Murder – Section 302 IPC – Dying Declaration – Multiple Dying Declarations – Inconsistency and Infirmity – Reliability – Appellant-husband convicted by Additional Sessions Judge, Biloli for murder of his wife Komal, who suffered 96% burn injuries on 19.07.2019 and succumbed on 23.07.2019 – Conviction rested solely on two dying declarations: Exhibit-61 recorded by PW-4 Naib Tahsildar and Exhibit-47 recorded by PW-2 Police Head Constable – Held: Both dying declarations suffer from material inconsistencies — Exhibit-61 attributes the incident to a call from the sister-in-law the previous night, while Exhibit-47 attributes it to the deceased not waking up early; there is variance in the manner and cause of the incident between the two declarations; in such circumstances, they cannot form the sole basis of conviction and require corroboration [Paras 18, 22–23].

Dying Declaration – Mental Fitness of Declarant – Medical Officer's Endorsement – Procedural Lapses – Deceased had sustained 96% burn injuries; sedatives and painkillers (Cefsula 1.5 gm and Tramadol) were administered; Medical Officer admitted in cross-examination that patient's general condition was poor, her blood pressure was 95 and she was uncooperative and a-febrile; Medical Officer's endorsement of mental fitness is doubtful as he was standing outside the ward during recording of Exhibit-61 and no written requisition was given by PW-2 or PW-4 for his opinion – PW-2 admitted that the dying declaration Exhibit-47 was not recorded in question-answer form, was not in his handwriting, the person who wrote it was not examined, and the toe impression was not attested by him – PW-4 did not put questions to the deceased to ascertain her mental fitness before recording Exhibit-61 – Held: Administration of sedatives and painkillers to a patient with 96% burns raises serious doubts about voluntariness and reliability of dying declarations; procedural lapses vitiate their evidentiary value [Paras 18–19].

Dying Declaration – Tutoring – Adverse Inference – Non-examination of Material Witnesses – Possibility of tutoring cannot be ruled out as relatives were present in the ward before being asked to leave; PW-1 (eyewitness who reached the spot) stated the deceased was not in a position to speak; PW-5 (mother of deceased) deposed that the incident occurred accidentally while cooking; medical records from Government Hospital, Naigaon (first point of admission) were not produced; statements of neighbours who brought the deceased to hospital were not recorded – Held: Non-production of crucial medical evidence and non-examination of material witnesses warrants drawing of adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act; accused entitled to benefit of doubt [Paras 20–21].

Dying Declaration – Principles Governing Appreciation – Where multiple dying declarations suffer from inconsistencies, infirmities and procedural irregularities, they cannot form the sole basis of conviction and must be corroborated — the person recording the dying declaration must be satisfied as to the mental fitness of the declarant before recording the statement; a conviction based on doubtful dying declarations where the deceased was administered sedatives, sustained extensive burn injuries, and material witnesses were not examined, is not sustainable [Paras 16–28].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence of the appellant under Section 302 IPC passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Biloli on 27.03.2023 in Sessions Case No. 28 of 2020 quashed and set aside – Appellant acquitted – To be released forthwith if not required in any other case – Fine, if paid, to be refunded after appeal period – Appellant to execute bond of Rs.15,000/- under Section 481 BNSS – Muddemal property to be dealt with in accordance with law.

Civil Procedure – Order IX Rule 13 CPC – Ex-Parte Decree – Setting Aside – Service of Summons – Postal Endorsement of Refusal – Presumption and Rebuttal – Respondent instituted a commercial suit against the Appellant and obtained an ex-parte decree on 22.03.2025 on the basis of a tracking report showing postal endorsement of "refusal" — Appellant denied service on oath, asserting that the tracking report did not bear his name and no summons were ever tendered to him — Trial Court dismissed the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree holding the Appellant duly served — Held: An endorsement of refusal gives rise to deemed service but the presumption is rebuttable; once a specific and sworn denial of service is made constituting credible rebuttal, the burden shifts upon the party asserting service to prove actual tender of summons by cogent evidence; failure to examine the postal official in such circumstances renders the finding of due service legally unsustainable [Paras 9–12].

Civil Procedure – Order IX Rule 13 CPC – Mutually Destructive Findings – Condonation of Delay and Simultaneous Finding of Prior Knowledge – The Trial Court condoned the delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC accepting the Appellant's date of knowledge as 11.04.2025 — simultaneously, the Trial Court held that the Appellant was duly served, thereby implying prior knowledge — Held: Once the Trial Court accepted 11.04.2025 as the date of knowledge for the purpose of limitation, it could not without cogent reconciliation simultaneously hold that the Appellant had prior due service; the two findings are mutually destructive and render the impugned order legally unsustainable [Para 13].

