Criminal Conspiracy – Section 120(B)(2) IPC – Arms Seizure – Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act – Prosecution’s Failure to Prove Recovery Beyond Doubt – Conviction Set Aside – The petitioner was convicted under Section 25(1-B)(a) of the Arms Act and Section 120(B)(2) of IPC for illegal possession of firearms based on evidence of a confessional statement and the recovery of arms from a box allegedly belonging to him. However, the prosecution failed to seize the box or prove its ownership, and key witnesses provided contradictory statements about the condition and possession of the box – Held: Conviction set aside due to lack of proper evidence and procedural infirmities [Paras 30-37].

Non-Seizure of Box – Material Evidence Not Properly Connected to the Accused – Infirmity in Prosecution Case – The prosecution failed to seize the box from which the arms were allegedly recovered, and witnesses admitted that the box was not locked or identified as belonging to the petitioner at the time of recovery. The box produced in court later had no conclusive identifiers, which led to a serious doubt about the connection between the petitioner and the recovered arms – Held: Prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 34-36].

Revisional Jurisdiction – Miscarriage of Justice – Conviction Overturned – The trial court and appellate court failed to adequately consider the inconsistencies and procedural shortcomings in the case, leading to a miscarriage of justice. The revisional court exercised its jurisdiction to correct these errors, resulting in the petitioner’s acquittal – Held: Conviction quashed, and petitioner acquitted [Paras 38-39].

Decision – Petition allowed – The conviction and sentence of the petitioner were set aside, and the petitioner was acquitted of all charges due to insufficient evidence and improper seizure procedures. The petitioner’s bail bonds were discharged, and the trial court's records were directed to be returned [Paras 39-41].

Society Election Dispute – Referral by Deputy Registrar to Prescribed Authority – Validity of Process – Multiple factions of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha claimed to have held valid elections in early 2021 – The Deputy Registrar, without offering reasons or examining the prima facie validity of the claims, referred the dispute to the Prescribed Authority – Held: The Deputy Registrar is not a mere rubber stamp – Before referring the matter to the Prescribed Authority under Section 25(1) of the Societies Registration Act, the Deputy Registrar must apply judicial mind to ascertain the genuineness of the dispute – Mechanical referral is invalid without forming a subjective satisfaction on whether the competing elections are bona fide – Matter remitted to the Deputy Registrar for fresh consideration [Paras 88-116].

Membership and Election Validity – Role of Deputy Registrar – Where conflicting elections are claimed by different factions, the Deputy Registrar is obligated to preliminarily assess the legitimacy of membership and elections – The Deputy Registrar must ensure that only genuine disputes are referred to the Prescribed Authority – Mechanical referrals undermine the statutory scheme and can lead to prolonged litigation [Paras 99-104].

Decision:Order of the Deputy Registrar dated 23.04.2022 quashed – The matter remitted to the Deputy Registrar for reconsideration by a reasoned and speaking order – The fresh decision must be completed within four months [Paras 116-118].

Substitution of Plaintiff – Application under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC – Dismissal – The applicant, son of the deceased plaintiff, sought substitution in the pending suit based on an agreement transferring rights to him – The application was filed more than six years after the agreement and after the death of the plaintiff – Held: The application was dismissed due to inordinate delay and lack of sufficient reason for substitution, as the suit had abated [Paras 10-13].

Abatement of Suit – Order XXII Rule 3 CPC – Plaintiff's Death – The plaintiff expired on 24.12.2020, and no application for substitution was filed within the statutory period of three months – The applicant failed to take requisite steps for substitution timely – Held: The suit is abated as there is no surviving right to sue in favor of the applicant [Paras 11, 14].

Reliance on Precedent Cases – Similar Circumstances – The applicant relied on previous judgments for similar relief – Held: The reliance was misplaced given the long delay of over six years and the applicant’s failure to act promptly after the execution of the agreement and the plaintiff’s death [Para 15].

Conduct of Applicant – Inaction and Delay – The applicant was aware of the proceedings and was cross-examined as a witness on behalf of the deceased plaintiff – The delay of more than six years was unexplained and demonstrated lack of diligence – Held: No sufficient reason to allow substitution under the given circumstances [Paras 10, 12-13].

Decision of the Judgement – Application Dismissed – The Court dismissed the application for substitution due to abatement of the suit and non-prosecution, leading to the dismissal of the pending suit against the defendants [Paras 17-18].

