Facts:

Hero Cycles (P) Ltd. claimed deduction of interest paid on borrowed sums from banks under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act for the Assessment Year 1988-1989.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction on grounds related to advances made by Hero Cycles to its subsidiary company and its directors.

Issues:

Whether the advances made by Hero Cycles were for business purposes and thus eligible for deduction under Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the advances made by Hero Cycles were justified by business expediency.

The Court emphasized the concept of "commercial expediency" in allowing deductions under the Income Tax Act.

It concluded that if the expenditure is incurred for the purpose of business expediency, it should be allowed as a deduction.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring that of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Facts:

The appellant, Baldev Singh, was found in possession of poppy husk during a police operation. Thirty-three bags of poppy husk were recovered from the trolley attached to his tractor during a Nakabandi operation. The prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of Ram Singh, ASI, a member of the police team involved in the operation. The appellant was convicted under Section 15 of the NDPS Act and sentenced to twelve years of rigorous imprisonment.

Issues:

The appeal included the credibility of the prosecution's witness, the non-examination of the investigating officer who prepared the case report.

The burden of proof regarding the conscious possession of the contraband by the appellant.

Held:

After carefully considering the arguments and evidence presented, the court upheld Baldev Singh's conviction under Section 15 of the NDPS Act. The court found Ram Singh's testimony to be reliable and sufficient to establish the appellant's possession of the contraband. Despite the non-examination of the investigating officer, the court determined that it did not prejudice the prosecution's case. The court also clarified the burden of proof under Section 35 of the NDPS Act, which shifts to the accused to prove their lack of knowledge about the contraband once physical possession is established.

In light of the prolonged legal proceedings, the court reduced Baldev Singh's sentence from twelve years to ten years of rigorous imprisonment. The appeal was partly allowed, confirming Baldev Singh's conviction but modifying his sentence.

Facts:

The incident leading to the case occurred promptly after the lodging of the FIR, with no significant delay. Allegations of ante-dating the FIR were unsubstantiated.

Issues:

Whether the delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate was fatal to the prosecution's case.

The significance of the absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) in evaluating the prosecution's evidence.

The inconclusive nature of the FSL report regarding the connection between the recovered bullet and pistol.

The credibility of eyewitness testimony regarding the circumstances of the incident.

Held:

The delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate was not deemed fatal to the prosecution's case, especially since there was no delay in lodging the FIR. The prosecution was not obligated to explain the delay unless questioned, and in this case, no adverse inference could be drawn.

The absence of a Test Identification Parade (TIP) does not invalidate the prosecution's case if eyewitnesses are found to be trustworthy and reliable. In this instance, the witnesses were local residents who knew the accused and the deceased, and their testimony was consistent.

While the FSL report was inconclusive regarding the connection between the recovered bullet and pistol, there was no mismatch between the bullet and the gun.

The credibility of eyewitness testimony was upheld, despite minor discrepancies. The testimony indicated that the shot was fired from close quarters, corroborated by the absence of blackening of the deceased's skin due to clothing.

Decision: The Court affirmed the conviction under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and Sections 3 and 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, based on the reliability of the evidence and circumstances presented in the case.

Facts:

Vidarbha Engineering Industries, the appellant no. 2, held three plots of land in Nagpur and entered into a collaboration agreement with Unitech Ltd. for a commercial project.

The agreement specified that Unitech would develop the property at its own cost and retain 78% of the constructed area while transferring 22% to Vidarbha Engineering.

The consideration mentioned in the agreement was Rs. 100.40 lakhs.

The Appropriate Authority issued a show cause notice alleging understatement of consideration based on a comparison with a sale instance in an adjoining locality.

The authority's calculation of consideration was found to be erroneous, and it failed to consider differences in property types and sizes.

Issues:

Whether the collaboration agreement constituted a transfer of property under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Whether the authority's determination of consideration was valid.

Whether the High Court's judgment adequately addressed the relevant aspects of the case.

Held:

The collaboration agreement constituted a transfer of property within the meaning of the Income Tax Act, 1961, despite Vidarbha Engineering not being the owner of the entire built-up area.

The authority's determination of consideration was erroneous and failed to consider relevant factors, rendering its decision invalid.

The High Court's judgment did not adequately address crucial aspects of the case, leading to the appeal being allowed and the High Court's judgment and the authority's order being set aside.

Facts:

The Appellant, VSE Stock Services Ltd., sought fee continuity benefit after amalgamating with its subsidiary to comply with SEBI regulations.

The amalgamation was aimed at enabling the Appellant to operate as a broker with the National Stock Exchange (NSE).

The dispute revolved around whether the amalgamation was compelled by law, entitling the Appellant to fee continuity benefit.

Issues:

Whether the amalgamation of the Appellant was compelled by law, justifying fee continuity benefit under SEBI regulations.

Held:

The court analyzed the circumstances surrounding the amalgamation and concluded that it was not compelled by law. Justice Sen and Justice Singh agreed with SAT's finding that the amalgamation was driven by business considerations rather than legal compulsion. They noted that while the Appellant argued for a liberal interpretation of "compulsion of law" to include SEBI's orders and directions, there was no evidence to suggest that SEBI forced the amalgamation.