Civil Procedure – Service of Summons – Registered Post – Burden of Proof – A presumption of service arises under Section 114 Illustration (f) of the Evidence Act read with Section 27 of the General Clauses Act where a letter is sent by registered post — where the addressee specifically denies service, the burden is on the party asserting service to prove it; the burden does not stand discharged by mere production of a vague postal report without examination of the postal official [Paras 9–12].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned Order dated 18.11.2025 set aside – Application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC allowed – Ex-parte judgment and decree dated 22.03.2025 set aside – Suit restored to its original position before the Trial Court – Parties directed to appear before the Trial Court on 20.05.2026 – Pending applications disposed of.

Section 102 CrPC – Power to Seize Property – Scope and Limits – Nexus Requirement – Freezing of Bank Accounts and Mutual Fund Units – The IO, in connection with an alleged fraud involving shares lent to accused persons, froze their bank accounts and mutual fund units under Section 102 CrPC – Held: The power under Section 102(1) CrPC to seize property is not a general power to seize any property of an accused but is limited to property which is alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under circumstances creating suspicion of commission of an offence – The emphasis is on the character of the property rather than its association with the accused – A direct link between the seized property and the commission of the alleged offence is a pre-condition for valid exercise of the power – Section 102 does not enable the police to seize property with a view to do justice and hand it over to the person they believe to be rightfully entitled [Paras 19, 21, 22, 27, 28].

Section 102 CrPC – Principles Summarised – The following principles govern exercise of power under Section 102: (i) it is a tool of investigation to collect evidence; (ii) bank accounts and Demat accounts are property within its scope but immovable property is excluded; (iii) only property alleged or suspected to be stolen or found in circumstances creating suspicion of commission of offence can be seized; (iv) a direct link between seized property and alleged offence is essential; (v) the power cannot be used for compensatory justice or as a recovery mechanism for complainant; (vi) seizure can be challenged on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, the property not meeting the definition, or absence of nexus [Para 28].

Freezing of Accounts – Nexus Not Established – De-Freezing Justified – Prima facie, some of the mutual fund accounts of the accused were opened and units acquired much prior to the transactions in question – The trail of sale proceeds of allegedly lent shares to the amounts in the frozen accounts was not established – The IO appeared to have frozen the accounts swayed by the general allegation of fraud rather than establishing a direct nexus – Where the investigating agency lacks the direct link between seized property and commission of the offence, continuation of freezing would amount to detaining property of the accused pending adjudication, negating the presumption of innocence – Held: De-freezing of accounts was justified [Paras 36, 37, 38, 39].

Shares Transferred to Demat Account – Beneficial Ownership Presumption – Section 46 Companies Act, 2013 – Where shares are transferred to the Demat account of a person, Section 46(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that the record of the depository is prima facie evidence of the interest of the beneficial owner – It would be for the prosecution to dislodge this presumption – The real nature of the transaction is a matter for trial [Para 34].

Condition of Bank Guarantee – Onerous – Modified to Indemnity Bond – The trial Court while rightly ordering de-freezing imposed a condition of furnishing a bank guarantee of Rs.6.55 Crores, which virtually amounted to denial of the prayer for de-freezing – Having concluded that there was no nexus between the seized property and the alleged offences and no likelihood of early conclusion of trial, the trial Court ought to have imposed only reasonable conditions – Held: The condition of bank guarantee set aside – Substituted with a direction to furnish an indemnity bond for Rs.6.55 Crores to bring back the said amount with interest as directed by the Court at conclusion of trial [Paras 42, 43].

Withdrawal of Civil Interim Relief – Freezing Cannot Substitute – The first informant had instituted a civil suit and filed a Notice of Motion for interim relief but withdrew the Notice of Motion – Allowing the freezing of accounts to continue till conclusion of criminal trial would amount to an order of attachment before judgment without satisfying the requisite legal standard, indirectly circumventing the withdrawal of civil interim relief [Para 40].

Decision: Criminal Application No. 191 of 2024 (first informant) dismissed – Criminal Application No. 790 of 2024 (accused No. 2) allowed – Impugned order modified – Accounts to be de-frozen subject to accused No. 2 furnishing an indemnity bond for Rs.6.55 Crores – Interim relief to continue for six weeks.

