Murder – Section 302/34 IPC – Common Intention – Abatement of Appeal – Surviving Appellant – Deceased Laxman was allegedly assaulted with laathis by four accused-appellants on 15.06.1982 near a well, following suspicion that Laxman had informed the police about illicit liquor manufacture at the house of Raghuver – Trial Court convicted all four accused-appellants under Section 302/34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment – Appellants Raghuver, Hira and Idal died during pendency of appeal and their appeals stood abated – Appeal adjudicated solely in respect of surviving accused-appellant No. 4, Chhakki [Paras 2, 11].

Section 34 IPC – Common Intention – Requirement of Premeditation, Pre-plan and Pre-concert – Prosecution witnesses Viran PW-1, Ram Dayal PW-2 and Tulsi PW-3 made only general allegations against all accused persons collectively and attributed no specific motive, cause or enmity to surviving accused-appellant Chhakki – Motive for the crime was exclusively personal to Raghuver and his brother Hira, who suspected Laxman of informing the police – Chhakki was not a family member of Raghuver and no evidence disclosed any reason for his participation – Investigating Officer PW-8 deposed that no witness stated they had seen the accused emerging from the house – Tulsi PW-3 contradicted himself in cross-examination as to whether he had seen the accused persons going from the back of the house – Held: Prosecution failed to establish premeditation, pre-plan or pre-concert between surviving accused-appellant Chhakki and the other accused-appellants; trial Court did not discuss or record any finding on common intention with reference to Chhakki; conviction with aid of Section 34 IPC is unsustainable in absence of proof of prior meeting of minds [Paras 14–20].

Section 34 IPC – Common Intention – Settled Principles – For conviction under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC, the prosecution must establish that all accused shared a pre-arranged plan and that the criminal act was done in furtherance of common intention – The plan may develop on the spot but must precede the act constituting the offence; a definite conclusion as to prior concert is essential – Trial Court merely relied on the nature and extent of injuries to infer intention to kill and did not address the requirement of premeditation and prior concert in respect of Chhakki – Held: This approach is not sustainable in law, particularly in a heinous offence like murder where every ingredient must be proved beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 18–20].

Decision: Criminal appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence of surviving accused-appellant Chhakki under Sections 302/34 IPC as passed by the Sessions Judge, Lalitpur on 03.10.1983 in Sessions Trial No. 147 of 1982 set aside – Chhakki acquitted – Already on bail; need not surrender; bail bonds cancelled and sureties discharged – Appellant to comply with Section 437-A CrPC.

Criminal Law - SFIO Complaint – Companies Act – Bonds Under Section 91 BNSS – Physical Presence – Petitioner was summoned as accused in a complaint filed by SFIO against 81 persons in connection with alleged fraud in 88 companies of SRS Group, wherein loans of Rs.528 crores were obtained from banks/financial institutions on the basis of false financial statements – Petitioner was never arrested during investigation – Petitioner applied under Section 91 BNSS for permission to furnish bonds without physical appearance before the Special Court – Trial Court dismissed the application holding that Section 91 BNSS does not envisage furnishing of bonds in the absence of the accused – Held: Trial Court committed no error; a bare reading of Section 91 BNSS makes it clear that bonds can be furnished only when the person is present in Court – However, direction issued to trial Court to follow Tarsem Lal guidelines and to not take the petitioner into custody if bonds are not accepted or found not in order, fixing the next date beyond two weeks [Paras 1–3, 21–24].

Tarsem Lal Principles – Applicability to Companies Act Complaints – Section 448 Companies Act 2013 – The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement (AIR 2024 SC 2512) in the context of complaints under PMLA were held applicable pari materia to complaints under Section 448 of the Companies Act, 2013, since Section 4 of PMLA and Section 448 of the Companies Act are similar provisions – Held: Once the accused was not arrested during investigation, the procedure of issuance of summons, acceptance of bonds under Section 91 BNSS, and the safeguards against automatic custody as outlined in Tarsem Lal, apply to such complaints also [Paras 17, 18, 19].

