Criminal Writ - Habeas Corpus - Preventive Detention – Right to Representation – Failure to Inform – Violation of Article 22(5) – Context of detention order passed by District Magistrate under NSA – Held: Article 22(5) of the Constitution confers two distinct rights: the right to be informed of the grounds of detention and the right to be afforded the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order. This right extends to making a representation specifically to the Detaining Authority (here, the District Magistrate) as long as the authority retains the power to revoke the order (within 12 days under NSA). In this case, the grounds of detention only informed the petitioner of his right to represent to the State Government, Central Government, and the Advisory Board, conspicuously omitting the Detaining Authority. This failure to inform the detenue of his right to represent to the authority that passed the order renders the detention illegal and vitiates the order. [Para 34]

Preventive Detention – Delay in Disposal of Representation – Unexplained Delay – Fatal to Detention – Context of 12 days delay by District Magistrate in forwarding representation to State Government – Held: The personal liberty of a citizen is paramount, and authorities are constitutionally mandated to deal with representations against preventive detention with a sense of urgency. The record showed that the petitioner submitted his representation on 23.09.2025, but the District Magistrate only forwarded it to the State Government on 05.10.2025. The affidavit filed by the authorities failed to provide any explanation whatsoever for this 12-day delay. Relying on established precedents, the Court held that such unexplained delay in processing the representation violates the constitutional safeguards under Article 22(5) and is fatal to the continued detention of the petitioner. [Paras 35, 39]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed. Detention order set aside. Detenue directed to be set at liberty. [Para 41]

Religious Institution – Classification under Endowments Act – Notification – Appellants challenged inclusion of Yogananda Ashramam as a public religious institution under Section 6(c)(ii) of A.P. Endowments Act – Evidence showed that Ashramam was established and maintained by founders' family without any public endowment, offerings, or public access – Court found that management was always with the family and public participation was minimal and not as of right – Held: Ashramam not a public religious institution within meaning of Section 2(23) – Notification quashed [Paras 10–22, 26–28]

Natural Justice – Publication under Section 6(c)(ii) – Procedure – Court held that no notice was given to appellants before notification enlisting Ashramam as public religious institution – Violation of principles of natural justice – Held: Notification issued without following Sections 43, 44, and income assessment under Section 65 – Procedurally flawed and legally unsustainable – [Paras 23–25, 28]

Specific Endowment – No Dedication of Property – Settlement deed did not indicate any dedication of property or income for public religious or charitable use – No evidence of specific endowment as per Section 2(25) – Held: Absence of endowment defeats classification as religious institution or temple – [Paras 21–22]

Legal Precedents – Private Religious Institutions – Followed precedents in VVVRK Yechendra v. State of A.P. and Miryala Narayana v. State of A.P. – High Court reiterated that publication under Section 6 must follow registration and hearing of affected parties – Held: Classification made in violation of binding procedural requirements and liable to be struck down – [Paras 23–25]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Gazette Notification under Section 6(c)(ii) dated 13.07.2000 quashed – Order of Deputy Commissioner dated 25.08.2009 in O.A. No. 42 of 2001 set aside – Ashramam held to be a private institution – No order as to costs – Pending miscellaneous petitions closed.

Constitutional Law – Resignation by Legislator – Inaction by Chairman – Writ maintainable – Petitioner, a Member of the Andhra Pradesh Legislative Council, submitted resignation on 23.11.2024 – Chairman failed to act upon it for over nine months – Held: Under Article 190(3)(b) and Rule 190 of the Council Rules, the Chairman is duty-bound to verify only voluntariness and genuineness of resignation and render a decision within reasonable time – Inaction held arbitrary and violative of Article 14 [Paras 26, 56, 64, 68]

Discretionary Power – Limits on Constitutional Functionaries – No absolute discretion – Discretion under Article 190(3)(b) and Rule 190 must align with constitutional standards – Use of term “may” in Rule 190(2) interpreted as “must” in light of constitutional intent and Parliamentary debates – Chairman cannot indefinitely delay action on resignation – Time beyond a month unreasonable [Paras 24, 29-33, 60-63]

Judicial Review – Legislative Procedure – Limited scope of interference – Courts may not decide voluntariness/genuineness but may intervene against prolonged delay – Held: Chairman’s prolonged inaction offends Wednesbury reasonableness and constitutional morality – Judicial review available on grounds of arbitrariness [Paras 24, 39, 44, 64-66]

Legislative Practice – Timeline for inquiry into resignation – Based on debates during 33rd Constitutional Amendment, inquiry into voluntariness/genuineness must be completed preferably within a fortnight or, at most, a month – Chairman’s call for personal interaction after one year held unjustified – Court directed completion of process within four weeks [Paras 53, 55, 68]

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Chairman directed to complete inquiry into petitioner’s resignation and render a decision within four weeks – Inaction held illegal, arbitrary, and violative of Article 14.