Fake Encounter – Acquittal – Appeal Against Acquittal – Prosecution Failure – Appellants, brothers of Sohrabuddin Shaikh, challenged the acquittal of respondent nos. 2 to 23 accused of murdering Sohrabuddin Shaikh, his wife Kausar Bi, and Tulsiram Prajapati in staged police encounters – Trial Court, after examining 210 witnesses (92 turning hostile), held that the prosecution failed to establish the charges of criminal conspiracy, fake encounter and murder – High Court, on re-appreciation, found no ground to interfere – Held: Judgment of acquittal does not suffer from perversity, manifest illegality or erroneous appreciation of evidence; appeals dismissed [Paras 3, 40, 42, 44].

Circumstantial Evidence – Broken Chain of Circumstances – Prosecution's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence – Key witnesses including bus passengers (PW-2, PW-3), cleaner (PW-7), drivers (PW-15, PW-30), and eyewitnesses at Vishala Circle (PW-15, PW-31) resiled from their prior statements and denied having witnessed the abduction or encounter – No prosecution witness identified any accused in the dock or established their presence at the scene – Held: Prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances pointing exclusively to the guilt of the accused; every hypothesis consistent with innocence remains open [Paras 8, 13, 15, 16, 25, 35, 36, 40].

Hostile Witnesses – Evidentiary Value – 92 out of 210 prosecution witnesses turned hostile and flatly denied making any statement to the police – Court held that though the testimony of a hostile witness is not rejected in entirety, and portions consistent with the prosecution case or corroborated by other evidence may be relied upon, in the present case the cross-examination of hostile witnesses did not elicit any material incriminating circumstance – Statements under Section 161 or 164 Cr.P.C. cannot be used as substantive evidence [Paras 27, 28, 29, 30].

Medical Evidence – Postmortem Findings – Dr. Dharmesh Somabhai Patel (PW-34) conducted postmortem of Sohrabuddin Shaikh and found multiple firearm injuries – Absence of burn marks or smoke deposits at injury sites, and absence of cadaveric spasm, were noted – Trial Court held these findings ruled out close-range firing but did not affirmatively establish fake encounter – Firearms seized were not ballistically linked to the accused; cartridges were not examined against service weapons allotted to the accused [Paras 11, 12, 13, 40].

Criminal Conspiracy – Proof – Prosecution alleged a conspiracy between police officers and politicians to eliminate Sohrabuddin Shaikh and Tulsiram Prajapati – No material was placed to establish politician-police nexus, political or monetary motive, or that any accused received benefit – Witnesses who initially spoke of the nexus theory were found to have improved their version years after the incident – Held: Mere transmission of thought or a shared desire is insufficient; a clear, affirmative link establishing the agreement and its furtherance is necessary [Paras 4, 33, 37, 38].

Res Gestae – Dying Declaration – Section 6 and Section 32, Evidence Act – Appellants sought to treat statements allegedly made by Tulsiram Prajapati to co-inmates (PW-72, PW-96, PW-139, PW-174, PW-205, PW-207, PW-208) expressing apprehension of being killed as res gestae or dying declaration – Held: Statements do not relate to the cause of or circumstances leading to the death of Tulsiram Prajapati; they cannot be treated as dying declaration under Section 32; they do not constitute res gestae as they were not made contemporaneously with the transaction [Paras 32, 33].

Sanction for Prosecution – Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Public Servants – Twenty of the twenty-two accused were public servants not removable without government sanction – Trial Court held that the alleged offending acts were integrally connected with the discharge of their official duty and the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance without prior sanction of the appropriate government authority – High Court upheld this finding [Paras 26].

Burden of Proof – Section 106, Evidence Act – Appellants contended that the burden to explain how the victims parted company should shift to the accused – Held: Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its primary burden of proof in a criminal case; it applies only to facts especially within the accused's knowledge and cannot be invoked to fill gaps in the prosecution case [Para 31].

Appeal Against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – High Court's power to reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal is a qualified power – Interference is warranted only when findings are perverse, manifestly unjust, or based on erroneous law – Where the trial Court's view is a possible and plausible view, the appellate Court cannot substitute its own view merely because another view is possible – Held: Trial Court applied correct legal principles; its conclusions are not contrary to the evidence on record; no ground for interference exists [Paras 41, 42].