Ex Parte Order in Maintenance Case – Non-Appearance of Petitioner – Section 125 CrPC – The petitioner challenged the ex parte order passed by the Family Court, directing him to pay maintenance of Rs. 10,000 per month to his wife – Petitioner contended that no proper notice of hearing was served, and the Family Court failed to observe whether his absence was wilful – Held: As per Section 126(2) CrPC, before passing an ex parte order, the Court must satisfy itself that the respondent wilfully avoided attending the proceedings – The Court found no evidence that the petitioner wilfully neglected to attend or was informed about the specific dates of the hearing [Paras 8-12].

Satisfaction of Court Before Proceeding Ex Parte – Requirement under Section 126(2) CrPC – The Family Court failed to record satisfaction that the petitioner wilfully neglected to attend the Court – A mere knowledge of the maintenance case's filing was insufficient to establish wilful avoidance of court attendance – The absence of a specific notice of hearing dates to the petitioner violated procedural requirements – Held: Ex parte order set aside due to non-compliance with Section 126(2) CrPC [Paras 10-12].

Final Decision – The revision petition is allowed – The ex parte order dated 06.07.2023 passed by the Family Court is set aside – The matter is remitted back to the Family Court, Begusarai, to decide the case afresh after giving both parties an opportunity of hearing – Both parties directed to appear before the Family Court on 12.11.2024 [Paras 13-14].

Bail - Murder – Mens Rea and Use of Safety Shoes as a Weapon – Section 302 IPC – Bail Denied - Petitioner accused of kicking the deceased, Hiralal, with safety shoes during a wedding altercation after a sudden provocation – Petitioner argued that the cause of death was unrelated to the kicks, citing the postmortem report and lack of external injuries – Court held: Kicking the deceased with safety shoes, a hard object capable of causing significant internal damage, particularly in the stomach and private parts, could demonstrate intent to cause serious injury or death – The use of safety shoes as a weapon increases the potential for fatal injuries, and the petitioner’s actions prima facie meet the ingredients of murder [Paras 7-10].

Causation and Internal Injuries – Septicemic Shock – Postmortem Report – The defense contended that the cause of death was "septicemic shock" due to surgical wounds and not from the kicks inflicted by the petitioner – Court held: Although the postmortem indicated septicemic shock, the kicks delivered to the deceased’s abdomen and private parts while wearing safety shoes were severe enough to contribute to internal injuries that may have led to the death – The petitioner’s actions fulfill the mens rea requirement for murder under Section 302 IPC [Para 4-5, 10].

Pending Evidence – Bail Denied Due to Pending Testimonies – Despite the defense presenting the testimony of the doctor who conducted the postmortem, several key eyewitness statements, including those of Mangi and Maku Ninama, were still pending – Court held: Since the trial is ongoing and crucial evidence is yet to be presented, bail cannot be granted at this stage [Para 8, 11].

Decision: Bail application dismissed – The court concluded that, based on the material available and the seriousness of the allegations, the petitioner is not entitled to bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. However, the observations made are solely for the purpose of deciding the bail application and shall not affect the merits of the case [Para 13].

Arbitration – Interim Measures – Invocation of Bank Guarantees – Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – The appellant sought to invoke several bank guarantees provided by the respondent, while the respondent sought a restraint on this action – The Arbitral Tribunal granted an injunction restraining the appellant from invoking the bank guarantees on the grounds of special equities and non-compliance with the terms of the guarantees – The appellant challenged the Tribunal’s decision under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Held: The Tribunal's decision was upheld as it found that the letters of invocation were not in compliance with the terms of the guarantees, and special equities existed in favor of the respondent, justifying the injunction [Paras 1, 4, 61-112].

Bank Guarantee – Conditional and Unconditional Bank Guarantees – Invocation Requirements – Appellant contended that a bank guarantee (BG) must be invoked according to its terms – If conditional, the invocation must meet specific conditions set out in the BG – If unconditional, injunction against invocation is permissible only under egregious fraud, irretrievable injustice, or special equities – Tribunal justified injunction against invocation on grounds that the letter of invocation did not conform to the BG and special equities existed – Held: BGs were unconditional and letters of invocation were in conformity with BGs, no egregious fraud or irretrievable injustice was shown – Injunction against invocation was not justified [Paras 89-91, 92, 106, 113-114, 128-130, 132].

Principles Governing Bank Guarantees – Precedents Cited – Court referred to Supreme Court judgments including Himadri Chemicals and Vinitec Electronics establishing principles for bank guarantee invocation – Unconditional bank guarantees must be honored by banks irrespective of disputes between parties – Injunction against invocation can be granted only in cases of egregious fraud, irretrievable injustice, or special equities – Fraud must vitiate the entire underlying transaction – Irretrievable injustice must be exceptional, overriding the terms of the guarantee [Paras 94, 24-28, 29-32, 36, 43, 49, 51].

