Criminal Law – Quashing of Proceedings – Parity with Co-Accused – Petitioner (Accused No.14) absconded during trial – Co-accused (Accused Nos.1-13, 15-21) tried and acquitted on 30.08.2025 – Trial Court held prosecution failed to prove conspiracy, motive, presence and recovery – Independent witnesses turned hostile – No cogent, coherent or convincing evidence to establish chain of circumstances – Held: When entire prosecution case collapsed and co-accused acquitted on merits, continuation of split-up proceedings against similarly placed accused would be futile – Proceedings quashed [Paras 7-9].

Circumstantial Evidence – Failure to Establish Complete Chain – Trial Court relied on principles in Hanumant v. State of M.P., Govindareddy v. State of Mysore and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra – Panch witnesses did not support recovery – No proof of conspiracy under Section 10 of Evidence Act – Independent witnesses hostile – Held: Prosecution failed to establish complete chain of circumstances excluding every hypothesis of innocence – Benefit extended to petitioner on parity [Para 7].

Inherent Powers of High Court – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Prevention of Abuse of Process – Though absconding accused ordinarily required to face trial, Court may exercise inherent powers to save precious judicial time where inevitable result of trial would be acquittal in view of earlier judgment on identical evidence – Continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process [Para 9].

Murder and Unlawful Assembly – Sections 302, 143-149 IPC – Entire case rested on circumstantial evidence – With acquittal of all other accused and total failure of prosecution evidence, split-up case cannot survive independently on same material [Paras 7-9].

Decision: Petition allowed – Proceedings in S.C. No.1529/2021 pending before I/c LX Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru quashed qua petitioner (Accused No.14) – Petitioner entitled to be set at liberty – Registry directed to communicate order to jail authorities for release in accordance with law [Para 10].

Preventive Detention – Goonda Act – Live and Proximate Link – Detention order passed on 30.08.2025 relying on criminal cases registered between 2019 and 2024 – Last crime dated 15.03.2024 – Gap of more than 16 months between last offence and detention order – Held: Absence of live and proximate link between past conduct and imperative need for detention – Detention based on stale incidents impermissible – Order vitiated [Paras 14, 17].

Preventive Detention – Subjective Satisfaction – Reliance on Factually Incorrect Material – Detaining Authority relied on Crime No.75/2021 referring to Criminal Appeal No.1435/2021 before High Court of Karnataka – Said appeal found unrelated and factually incorrect – Held: Subjective satisfaction founded on inaccurate and irrelevant material cannot be sustained – Casual approach in exercise of exceptional power of preventive detention violates Article 21 – Order liable to be quashed [Paras 15-16].

Preventive Detention – Scope of Judicial Review – Constitutional Court entitled to examine existence of requisite satisfaction, relevance of material, live link, absence of staleness and strict adherence to statutory timelines – Reliance placed on Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana – Preventive detention not punitive but preventive in nature – Detention order based on stale material amounts to punishment without trial [Paras 12-13].

Public Order – Distinction from Law and Order – Preventive detention cannot be invoked merely because criminal cases are pending – Ordinary criminal law remedies must be exhausted unless compelling circumstances demonstrate threat to public order – Power under Goonda Act is exceptional and must be exercised with extreme caution [Paras 3, 16-17].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Detention order dated 30.08.2025, approval order dated 04.09.2025 and confirmation order dated 09.10.2025 quashed – Respondents directed to set detenue at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case – No order as to costs [Para 18].

Employees’ State Insurance – Damages under Section 85-B – Limitation – No express limitation prescribed for passing order under Section 85-B – Contribution for period 1972–1989 paid on 07.09.2000 – Damages imposed on 16.04.2014 – Delay of 14 years – Held: Even in absence of express statutory limitation, power must be exercised within reasonable period – Five years considered reasonable based on scheme of Act – Order passed beyond reasonable period unsustainable [Paras 21–26, 33].

Reasonable Period – Determination – Penal civil liability – Where statute confers power without prescribing limitation, such power must be exercised within reasonable time – Second proviso to Section 45-A (five-year limit), Regulation 32 (five-year record retention) and proviso to Explanation (b) to Section 77(1A) provide legislative guidance – Five years treated as reasonable benchmark for Section 85-B proceedings [Paras 23–25].