Tarsem Lal – Scheme Summarised – Upon filing of complaint where accused was not arrested during investigation: summons and not warrant to be issued; accused appearing on summons not to be treated as in custody and not required to apply for bail; Special Court may direct furnishing of bond; if accused fails to appear, bailable warrant first, then non-bailable warrant; bond under Section 91 BNSS is only an undertaking to appear and does not amount to grant of bail; if warrant or proclamation already issued, accused cannot be let off merely by furnishing bond but must apply for cancellation of warrant; when accused appears on cancellation application, custody not to be insisted upon if undertaking given to appear regularly; after filing of complaint, Investigating Agency cannot independently arrest the accused [Para 18].

Proclamation – Section 82 Cr.P.C. – First Prayer – Petitioner challenged order dated 19.04.2024 issuing proclamation – Held: Summons, bailable warrants and warrants of arrest were repeatedly issued and the petitioner did not appear; proclamation was the only course left for the trial Court; this prayer has no merit and is rejected [Para 16].

Via Media – Petitioner's Apprehension of Custody – Direction to Trial Court – Court noted the petitioner's anxiety about appearing in Court due to apprehension of being taken into custody if bonds are not accepted, which is a common concern at district level – Held: A via media is required; petitioner directed to appear before the trial Court on the next date; trial Court directed to entertain application for recalling of warrant and for permission to furnish bonds in light of Tarsem Lal; if bonds are not accepted or not found in order, trial Court shall not take petitioner into custody but shall fix the next date beyond two weeks to enable the petitioner to avail legal remedies [Para 24].

Decision: Petition partly allowed – Order dated 17.05.2025 dismissing the application under Section 91 BNSS set aside qua the petitioner – Trial Court directed to follow the dictum of Tarsem Lal – Prayer for quashing of proclamation order dated 19.04.2024 dismissed.

Transfer of Property Act 1882 - Section 54 - Sale - Interpretation of Sale Deed - Conflict between boundaries and description - Identification of property - Held - Boundaries must prevail as against measurements or any discrepancy with respect to identity of the property - Extrinsic evidence and acts of parties are admissible to gather real intention - Perusal of boundaries in sale deed and site plans confirmed suit property was intended to be sold - [Paras 10-12]

Limitation Act 1963 - Article 65 - Adverse Possession - Simultaneous plea of title and adverse possession - Suit for possession - Held - Claim of title and plea of adverse possession from the same date cannot simultaneously hold - Person claiming adverse possession must prove the specific date from which possession became hostile - Legal notice issued by plaintiff's father in 1967 regarding illegal construction evidenced knowledge of adverse possession - Suit filed in 1982 was beyond the 12-year statutory period - [Paras 13-15]

Punjab Courts Act 1918 - Section 41 - Second Appeal - Jurisdiction - Framing of questions of law - Held - Questions of law are not required to be framed in second appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court as jurisdiction is circumscribed by Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act 1918 - [Para 16]

Decision: Regular second appeal dismissed – Judgment and decree of the lower courts upheld.

Arbitration – Non-Arbitrability – Airport Premises – Eviction – Chapter-VA of AAI Act – Petitioners granted licenses for 7 years by AAI for running restaurant-cum-hangout format at Juhu Airport through a competitive tender process – AAI terminated licenses by notices dated 22 March 2025 alleging lack of authority in the executing officer and encroachment beyond allotted area – Petitioners filed Section 9 Petitions for interim stay and Section 11 Application for appointment of arbitrator – AAI opposed on the ground that disputes relating to eviction from airport premises are non-arbitrable under Chapter-VA of the AAI Act – Held: Disputes and differences relating to eviction and recovery of airport premises are non-arbitrable; Section 9 Petitions dismissed and Section 11 Application disposed of with liberty to file fresh application for disputes outside Chapter-VA [Paras 1, 2, 3, 52, 53, 54].

Arbitration Clause – Excepted Matters – Clauses 25.1 and 25.10 – The license agreement contained a dispute resolution clause (Clause 25) providing for mediation followed by arbitration for all disputes touching or concerning the agreement; however, Clause 25.1 excluded disputes to which the AAI Act and rules apply, and Clause 25.10 expressly excluded from arbitration all disputes for which eviction and recovery procedure is provided under Chapter-VA of the AAI Act – Held: The exclusion under Clauses 25.1 and 25.10 is express and unambiguous; excepted matters cannot be referred to arbitration and any reference made in respect thereof renders the proceedings, including any award, null and void [Paras 17, 18, 26].