Advocates – Suspension from Practice – Ex Parte Order – Principles of Natural Justice Violated – Bar Council of U.P. passed an order suspending petitioner for 10 years from practicing law on the allegation of bigamy – Petitioner argued he was not served notice or given opportunity of hearing – Court found that notice dated 17.02.2025 fixed appearance on 10.03.2025, but the order was passed prematurely on 23.02.2025 – Held: Suspension order passed in violation of natural justice – Quashed with liberty to issue proper notice and pass a reasoned order [Paras 3, 17–19].

Moral Turpitude – Allegation of Bigamy – Absence of Conviction – Whether acts of bigamy constitute moral turpitude in absence of conviction considered – Petitioner relied on Raj Kishor Yadav case – Court held moral turpitude must be tested contextually and cannot be presumed without adjudication – Distinguished Madras High Court judgment in P. Mohanasudaram which involved a conviction – Held: Without conviction, bigamy allegation alone cannot justify professional suspension [Paras 4–6, 13–16].

Alternative Remedy – Maintainability of Writ – Despite availability of appeal under the Advocates Act, writ petition entertained due to denial of natural justice – Held: Writ maintainable in exceptional circumstances where procedure is blatantly violated [Para 11].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 23.02.2025 quashed – Bar Council directed to issue a fresh notice and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law within 12 weeks from the date of judgment.

Criminal Law – Maintainability of Second Application under Section 482 CrPC – Earlier application challenging summoning order and entire proceedings was withdrawn to pursue remedy of discharge – Trial Court dismissed discharge application as not maintainable in complaint case – Held: Second application maintainable due to change in circumstances – First application not decided on merits – Bar of res judicata not attracted in criminal proceedings – Principles clarified by Supreme Court in Muskan Enterprises, Anil Khadkiwala, and Bhisham Lal Verma cases [Paras 3–21].

Defamation – Summoning Order – Corporate Employer’s Use of “Absconding” in Show Cause Notices – Complaint under Section 500 IPC filed by former employee alleging defamatory content – Held: Use of term “absconding” in employment context not defamatory per se – Show cause issued in good faith over unauthorized absence – Covered under Seventh Exception to Section 499 IPC – Proceedings found to be malicious and driven by service dispute – Summoning order quashed [Paras 23–51].

Employer-Employee Dispute – Criminal Complaint Based on Service Grievance – Complainant issued show cause notices for unauthorized leave – Received full and final settlement – Instead of approaching labour or civil forum, filed criminal complaint – Court holds such recourse is misuse of process – Complaint lacks ingredients of criminal defamation – Entire proceedings quashed under Bhajan Lal principles [Paras 27–51].

Judicial Powers – Exercise of Section 482 CrPC – High Court reiterates caution against mechanical issuance of summons – Summoning accused is serious matter – Magistrate must apply judicial mind to preliminary evidence – Complaint devoid of prima facie case liable to be quashed [Paras 37–39, 48].

Decision: Applications allowed – Orders dated 06.09.2025, 18.10.2025, and 17.02.2025 set aside – Entire proceedings in Complaint Case No. 9669 of 2024 quashed qua applicants – Trial Court to be informed [Para 51].

Rent Control Law – Estoppel of Tenant – Challenge to Derivative Title – Context of tenant challenging the title of the landlord who claimed ownership via a Will – Held: Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates a statutory estoppel preventing a tenant from challenging the title of the landlord during the continuance of the tenancy. The petitioner-bank argued that the respondent was merely an executor of the Will and not the owner, thereby lacking locus standi. However, the Court observed that the tenant had voluntarily tendered rent to the respondent after verifying the Will, thereby creating a valid attornment. Once attornment is established and the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted through the payment of rent, the tenant is legally precluded from questioning the validity of the landlord's derivative title or the nature of his ownership (executor vs. owner). [Paras 12, 15]