Interest Proceedings – Distinction from Damages – Pendency of interest proceedings and litigation regarding rate of interest does not justify delay in initiating damages – Damages levied for delayed contribution, not for interest – Hence, independent cause – Fourteen-year delay unexplained and unreasonable [Paras 27–28].

Welfare Legislation – Penal Provisions – Deterrence – Though ESI Act is beneficial social legislation, penalty provisions cannot be invoked after inordinate delay – Certainty in litigation required – Deterrent effect diluted if invoked after long lapse of time [Para 30].

Scope of Judgment – Court proceeded on assumption that no express limitation exists for Section 85-B – Question whether express limitation is otherwise provided kept open for adjudication in appropriate case [Para 32].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Substantial question of law answered against the appellant-Corporation and in favour of respondent-Gymkhana – Order of ESI Court quashing damages upheld – Statutory authorities expected to act within reasonable time henceforth.

Customs – Duty Drawback – SEZ Unit – Reversal of ITC – Consequential Order – Earlier Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023 allowed drawback @15.61% subject to reversal/adjustment of ITC – Department accepted said order and did not prefer further appeal – Assistant Commissioner passed Order-in-Original dated 24.01.2024 granting drawback after adjusting ITC and interest – Commissioner (Appeals) in subsequent appeal set aside said consequential order holding assessee not eligible for drawback due to availment of ITC – Held: Commissioner (Appeals) could not revisit or nullify findings in earlier Order-in-Appeal which had attained finality – Action amounts to impermissible review – Doctrine of functus officio attracted – Impugned Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2025 set aside [Paras 6, 6.6, 6.12, 6.26, 7].

Doctrine of Functus Officio – Finality of Appellate Orders – Once Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023 was accepted by Department and not challenged before higher forum, findings therein attained finality inter se parties – Commissioner (Appeals) became functus officio in respect of issues decided – In absence of statutory power of review under Customs Act, reopening issue in appeal against consequential order impermissible – Quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order in garb of deciding subsequent appeal – Judicial discipline mandates implementation of earlier appellate order in letter and spirit [Paras 6.1–6.4, 6.21–6.22].

Res Judicata – Issue Estoppel – Application in Quasi-Judicial Proceedings – Though strict provisions of Section 11 CPC not applicable to tax proceedings, principles of issue estoppel and finality apply – Once entitlement to drawback subject to ITC reversal adjudicated and accepted, same issue cannot be reagitated in subsequent stage of same proceedings – Reopening settled issue amounts to review and violates principles of public policy and certainty in litigation [Paras 6.13–6.15, 6.20].

Judicial Discipline – Binding Nature of Appellate Orders – Subordinate authorities bound to follow unchallenged appellate orders – Mere disagreement with earlier decision or reliance on circulars cannot justify departure unless order is stayed or set aside by competent forum – Failure to adhere results in administrative chaos and harassment – Reliance placed on settled law of Supreme Court [Paras 6.22, 6.24].

Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction – Consequential Orders – Appeal against Order-in-Original passed to give effect to prior appellate decision cannot be used as mechanism to unsettle or override earlier binding findings – Commissioner (Appeals) exceeded jurisdiction by effectively sitting in review over Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2023 – Such course not sanctioned under Customs Act [Paras 6.6, 6.19, 6.21].

Relief – Impugned Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2025 (issued on 08.10.2025) set aside – Matter remitted to Commissioner (Appeals), Bhubaneswar to consider merits of respective appeals without reopening findings already attained finality – Writ petition allowed to said extent – No order as to costs [Paras 7, 7.1, 8].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed in part – Order-in-Appeal dated 30.09.2025 set aside – Matter remitted to Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh consideration in accordance with law and observations made – No costs.