Unauthorized Occupation – Section 28-A(f) of AAI Act – Upon issuance of termination notices dated 22 March 2025, the authority to occupy airport premises stood determined and petitioners automatically became unauthorized occupants within the meaning of Section 28-A(f) of the AAI Act – Eviction proceedings were initiated by the Eviction Officer by notices under Sections 28-C and 28-F on 11 June 2025 – Held: From the date of termination, disputes relating to occupation of airport premises by petitioners became non-arbitrable under Section 28-M of the AAI Act [Paras 33, 34].

Chapter-VA of AAI Act – Complete Code – Section 28-M – Bar on Jurisdiction – Chapter-VA of the AAI Act, inserted by Act 43 of 2003, constitutes a complete code for eviction of unauthorized occupants from airport premises – The Eviction Officer is empowered with powers of a Civil Court under Section 28-H – Section 28-M declares finality of orders of the Eviction Officer and bars jurisdiction of any court or authority including for grant of injunction in respect of actions taken or intended to be taken by the Eviction Officer under Chapter-VA – Held: Section 28-M read with Section 2(3) of the Arbitration Act makes disputes relating to eviction and recovery of airport premises non-arbitrable as a matter of public policy [Paras 19 to 25, 30, 31, 32].

Validity of Termination – Defense Before Eviction Officer – Not Arbitrable – Petitioners contended that the dispute about validity of the termination notices was arbitrable – Held: If petitioners believe the termination notices are illegal or invalid, such contentions can only be raised as a defence in eviction proceedings before the Eviction Officer; the issue of validity of termination cannot be separately adjudicated in arbitration [Paras 42, 49].

Interlocutory Order – Not Binding at Final Hearing – Earlier interlocutory order dated 23 June 2025 granting status-quo had recorded prima-facie observations that HLV Limited was distinguishable – Held: Prima-facie observations made at the stage of ad-interim relief do not bind the Court at the stage of final decision; such findings are not res judicata [Para 50].

Section 11 – Referral Jurisdiction – Hands-Off Approach – Petitioners urged that reference to arbitration be made leaving arbitrability to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 – Held: Where the Court has arrived at a finding that disputes are non-arbitrable, there is no question of adopting a hands-off approach or making reference to arbitration; only disputes not covered by Chapter-VA of the AAI Act can be referred to arbitration and petitioners granted liberty to file fresh Section 11 application for such disputes [Paras 47, 52].

Decision: Commercial Arbitration Petitions (L) Nos. 13393 of 2025 and 12378 of 2025 under Section 9 dismissed; ad-interim measures vacated – Commercial Arbitration Application No. 38289 of 2025 disposed of; liberty granted to file fresh application for reference to arbitration only in respect of disputes to which Chapter-VA of the AAI Act does not apply – No order as to costs.

Writ Law - Police Investigation - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Petitioner alleged police inaction in conducting investigation and filing charge sheet in Crime No. 126 of 2022 - Complaint was registered for offences of cheating and forgery under the IPC following a direction from the Additional Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC - State contended that the investigation was at a progressive stage - High Court examined the limits of writ jurisdiction in interfering with the investigative process of the executive - Court relied on Supreme Court precedents emphasizing judicial restraint in fixing time-bound investigation schedules - Court observed that while Article 21 guarantees a speedy trial and investigation - fixed timelines should be the exception and not the norm - Held - Respondent No. 4 directed to complete the investigation and take appropriate steps to file a charge sheet or final report within a reasonable time in accordance with law - [Paras 1-11].

Criminal Law - Judicial Restraint - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Scope of judicial intervention in investigation - High Court should not ordinarily direct the filing of a charge sheet while investigation is pending as it curtails the discretion of the investigating officer - Directing specific outcomes in investigation can prejudice the concept of a fair trial - Held - Courts must exercise restraint and not issue directions that foreclose executive discretion except in extreme cases - [Paras 6-7].

Criminal Law - Right to Speedy Trial - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Timely investigation - Investigative process is often unpredictable and involves numerous variables - Right to a speedy trial includes a timely and diligent investigation as an essential component of personal liberty - Timelines for investigation are to be imposed reactively where there is material evidence of undue delay or stagnation - Held - The challenge lies in balancing the practical realities of investigation with the constitutional mandate of promptitude - [Paras 8-9].

