Criminal Law – Kidnapping – Rape – POCSO – Age of Prosecutrix – Proof – Charges under Sections 363/366/342/376/506 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act — prosecution's case that prosecutrix was aged 16½ years at time of incident in January 2013 — birth certificate not proved as original birth register lost during office shifting — parents (PW-4 and PW-5) could not tell date of birth of prosecutrix in cross-examination — Janam Patri and Jachcha Bachcha Raksha Card not admissible as proof of date of birth — Held: Prosecution failed to prove that prosecutrix was a minor at the time of incident; POCSO Act consequently not applicable [Paras 11–15].

Evidence – Testimony of Prosecutrix – Sterling Quality – Material Contradictions – Prosecutrix (PW-1) deposed she went to Amritsar under telephonic threats but no physical force was used and respondent was not present in Delhi — she travelled alone by bus without making any complaint to mother, relatives, employer or police — did not try to escape from Amritsar despite visits to Golden Temple and Sheetla Mandir — admitted to calling respondent "Babu" or "Husband" voluntarily — admitted to attending work throughout January 2013 and receiving full salary — video showed her looking happy — MLC showed no visible fresh external injury — Held: Testimony is marked by material contradictions, improvements and inconsistencies on core aspects; does not inspire confidence of sterling quality; version unreliable [Paras 17–24].

Investigation – Slip-shod Manner – CDR and Mobile Records – Customer Application Form for mobile number used to trace prosecutrix not proved — service provider not examined — CDR and location chart not duly proved — Ram Kumar, in whose name number was registered, not examined — place and manner of arrest of respondent contradicted between prosecution witnesses — Held: Slip-shod investigation makes prosecution case doubtful; benefit goes to accused [Paras 25–26].

Appeal Against Acquittal – Double Presumption – Standard of Interference – Presumption of innocence stands reinforced by acquittal — appellate court may interfere only when trial court's findings are perverse, manifestly illegal, or grossly unjust or when there are very substantial and compelling reasons — if two reasonable views possible, one leading to acquittal must be preferred — Held: Trial court's view is plausible and reasonable; prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; no interference warranted [Paras 27–29].

Decision: State appeal dismissed — acquittal of respondent dated 20.07.2019 affirmed — bail bond and surety discharged.

Revenue Law - Eviction from Gram Sabha Land - Procedure under Section 67 - Statutory Rules vs. Court Guidelines - Petitioners evicted and penalized for constructing a mosque on Gram Sabha land (Khalihan) - Assailed for denial of opportunity to cross-examine the Lekhpal, relying on guidelines in Rishipal Singh v. State of U.P. - Held: Proceedings under Section 67 read with Section 225-A of the Code and Rules 66, 67, and 192 of the Rules are strictly summary in nature, to be decided upon affidavits - The guidelines framed in Rishipal Singh recommending a detailed procedure were meant for the State to "adopt" by suitably amending the Rules - Until the State Government amends the Rules, the existing statutory summary procedure shall prevail - Eviction order passed in compliance with existing Rules is valid [Paras 13-19, 27-30].

Statutory Interpretation - Enforceability of Court Guidelines - Existence of Statutory Rules - Held: While courts may frame guidelines to fill a legislative vacuum (as in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan), where specific, valid, and enforceable statutory rules exist, there is no occasion to exercise extraordinary powers to formulate new enforceable guidelines unless the existing rules are struck down - Directions in Rishipal Singh requiring mandatory oral evidence and cross-examination amount to converting a summary procedure into a regular procedure and cannot be enforced prior to formal adoption by the State via amendment of Rules [Paras 27-29].

Revenue Law - Imposition of Penalty - Proof of Occupation or Construction - Eviction upheld but penalty set aside - Held: There was no material on record to link the petitioners to either the construction or the occupation of the mosque - Imposition of penalty of Rs. 36,000/- by the Tehsildar set aside [Para 25].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed - Order of eviction upheld - Imposition of penalty against the petitioners set aside due to lack of linking material.