Family Courts Act — Section 7 — Code of Civil Procedure — Section 24 — Power of Transfer — Family Court — Whether Vested — Family Court No. 1, Bharatpur transferred four pending matrimonial cases to Family Court No. 2 relying on general view expressed by learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court in order dated 24.04.2017 — Family Court No. 2 expressed doubt as to whether such power vested in the Family Court and referred the matter to the High Court — Held: Section 7 of the Family Courts Act governs the jurisdiction of Family Courts and does not envisage or confer any power upon the Family Court to transfer cases from one Family Court to another, even within the same city or district — Power of transfer under Section 24 CPC is distinct, exclusive, and independent and vests only in the High Court or the District Court — Such power is exerciseable only in respect of proceedings pending before a Court subordinate to it — One Family Court is not subordinate to another Family Court in the same district — Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, being a special statute, prevails over the general provision of Section 24 CPC — Question No. 1 answered in the negative: Family Court lacks jurisdiction to transfer cases from one Family Court to another under Section 24 CPC [Paras 15–24].

Family Courts — Transfer of Cases — Which Court Competent — High Court or District Court — Whether Family Court Is Subordinate to District Court — Family Court established under Section 3 of the Family Courts Act exercises jurisdiction equivalent to that of the District Court or subordinate civil court in respect of matters under Section 7(1)(a) — By virtue of Section 7(1)(b), Family Court is deemed to be a District Court for purposes of exercising such jurisdiction — However, a Family Court cannot be considered subordinate to the Principal District Court for purposes of Section 24 CPC — Held: Transfer of cases from one Family Court to another, whether within the same district or between two districts within the same State, can be exercised by the High Court alone under Sections 22, 23 and 24 CPC — Power of transfer under Section 21A of the Hindu Marriage Act also exerciseable only by a Court empowered under Section 24 CPC, not by the Family Court — Administrative allocation of work among Judges of the same Family Court is distinct from judicial power of transfer [Paras 19–22].

Single Judge's General View — Per Incuriam — Binding Precedent — Whether Single Judge Can Vest Transfer Power in Family Court by Judicial Order — Learned Single Judge, while deciding a transfer application in 2017, expressed a general view that Family Courts situated in the same city may exercise power of transfer suo motu or on an application by parties — Held: Such view cannot be held to be in conformity with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act or Section 24 CPC — The Single Judge's view was expressed without considering that Section 7 of the Family Courts Act does not confer transfer power on Family Courts and without appreciating that transfer under Section 24 CPC is exerciseable only in respect of subordinate courts — The general view expressed in para Nos. 4, 6 and 9 of the order dated 24.04.2017 is held to be per incuriam and does not constitute a binding judicial precedent — No judicial order of a Single Judge of the High Court can vest in the Family Court a power of transfer not conferred by its special statute — Questions Nos. 2 and 3 answered accordingly [Paras 25–26].

Decision: Civil Reference disposed of — Order dated 06.12.2025 passed by Family Court No. 1, Bharatpur transferring cases without jurisdiction declared non-est — Parties at liberty to invoke jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 24 CPC — General view expressed in para Nos. 4, 6 and 9 of order dated 24.04.2017 of learned Single Judge declared per incuriam and not binding on Family Courts — Copy of order directed to be sent to Family Court Nos. 1 and 2, Bharatpur and circulated to all Family Courts in the State of Rajasthan where more than one Family Court has been established [Paras 27–29].

Criminal Law – Dacoity with Murder – Section 396 IPC – Appellants convicted for committing dacoity at house of Pohap Singh during intervening night – One Summera died due to firearm injuries and nine persons sustained injuries – FIR promptly lodged naming five appellants and one Kunji along with six unknown persons – Trial Court convicted appellants – High Court on reappraisal found prosecution story improbable and identification doubtful – Conviction set aside [Paras 22, 30-32, 44-45].

Identification – Visibility in Electric Light – Prosecution case that accused committed dacoity in electric light without covering faces – Accused known to witnesses and one appellant resident of same village – Court held it unnatural and against human conduct that known dacoits would commit crime openly without concealing identity – No evidence produced from electricity department to prove availability of power supply at 2:00 a.m. – Identification unsafe to rely upon [Paras 31-33, 35, 43].

Enmity – Double-Edged Weapon – Motive alleged that appellant Hardayal bore grudge as Pohap Singh had helped Deepa after Hardayal eloped with his wife – Will executed and cancelled by Hardayal in favour of informant’s son – Held: Enmity can be motive for crime as well as false implication – In present case, prior animosity raised serious doubt regarding false implication [Paras 38-40].