Impleadment Application – Suppression of Facts – Interim Application No. 1172 of 2026 filed by a stranger seeking to challenge the discharge of A-16 Amit Anilchandra Shah was found to have suppressed material orders including a Supreme Court order dated 1st August 2016 dismissing a Special Leave Petition arising from an earlier challenge to the same discharge – Applicant had no nexus with the case and surfaced nearly two decades after registration of Crime No. 5 of 2005 – Held: Application filed with oblique motive and at the instance of a political adversary; disposed of accordingly [Para 43].

Decision: Criminal Appeal Nos. 641 and 656 of 2019 dismissed – Judgment of acquittal dated 21st December 2018 confirmed – Interim Application No. 1172 of 2026 disposed of.

Preventive Detention – PITNDPS Act – Section 3(1) – Non-Application of Mind – Relevant Ground for Bail Ignored – Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 was passed against the petitioner based on her involvement in four FIRs under the NDPS Act and four other FIRs relating to illicit liquor trade – The Detaining Authority referred to the bail order dated 19.09.2024 passed in FIR No. 941/2023 only on the ground of parity with co-accused, while omitting the material ground that the Trial Court had also found prima facie non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act (failure to serve notice of second option to be taken before Magistrate/Gazetted Officer) – Held: The Detaining Authority failed to apply its mind to a very relevant consideration; had the violation of Section 50 been noticed, it may have influenced the Detaining Authority one way or the other; the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is accordingly vitiated [Paras 31–37].

Preventive Detention – Delay – Live and Proximate Link – Unexplained Gap – Certified copies of relevant papers were obtained by the Sponsoring Authority on 16.11.2024 and 27.11.2024, yet the proposal was sent only on 10.02.2025; thereafter the Detention Order was passed on 13.05.2025 and executed on 26.05.2025 – No satisfactory explanation was offered for the delay between the date of bail (19.09.2024) and the date of proposal (10.02.2025) – FIR No. 164/2025 dated 14.04.2025, involving only 3.65 grams of heroin and in which petitioner was released on bail on personal bond on the same day with no chargesheet filed even after a year, is insufficient to wish away the earlier delay – Held: Delay in passing the Detention Order itself demonstrates absence of live and proximate link between grounds of detention and the purpose sought to be achieved [Paras 38–43].

Preventive Detention – Bail Granted Despite Section 37 NDPS Act – State's Failure to Seek Cancellation – If an accused is released on bail despite the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, this is suggestive that the Court may not have found a prima facie case against her; this fact, had it been placed before the Detaining Authority, would have influenced the subjective satisfaction – The State neither challenged the bail orders nor sought cancellation; thereafter resorting to preventive detention was an extraordinary step that was not warranted in the circumstances – Relied upon: Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, 2023 9 SCC 587; Dhanyam v. State of Kerala, AIR 2025 SC 2868; Sushanta Kumar Banik [Paras 34–36].

Judicial Review – Preventive Detention – Parameters – The constitutional court when called upon to test the legality of a preventive detention order may examine: whether the order is based on requisite subjective satisfaction; whether all relevant circumstances have been applied to mind; whether the power is exercised for the authorised purpose; whether the satisfaction rests on rationally probative material; whether there is a live and proximate link between past conduct and the need to detain; whether grounds are precise, pertinent and relevant; and whether statutory timelines have been adhered to – Relied upon: Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, 2023 9 SCC 587 [Para 28].

Object of Preventive Detention – Preventive detention affords protection to society not by punishing a person for what he has done but by intercepting before he acts – However, it is a serious invasion of personal liberty and the safeguards provided under the Constitution and the enabling statute must be strictly adhered to – Relied upon: Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, (1982) 2 SCC 403 [Para 27].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Detention Order dated 13.05.2025 and Confirmation Order dated 08.08.2025 set aside – Petitioner directed to be released forthwith if not detained in any other case – Observations limited to validity of Detention Order; not to influence pending cases including FIR No. 164/2025 – No order as to costs.

Criminal Law - Quashing of Proceedings - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 153 - Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot - Petitioners A1 and A2 sought to quash FIR registered for circulating false social media post claiming de facto complainant son was arrested with 60kg Ganja - Petitioners contended no provocation to cause rioting was established - High Court observed Section 153 IPC requires an illegal act providing provocation with intent or knowledge that it will cause rioting - Court found no specific accusation that the false propaganda led to any rioting - Held - Proceedings under Section 153 IPC quashed as the essential ingredients were not attracted - [Paras 1-10].