Letters of Invocation – Compliance with Bank Guarantees – Letters of invocation must substantially meet the requirements of the BGs – Tribunal erred by limiting its consideration to specific paragraphs of the letters – Letters included references to termination notices detailing respondent's breaches – The invocation was in accordance with BGs’ stipulations – Subsequent addendum or curative notice can supplement initial defective invocation [Paras 96-110, 112, 113].

Special Equities – Justifying Injunction – Tribunal's decision based on alleged financial distress resulting from invocation lacked empirical evidence – Special equities must be overwhelming and predominate over bank's obligation to honor the BG – In absence of cogent evidence showing irretrievable injustice, special equities cannot justify injunction against invocation – Invocation does not result in irreparable harm to the respondent as restitution remains possible through arbitration [Paras 115-121, 122-124, 130, 131].

Conclusion – Tribunal’s Order Set Aside – Tribunal's findings were unsustainable on facts or in law – No case for injuncting invocation of BGs existed – Requirements of BGs were satisfied in the letters of invocation – No irretrievable injustice or special equities shown – Appeal allowed – Stay on invocation of BGs vacated [Paras 128-130, 132, 142-143].

Leasehold Property – Division and Partition – The Gupta and Jain families acquired a leasehold property on a perpetual lease from the Military Estate Officer – The property was sold to them in two equal undivided shares through two separate Agreements to Sell (ATS) – Held: The perpetual lease did not restrict division or partition of the property, allowing each family to have separate and independent possession – The court ruled that the property could be divided, and the respective portions were always intended to be separate, specific, independent, and exclusive since the purchase in 1983 [Paras 134-142].

Perpetual Lease Deed – Interpretation and Restrictions – Clause 8 of the perpetual lease allowed for assignment, transfer, or sub-lease of the property or any part thereof with mere intimation to the Military Estate Officer – Held: The clause did not prohibit subdivision of the property, and thus, the families were not restricted from dividing the property into distinct portions – The suit property was capable of being sub-divided as per the terms of the lease [Paras 136-140].

Sale Deeds and Supplementary Agreements – Division and Independent Portions – The families executed separate sale deeds and supplementary agreements defining specific portions of the property – The court observed that the ATS, supplementary agreements, and sale deeds indicated the intention for separate sales of independent and distinct areas – Held: The sale deeds executed in 2000 reflected the reality of the division, confirming separate ownership of the North-Eastern and South-Western portions by the Jain and Gupta families, respectively [Paras 150-156].

Construction and Alteration – Unauthorized Construction – The Gupta family was found to have constructed a new outhouse without obtaining requisite sanctions from authorities – The court noted that while the families had independent possession, any construction must comply with the terms of the perpetual lease and obtain necessary permissions – However, this did not affect the ownership of the separate portions [Paras 180-185].

Property Dispute – Partition and Ownership – Dispute between Gupta family and Jain family over the property located at 4 Cavalry Lines, Delhi – Disagreement on whether the property was divided or undivided and the validity of the construction and erection of a partition wall – Held: The suit property was divided into two equal shares, with the Gupta family owning the South West portion and the Jain family owning the North East portion – Agreement to Sell (ATS) executed on 16.09.1983 indicated the division – The purdah wall erected by the Jain family was a physical demarcation of the partitioned areas – Jain family entitled to an injunction against interference by the Gupta family [Paras 158-239].

Construction by Gupta Family – Unauthorized Additions – Evidence showed that the Gupta family expanded their outhouse from 900 sq. ft. to 3010 sq. ft. – Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) declared the construction unauthorized and issued a demolition notice – Additional construction indicated that the Gupta family treated their portion of the property as distinct and separate – Plaintiff witness PW1 testified to the changes in the outhouse but could not confirm specific details due to renovations [Paras 158-159].

Mutation Letters and Lease Rent – Separate Records Indicating Division – Mutation letters from 1985 indicate that the property was mutated in favor of both families, but did not specify distinct areas – The Hon'ble Supreme Court has established that mutation entries do not confer title and are meant for revenue records only – Evidence showed both families were paying lease rent separately from 1985 to 1992, indicating they treated the property as divided – Defense Estates Office records supported the separate payment of lease rents by both families [Paras 160-167].

Purdah Wall and Physical Partition – Erection and Purpose – The Jain family constructed a purdah wall in 1991, claiming it was within their portion of the property – Gupta family argued the wall was for preventing soil erosion and siltage, but could not provide substantive evidence – Court found that the wall, along with a black line running through the verandahs, served as a partition between the properties as per the ATS – No complaints from the Gupta family regarding the wall were recorded, suggesting acceptance of the division [Paras 185-199].