Recovery – Non-Recovery of Looted Property – Despite prompt FIR and raids conducted, no looted ornaments, cash or valuables recovered from appellants – No incriminating material seized – Failure to connect accused with stolen property weakens prosecution case in dacoity [Paras 22, 30, 33].

Withholding of Material Witness – Non-Examination of Pohap Singh – Dacoity allegedly committed at his house – Prosecution failed to examine him without explanation – Adverse inference drawn – Prosecution version rendered doubtful [Para 41].

Appreciation of Evidence – Inherent Improbabilities – Courts must assess probabilities and intrinsic circumstances – Story that accused committed dacoity in electric light without covering faces and without recovery of stolen property held improbable – Prosecution version found artificial and fabricated – Benefit of doubt extended [Paras 32, 36-38, 42, 44].

Abatement – Appeal against one appellant Hardayal already abated due to death – Remaining appellants entitled to acquittal – Directed to furnish bonds under Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (now Section 481 BNSS) [Paras 46-47].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 396 IPC set aside – Appellants Amar Singh, Prakash @ Om Prakash, Bahori and Biri Singh acquitted – Hardayal’s appeal abated – Bail bonds cancelled subject to compliance under Section 481 BNSS.

Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act – Deemed Conveyance – Scope of Section 11 – Promoter’s obligation to convey “his right, title and interest” – Developers contended that only leasehold rights were contemplated under allotment letters and development agreements – No registered lease ever executed – Land continued to vest in owner who obtained IOD and Commencement Certificate and caused construction – Held: Under Section 11(1), promoter must convey entire interest actually held by him – If promoter holds ownership, ownership must pass to society – Private contractual clauses cannot dilute statutory mandate – Deemed conveyance of ownership upheld [Paras 46-52, 79-82].

Promoter – Wide definition under Section 2(c) MOFA – Includes person who constructs or causes construction – Owner obtaining development permissions and enabling construction through developer falls within definition – Promoter cannot avoid statutory obligations by splitting roles between owner and developer – Substance of transaction to prevail over form [Paras 36-43, 77-79].

Contractual Clauses vs Statutory Mandate – Allotment letters and flat agreements repeatedly referring to “lease” – Municipal condition initially prohibiting leasing for ten years – No executed lease deed in existence – Held: Mere intention to grant lease does not create leasehold estate – Unexecuted proposal cannot restrict statutory entitlement of society – Section 11 read with Rule 5 and Form V overrides contrary drafting [Paras 64-66, 75-79].

Deemed Conveyance – Nature of estate transferable – Society entitled to entire estate held by promoter – If promoter holds freehold, ownership must be conveyed – If promoter holds leasehold, full leasehold must be assigned – Promoter cannot retain superior interest and transfer fragmentary rights – Legislative intent is to secure collective ownership for flat purchasers [Paras 48-52, 56-57, 61-63].

Precedent – Reliance on earlier order granting only assignment of lease in another society (Mahavir CHS) – Held: Deemed conveyance proceedings are fact specific – Outcome depends on nature of title in each case – Earlier order not determinative without identical title position [Paras 68-73].

Consumer Protection Objective – MOFA enacted to prevent promoters from indefinitely retaining title after sale of flats – Statutory scheme mandates formation of society and transfer of full interest within prescribed period – Interpretation must advance protective purpose of legislation [Paras 28-35, 46-47].

Decision: Writ Petitions dismissed – Impugned orders granting unilateral deemed conveyance in favour of respective respondent societies upheld – Authorities directed to complete consequential steps – No order as to costs.

Service Law – Suspension on Arrest – Acquittal in Criminal Case – Claim for Full Pay and Allowances – Petitioner ANM placed under suspension from 1/9/1999 after arrest in criminal case under Sections 307, 294, 341 & 34 IPC – Convicted by Trial Court and later acquitted by High Court in appeal – Suspension period treated as on duty for all purposes except pay and allowances – Held: Suspension was under deeming provision of Rule 9(2)(a) of Rules, 1966 on account of custody beyond 48 hours – Such suspension cannot be termed wholly unjustified merely because of subsequent acquittal – Full pay and allowances admissible only when competent authority records finding that suspension was wholly unjustified under FR 54-B(3) – No such finding recorded – Petition dismissed [Paras 8-11, 19].