The court referred to previous judgments, including Ratnabali Capital Markets Ltd. case, which established that fresh registration fees are required upon merger unless the merger was compelled by law as an alternative to liquidation. Since the facts of this case did not suggest any such situation, the court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the arguments presented by the Appellant. No costs were awarded.

Facts:

Oracle Stocks and Shares Ltd. (Oracle) was initially registered as a trading member in two segments, the Wholesale Debt Market (WDM) and the Equity Market/Capital Market (EM/CM).

Oracle formed a joint venture with Prebon Holdings B.V. (Prebon Group), resulting in the creation of Prebon Yamane (I) Ltd. (the Respondent), limited to the WDM segment.

NSE approved the segregation of memberships of Oracle and the Respondent, subject to certain conditions.

The Respondent applied for membership in the Derivatives Segment, which was rejected by SEBI due to unpaid dues.

The Respondent appealed this decision to SAT, which directed SEBI to refund the amounts paid by the Respondent.

Issues:

Whether the Respondent is entitled to fee continuity benefit as per SEBI regulations.

Whether the Respondent's claim of being a continuation of Oracle is valid.

Held:

The Court held that the Respondent was not entitled to fee continuity benefit as it did not meet the criteria specified in Clause 4 of Schedule III of SEBI (Stock Brokers and Sub Brokers) Regulations, 1992. The Court rejected the argument that the Respondent was a continuation of Oracle, stating that they were distinct entities.

Furthermore, the Court dismissed the Respondent's claim of believing it was granted fee continuity, citing letters from the Respondent requesting fee continuity.

The Court affirmed the validity of the amounts deposited by the Respondent and allowed SEBI's appeal, recalling the interim order granted in favor of the Respondent.

Facts:

The case involved stock brokers who had converted their individual/partnership memberships into corporate entities prior to April 1, 1997. The Securities & Exchange Board of India (SEBI) denied them the benefit of fee continuity under paragraph 4 of Schedule III to the Regulations.

Issues:

Whether stock brokers who converted their memberships before April 1, 1997, were entitled to fee continuity benefits under paragraph 4 of Schedule III.

Held:

The Court examined the provisions of Schedule III and the explanations provided therein. It found that paragraph 4, introduced by an amendment effective from January 21, 1998, did not explicitly exclude corporate entities formed before that date from availing fee continuity benefits. The Court emphasized the legislative intention to incentivize corporatization of stock brokers and held that the benefits should not be restricted based on the conversion date. Additionally, an explanation introduced with effect from February 20, 2002, clarified that corporate entities resulting from conversion shall be deemed a continuation of the old entity for fee collection purposes. Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeals filed by SEBI and upheld the judgments and orders of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) in favor of the stock brokers. The Court concluded that the benefit of fee exemption should be extended to entities converting into corporate entities before April 1, 1997, in accordance with the provisions of Schedule III and the explanations provided therein.

Facts:

The respondent no. 5 was originally allotted a fair price shop, which was subsequently cancelled due to various complaints against improper distribution of essential commodities. The appellant, Poonam, was then allotted the shop after respondent no. 5's cancellation. However, respondent no. 5 appealed against the cancellation and succeeded, resulting in the cancellation of the appellant's allotment as well. Subsequently, Poonam filed a writ petition challenging the decision.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being a subsequent allottee, had the right to continue litigation as a necessary party?

Did the appellant have an independent legal right to challenge the appellate order in a writ petition?

Held:

The court held that the appellant, Poonam, was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the dispute. Although she was permitted to participate in the appeal process, this did not confer any legal status on her. Her participation did not change the fact that she was essentially a third party to the dispute. Therefore, she did not have the locus standi to challenge the appellate order in a writ petition.

Additionally, the court emphasized the principle of natural justice, stating that no order should be passed without giving a chance to the person who would be adversely affected by it. However, the applicability of natural justice must be considered in the context of the case and the parties involved.

Decision: The court dismissed Poonam's appeal, upholding the decision of the High Court. It held that Poonam, as a subsequent allottee, did not have the right to challenge the appellate order in a writ petition, as she was not a necessary party to the dispute.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 was undergoing training for appointment as a Store Hand Technical (SHT) in the Army Supply Corps.

He was granted leave but later remained absent without sanctioned leave.

A summary inquiry found him absent for 108 days without sanctioned leave, leading to his discharge from service.

Issues:

Whether the discharge of Respondent No. 1 was in compliance with the principles of natural justice and relevant military regulations.

Whether the Commanding Officer had the authority to discharge the respondent.

Held:

It is an admitted fact that Respondent No. 1 had not been attested. Certain formalities are required to be done for being attested as per the provisions of Section 17 of the Act and admittedly the said formalities had not been done.

A person who remained absent unauthorisedly and who was declared deserter can never turn out to be a good soldier... Commanding Officer can discharge non attested person enrolled under the Act.

In view of the aforestated facts, the High Court should not have quashed and set aside the said order of discharge which had been passed in accordance with law and therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment delivered by the High Court. The appeal stands disposed of as allowed with no order as to costs.