Decision: Writ Petition disposed of – Respondent No. 4 directed to complete investigation and file a charge sheet or final report before the Jurisdictional Magistrate within a reasonable time.

Preventive Detention – PITNDPS Act – Section 3(1) – Non-Application of Mind – Relevant Ground for Bail Ignored – Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 was passed against the petitioner based on her involvement in four FIRs under the NDPS Act and four other FIRs relating to illicit liquor trade – The Detaining Authority referred to the bail order dated 19.09.2024 passed in FIR No. 941/2023 only on the ground of parity with co-accused, while omitting the material ground that the Trial Court had also found prima facie non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act (failure to serve notice of second option to be taken before Magistrate/Gazetted Officer) – Held: The Detaining Authority failed to apply its mind to a very relevant consideration; had the violation of Section 50 been noticed, it may have influenced the Detaining Authority one way or the other; the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is accordingly vitiated [Paras 31–37].

Preventive Detention – Delay – Live and Proximate Link – Unexplained Gap – Certified copies of relevant papers were obtained by the Sponsoring Authority on 16.11.2024 and 27.11.2024, yet the proposal was sent only on 10.02.2025; thereafter the Detention Order was passed on 13.05.2025 and executed on 26.05.2025 – No satisfactory explanation was offered for the delay between the date of bail (19.09.2024) and the date of proposal (10.02.2025) – FIR No. 164/2025 dated 14.04.2025, involving only 3.65 grams of heroin and in which petitioner was released on bail on personal bond on the same day with no chargesheet filed even after a year, is insufficient to wish away the earlier delay – Held: Delay in passing the Detention Order itself demonstrates absence of live and proximate link between grounds of detention and the purpose sought to be achieved [Paras 38–43].

Preventive Detention – Bail Granted Despite Section 37 NDPS Act – State's Failure to Seek Cancellation – If an accused is released on bail despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, this is suggestive that the Court may not have found a prima facie case against her; this fact, had it been placed before the Detaining Authority, would have influenced the subjective satisfaction – The State neither challenged the bail orders nor sought cancellation; thereafter resorting to preventive detention was an extraordinary step that was not warranted in the circumstances – Relied upon: Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, 2023 9 SCC 587; Dhanyam v. State of Kerala, AIR 2025 SC 2868; Sushanta Kumar Banik [Paras 34–36].

Judicial Review – Preventive Detention – Parameters – The constitutional court when called upon to test the legality of a preventive detention order may examine: whether the order is based on requisite subjective satisfaction; whether all relevant circumstances have been applied to mind; whether the power is exercised for the authorised purpose; whether the satisfaction rests on rationally probative material; whether there is a live and proximate link between past conduct and the need to detain; whether grounds are precise, pertinent and relevant; and whether statutory timelines have been adhered to – Relied upon: Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, 2023 9 SCC 587 [Para 28].

Object of Preventive Detention – Preventive detention affords protection to society not by punishing a person for what he has done but by intercepting before he acts – However, it is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the safeguards provided under the Constitution and the enabling statute must be strictly adhered to – Relied upon: Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, (1982) 2 SCC 403 [Para 27].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 and Confirmation Order dated 08.08.2025 set aside – Petitioner directed to be released forthwith if not detained in any other case – Observations limited to validity of Detention Order; not to influence pending cases including FIR No. 164/2025 – No order as to costs.

Section 102 CrPC – Power to Seize Property – Scope and Limits – Nexus Requirement – Freezing of Bank Accounts and Mutual Fund Units – The IO, in connection with an alleged fraud involving shares lent to accused persons, froze their bank accounts and mutual fund units under Section 102 CrPC – Held: The power under Section 102(1) CrPC to seize property is not a general power to seize any property of an accused but is limited to property which is alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under circumstances creating suspicion of commission of an offence – The emphasis is on the character of the property rather than its association with the accused – A direct link between the seized property and the commission of the alleged offence is a pre-condition for valid exercise of the power – Section 102 does not enable the police to seize property with a view to do justice and hand it over to the person they believe to be rightfully entitled [Paras 19, 21, 22, 27, 28].

Section 102 CrPC – Principles Summarised – The following principles govern exercise of power under Section 102: (i) it is a tool of investigation to collect evidence; (ii) bank accounts and Demat accounts are property within its scope but immovable property is excluded; (iii) only property alleged or suspected to be stolen or found in circumstances creating suspicion of commission of offence can be seized; (iv) a direct link between seized property and alleged offence is essential; (v) the power cannot be used for compensatory justice or as a recovery mechanism for complainant; (vi) seizure can be challenged on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, the property not meeting the definition, or absence of nexus [Para 28].

