Criminal Contempt — Social Media Campaign — Scandalising the Court — Judicial Independence — Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Respondents, aggrieved by orders passed by this Court in a criminal revision petition, initiated a coordinated and sustained public campaign through social media platforms, press conferences, edited videos and public letters, instead of availing legal remedies before the Supreme Court — The campaign was found to be a calculated attempt to vilify the presiding Judge, undermine judicial independence, and obstruct administration of justice — Recusal applications filed by respondents were rejected by a detailed judgment dated 20.04.2026 — Held: Acts of the proposed contemnors prima facie constitute criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Suo motu proceedings drawn — Matter directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for assignment to an appropriate Bench [Paras 1-18, 116, 120, 139].

Contemptuous Conduct — R-18 Arvind Kejriwal — Declarations on Social Media — R-18 publicly published a letter on platform 'X' on 27.04.2026 attributing political bias to this Court and declaring he would neither appear personally nor through counsel in the matter — He stated that no ordinary citizen could believe that this Court could rule against the Solicitor General or the Union Government, and that the outcome appeared "foretold" — His public declaration framed as "Satyagraha" was found to be, in effect, a deliberate attempt to publicly portray the Court as incapable of independent adjudication — Held: Such statements scandalise the Court and lower its authority in the eyes of the public and appear to fall within the ambit of criminal contempt [Paras 40-56].

Contemptuous Conduct — R-8 Manish Sisodia and R-19 Durgesh Pathak — Both respondents published letters on social media platform 'X' endorsing R-18's position, declaring they had no hope of receiving justice from this Court and would not participate in proceedings either personally or through counsel — Held: Such statements and conduct tend to scandalise and lower the authority of this Court and constitute a serious and deliberate attempt to obstruct administration of justice, falling within Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act [Paras 57-60].

Contemptuous Conduct — Sanjay Singh (@SanjayAzadSln) and Devesh Vishwakarma (@devesh_aap) — Posts published on 'X' falsely alleged that the presiding Judge received promotions on attending RSS/BJP events and that no justice could be expected from her — A video of the Judge's lecture at Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidyapeeth, Varanasi (delivered on 19.05.2024 at a workshop on new criminal laws) was selectively cropped and circulated in a misleading manner, falsely portraying it as a speech at an RSS/BJP event — Fact-check reports by PTI, Bar & Bench and Alt News confirmed the video was decontextualised — Held: Such statements and edited video publications prima facie amount to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [Paras 61-77].

Contemptuous Conduct — Vinayy Mishra (@vinayymishraap) — Published posts on 'X' attributing political allegiance to this Court; insinuated that if this Court did not recuse, the case would effectively be heard at the "BJP headquarters" — Photographs of the Judge receiving a memento at an academic event were falsely projected as awards received at political party programmes — Held: Statements of such nature have the tendency to scandalise this Court, lower the authority of the judiciary, and interfere with administration of justice, falling within criminal contempt [Paras 78-83].

Contemptuous Conduct — Saurabh Bhardwaj — Press Conference on YouTube — AAP State President, Delhi, held a press conference on 10.03.2026 — one day after the case was first listed — and publicly questioned the relationship of the presiding Judge with the BJP without any factual basis, casting aspersions on her integrity and impartiality — Held: Such statements publicly portraying a sitting Judge as politically connected during the pendency of a criminal case tend to lower the authority of the Court and scandalise the institution, falling within the ambit of criminal contempt [Paras 84-89].

Law of Criminal Contempt — Fair Criticism vs. Scandalising the Court — Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — The Court reiterated the settled distinction between fair and bona fide criticism of judicial orders, which is permissible, and a calculated campaign to scandalize the Court and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, which constitutes criminal contempt — A defamatory statement against a Judge personally constitutes libel; when it is calculated to interfere with due administration of justice, it becomes contempt — Popularity or political influence cannot confer constitutional immunity from the law of contempt — Held: A lie spoken a thousand times does not become the truth; intimidation clothed as legitimate criticism does not become immune from the law of contempt [Paras 25-32].