Rent Control Law – Scope of Eviction Proceedings – Title Dispute – Jurisdiction of Rent Controller – Context of tenant raising complex issues regarding the validity of the Will and probate proceedings – Held: The Rent Controller constitutes a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and does not possess the authority of a Civil Court to adjudicate complex questions of title. In an eviction suit, the landlord is only required to plead and prove the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and a statutory ground for eviction. If the landlord proves the relationship, the suit must succeed or fail based on the grounds for eviction, regardless of any dispute over the landlord's title. In this case, the concurrent findings of the courts below regarding bona fide requirement and material impairment of the property were upheld, and the title dispute was deemed irrelevant to the eviction outcome. [Paras 11.2, 11.3, 14]

Decision: Petition dismissed. Eviction order upheld. [Para 17]

Criminal Law - CrPC – MPDVPK Act – Jurisdiction – Cognizance – Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) CrPC – Offences under Section 394 IPC and Sections 11/13 MPDVPK Act being “specified offences” – Only Special Court competent to take cognizance under Section 8 of MPDVPK Act – Magistrate not empowered to direct registration of FIR for specified offences – FIR and Magistrate’s order quashed – Petition allowed [Paras 10–15].

Criminal Procedure – Section 156(3) CrPC – Stage of Investigation – Distinction between ordering investigation and taking cognizance – Held: Direction under Section 156(3) CrPC is not itself cognizance; however, only a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 CrPC can issue such direction – Since MPDVPK Act excludes Magistrate’s power to take cognizance regarding specified offences, Section 156(3) order also cannot be invoked for such offences [Paras 10, 13].

Special Courts – MPDVPK Act – Sections 6 & 8 – Exclusive jurisdiction – Specified offences – Section 394 IPC expressly included in “specified offence” under Section 2(f)(2)(iii) – Only Special Court can take cognizance of such offences – Magistrate lacks jurisdiction even at pre-cognizance stage for directing registration of FIR in respect of specified offences – Order of Magistrate invalid [Paras 11–14].

Interpretation – Section 2(b) & 2(f) MPDVPK Act – Definition of “dacoit” and “specified offence” – Offences committed in notified dacoity-affected areas fall exclusively within Special Court jurisdiction – Magistrate cannot assume competence merely because investigation is at initial stage [Para 14].

Quashing of Proceedings – Section 482 CrPC – Magistrate’s order directing registration of FIR for offences under Section 394 IPC and Sections 11/13 of MPDVPK Act set aside – FIR registered pursuant thereto also quashed as being without jurisdiction – Petition allowed [Para 15].

Civil Law – Remand of Case – Order 41 Rule 23A CPC – Failure to Appreciate Evidence Independently – Context of Trial Court decreeing a suit for possession solely based on a previous judgment (Ex. PX) without independent findings on title – Held: The Trial Court committed a material procedural error by failing to record independent findings on the core issue of title (Issue No. 1). Instead of discussing the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the Trial Court relied exclusively on a previous judgment (Ex. PX) concerning the same land. Since Ex. PX was subsequently set aside by the Appellate Court, the entire foundation of the Trial Court's decree collapsed. The Lower Appellate Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the decree and remand the matter for a fresh decision, as the Trial Court had effectively failed to apply its judicial mind to the pleadings and evidence on record. A wholesale remand is permissible and necessary when the Trial Court has not decided material issues on their own merits. [Paras 14-15]

Decision: Appeal dismissed. Case remanded to Trial Court. [Para 16]

Service Law – Seniority – Determination of Inter-se Seniority – Direct Recruits vs. Promotees – Recruitment Year vs. Date of Appointment – Held: Seniority cannot be reckoned from the date of occurrence of vacancy or initiation of recruitment process unless expressly provided by rules – It must be reckoned from the date of substantive appointment/entry into the cadre – The judgment in K. Meghachandra Singh (2020), which overruled N.R. Parmar (2012), is binding – Direct recruits appointed later cannot claim seniority over promotees appointed earlier, even if the vacancies pertained to an earlier year. [Paras 12, 18-19]

Precedent – Binding Nature – Reference to Larger Bench – Held: The fact that the decision in K. Meghachandra Singh has been referred to a larger bench in Hariharan (2022) does not stay its operation or dilute its binding nature – Subordinate courts and Tribunals must follow the existing law declared by the Supreme Court until it is overruled – Administration of justice cannot be put on hold awaiting a larger bench decision. [Para 20]

Seniority – Retrospective Application – Held: An employee not borne in the cadre cannot be given seniority retrospectively to affect those validly appointed in the meantime – Petitioners (Direct Recruits) appointed in 2017 cannot claim seniority over Promotees appointed in 2016, despite vacancies relating to 2015/2016. [Para 19]

Decision: Writ Petitions dismissed. Tribunal order upholding the seniority list based on K. Meghachandra Singh affirmed.