Facts:

The Food Inspector filed a complaint against the respondent for selling adulterated Toor Dal.

The sample analysis initially indicated adulteration with Kesari Dal, but a later certificate from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory pointed to synthetic Coal Tar Dye.

The respondent challenged the charge, arguing that a fresh sanction was needed due to the change in analysis results.

Issues:

Whether a fresh consent is required for prosecution when the Director's certificate supersedes the Public Analyst's report.

Held:

The court observed that the institution of prosecution under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act can be validly done with the consent of the appropriate authority.

The certificate from the Director, replacing the Public Analyst's report during the trial, does not necessitate a fresh consent for prosecution.

The court emphasized that the purpose of obtaining consent is to prevent unnecessary or frivolous prosecution, and once validly instituted, the judicial functionary can control further proceedings.

Section 216(5) of the CrPC, dealing with alteration of charges, does not require a fresh sanction if the altered charge is based on facts for which consent was already obtained.

The court concluded that once validly instituted, neither new data nor added reasons in the Director's certificate can annul the original sanction, and the trial must proceed with the existing certificate.

Facts:

The Forest Tribunal, under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, issued an order on 11.8.1982, asserting that the disputed land did not vest in the Government. The State of Kerala's appeal to the High Court against this order was dismissed on 17.12.1982. With no statutory remedy for appeal, revision, or review against the High Court's order, the State filed an SLP before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on merits on 18.7.1983. Subsequently, Section SC was inserted into the 1971 Act, empowering the government to file appeals or review applications in specific cases. In January 1984, the State sought a review of the High Court's order.

Issues:

The maintainability of the review petition after the dismissal of the SLP. The petitioner contended that the High Court's order had merged into the Supreme Court's order, rendering a review petition misconceived.

Held:

The High Court's order of 17.12.1982 did not merge with the Supreme Court's order of 18.7.1983. Therefore, the High Court had the authority to review its earlier decision. The right of review was statutorily conferred on the High Court by sub-Section (2) of Section SC of the Kerala Act.

Article 136 of the Constitution grants the Supreme Court sweeping jurisdiction. The exercise of this jurisdiction involves two steps: granting special leave to appeal and hearing the appeal. Dismissing an SLP, even if by a non-speaking order, does not result in the merger of the impugned order into the Supreme Court's order.

An order dismissing an SLP, whether by a non-speaking or speaking order, does not attract the doctrine of merger. A non-speaking order does not substitute itself for the order in issue or declare law under Article 141.

Mere pendency of an application for leave to appeal does not jeopardize the finality of the decree or order under challenge. The finality is at risk only if leave to appeal is granted and the appeal is pending, reopening the issues decided.

The doctrine of merger is not universally applicable and depends on the nature of jurisdiction exercised and the subject matter of challenge. It is a common law doctrine based on principles of propriety.

The right of review is available when an SLP is dismissed. The review can be preferred in the High Court before special leave is granted but not after it is granted. Once special leave is granted, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is invoked.

FACTS:

The plaintiff, a tenant, filed a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of a property by the first defendant. The first defendant, having entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, later sold the property to defendants 2 to 5. The plaintiff claimed that the subsequent sale was not bona fide, and he sought specific performance of the original contract.

ISSUES:

Whether defendants 2 to 5 are bona fide purchasers without notice of the original contract?

Whether defendants 2 to 5 were required to make an inquiry into the nature of possession or title of the plaintiff at the time of the subsequent sale?

HELD:

The court held that defendants 2 to 5 were not bona fide purchasers in good faith for value without notice of the original contract. The court emphasized the duty of a subsequent purchaser to make an inquiry into the title and interest of the person in actual possession. The actual possession itself is deemed notice of the title, and a subsequent purchaser must inquire into further interests, nature of possession, and title when entering into a sale transaction.

DECISION: The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment and decree of the trial court were confirmed. Defendants 1 to 5 were directed to execute and register the sale deed in favor of the plaintiff for the suit property.

REFERRED CASES:

Veeramalai Vanniar (Died) and Others Vs. Thadikara Vanniar and Others, AIR 1968 Mad 383 : (1968) ILR (Mad) 511 : (1968) 81 LW 90 : (1968) 1 MLJ 437

Dr. Govinddas and Another Vs. Shrimati Shantibai and Others, AIR 1972 SC 1520 : (1972) 74 PLR 227 : (1973) 3 SCC 418 : (1972) 4 UJ 543

Facts:

A commercial plot was allotted on a free-hold basis to the respondent's husband.

The allotment required completion of the building according to sanctioned plans.

The husband constructed a building with the ground floor for commercial use and first and second floors for residential purposes.

The respondent applied for a residential plot, declaring no ownership of residential property in the Union Territory.

An allotment was made, but it was later canceled when authorities realized the husband owned a residential flat.

Issues:

The primary issue revolves around the interpretation of Regulation 6(1) concerning the eligibility of the respondent for a residential plot, given her husband's ownership of a residential flat on a commercial plot.

Held:

The eligibility hinges on whether the husband owned a residential plot or house in the specified region.