Registered Sale Deeds – Reconfirmation of Partition – Sale deeds executed in favor of the Jain family reconfirmed the division indicated in the ATS – These deeds described the North East half portion in detail, consistent with the area occupied by the Jain family – The court held that these documents were valid and not barred by the doctrine of "Post Litem Motam," which applies to statements or declarations rather than registered sale deeds [Paras 200-214].

Court’s Findings and Relief Granted – Partition Affirmed – The court held that the suit property was divided at the time of the execution of the ATS and that the Jain family occupied the North East portion, while the Gupta family occupied the South West portion – Jain family's suit for a declaration of ownership of the North East portion and for an injunction was granted – The Gupta family was restrained from creating obstacles and interfering in the Jain family's possession and completion of the purdah wall – Gupta family’s suit claiming the property was incapable of partition was dismissed [Paras 221-234].

Decision – Final Orders – The court decreed in favor of the Jain family and dismissed the suit by the Gupta family – No orders as to costs – The court appreciated the assistance provided by the legal teams in disposing of the long-standing dispute [Paras 239].

Criminal Law - Acquittal - Conviction under Sections 323 and 436 IPC - Sufficiency of Evidence – The appellants were convicted for voluntarily causing hurt and committing mischief by fire – The prosecution case was that the appellants demanded money from the complainant and, upon refusal, assaulted him and set his house on fire – Held: The court found that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt – The key prosecution witnesses, including the complainant and his wife, were not supported by independent witnesses, and there were inconsistencies in the evidence – The benefit of doubt was extended to the appellants, leading to their acquittal [Paras 12-20].

Role of Independent Witnesses – Credibility of Evidence – The court emphasized the lack of support from independent witnesses for the prosecution’s version – Testimonies from neighbors indicated a dispute over money between the complainant and the appellants – The court noted that the prosecution's case rested on unreliable evidence, and the failure to seize key items such as the stick and kerosene can further weakened the case [Paras 15-18].

Medical Evidence – Absence of Injuries – The medical examination of the complainant and the village Kotwar showed no external injuries, casting further doubt on the prosecution’s claim of assault – The complainant’s wife had minor scratch marks, which could have been caused by broken bangles – Held: The absence of injuries and the lack of seizure of weapons indicated the prosecution’s failure to establish the occurrence of the alleged assault [Paras 19-20].

Decision – Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt – The court held that the prosecution failed to establish the charges against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt – Given the inconsistencies and lack of credible evidence, the benefit of doubt was extended to the appellants – The conviction and sentence were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted of the charges against them [Paras 20-22].

Maintainability of Writ Petition – Arbitration Clause in Contract – Article 226 of the Constitution – The petitioner challenged the termination of his LPG distributorship license by IOCL, raising issues of arbitrariness and violation of fundamental rights – The respondent argued that the presence of an arbitration clause in the contract barred the petitioner from seeking remedy under Article 226 – Held: The court ruled that the writ petition was maintainable as the petitioner alleged arbitrary and unreasonable action by a state instrumentality, and the presence of an arbitration clause did not constitute an absolute bar to judicial review in cases involving violation of constitutional mandates [Paras 6-12].

Termination of License – Misrepresentation and Ownership of Land – The petitioner was accused of misrepresenting ownership of land when applying for the LPG distributorship – He purchased the land in question based on a sale deed but later discovered that the vendor did not have full ownership – Held: The court found that the petitioner acted in good faith based on the information provided by the vendor and complied with IOCL’s instructions to cure the defect in the land title – IOCL conducted field verification before granting the license, and thus shared responsibility in ensuring due diligence – The termination of the license was deemed unsustainable as the alleged misrepresentation did not meet the criteria outlined under Section 18 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 [Paras 13-20].

Misrepresentation under Section 18 of the Indian Contract Act – The court analyzed the definition of misrepresentation under Section 18 of the Indian Contract Act, concluding that the petitioner’s actions did not amount to misrepresentation – The court emphasized that the misrepresentation must induce the other party to gain an advantage and that the party alleging misrepresentation had the means to discover the truth with ordinary diligence – In this case, both parties were mistaken, and IOCL had a duty to verify the information before entering into the contract [Paras 18-22].

Decision – Termination Quashed – License to be Continued – The court held that the termination order was unsustainable and quashed it – IOCL was directed to allow the petitioner to continue with the distributorship license, making a specific order within eight weeks – The court emphasized the petitioner’s right to livelihood and the absence of legal tenability in the misrepresentation claim [Paras 23-26].