Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – Domestic Cruelty and Dowry Allegations – Quashing set aside – FIR alleged beatings, abuses, tearing clothes and demand of ₹5 lakhs – High Court quashed FIR as vague and non-cognizable relying on statements in divorce proceedings – Held: At pre-investigation stage, such evaluation is premature and outside Section 482 limits – Investigation must first ascertain material for chargesheet [Paras 4-7, 10].

Civil Findings vs. Criminal Process – Use of Civil Court Findings – Impermissible at 482 Stage – Reliance on V.M. Shah (Sec. 633 Companies Act) misplaced – Even if civil findings can bind in appropriate contexts, they cannot be imported to quash an FIR before investigation commences – Subsequent civil findings are for IO/trial court at charge/ trial stage, not for 482 quashment [Paras 8-9].

Scope of Section 482 CrPC – Early Interference Discouraged – Citations of Swapan Kumar Guha and Madhavrao Scindia did not aid quashment on these facts and timing – The High Court erred by assessing merits as if in appeal and by substituting investigation with its own appreciation [Paras 7, 9].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Impugned High Court order quashing FIR set aside – Mahila Police Station, Bikaner directed to proceed with investigation in FIR No. 33 dated 01.06.2001 – Appeals allowed with directions [Paras 10-11].

Rape Conviction – Sentence Reduction by High Court – Order Set Aside – Respondent convicted under Section 376 IPC and sentenced by trial court to seven years' rigorous imprisonment – High Court reduced sentence to period already undergone (approx. 11 months) citing respondent’s illiteracy and young age – Held: Such reasons do not meet the standard of “adequate and special reasons” required under Section 376 IPC for reduction below prescribed minimum – High Court’s order unsustainable in law [Paras 3, 21-22].

Sentencing – Principles of Proportionality – Need for Deterrence in Sexual Offences – Supreme Court reiterated that rape is a grave offence impacting victim’s dignity and social order – Sentences must reflect societal condemnation and protect public interest – Undue sympathy or leniency undermines justice and public confidence in legal system – Reduction of sentence without compelling justification is legally impermissible [Paras 7-11, 15-17].

Minimum Sentence – Section 376 IPC – Requirement of “Adequate and Special Reasons” – Both Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 376 prescribe minimum sentences – Reduction below the minimum can be granted only upon recording adequate and special reasons in judgment – Vague or general reasons such as rural background or young age are insufficient – Discretion must be exercised judicially and in accordance with statutory mandate [Paras 19-21].

Judicial Discretion – Sentencing Must Balance Aggravating and Mitigating Factors – Courts must consider all relevant circumstances including nature of offence, manner of commission, and impact on victim and society – No strait-jacket formula, but decision must rest on principled reasoning – High Court failed to evaluate or record such balance, rendering its order vulnerable [Paras 13, 21, 23].

Final Decision – High Court Order Set Aside – Remand on Sentence – Supreme Court set aside High Court’s reduction of sentence and remitted matter for reconsideration of sentence – High Court to decide afresh after evaluating all mitigating and aggravating factors in line with settled principles [Paras 22-24].

Public Interest Litigation – Service Matters – Locus Standi – PIL Not Maintainable – A writ petition filed by respondent No. 4 styled as a Public Interest Litigation challenged the appellant’s appointment as Auction Recorder on the ground of past conviction under Section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act – Held: In service matters, PILs are not maintainable – The petition was motivated by personal rivalry and not in public interest – High Court erred in entertaining the PIL [Paras 6, 8, 13, 14].

Conviction under Punjab Excise Act – Effect on Appointment – Section 61, Punjab Excise Act, 1974 – Appointment Valid – The appellant had been convicted in 1974 under Section 61(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act – Market Committee, relying on legal advice, held that since the conviction did not involve moral turpitude, appellant was eligible for appointment – Regularisation under 1989 Rules upheld – High Court’s finding that appointment was contrary to rules set aside [Paras 3, 4, 14].

Misuse of Public Interest Litigation – Abuse of Process – Court’s Caution – Courts must guard against misuse of PILs filed to settle personal scores – Genuine PILs intended to redress public wrongs must be distinguished from frivolous, politically motivated or publicity-oriented petitions – Courts should dismiss such petitions at the threshold and in appropriate cases impose costs [Paras 6-12].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – The High Court judgment declaring appellant’s appointment illegal was set aside – Appeals allowed with no order as to costs [Paras 14-15].