The Court held that the residential flat above the ground floor commercial plot qualified as a residential house under Regulation 6(1).

The respondent's declaration was deemed incorrect, justifying the cancellation of the allotment.

The Court set aside previous orders and upheld the cancellation of allotment.

Despite the bona fide nature of the respondent's statement, the deposit was permitted to be refunded without interest, deviating from the usual regulation on forfeiting the deposit.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

Tirupati Mills, incorporated in 1972, faced financial distress and was declared a sick industrial company in 1988.

On 5-7-1997, an agreement was made between Tirupati Woollen Mills Shramik Sangharsha Samity ("Samity") and appellant-Divya for the purchase of assets and re-employment of workers.

Legal proceedings ensued, leading to a series of court orders and appeals.

Offers for the sale of assets were made, with the appellant initially offering Rs. 37 lakhs, later increased to Rs. 85 lakhs, and finally, Rs. 1.3 crores.

Issues:

Include the adequacy of the sale price, the conduct of the auction, and the subsequent offers made by other parties.

Held:

The Court, considering the chequered history of the sale proceedings, held that the appellant initially underbid for the property, indicating an attempt to take advantage of a court sale. The subsequent increase in the bid to Rs. 1.3 crores did not negate this initial undervaluation. Respondents 7 and 8 expressed willingness to purchase the property for Rs. 2 crores after the sale was confirmed but before possession was handed over. The Court, relying on Clause 11 of the terms and conditions of sale, set aside the confirmed sale in favor of the appellant for the benefit of creditors and public interest. Respondents 7 and 8 were directed to compensate the appellant with Rs. 70,000 each. The Court emphasized its duty to ensure an adequate price for the property.

Facts:

The dispute centered around land measuring 2 Kanals 12 Marias, classified as "gair mumkin toba" or pond land, in village Khokhar, Punjab. Respondent No. 2 claimed ownership through an auction in 1959. Appellant, inducted as a tenant in 1978, contended the land was evacuee property. The appellant was growing sugarcane on the land.

Issues:

Discrepancy in the auctioned land's classification (gair mumkin bhatta) and the appellant's possession (gair mumkin toba).

Validity of the corrigendum issued in 1985, including the land in the possession of the appellant.

Adequacy of the appellant's locus standi in light of canceled auction proceedings.

Held:

The auctioned land's classification discrepancy and possession were crucial. The appellant was in possession since 1978, and respondent No. 2's objections emerged only in 1982, after a lapse of 23 years. The authorities erred in applying Rule 90, which addresses clerical or arithmetic errors, not disputes of possession.

The corrigendum issued in 1985 lacked a factual basis and was deemed arbitrary. The Chief Settlement Commissioner's oversight of the appellant's possession rights was noted.

The cancellation of the auction without notifying the appellant and denying a fair hearing was deemed unjust. The appellant had locus standi, and his rights were adversely affected.

Facts:

The petitioner was appointed as a temporary Munsif in 1981, confirmed in 1985, and later promoted to a Civil Judge in 1993.

A review in 1998 allowed the petitioner to remain in service until the age of 58.

A subsequent decision, invoking Rule 71(A1), mandated the petitioner's retirement at the age of 58.

Issues:

Whether Rule 71(A1) is valid and in compliance with previous judgments, specifically addressing the extension of the retirement age for judicial officers.

Held:

The court upholds the validity of Rule 71(A1) as it aligns with the intention of raising the tone and morale of judicial services.

The judgment emphasizes the need for periodic evaluation to retain officers with potential for continued useful service.

The court clarifies that the extension to the age of 60 is not automatic but subject to the High Court's positive recommendation based on a comprehensive assessment.

The decision dismisses the petition, asserting that without a specific rule, judicial officers have no inherent right to continue beyond the age of 58.

Facts:

The petitioners, engaged in providing credit to the public, challenged the constitutionality of Section 45-S, alleging that it prohibited them from accepting public deposits for their business. They argued that this restriction adversely affected various sectors with seasonal financial needs.

Issues:

Constitutionality of Section 45-S concerning the acceptance of public deposits by non-banking institutions.

Violation of Articles 19(1)(g), 19(6), and 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that Section 45-S does not restrict unincorporated bodies from conducting their financial business but specifically prohibits utilizing public deposits. There is no unrestricted fundamental right to accept deposits from the public. The court emphasized the need for prudence in managing public funds, especially considering the risks posed by unincorporated bodies.

The court highlighted that the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had considered various committee reports before amending Section 45-S in 1997. The question of restricting financial activities by unincorporated bodies is a matter of economic policy, and the court should defer to the expertise of expert bodies in such cases.

Even if the restrictions amounted to a total prohibition, the court justified it in the public interest, citing the uncontrolled growth of unincorporated bodies accepting deposits. The prohibition on partnership firms engaging in such business is considered a reasonable restriction.

The court emphasized the importance of not interfering with economic legislation unless it is manifestly unjust or glaringly unconstitutional. It stated that the presumption is in favor of the constitutional validity of legislation, and judicial discretion should consider overwhelming public interest.