Criminal Law – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – Conviction under Section 302 IPC upheld – Appellant accused of murdering the deceased after expressing improper intentions towards the deceased's wife – Case rested on circumstantial evidence: motive, last seen together, extra-judicial confession, and recovery of blood-stained axe – Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment – Held: The chain of circumstances is complete, unerring, and excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence – The evidence of prosecution witnesses is cogent and corroborates the medical and forensic evidence – Conduct of accused attempting to flee and his failure to provide a plausible explanation in his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement further strengthens the prosecution case – Appeal dismissed [Paras 24–29, 61].

Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Burden of Proof under Section 106 of Evidence Act – Deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused shortly before the occurrence, having left on the pretext of fishing – Held: When an accused is last seen with the deceased, the burden shifts to the accused to offer a reasonable explanation as to when and how they parted company – Accused merely claimed false implication and failed to offer any plausible explanation – Such failure attracts the principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act and provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances [Paras 39–44].

Evidence – Appreciation of Evidence – Minor Contradictions – Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus – Defence highlighted minor discrepancies regarding time of death, delay in FIR, and sequence of events – Held: Minor contradictions or omissions that do not go to the root of the prosecution case cannot be a ground to discard otherwise reliable testimony – The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and is merely a rule of caution – Testimony of a rustic village wife in severe emotional distress cannot be discredited over minor inconsistencies – Substratum of the prosecution case remains intact [Paras 31–38].

Medical Jurisprudence – Time of Death – Post-mortem Findings – Defence challenged time of occurrence based on the presence of semi-digested food in the stomach – Held: The condition of stomach contents is not an infallible or precise guide for determining the exact time of death – It must be appreciated in conjunction with other surrounding circumstances – Digestion rates vary based on physiological factors – Medical evidence regarding the probable time of death is broadly consistent with the positive direct evidence of the prosecution [Paras 51–57].

Criminal Trial – Investigation Lapses – Forensic Evidence – Forensic report confirmed human blood on the recovered axe and clothes but did not establish the exact blood group – Held: Occurrence pertains to 2004 when forensic techniques were comparatively limited – Defective investigation or failure to determine exact blood group cannot be a ground for acquittal when the substantive evidence is trustworthy – Doubts must be reasonable and not based on conjectures or isolated infirmities [Paras 45–50, 58–60].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment and order of conviction under Section 302 IPC affirmed – Appellant directed to serve the remaining part of his sentence.

Trademark Law - Infringement and Passing Off - Deceptive Similarity - 'TULASI' vs 'TULSI' - Appeals against temporary injunction restraining defendant from using 'TULSI' for incense sticks - Plaintiff using registered word and device mark 'TULASI' since 1950; defendant using 'TULSI' alongside mark 'JALLAN' since 2023 - Held: Plaintiff established a prima facie case of infringement and passing off based on long, continuous, and exclusive use of its registered mark. Defendant's use of 'TULSI' in large font masking its trademark 'JALLAN' was prominent and acted as a trademark/source identifier rather than a mere descriptor of fragrance. Phonetic similarity between the marks creates a likelihood of confusion. Temporary injunction correctly granted by Trial Court [Paras 32-45, 62-67].

Trade Marks Act, 1999 - Sections 30(2)(a) and 35 - Defense of Descriptive Use - Defendant claimed 'TULSI' merely described the fragrance/ingredient of incense sticks - Held: Statutory protection under Section 30(2)(a) is available only for bona fide and purely descriptive use. Prominent display of the word 'TULSI' on packaging in a significantly larger font than the house mark 'JALLAN' negated the defense of descriptive use at the interlocutory stage. Trial Court justified in concluding the word functioned as a source identifier, limiting the monopoly exception for descriptive common words [Paras 34-36, 42-45, 63-65].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLIII Rule 1(r) - Scope of Interference with Discretionary Orders - Held: The Appellate Court's power to interfere with discretionary interlocutory orders granting temporary injunctions is limited. An Appellate Court will not substitute its own view merely because another conclusion is possible, unless the Trial Court's exercise of discretion is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or in disregard of settled legal principles. The Trial Court properly evaluated prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. No grounds for interference [Paras 18, 61, 68].

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The common order passed by the Trial Court allowing the temporary injunction applications filed by the plaintiff is upheld.

