already been released by the Governor after serving over 24 years of incarceration. Citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Union of India vs. Sriharan and Suresh Yadav vs. State of Chhattisgarh, the Bench held that while the conviction and sentence are legally affirmed, the judicial dismissal of an appeal does not override the constitutional power of remission. Consequently, though the conviction stands, the appellant is not required to surrender to serve the remainder of the life sentence, as the Governor’s sovereign power to grant reprieve remains "untouchable by the Court."