Criminal Law - Public Mischief - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 505(2) - Statements creating or promoting enmity between classes - Prosecution alleged false news was circulated to promote enmity between two groups to which the parties belonged - Petitioners argued the news did not create hatred between religious or racial groups - Court held that whether the act was done with intent to promote enmity is a disputed question of fact requiring investigation during the course of trial - Held - Prayer to quash proceedings under Section 505(2) IPC dismissed - [Paras 10-13].

Criminal Law - IT Act - Information Technology Act 2000 - Section 66 - Computer related offences - Allegation of misusing electronic devices and social media to circulate defamatory and false news - Court observed that FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence but the foundation for investigation - Held - At the prima facie stage proceedings under Section 66 IT Act and Section 120B IPC cannot be interfered with as investigation must proceed to cull out material - [Paras 11-13].

Decision: Criminal Petition allowed in part – Proceedings in Crime No. 354 of 2021 quashed only in respect of Section 153 IPC – Petition dismissed regarding Sections 120B and 505(2) IPC and Section 66 IT Act.

Freedom Fighter's Pension – Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme – Eligibility of Unmarried Daughter – Conditions Sine Qua Non – The appellant, unmarried daughter of late Krishna Pada Bera, a freedom fighter who participated in the Quit India Movement of 1942 and was imprisoned for six months, claimed pension after the death of her father in 1996 – Application made only in June 2007, i.e., more than 11 years after the death of the freedom fighter – Held: The conditions for grant of pension to an unmarried daughter are cumulative and not alternative — she must be unmarried with no source of income, must apply within six months of death of the freedom fighter, must declare she is not employed or receiving pension elsewhere, and must not be earning in excess of Rs.20,000/- per month; appellant was regularly employed and drawing salary on the date of death of her father and thus was not a dependent; failure to meet threshold conditions is fatal to the claim [Paras 13–15, 34].

Freedom Fighter's Pension – Unexplained Delay – Three Limbs – Monetary Claim in Writ Petition – The appellant failed to explain three distinct periods of delay: (i) 11 years from the date of death of father in 1996 till first application in 2007; (ii) rejection of representation in August 2012 not challenged, second representation in December 2016 also rejected in January 2017 and not challenged; (iii) no approach to court for more than six years after the second rejection — writ petition filed only in 2023 – Held: Even in the absence of a specified statutory limitation period, a monetary claim made in a writ petition must be explained if it falls beyond three years; appellant offered no explanation for any of the three delayed timelines; the findings in the rejection order of August 2012 — never challenged — have attained finality and are binding on the appellant [Paras 23–33, 34].

Freedom Fighter's Pension – 2014 Amendment – Timeline of Six Months – Nature of Timelines – The 2014 modification introduced a requirement that application for transfer of pension must be made within six months of the death of the freedom fighter; applications received thereafter were to be referred to the Ministry – Held: Timelines do not constrict a substantive right but merely discipline the mode and manner of its exercise; even if pension is treated as a right, it is not an unbridled right and comes with qualifications and restrictions; the appellant is unable to cross the threshold parameter of stipulated timelines [Paras 19, 22, 34].

Freedom Fighter's Pension – Office Memorandum of 2017 – Scope and Applicability – The 2017 Office Memorandum was issued to clarify that uniform income ceiling would apply to persons drawing pension which had been stopped; it served only to rejuvenate stopped pension of those already granted pension – Held: The 2017 memorandum does not create a fresh right in favour of an applicant who was never granted pension in the first place; the appellant's claim cannot be sustained thereunder [Para 21].

Freedom Fighter's Pension – Discrimination – Parity with Similarly Situated Claimants – Appellant relied on decisions in Alaka Bera (supra) and Kanchan Barman (supra) to contend that similarly placed persons were granted pension and she was being treated discriminatorily – Held: Those decisions were on a different and more restricted footing relating only to the date of application; the appellant stood on a materially different and weaker footing and the said decisions are not applicable [Para 31].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Impugned order of the learned Single Judge dated 04.10.2023 upheld – Appellant held not entitled to pension under the Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension Scheme, 1980 – No order as to costs.