Judicial Propriety — Transfer of Main Revision Petition — Not a Recusal — Having drawn suo motu contempt proceedings, this Court directed the main revision petition CRL.REV.P. 134/2026 to be placed before the Chief Justice for assignment to another Bench — Clarified that this is not a recusal nor a yielding to the demands of the contemnors — The order rejecting recusal dated 20.04.2026 remains unchallenged and continues to hold the field — Transfer directed solely on grounds of judicial propriety and fairness to the accused so that the contemnors cannot project themselves as victims of bias [Paras 131-137].

Decision: Suo motu criminal contempt proceedings initiated — Registry directed to assign appropriate case title and number to the contempt proceedings and place them before the Chief Justice on 15.05.2026 for assignment to an appropriate Bench, for issuance of show-cause notices to the proposed contemnors as per Contempt of Courts (Delhi High Court) Rules, 2025 — Main revision petition CRL.REV.P. 134/2026 also placed before the Chief Justice for assignment to another Bench.

Constitutional Law – Writ Jurisdiction – Article 226 – Disputed Property Title – Writ petition filed under Article 226 challenging alleged forcible dispossession by State authorities from land bearing Survey No. 770, Naugaon, District Dhar, admeasuring 0.493 hectare — petitioners claimed ownership based on revenue entries since 1927-28, municipal tax payments, and earlier SDO orders dated 22.07.2008 and 13.05.2019 terminating dispossession proceedings — Held: disputed questions of ownership and title cannot be adjudicated in summary writ proceedings; petitioners at liberty to file a civil suit before a competent civil court [Paras 19, 27, 28, 39].

Revenue Records – Mutation Entries – No Conferral of Title – Payment of municipal taxes and mutation of name in revenue or municipal records does not confer or extinguish title — SDO order dated 22.07.2008 neither explicitly declared petitioners as rightful owners nor did the precedent order in M.P. No. 180/1981 reflect the petitioners' names or the subject survey number — records instead indicate petitioners' ancestors functioned as hospital superintendents in a caretaker capacity — Held: mutation entries are for fiscal purposes only and confer no right, title or interest [Paras 20–26].

FIR – Quashment – Article 226 – Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B IPC – FIR registered on complaint by Tahsildar alleging fraudulent alienation of Government property through forged documents — petitioner, functioning at best as an administrative superintendent, executed a registered lease deed in 2008 and agreement to sell in 2009 without any verified legal right — prima facie cognizable offences disclosed — Held: case does not fall within any of the parameters for quashing an FIR as laid down in Bhajan Lal; High Court should not stifle a legitimate criminal investigation at the threshold [Paras 29–37].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — petitioners granted liberty to file a properly constituted civil suit before a competent civil court to establish ownership, title, and right to sell or lease the property — no order as to costs [Paras 38–40].

Section 92 CPC – Leave to File Suit – Public Religious Trust – Standard at Leave Stage – The appellants/temple sought leave under Section 92 CPC to institute a suit for appointment of a management committee, alleging the Sarvarakar was a non-resident outsider with no connection to the traditional Bairagi succession who was attempting to alienate temple properties – The trial court rejected the leave application holding that no express or implied trust was established – Held: At the stage of granting leave under Section 92 CPC, the Court does not decide the rights of parties and no right is adjudicated – The Court has merely to see whether there is a prima facie case for granting leave – This order does not affect the final decision on merits – Impugned order set aside and leave granted [Paras 30, 34].

Section 92 CPC – Prerequisites – Public Trust – Constructive Trust – Section 92 CPC presupposes the existence of a public trust of a religious or charitable character and the suit can proceed on the allegation that there is a breach of trust or that direction of the Court is necessary for administration of such trust – The legislature has used the words "express or constructive trust" in the section – A constructive trust arises by operation of law without regard to the intention of the parties to create a trust – The public nature of the temple was not disputed by either side and no documentary evidence of Sarvakaraship or maintenance by the predecessors of the defendant was produced [Paras 29, 31, 32, 33].