Industrial Disputes – Definition of ‘Industry’ – Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act – Doubt over correctness of Bangalore Water Supply case – Reference to Larger Bench ordered – Apparent conflict between decisions of two Benches regarding whether Social Forestry Department is an ‘industry’ – Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa (seven-Judge Bench) gave expansive interpretation but with divergent opinions – Legislature amended definition in 1982 excluding certain functions, but amendment kept dormant for over 23 years – Court noted over-expansive application of definition caused practical difficulties in industrial adjudication, particularly in areas like hospitals, education, welfare schemes, and liberal professions – Held: Judicial interpretation has reached its limit; larger Bench to reconsider correctness and scope of Bangalore Water ruling, in light of amended but unenforced definition and contemporary experience [Paras 1–20, 35–54].

Sovereign Functions – Exclusion from scope of ‘Industry’ – Court cautioned against restricting “sovereign functions” only to inalienable functions (law and order, legislation, judiciary); in constitutional democracy, welfare functions undertaken in discharge of Directive Principles may also qualify as sovereign – Such governmental activities not to be forced into Industrial Disputes Act merely by expansive interpretation [Paras 43–44].

Judicial Restraint – Legislative Role – Court emphasized that definition of ‘industry’ is vague and imprecise; legislature must clarify; judiciary cannot by policy-oriented expansion impose obligations beyond text – Reiterated principle that interpretation must balance interests of employers, employees, and the public [Paras 37–42, 50–53].

Decision – Case referred to Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of a larger Bench to reconsider Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa and re-examine the definition of ‘industry’ under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act [Para 54].

Service Law - Absorption And Regularisation - Statutory Canteen – Status of Employees – Section 46, Factories Act, 1948 – Absorption Denied – Canteen workers employed through contractor in refinery canteen claimed absorption as IOC employees – Single Judge allowed claim holding canteen is statutory and workers are employees of management – Division Bench reversed relying on Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd. v. Shramik Sena – Held: Workers in a statutory canteen are employees of management only for limited purposes of the Factories Act, not for all service benefits – In present case, contractor independently engaged staff, paid wages, maintained records, entered settlements with canteen workers; IOC neither appointed nor reimbursed them – Hence workers not entitled to absorption or regularisation [Paras 6-20].

Factories Act – Definition of “Worker” – Section 2(1) – Scope – Persons employed in statutory canteens are “workers” of the occupier for Factories Act compliance – Such status does not extend to confer rights relating to recruitment, seniority, pension, or regular employment under principal employer – Distinction reaffirmed [Paras 7-8].

Employer-Employee Relationship – Test of Control and Supervision – Though IOC exercised supervisory control to ensure quality food/service, contractor retained autonomy in appointment, dismissal, and wage obligations – Such quality-control supervision does not create master-servant relationship – Absent factors of direct appointment, wage reimbursement, or retention across contractors (as in Indian Petrochemicals), canteen workers cannot be deemed IOC employees [Paras 13-18].

Labour Settlements – Effect – Settlements were executed between contractor and canteen workers before Labour Commissioner; IOC was not a party – Indicates that workmen themselves acknowledged contractor as employer – Strengthens finding that IOC was not their employer [Para 19].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Division Bench order upheld – Canteen workers not entitled to absorption/regularisation in Indian Oil Corporation – No order as to costs [Para 20].

Civil – Writ - NHRC Membership – Eligibility – Section 3(2)(d), Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 – Police Officer as Member – Appointment Upheld – Challenge to appointment of former CBI Director as NHRC Member contending police officers are impliedly excluded and appointment violates Articles 14/21 and Paris Principles – Held: Section 3(2)(d) uses clear, inclusive language (“persons having knowledge of, or practical experience in, matters relating to human rights”) and contains no exclusion of police officers – Courts cannot rewrite statute to import an exclusion; Act presumed intra vires – Appointment valid [Paras 6–8, 20].

International Standards – Paris Principles/UN General Assembly Resolution – Status and Effect – Municipal Law Prevails – The Paris Principles and UNGA Resolution are not binding “covenants” in international law and cannot override express provisions of the PHRA; once Parliament has legislated, validity of appointment is tested only against the Act – Disagreement expressed with view treating them as binding; agreement with Dharmadhikari, J. [Paras 17–19].

Judicial Review of Appointments – Limited Scope – Court examines whether statutory qualifications exist; it does not reassess merit or import non-statutory conditions like public perception – Reliance on R.K. Jain affirmed [Paras 3–4].

Police as Alleged Human Rights Violators – Generalised Condemnation Deprecated – Case-specific strictures (e.g., D.K. Basu; Munshi Singh Gautam) cannot translate into institutional disqualification – Sweeping remarks against entire police force impermissible (State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim) – Public displeasure is not a legal yardstick for eligibility under the Act [Paras 9–12].