Fundamental Rule 54-B – Scope and Interpretation – Payment of Back Wages – FR 54-B(3) mandates payment of full pay and allowances only if suspension is found wholly unjustified – Discretion lies with competent authority – Where suspension is statutory consequence of arrest and prosecution not initiated at instance of department, denial of full back wages justified – Employer cannot be burdened for period services were not rendered due to employee’s involvement in criminal case [Paras 9-11, 15-16].

Back Wages after Acquittal – Criminal Prosecution not at Department’s Instance – Supreme Court Precedents – Relied on Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Gujarat Electricity Board and Union of India v. Jaipal Singh – Held: If employee involved in criminal case in personal capacity and department not responsible for prosecution, reinstatement on acquittal does not automatically entitle employee to back wages – Each case to be considered on its own facts – Suspension during pendency of trial and appeal not wholly unjustified [Paras 12-16].

Long Suspension – Stages of Proceedings – Gurpal Singh Case Distinguished – Apex Court held that suspension during trial and pendency of appeal cannot be termed wholly unjustified – Only suspension beyond reasonable stage without justification may attract full pay – In present case, suspension continued till retirement due to criminal proceedings – No stage shown where suspension became wholly unjustified [Para 17].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed – Impugned order dated 25/1/2019 treating suspension period as on duty except for full pay and allowances upheld – Petitioner not entitled to full pay and allowances for suspension period.

FIR Registration – BNSS, 2023 – Preliminary Enquiry under Section 173(3) – Petitioner sought mandamus to register FIR alleging forgery, defamation, offences under SC/ST Act and IT Act – Police conducted preliminary enquiry with prior approval and closed complaint as “No Cognizable Offence” – Held: Under Section 173(3) BNSS, preliminary enquiry permissible in offences punishable between 3 to 7 years to ascertain prima facie case – If no prima facie case found, FIR need not be registered – Action of police in conformity with BNSS – No interference warranted [Paras 6(ii)-6(iv), 8].

Alternative Remedy – Sections 173(4) and 175 BNSS – Petitioner directly invoked Article 226 without approaching Superintendent of Police or Magistrate – Held: Statutory remedy before SP and thereafter Magistrate is mandatory precondition – Writ petition not maintainable without exhausting remedy – Liberty granted to approach Magistrate [Paras 6(v), 8, 11].

Defamation – Non-Cognizable Offence – Allegations primarily disclose reputational harm due to media broadcast – Criminal defamation under Section 356 BNS is non-cognizable and bailable – Held: Police cannot register FIR for defamation alone – Remedy lies before Magistrate by private complaint [Para 3 – Reply; Paras 7, 9].

SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act – Essential Ingredients – Complaint did not disclose insult or intimidation on ground of Scheduled Tribe status – Mere allegation of fabrication of documents insufficient – No prima facie case under SC/ST Act made out – Held: Provisions not attracted [Para 7, 9].

Information Technology Act – Ingredients of Offence – Allegations did not disclose impersonation, identity theft, cheating by personation, or publication of obscene/sexually explicit material – No material to attract Sections 66C, 66D, 67, 67A IT Act – Held: No cognizable offence under IT Act prima facie made out [Para 7].

Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Mandamus to Register FIR – In light of statutory scheme under BNSS and Supreme Court decisions, writ court should not direct registration of FIR when statutory remedies exist and preliminary enquiry conducted in accordance with law – Held: No mandamus can be issued – Writ dismissed [Paras 8-10].

Applicability of BNSS – Complaint lodged after enforcement of BNSS on 01.07.2024 – Held: Procedure under BNSS governs – Old CrPC provisions not applicable – Section 173(3) BNSS marks departure from Section 154 CrPC and permits limited preliminary enquiry even where cognizable offence disclosed [Paras 6(i)-6(iv), 9].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Communication dated 08.11.2025 upholding “No Cognizable Offence” sustained – Petitioner at liberty to approach competent Magistrate under BNSS, 2023 – Pending applications closed.