Public Temple – Sarvarakar – Revenue Entry – Disputed Succession – The first recorded Sarvarakar of the temple was Ram Swarup Maheshwari, a resident of Kanpur, with no prior Sarvarakar's name in the record – His name was allegedly entered in revenue records through collusion with Revenue Department employees without legal authority – A civil court alone can appoint a Sarvarakar/Sevayat – Subsequent purported transfer of Sarvarakarship through a Will dated 21.12.1976 to the original defendant, and mutation entries made on that basis, were disputed – Such questions are matters for trial [Paras 5, 6, 22, 32].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 13.01.2026 set aside – Leave to file suit under Section 92 CPC granted.

Delhi Rent Control Act – Applicability – Bar under Section 50 – Suit for Possession – Second Appeal – Appellant/landlord filed Civil Suit for possession of a shop against the Respondent/tenant on the ground that the Suit Property fell in an area not covered by the DRC Act – Both Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the Suit as barred under Section 50 DRC Act – Held: Second Appeal dismissed [Paras 1, 13, 18, 41].

Territorial Applicability – Schedule 1 to Section 1(2) DRC Act – Municipal Committee, Delhi-Shahdara – The Suit Property was urbanised vide Notification dated 08.12.1954 under Section 5(3) Punjab Municipal Act, making it part of the Municipal Committee, Delhi-Shahdara – The DRC Act came into force on 09.02.1959, and its Schedule 1(2) expressly included all areas within the Municipal Committee, Delhi-Shahdara as on 7th April, 1958 – Since the area was already notified and urbanised prior to enactment of the DRC Act, no subsequent separate Notification was required to extend the Act to the Suit Property – Held: DRC Act was applicable to the Suit Property from the date of its enactment itself [Paras 30, 31, 35, 40].

Proviso to Section 1(2) DRC Act – Interpretation – The proviso requiring a further Notification to extend the DRC Act operates only in respect of areas notified or included within MCD limits after the date of Notification of the Act, i.e., after 09.02.1959 – Where urbanisation predates the Act, the proviso has no application – Contention of the Appellant that a second Notification was required even for pre-Act urbanised areas held to be not tenable [Paras 32, 34, 35].

Conduct of Plaintiff – Approbation and Reprobation – The Appellant had earlier filed a Civil Suit (C.S. No. 389/2012) which was withdrawn when the plea of bar of Section 50 DRC Act was raised – Thereafter he filed an Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act (No. E-72/2016), which got dismissed in default and the Restoration Application was also dismissed – The filing of a fresh Civil Suit after abandoning the DRC Act proceedings, without any change in circumstances, amounts to approbation and reprobation and further establishes the applicability of the DRC Act to the Suit Property – Held: Civil Suit not maintainable [Paras 36, 37, 38, 39].

Decision: Second Appeal dismissed – Judgments of learned Civil Judge dated 06.06.2023 and learned ADJ dated 28.03.2024 upheld – Pending applications disposed of.

NDPS – Bail – Cultivation of Ganja – Definition of "Ganja" under Section 2(iii)(b) – Petitioner accused of illegally cultivating ganja plants on his agricultural land amidst jowar plantation, with 20 plants weighing 10 kg 500 grams seized during a raid – Petitioner in custody since 11.12.2025 – Contention that seized substance does not satisfy the definition of "ganja" under Section 2(iii)(b) of the NDPS Act, which defines ganja as the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant, excluding seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops – Mahazar report revealed that the seized material comprised roots, stem, branches and leaves, all weighed together – Held: Substance recovered runs contrary to the statutory definition of ganja inasmuch as the weight includes roots, stems and branches, which are excluded from the definition – Petitioner makes out a prima facie case of innocence – Bail granted subject to conditions [Paras 2–9].

Decision: Criminal Petition allowed — Petitioner directed to be enlarged on bail in Crime No. 180/2025 — Subject to execution of personal bond of Rs. 2,00,000/- with two local sureties, regular appearance before Trial Court, non-tampering with prosecution witnesses, non-involvement in similar offences, and non-departure from jurisdiction of Trial Court without permission.