Consultation with NHRC Chair – Not Mandatory – Section 4 provides a self-contained selection mechanism via high-level Committee; statute does not require consulting the NHRC Chair; prior practice cannot create a mandatory requirement – Non-response of one Committee member does not vitiate selection; Act contemplates no quorum and validates appointments despite vacancy [Paras 13–15].

Decision – Writ petition dismissed – Appointment sustained – No illegality or arbitrariness shown [Para 20].

Election Petition – Allegation of Corrupt Practice – Section 123(3) of the Representation of the People Act – Dismissal Upheld – Appellant alleged that respondent’s election was vitiated as religious leaders made appeals to voters in his favour – Held: For corrupt practice under Section 123(3), appeal must be on the ground of “his” religion i.e., the candidate’s religion, or to refrain from voting on the ground of opponent’s religion – Election petition lacked averment that appeal was made on the basis of respondent’s religion – Mere appeal by religious leaders without linking to candidate’s religion is insufficient to constitute corrupt practice – Petition dismissed for disclosing no cause of action [Paras 10-13].

Material Facts in Election Petition – Section 83(1) Representation of the People Act – Failure Fatal – Pleadings must contain material facts constituting corrupt practice – Absence of such facts cannot be cured after limitation period – Election Judge rightly struck down defective pleading under Order 6 Rule 16 CPC and dismissed petition under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC – Appeal dismissed [Paras 14-15].

Decision – Appeal dismissed with costs – Order of designated Election Judge of the High Court affirmed [Para 15].

Criminal Law – Conviction under Section 324 IPC – Voluntarily causing hurt by knife – Conviction Upheld – The appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for assaulting PW-1 with a knife, causing incised injury on the wrist – Conviction affirmed by High Court in revision – Defence of false implication due to animosity and non-recovery of knife rejected – Held: Testimony of injured witness is trustworthy and corroborated by medical evidence – Knife is a dangerous weapon under Section 324 IPC even if not recovered – Conviction sustained [Paras 2-7, 11-15].

Weapon Recovery – Non-recovery of Knife – Not Fatal – Merely because the knife was not recovered, conviction cannot be set aside – Medical evidence and eye-witness testimony sufficient to prove offence – Doctor’s opinion and injury description corroborate use of sharp-edged weapon [Paras 6, 15].

Dangerous Weapon – Scope of Section 324 IPC – Construed broadly – Section 324 covers any instrument used as weapon of offence likely to cause death – Nature of instrument, not manner of use, determines classification – Knife described by witnesses and corroborated by injury report falls within scope of Section 324 IPC [Paras 12-14].

Sentence – No Leniency – Appellant’s plea to reduce sentence to period undergone rejected – Custody since June 2004 did not justify reduction – Court held that considering gravity of offence, sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment proper – No interference warranted [Para 16].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Section 324 IPC affirmed – No scope for interference [Para 17].

Criminal Contempt of Court – Scandalising the Judiciary – News Report based on Speech – Gross Contempt Made Out – Rajendra Sail in a public rally termed the High Court judgment acquitting accused in Niyogi murder case as “rubbish,” alleged bias, corruption and lack of honesty of judges, and questioned assignment of cases to retiring judges – Held: Statements transgressed limits of fair criticism and had clear tendency to lower the authority of the court, undermine public confidence in judiciary, and embarrass judges in discharge of duties – Publication amounted to gross contempt [Paras 7–9, 43–46].

Fair Criticism v. Scandalisation – Limits Clarified – Judgments are open to fair and even strong criticism, but imputing motives, alleging bias or corruption, or describing judiciary as lacking honesty or courage amounts to scandalizing the court – Such vilification not protected as fair criticism and liable to contempt action [Paras 12–15, 19–20, 44–45].

Media Responsibility – Editors, Publishers and Reporter – Apology Accepted – Newspaper functionaries published apology prominently before notice of contempt – Court held their action was error of judgment without intent to scandalise – Having regard to unconditional apology, conviction maintained but sentence set aside with caution to exercise greater responsibility in future reporting [Paras 31, 39–40].

Apology by Rajendra Sail – Rejected – Court noted Sail was educated, a law graduate, and active in public life with knowledge of judicial process – His remarks were not mere emotional outburst of an uninformed person – Apology not bona fide – Sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment reduced to one week in view of his background, but conviction sustained [Paras 41–49].

Decision – Appeals of newspaper functionaries allowed, apologies accepted and sentences set aside – Appeal of Rajendra Sail partly allowed, sentence reduced from six months to one week simple imprisonment – Impugned High Court order modified accordingly [Paras 49–50].