Property Law - Doctrine of Lis Pendens vs. Bona Fide Purchaser - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 19(b) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 52 - Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of a registered agreement to sell dated 03.09.1981 executed by Defendant No. 1 - During the pendency of the suit, Defendant No. 1 executed a sale deed in favour of Defendants No. 2 to 7 on 11.10.1982 - Trial court denied specific performance holding the subsequent purchasers to be bona fide purchasers for value without notice under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act - Held: Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to the institution of a suit - Once a suit is instituted, the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act comes into force and prevails over Section 19(b) - The defense of bona fide purchaser without notice is not available to pendente lite transferees, as Section 52 is based on public policy - Subsequent purchasers are bound by the decree irrespective of good faith or lack of notice - Trial court legally erred in granting the benefit of Section 19(b) to pendente lite purchasers [Paras 32-37, 65-70].

Property Law - Transfer by Unauthorized Person - Subsequent Acquisition of Interest - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 43 - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 13(a) - At the time of executing the agreement to sell (03.09.1981), Defendant No. 1 had an imperfect title as the property had been previously sold to a third party - Subsequently, on 07.09.1981, Defendant No. 1 acquired perfect title when the prior sale deed was cancelled via a compromise decree - Held: Under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act, if a vendor acquires any interest in the property subsequent to the contract and the agreement subsists, the purchaser can compel the vendor to make good the contract out of such acquired interest - Subsequent purchasers cannot oppose specific performance on the ground of the vendor's initial lack of title [Paras 35-38, 66-68].

Specific Performance - Readiness and Willingness - Proof of Execution - Plaintiff proved payment of substantial earnest money (Rs. 41,000/- out of the total consideration of Rs. 79,500/-) and the execution of the registered agreement - Plaintiff further proved readiness and willingness by remaining present at the Sub-Registrar's office on the stipulated date and serving legal notice - Defendant No. 1 committed default by failing to obtain the requisite income tax clearance and failing to execute the sale deed - Held: Plaintiff successfully established readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract - Plaintiff is entitled to the primary relief of specific performance [Paras 59-61].

Decision: Appeal allowed with costs - Impugned judgment and decree dated 30.09.1986 of the trial court set aside - Suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 03.09.1981 decreed against all defendants - Defendant No. 1 directed to execute the sale deed and hand over vacant possession upon receiving the balance consideration within two months, failing which the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree executed through the court.

Civil Law – Territorial Jurisdiction – Waiver of Objection – Section 21 and Order VII Rule 10 CPC – Suit for recovery of Rs. 10 lacs where Trial Court allowed the respondent's application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC to return the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction – Appellant contended that the respondent did not object to territorial jurisdiction in the written statement and no issue was framed on this aspect – Held: In terms of Section 21 CPC, an objection to territorial or local jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity, and in any case at or before the settlement of issues – If not taken at the earliest, the objection is deemed to be waived – Territorial jurisdiction can be assumed by the Court upon waiver, as it does not go to the root of the matter unlike inherent lack of subject-matter jurisdiction – Since the respondent raised no objection at the first instance or at the stage of framing issues, the objection stands waived – Impugned order returning the plaint is set aside and the suit is restored [Paras 3–10].

Decision: Appeal succeeds and is disposed of – Impugned order dated 23.07.2022 is set aside – Suit is restored to its original number and directed to be listed before the concerned Trial Court on 30.03.2026.

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Maintainability of direct approach to High Court – Concurrent Jurisdiction – Section 482 BNSS gives concurrent powers to the High Court and Sessions Court to entertain anticipatory bail applications – Normal rule requires approaching the Sessions Court first, but High Court can entertain directly in special or extra-ordinary circumstances – FIR was lodged on the direction of Special Judge (POCSO) under Section 173(4) BNSS – Special Judge acts in dual capacity as Magistrate and Sessions Court – Held: The present application comes within the purview of special/extra-ordinary circumstances; preliminary objection of the State against direct maintainability before the High Court is rejected [Paras 26–32].