Copyright Law – Interim Injunction – Suppression of Material Facts – Discretionary Relief – Plaintiff, producer of cinematograph film 'Tridev', claimed first ownership of copyright in the song 'Tirchi Topiwale' comprising literary work (lyrics by Anand Bakshi), musical work (composed by Kalyanji-Anandji) and sound recording — by assignment agreement dated 30.06.1988, plaintiff assigned limited rights to defendant No. 3 (Super Cassettes Industries Pvt. Ltd.) confined to record-based exploitation, i.e., manufacture and sale of cassettes and gramophone records — defendants used original and remixed version titled 'Rang De Lal (Oye Oye)' in film 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' released on 19.03.2026 — plaintiff sought injunction restraining OTT release of the film to the extent it comprises the said song — Held: plaintiff disentitled from discretionary relief on account of suppression of material facts, prolonged inaction, and failure to satisfactorily explain non-disclosures in plaint, rejoinder and affidavits [Paras 14–30].

Assignment Agreement – Scope of Rights – Interpretation – Agreement dated 30.06.1988 defined "the said work" to include literary, dramatic, musical, record and cinematographic film copyrights in 'Tridev' — paras 2(i) and 2(xi) assigned all rights, titles and interests in literary, dramatic and musical works embodied in the said work, including the right to make or authorize any versions and to perform, broadcast or transmit such versions — para 7 permitted adaptation and combination with any other work — para 12 applied assignment to all songs, dialogues and sequences irrespective of their presence in any version of the film — Held: prima facie, the agreement granted all rights in musical, literary and dramatic works in the said work to defendant No. 3, excluding only the cinematograph film itself — the agreement in present case not entirely pari materia with the agreement considered in Shemaroo Entertainment [Paras 33–33.7].

Interim Injunction – Triple Test – Clean Hands – A party seeking discretionary relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC must come to court with clean hands and disclose all material facts — plaintiff issued legal notice dated 26.04.2016 alleging infringement in film 'Azhar' but took no follow-up action after defendant No. 3's reply dated 02.05.2016 — songs from 'Tridev' were also used in 'K.G.F: Chapter 1' (2019) without any protest — plaintiff suppressed multiple suits filed between 2016 and 2020 and falsely claimed promoter had no connection with industry during that period — affidavits of promoter Mr. Rajiv Rai and Mr. Umesh Mehta contradicted the plaint — Held: failure to provide satisfactory explanation of non-disclosures tantamounts to suppression; suppressio veri suggestio falsi disentitles a party from discretionary relief [Paras 15–27].

OTT Injunction – Incongruity – Balance of Convenience – Plaintiff's inaction for seven to nine years since prior alleged infringements assured defendant No. 3 to exercise its rights and induced defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to invest hugely in producing 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' — restraining OTT release while theatrical exhibition continues would create an incongruous situation — any loss occasioned to plaintiff adequately compensable in monetary damages — Held: application for interim injunction not maintainable — defendant No. 3 directed to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs in court to be invested in interest-bearing FDR for the benefit of the successful party at trial [Paras 28–29, 42–46].

Decision: Application for interim injunction disposed of — defendant No. 3 directed to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs within four weeks with Registrar General of the Court — said deposit to be invested in interest-bearing FDR with auto-renewable clause — observations confined to adjudication of interim application only and not an expression on merits of the suit — suit listed before Joint Registrar on 13.07.2026 and before Court on 21.08.2026 [Paras 46–50].

Criminal Law – Murder and Attempt to Murder – Unlawful Assembly – Sections 148, 302, 307 and 149 IPC – Acquittal – Four appellants convicted by Trial Court for fatal assault on deceased Inder Singh at the basement of Uphaar Cinema on 13-14.08.1996 by an unlawful assembly armed with iron rods and wooden sticks – High Court, on re-appreciation of evidence, finds the prosecution case riddled with infirmities including tainted TIP, contradictory eye-witness accounts, absence of independent witnesses, unexplained secret informant, and acquittal of persons described as central to the formation of the unlawful assembly – Held: Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – Impugned orders of conviction dated 01.05.2003 and sentence dated 05.05.2003 set aside – Appellants acquitted [Paras 1, 2, 74, 75].