Freezing of Accounts – Nexus Not Established – De-Freezing Justified – Prima facie, some of the mutual fund accounts of the accused were opened and units acquired much prior to the transactions in question – The trail of sale proceeds of allegedly lent shares to the amounts in the frozen accounts was not established – The IO appeared to have frozen the accounts swayed by the general allegation of fraud rather than establishing a direct nexus – Where the investigating agency lacks the direct link between seized property and commission of the offence, continuation of freezing would amount to detaining property of the accused pending adjudication, negating the presumption of innocence – Held: De-freezing of accounts was justified [Paras 36, 37, 38, 39].

Shares Transferred to Demat Account – Beneficial Ownership Presumption – Section 46 Companies Act, 2013 – Where shares are transferred to the Demat account of a person, Section 46(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that the record of the depository is prima facie evidence of the interest of the beneficial owner – It would be for the prosecution to dislodge this presumption – The real nature of the transaction is a matter for trial [Para 34].

Condition of Bank Guarantee – Onerous – Modified to Indemnity Bond – The trial Court while rightly ordering de-freezing imposed a condition of furnishing a bank guarantee of Rs.6.55 Crores, which virtually amounted to denial of the prayer for de-freezing – Having concluded that there was no nexus between the seized property and the alleged offences and no likelihood of early conclusion of trial, the trial Court ought to have imposed only reasonable conditions – Held: The condition of bank guarantee set aside – Substituted with a direction to furnish an indemnity bond for Rs.6.55 Crores to bring back the said amount with interest as directed by the Court at conclusion of trial [Paras 42, 43].

Withdrawal of Civil Interim Relief – Freezing Cannot Substitute – The first informant had instituted a civil suit and filed a Notice of Motion for interim relief but withdrew the Notice of Motion – Allowing the freezing of accounts to continue till conclusion of criminal trial would amount to an order of attachment before judgment without satisfying the requisite legal standard, indirectly circumventing the withdrawal of civil interim relief [Para 40].

Decision: Criminal Application No. 191 of 2024 (first informant) dismissed – Criminal Application No. 790 of 2024 (accused No. 2) allowed – Impugned order modified – Accounts to be de-frozen subject to accused No. 2 furnishing an indemnity bond for Rs.6.55 Crores – Interim relief to continue for six weeks.

Commercial Courts – Order XI Rule 1 CPC – Leave to File Additional Documents – "Power, Possession, Control or Custody" – Certified Copies as Public Documents – The petitioners filed a commercial suit for specific performance of an oral agreement for sale of land – They subsequently filed I.A. No. 271 of 2025 seeking leave to place 133 additional documents on record including certified copies of sale deeds, Gram Panchayat resolutions, VMRDA challans, and Google map images – The learned Special Judge rejected the application holding that these documents could have been obtained with reasonable efforts at the time of institution of the suit – Held: Documents which could be obtained from public authorities cannot be deemed to be in "power, possession, control or custody" of a party unless actually obtained; the date of a document being prior to the institution of the suit does not automatically make it available in the power, possession, control or custody of the plaintiff at the time of filing; the finding of the Special Judge that documents could have been obtained with reasonable efforts is not a finding that they were in actual power, possession, control or custody and is therefore not sustainable [Paras 33–34].

Commercial Courts – Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) CPC – Documents Required in Answer to Defendant's Case – Exclusion of Entire Rule 1 – The defendants in their written statement disputed the quantum of sale consideration paid for the transferred land of Ac.79.89 cents and raised a plea inconsistent with the plaint – To answer this specific defence, the petitioners sought to file certified copies of sale deeds – Held: Once Order XI Rule 1(1)(c)(ii) is attracted i.e., documents relevant in answer to a case set up by the defendant subsequent to filing of the plaint – the entire Rule 1 including sub-rule (5) stands excluded; the expression "this Rule" in clause (c) refers to Rule 1 as a whole and not merely sub-rule (1); sub-rule (5) being in the nature of an exception to sub-rule (1) also stands excluded when clause (c)(ii) is attracted; application for leave cannot be rejected on the basis of sub-rules (1) and (5) in such cases [Paras 36–43].

