Demand and Acceptance of Bribe Must Be Proved as a Fact – Mere Possession of Money Not Enough: Kerala High Court

“Sanction to Prosecute Cannot Be Assailed at Appellate Stage Without Showing Failure of Justice” – In a significant verdict reinforcing core principles of anti-corruption jurisprudence, the Kerala High Court upheld the conviction of a former District Officer of the Ground Water Department, Wayanad, for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, while exercising appellate discretion to reduce the sentence considering passage of time and mitigating circumstances.

Justice A. Badharudeen emphatically reiterated that “proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to establish offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act.” The High Court refused to interfere with the conviction recorded by the Special Judge, Kozhikode, but modified the sentence imposed on the appellant.

“Demand and Acceptance – The Heart of Corruption Offence, Even Without a Trap”

The Court began by summarising the consistent oral testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3, who deposed that the appellant demanded ₹50,000 each from P.D. Dinesh Babu and P.V. Vinod to secure employment as casual labourers, and further accepted ₹60,000 from another person promising appointment as a driver. These amounts were paid directly at the appellant’s residence.

Justice Badharudeen observed, “On re-appreciation of evidence, this Court is of the firm view that the ingredients to attract offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act, 1988, have been proved by the prosecution, without any reasonable doubts.”

Referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [AIR 2023 SC 330], the Court reaffirmed, “Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue is sine qua non to establish guilt under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d). Mere possession or recovery of the amount without proof of demand is insufficient.”

It further clarified, “Conviction can still be sustained on the strength of oral and circumstantial evidence, even in the absence of trap or recovery proceedings, as long as the foundational facts are proved.”

The Court noted that PW1 and PW2’s testimony was corroborated by documentary evidence of pledged ornaments (Ext.P19) and financial records showing procurement of money used for the bribe. The defence plea that the amounts were refundable deposits was rejected, with the Court remarking, “The existence of an agreement (Ext.P2) acknowledging part repayment cannot negate the established fact of bribe demand and receipt.”

“Sanction for Prosecution is Not a Hollow Form – But Its Defect Alone Won’t Vitiate Trial Without Prejudice to Accused”

One of the major grounds raised in appeal was that the prosecution sanction under Section 19 PC Act was defective, as the sanctioning authority was not examined, and the order (Ext.P26) did not specifically mention “acceptance” of the bribe.

The Court rejected this argument by invoking the saving clause in Section 19(3)(a) PC Act and ruled, “Unless failure of justice is demonstrated, mere omission or irregularity in the sanction order cannot vitiate trial or conviction.”

Citing State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy [(2004) 7 SCC 763], the Court noted that, “The trial court as well as appellate court must record satisfaction that the defect in sanction has caused a failure of justice. That burden has not been discharged by the appellant in this case.”

It added, “In fact, the sanction order was produced without objection and shows application of mind. The non-examination of the sanctioning authority, by itself, is not fatal.”

“Preliminary Enquiry Not Mandatory – FIR Based on Vigilance Report Is Valid”

The appellant also argued that the FIR was illegal as no preliminary enquiry preceded it. The Court dismissed this contention, holding that, “Preliminary enquiry is not mandatory in vigilance cases. In this case, the FIR was based on a Vigilance Enquiry Report dated 11.08.2004. The procedural foundation was in place.”

Justice Badharudeen remarked, “There is nothing on record to show that the FIR was registered without substance. The FIR and report were received by the Special Court the same day. There was neither procedural illegality nor prejudice.”

“Sentence Modified Considering Long Lapse of Time – But Conviction Must Stand”

While upholding the conviction, the Court considered the time elapsed since the commission of the offence and the conviction (over 20 years since the alleged bribery in 2003, and 13 years since conviction in 2013). The Court modified the sentence as follows:

“The accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, and one year under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2), with fine amounts maintained. Sentences shall run concurrently.”

The Court vacated the bail granted to the accused and directed him to surrender before the Special Court, failing which execution proceedings were to commence.

“Court Will Not Interfere with Conviction on Technical Grounds Unless Real Prejudice is Shown”

The Kerala High Court’s ruling is yet another reminder that while technical compliance under procedural safeguards is important, a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act will not be upset unless real injustice or prejudice is shown to have been caused.

Justice Badharudeen summarised this principle aptly, holding, “To interpret Section 19 otherwise is to render its saving clause meaningless. Absence of prejudice is the threshold for interference.”

The judgment thus solidifies the jurisprudence that proof of demand and acceptance, not procedural technicalities, form the bedrock of a conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Date of Decision: 28 January 2026