Test Identification Parade – Prior Exposure to Witnesses – Admissibility – Appellants Nasir Ahmed, Mohd. Nadir Khan and Suresh Kumar @ Chuchu were shown to PW-1/Vikram and PW-2/Gianender at the Police Post immediately upon their arrest – Their subsequent refusal to participate in the TIP cannot be accorded evidentiary value – Consequential dock identification by the eye-witnesses also rendered inadmissible – Held: The Trial Court committed a grave error in convicting these appellants solely on the basis of their refusal to participate in the TIP and in-court identification following prior exposure [Paras 63, 67, 68] – Adverse inference for non-participation in TIP cannot support identification when authenticity of TIP is itself under serious doubt [Para 66].

Unlawful Assembly – Common Object – Acquittal of Key Accused – Benefit of Doubt – As per the prosecution's own case, it was accused Devinder who had instigated the quarrel and travelled to Lado Sarai to bring associates, while accused Harender Kumar @ Pandit drove the bus carrying the unlawful assembly; both were acquitted by the Trial Court – Their acquittal fatally breaks the chain of circumstances constituting the prosecution's case – Where prosecution's case against accused is so inextricably mixed up that grain cannot be separated from chaff, benefit of doubt must extend to all accused [Paras 35, 58, 53].

Eye-Witness Testimony – Contradictions – Unreliability – The three eye-witnesses PW-1/Vikram, PW-2/Gianender and PW-11/Jeet Ram @ Jeetu gave mutually contradictory accounts of who had quarrelled with the deceased in the cinema balcony – PW-6/Dayanand, the sole public witness to the first part of the incident, turned hostile and denied any quarrel inside the cinema hall – No description of the assailants was given by any witness in their Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements – Assault took place in darkness of basement at midnight and no source of light was marked in the site plan – Eye-witnesses PW-1/Vikram and PW-2/Gianender admitted they could not identify who gave beatings and sustained only simple injuries [Paras 54, 55, 56, 57, 38].

Secret Informant – Arrest – Absence of DD Entry – The first arrest was made more than seven months after the incident, allegedly on secret information received by an officer of a police station different from the one which registered the FIR, with no DD entry or official record – Non-examination of the secret informant casts doubt on the prosecution's case – Remaining appellants were arrested solely on the basis of disclosure statements made by the appellant Suresh Kumar @ Chuchu [Paras 60, 61, 36].

TIP – Evidentiary Value – Not Substantive Evidence – Conviction Cannot Rest Solely on TIP – As far as appellant Jagjit Singh is concerned, he was not shown to witnesses prior to TIP, having surrendered in court on 20.05.1997 – He was identified by only one witness (PW-1/Vikram) in the TIP; PW-2/Gianender did not identify him – Conviction cannot be based solely on identification by one witness in TIP, in the absence of corroborating substantive evidence – TIP is not substantive evidence; its purpose is corroboration of sworn testimony [Paras 69, 70, 71, 72, 73].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Conviction and sentences under Sections 148, 302/149 and 307/149 IPC set aside – All four appellants acquitted – Personal bonds and sureties discharged – Copy of judgment to be communicated to concerned Jail Superintendent and Trial Court.

Specific Performance – Temporary Injunction – Power of Attorney – Fraud and Collusion Alleged – Appellants/defendant nos. 1 and 2, being owners of the suit property, challenged an order of temporary injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 in a suit for specific performance – Agreement for sale in favour of the plaintiff was allegedly executed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 acting as attorneys under a registered power of attorney granted by the appellants – Appellants contended that the power of attorney and the underlying agreement for sale between themselves and respondent nos. 2 and 3 were mutually cancelled prior to the suit agreement, and that the suit agreement was executed fraudulently without their knowledge or consent and without receipt of any consideration by them – Further alleged collusion between respondent no. 1 and respondent nos. 2 and 3, evidenced by mutual monetary transactions in bank statements – Respondent no. 1 countered that the suit agreement was executed during subsistence of the registered power of attorney and that substantial consideration had been paid – Held: None of the grave allegations of fraud and collusion raised in the written objection were adverted to by the Trial Judge while passing the impugned order – Impugned order paid mere lip-service to the three cardinal tests for grant of injunction without recording any clear reason for finding a prima facie case – Impugned order unsustainable [Paras 2–12].

