Development Cannot Override The Master Plan: Supreme Court Nullifies Cement Unit CLU In Agricultural Zone

“A Permission Must Be Lawful When It Is Granted — It Cannot Be Rendered Lawful By A Later Event”, In a powerful reaffirmation of statutory planning discipline and constitutional environmental safeguards, the Supreme Court of India on 13/02/2026 set aside the Change of Land Use granted to Shree Cement North Private Limited for establishing a cement grinding unit in Sangrur, Punjab, holding that the permission was issued contrary to the operative Master Plan and was therefore “without jurisdiction and void.”

The reportable judgment delivered by Justice Vikram Nath, for a Bench also comprising Justice Sandeep Mehta declared that statutory planning norms cannot be diluted by executive convenience or ex post facto approvals.

The Court categorically held, “A permission must be lawful when it is granted. It cannot be rendered lawful by a later event unless the statute itself so provides.”

The ruling not only quashed the CLU dated 13.12.2021 and the Consent to Establish dated 14.12.2021, but also struck down the CPCB’s January 2025 reclassification of stand-alone grinding units from “Red” to “Orange” category, holding that such regulatory dilution violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

“Master Plan Is Not A Policy Document — It Has Statutory Force”

The controversy arose when a CLU was granted permitting establishment of a cement grinding unit over 47.82 acres falling within a rural agricultural zone under the Sangrur Master Plan. The Punjab & Haryana High Court had upheld the CLU on the basis that the Planning Board granted approval in its 43rd meeting dated 05.01.2022.

The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning.

Interpreting Sections 70, 75 and 76 of the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995, the Court held that a Master Plan published in the Official Gazette acquires statutory force and binds both authorities and citizens.

The Bench observed that zoning prescriptions represent “a considered legislative balance between competing land uses” and cannot be displaced by ad hoc administrative permissions.

Referring to Bangalore Medical Trust, the Court reiterated that planning norms cannot be diluted in a manner that defeats public interest, and that when a statute prescribes a particular manner for alteration, “it must be done in that manner and in no other manner.”

Since the site fell in a rural agricultural zone where a red category industry was impermissible, the CLU was fundamentally unlawful on the date of its issuance.

“Minutes Of A Meeting Cannot Substitute A Statutory Amendment”

The State had argued that the Planning Board’s approval on 05.01.2022 cured the defect in the CLU. The Court decisively rejected this contention.

It held that alteration or revision of a Master Plan requires publication, invitation of objections, consideration, and Gazette notification. A decision recorded in the minutes of a meeting cannot operate as an amendment brought into legal force under the Act.

The Court clarified that a jurisdictional defect cannot be retrospectively cured by executive endorsement, and that the PRTPD Act contains no provision permitting retrospective validation of an unlawful CLU.

“No amount of financial investment,” the Court held, “can justify the continuation of an illegal project that operates in derogation of the statutory planning framework.”

“Preventive Environmental Safeguards Must Operate At The Threshold”

The Court further examined compliance with environmental safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act and the EIA Notification, 2006.

It emphasized that environmental clearance is preventive in character and must precede site preparation or construction. Terms of Reference or public hearing cannot substitute prior Environmental Clearance.

On siting norms under the PPCB Notification dated 02.09.1998, which prescribes minimum distance from habitations and educational institutions, the Court found that compliance was not demonstrably established.

“Siting norms are not satisfied by an assumption that the distance may be more when measured differently,” the Court observed, holding that boundary-based measurements without identified emission sources could not constitute regulatory satisfaction.

Given the proximity of a functioning school and residential clusters, the precautionary principle required strict adherence to preventive standards.

Accordingly, the Court held that the siting discipline and environmental safeguards were not complied with in the manner required by law.

“Right To A Clean Environment Is The Constitutional Minimum”: Supreme Court Strikes Down CPCB’s 2025 Reclassification

“Regulatory Downgrade That Weakens Environmental Protection Must Be Scientifically Substantiated”

During pendency of the appeals, the CPCB reclassified “stand-alone grinding units without CPP” from “Red” to “Orange” category in January 2025. Consequential notifications relaxed siting and consent safeguards.

The petitioners challenged this under Article 32.

While acknowledging that courts ordinarily defer to expert bodies in technical matters, the Supreme Court held that judicial restraint cannot extend to cases where regulatory dilution affects life and health.

The Court observed that cement grinding units inherently involve handling of powdered material leading to particulate emissions, and that the relevant question is not comparative pollution between integrated and stand-alone plants, but whether exposure risk has reduced sufficiently to justify dilution of safeguards.

The Bench held that the revised categorisation relied on sector-level Pollution Index assumptions rather than exposure realities in sensitive contexts.

“The right to life under Article 21 encompasses the right to a clean and healthy environment,” the Court declared, adding that preventive safeguards form part of the constitutional minimum.

A regulatory downgrade relaxing siting norms without scientifically substantiated justification was held arbitrary under Article 14 and violative of Article 21.

Invoking the precautionary principle recognised in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum and M.C. Mehta, the Court ruled that environmental governance must “err on the side of protection” where credible risk exists.

The Supreme Court quashed the CPCB’s January 2025 reclassification insofar as it downgraded stand-alone grinding units from “Red” to “Orange” category. Notifications GSR 84(E) and GSR 85(E) were struck down to the extent they relaxed siting and regulatory safeguards.

Any consent or approval granted solely on the basis of such reclassification was directed to stand withdrawn.

The Court, however, granted liberty to authorities to undertake a fresh, transparent and scientifically substantiated exercise consistent with the precautionary principle.

A Strong Constitutional Message

In its concluding observations, the Court underscored that economic development cannot be pursued at the cost of constitutional guarantees.

“Development is not an abstract or absolute goal. It is conditioned by the non-derogable obligation to protect life, health, and environmental integrity.”

The judgment stands as a major precedent reaffirming that Master Plans are binding statutory instruments, that ex post facto executive approvals cannot cure jurisdictional illegality, and that environmental safeguards are inseparable from the fundamental right to life under Article 21.

Date of Decision: 13/02/2026