Land Acquisition – Requisition Without Subsequent Acquisition – West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 – Petitioner's land (RS Plot Nos. 452, 453, 527, 513 and 513/3862 totalling 29 decimals, Mouza Bural, PS Sabong, Paschim Medinipur) requisitioned under Section 3(1) of the 1948 Act in LA Case No. 255 of 1975–76 – Possession delivered to Requiring Body on 22.02.1978 – No notification under Section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act ever published – No award passed – No compensation paid – Held: In the absence of issuance of notice under Section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act, vesting under Section 4(2) never occurred – 1948 Act, being a temporary statute, expired by efflux of time on 31.03.1997 – With the expiry of the statute, requisition also came to an end – No notice under Section 9(3A) or Section 9(3B) of the 1894 Act was ever served during the lifetime of the 1894 Act – After repeal of the 1894 Act with effect from 01.01.2014, no further notice under Section 9(3A) could be issued – State possessing land forcibly and without authority of law – Petitioner entitled to fair compensation under the 2013 Act [Paras 37–59, 71–73].

Constitutional Law – Article 300A – Right to Property – Deprivation Without Authority of Law – No person can be deprived of property save by authority of law – Utilisation of private land for a permanent public purpose without initiating valid acquisition proceedings and without payment of compensation is violative of Article 300A – State, as a welfare State governed by rule of law, cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution – State cannot claim adverse possession over land of its own citizens – Held: Petitioner entitled to be compensated for deprivation of property without legal sanction [Paras 15, 57, 59, 73].

Delay and Laches – Land Acquisition – Distinction from Service Jurisprudence – State objected to maintainability of writ petition on ground of inordinate delay, possession having been taken in 1978–79 – Held: Doctrine of delay and laches cannot be invoked to defeat a land loser's claim for compensation where possession was taken without due process of law – Cause of action in such cases is continuous – Where the State deprives a citizen of property without sanction of law, shocks the judicial conscience, and no third-party interest is involved, delay cannot be a bar – Decisions in U.P. Jal Nigam and Rabindra Nath Bose, being cases of service jurisprudence, distinguished and held inapplicable – Discretion exercised in favour of petitioner to promote substantial justice [Paras 14–35].

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – Applicability – Section 24 – State contended that the 2013 Act cannot apply retrospectively to acquisition initiated and possession taken under the 1948 Act and not the 1894 Act – Held: Section 24 of the 2013 Act is a saving section and saves acquisition proceedings from lapsing only to the extent indicated therein – Since no acquisition proceeding under the 1894 Act was ever initiated and no notice under Section 9(3A) was served during the lifetime of the 1894 Act, the only recourse available is initiation of acquisition proceedings under the 2013 Act – Respondent authorities directed to initiate and complete acquisition proceedings including payment of compensation within four months [Paras 61–74].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Respondent authorities directed to initiate proceedings for acquisition of petitioner's land under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and to complete entire proceedings including payment of compensation within four months from receipt of a server copy of this order.

Civil Procedure – Impleadment of Party – Necessary Party – Privity of Contract – Tenants of Kamla Bhuvan filed writ petition seeking direction to comply with Regulation 33(7)(A) of DCPR-2034 for redevelopment – Sought impleadment of M/s. BS Lifespace as respondent on the ground that the new developer had actively participated in redevelopment activities and had received consent-cum-declarations from 62 tenants – Landlords (Respondent Nos. 3 to 5) opposed impleadment, stating no contract existed with the new developer – Held: Petitioners have no right to implead a party having no privity of contract with the landlords; impleadment would only enlarge and complicate the issues – Application dismissed with costs [Paras 4–8].

Abuse of Process of Court – Pressure Tactic – Coercion – No binding contract between M/s. BS Lifespace and existing landlords – Application found to be a back-door entry by the proposed respondent through the guise of an impleadment application – Court observed that the application was prima facie moved and financed by the proposed respondent to crystalize an unenforceable right against the landlords and original developers – Held: Courts cannot be used as tools to coerce or pressurize parties; such abuse of process cannot be countenanced – Application dismissed with costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- payable to Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa's Advocate Academy and Research Center within two weeks [Paras 5–8].

Tenants' Rights – Redevelopment – Settled Law – Court noted that rights of tenants in redevelopment matters are well-settled and elucidated in Chandralok People Welfare Association v. State of Maharashtra and Anandrao G. Pawar v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai – However, impleadment of a party with no contractual nexus with the landlord cannot be permitted under the guise of protecting tenant interests [Para 4.2].

Decision: Interim Application dismissed – Costs of Rs. 5,00,000/- imposed, payable to BCMG's Advocate Academy and Research Center – Writ Petition listed for compliance on 15/06/2026.