Injunction – Remand – Reasoned Order – Upon setting aside the impugned order, the temporary injunction application remanded to the Trial Judge for fresh hearing on merits – Trial Judge directed to pass a reasoned order considering and adverting to all disputes raised by both parties in the injunction application and written objection respectively – During pendency of the fresh hearing, the interim order of injunction revived restraining the appellants from selling, transferring, or alienating the suit property in favour of third parties – Fresh disposal directed preferably by 30 June 2026 – Merits of respective contentions left entirely open [Paras 13–18].

Decision: FMA 433 of 2026 allowed on contest — Impugned order dated December 12, 2025 of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Third Court at Howrah in Title Suit No. 528 of 2023 set aside — Temporary injunction application remanded for fresh adjudication — Interim injunction against appellants revived during pendency — CAN 1 of 2026 disposed of — No order as to costs.

NDPS – Bail – Commercial Quantity – Section 37 NDPS Act – Rigour Applicable – Recovery of 2.700 kg methamphetamine (Ice) from vehicle – A3 arrested on 22.06.2024 and A4 arrested on 09.11.2024 – Both petitioners sought bail on multiple grounds including non-furnishing of grounds of arrest, absence of CCTV footage during recovery, remand beyond 24 hours, and parity with co-accused – No materials placed to overcome the rigour of Section 37 NDPS Act – Held: Bail petitions dismissed [Paras 8, 16, 17].

Grounds of Arrest – Prospective Application – Arrest Memo vs. Grounds of Arrest – Mihir Rajesh Shah – The Supreme Court in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (2026) 1 SCC 500 (decided 06.11.2025) held that the right to seek bail on account of inadequacy of grounds of arrest would apply only prospectively from 06.11.2025 – Both arrests in the present case were prior to that date – Held: Petitioners cannot raise the issue of non-furnishing of grounds of arrest, even though arrest memos and grounds of arrest stand on a different footing as held by the Supreme Court [Paras 9, 10, 11, 15].

Parity with Co-Accused – Not Available – The co-accused Abdul Gaffar was granted bail in Crl.O.P.No.7908 of 2025 on the ground of non-furnishing of grounds of arrest; however, the judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah's case mandating prospective application from 06.11.2025 was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge therein – Petitioners cannot seek parity on the basis of an order that did not consider the binding prospective restriction – Moreover, the role of the present petitioners is distinct from that of Abdul Gaffar [Paras 6, 14, 15].

NDPS – Recovery – Absence of CCTV/Videography – Not Fatal in Absence of Court Direction – Petitioners contended that absence of CCTV recordings during the recovery proceeding entitled them to bail, relying on Ragul Rahaman v. NCB (SLP (Crl.) No.11712 of 2025) – Held: The said ruling arose from a case where the Calcutta High Court had issued a specific direction for videography, which was not done in the present case; the ruling is not applicable – This contention was in any event raised in earlier bail applications and rejected [Para 12].

Detention Beyond 24 Hours – Allegation Not Substantiated – Petitioners were intercepted on 20.06.2024 but A3 was formally arrested on 22.06.2024 after voluntary statements were recorded under Section 67 NDPS Act – No material on record showed that the petitioners were detained prior to formal arrest – Both petitioners were remanded to judicial custody within 24 hours of their respective dates of arrest – Held: No illegality found in the remand [Paras 13, 15].

Distinction – Detention Orders vs. Bail Jurisprudence – Judgments in Shabna Abdulla v. Union of India, 2024 INSC 612 and Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117, cited by the petitioners, arose in the context of preventive detention orders and are not applicable to bail matters – Distinguished [Para 11].

Decision: Both Criminal Original Petitions dismissed – No grounds made out to overcome the rigour of Section 37 NDPS Act.