Procedural Law – Handmaid of Justice – Reasonable Cause – Liberal Construction – Provisions of Order XI Rule 1 CPC as applicable to Commercial Courts are procedural in nature and must be construed liberally to advance substantial justice – Procedural and technical hurdles shall not be allowed to come in the way of effective adjudication so long as the adverse party does not suffer serious prejudice – The expression "reasonable cause" for non-disclosure must be considered in correct perspective with a view to advance substantial justice – Procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant; not an obstruction but an aid to justice [Paras 27–28, 44].

Secondary Evidence – Certified Copies of Sale Deeds – Objection as to Admissibility – Stage of Raising – Leave to receive documents is distinct from admissibility of those documents at trial – Objections under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act as to production of secondary evidence without proof of loss of primary evidence are to be raised and considered at the appropriate stage before the learned Special Judge and do not bear on the question of grant of leave to file documents [Para 45].

Decision: Civil Revision Petition allowed – Impugned order dated 04.02.2026 rejecting I.A. No. 271 of 2025 set aside – Learned Special Judge directed to take the documents on record, subject to admissibility to be considered at trial – Pending miscellaneous petitions stand closed.

Motor Accident Claims – Liability of Insurance Company – Absence of Driving Licence – Burden of Proof – Appellant-claimant sustained injuries when a tipper owned by the 1st respondent dashed against his auto on 18.03.2013 – MACT exonerated the Insurance Company (2nd respondent) from liability on the ground that the driver of the offending vehicle did not possess a valid driving licence – On appeal, High Court finds that the Insurance Company failed to discharge its burden of proving absence of driving licence – RW.1 admitted no document was produced to substantiate the contention; RW.2's oral testimony regarding absence of licence was not supported by the Motor Vehicles Inspector's report or any official document obtained through proper procedure – Charge sheet did not indicate prosecution under Sections 180 or 181 of the MV Act – Held: A mere unserved legal notice to the owner cannot discharge the burden of proving absence of driving licence; the Insurance Company is jointly and severally liable along with the vehicle owner [Paras 8–21].

Motor Accident Claims – Standard of Proof – Preponderance of Probability – In claims for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, the standard of proof is preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt – MACT is entitled to adopt a holistic view relying on official crime records including FIR, charge sheet, registration certificate, insurance policy and fitness certificate as the basis for its findings – Driver of the offending vehicle was not examined; FIR and charge sheet stood against him, corroborating the claimant's version – Held: The summary and social welfare nature of Motor Vehicles Act proceedings requires a liberal approach [Paras 13–17].

Quantum of Compensation – Disability Assessment – Medical Board Certificate – MACT's Reduction of Disability Without Basis – The Medical Board of RIMS, Kadapa, assessed permanent disability at 40% vide Ex.A4, issued specifically for court purposes – PW.2, Orthopedic Surgeon, confirmed non-union fracture of right femur, osteoporosis, painful restricted movements, inability to stand or squat, and antalgic gait, and assessed disability at 40% – MACT, without any basis, reduced disability to 15% – Held: Reduction of Medical Board assessed disability without reassessment or contrary evidence is unsustainable; disability accepted at 40% – Monthly income taken at Rs.3,000/- (inclusive of future prospects); loss of earning capacity computed at Rs.1,200/- per month, i.e., Rs.14,400/- per annum; multiplier of 11 applied; compensation under permanent disability head fixed at Rs.1,58,400/- [Paras 23–24].

Compensation – Enhancement – Just and Reasonable Award – Total compensation enhanced from Rs.93,400/- to Rs.1,98,400/- under the following heads: pain and suffering Rs.20,000/-; transportation Rs.5,000/-; medical expenditure and attendant charges Rs.10,000/-; extra nourishment Rs.5,000/-; loss of income due to permanent disability Rs.1,58,400/- – Interest awarded at 6% per annum from the date of petition till realisation – Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 held jointly and severally liable; Insurance Company directed to deposit amount within two months directly to claimant's bank account, failing which before the MACT [Paras 25–26].

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – Award of MACT modified – Compensation enhanced from Rs.93,400/- to Rs.1,98,400/- with interest at 6% p.a. – Insurance Company held jointly and severally liable – No order as to costs.