Criminal Law – POCSO Act – Section 29 Presumption of Guilt – Applicability at pre-arrest bail stage – State opposed anticipatory bail relying on the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act – Held: Presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act cannot be invoked at the stage of pre-arrest bail before the framing of charges – Requiring an accused to rebut the presumption of guilt before foundational facts are established and charges are framed would do violence to fundamental criminal jurisprudence and Article 21 of the Constitution – Grant or refusal of bail at this stage is to be decided on usual and ordinary settled principles [Paras 40–45].

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Factual Matrix and Conduct of Parties – Delay in FIR and unnatural conduct – FIR lodged after 6 days delay by a stranger claiming to be the guardian of the victims – Victims did not inform their natural parents but confided in a stranger – Material improvements in victims' statements regarding date and place of incident – Victims were interviewed by media in violation of POCSO and Juvenile Justice Act protocols – Dispute regarding bathing rights in Magh Mela coincided with the date the informant allegedly received information of the offence – Medical report noted no external injuries and only stated sexual assault cannot be ruled out – Held: Considering the factual matrix, discrepancies, and unnatural course of human conduct, a case for grant of anticipatory bail is made out [Paras 33–39, 51–52].

Procedural Law – Filing of Affidavit – Defective Affidavit – State objected that the affidavit in support of the anticipatory bail application was not sworn by Applicant No.1 but by Applicant No.2 and a stranger (pairokar), allegedly violating Rule 18-A of Allahabad High Court Rules – Held: Procedural laws are handmaids of justice and not meant to defeat the ends of justice – Hyper-technical approach cannot be adopted to throw out the application when Applicant No.2 explicitly stated he is doing pairavi on behalf of Applicant No.1 [Para 46].

Decision: Anticipatory bail application allowed – In the event of arrest, applicants are directed to be released on anticipatory bail on furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties each, subject to conditions including not tampering with evidence, not leaving India without permission of the Court, and all parties refraining from giving media interviews regarding the present case during the pendency of the investigation/trial.

Criminal Law - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138 and 141 - Vicarious Liability of Directors - Quashing of Summoning Orders - Petitioner sought quashing of summoning orders and criminal proceedings arising from dishonoured cheques issued by the company - Petitioner contended that he was an Independent Director (Non-Executive), not a signatory to the cheques, and not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company - Complaints alleged generally that the petitioner was personally responsible for the day-to-day management - Held: Vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act must be strictly construed. Mere designation as a director is not sufficient to establish liability. The complaint must contain specific averments demonstrating the director's direct involvement in the affairs of the company at the relevant time. A non-executive or independent director who has not signed the cheques cannot be held liable based on bald, cursory statements. The petitioner was an Independent Director and had resigned before the summoning orders were issued. In the absence of foundational averments establishing a direct nexus to the financial transactions, the petitioner cannot be held vicariously liable. Summoning orders set aside and criminal proceedings quashed [Paras 7-15].

Decision: Petitions disposed of - Summoning orders dated 22.05.2017 and 01.07.2017 set aside qua the petitioner, and all criminal proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.

Commercial Law – Contracts – Suit for Recovery of Money – Breach of Contract – Demurrage and Excess Freight Charges – The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,18,70,115/- (principal and interest) against the defendant/respondent regarding a contract for transportation services – Defendant contended that plaintiff breached the contract by failing to place trailers at the designated time, forcing the defendant to hire alternate transporters and incur demurrage charges imposed by port authorities – Defendant recovered Rs. 29,61,000/- by encashing bank guarantee, retaining EMD, and from pending bills – Held: Trial Court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to prove the basis of its claim, having produced no supporting documents like invoices – Defendant produced adequate material, including bills from port authorities, to justify deductions made strictly in accordance with the contract terms – Dismissal of suit upheld [Paras 15, 20, 23, 30–34].

Evidence – Burden of Proof – Claim for outstanding dues – Plaintiff claimed a specific sum but failed to enumerate details or produce any material/invoices to substantiate the claim other than a statement of accounts and a demand letter – PW1 admitted no separate bills were raised – Held: Plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving the amount due and payable – Defendant justified its deductions with documentary evidence (Ex. D28) which went unimpeached in cross-examination – Appeal dismissed [Paras 20, 26, 32–34].

Decision: Appeal dismissed as being devoid of merit with costs. All pending applications disposed of.