Facts:

The case pertains to Criminal Appeal No. 1867 of 2012, where the appellant, Nanjappa, challenged a decision by the State of Karnataka. The incident occurred on March 24, 1998, and Nanjappa, at that time, was around 38 years old.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, particularly concerning the necessity of previous sanction for prosecuting a public servant for specified offenses under the Act.

Held:

The language of sub-section (1) of Section 19 unequivocally mandates that no court can take cognizance of offenses against a public servant under specified sections of the Act without the previous sanction of the competent authority.

Sub-section (3) of Section 19 prohibits interference with an order passed by a Special Judge based on defects, omissions, or irregularities in the sanction, except where the higher court finds a failure of justice.

The trial court, in this case, correctly held the sanction to be invalid due to the incompetence of the authority issuing it. However, it erred by not discharging the accused but instead acquitted them on the merits of the case.

Considering the age of the appellant, the distant point in time since the incident, and the doubts raised about the prosecution's case, there's no compelling reason for directing a fresh trial.

Decision: The appeal is allowed, and the judgment of the trial court is upheld, with the observation that the trial court should have discharged the accused instead of acquitting them on the merits of the case.

Facts:

Dilip Kumar Sarkar, the Respondent, was working as the Controller of Examinations at the University of North Bengal.

Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Sarkar due to irregularities and financial losses identified in the University's funds, allegedly caused by him.

Various audit reports highlighted irregularities and financial losses, leading to an investigation by the University.

The Vice-Chancellor issued an order suspending Sarkar from his duties, prompting Sarkar to file a writ petition challenging the suspension.

Issues:

Whether the suspension order issued by the Vice-Chancellor was legally valid.

Whether the Division Bench's order adequately addressed the legal questions raised in the case.

Held:

The Court found dissatisfaction with the Division Bench's approach, criticizing its confusion and failure to address key legal questions.

The Division Bench's order made conditional and contingent directions regarding the Executive Council's decision-making process and the Vice-Chancellor's powers under Section 10(6) of the North Bengal University Act, 1981.

The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench's order and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

Facts:

The case involves the State of Maharashtra and Others as the appellant and Shiva and Others as the respondents. The respondents were accused of organized crime under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOCA). The charges against them were related to incidents occurring before and after the enactment of MCOCA. The Trial Court convicted the respondents, but the High Court acquitted them, setting aside the conviction orders passed by the Special Court under MCOCA.

Issues:

Whether the invocation of MCOCA required strict compliance with the provisions of Section 23 of the Act?

Whether the prosecution had proved that the respondents committed offences for pecuniary, economic, or similar advantages after the promulgation of MCOCA?

Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the convictions?

Held and Decision:

The Supreme Court, after thorough consideration of the arguments and the facts presented, held:

The High Court was correct in its interpretation that mere proof of filing charge sheets in the past was not enough to establish guilt under MCOCA. It was essential to prove that the accused were involved in continuing unlawful activities with the objective of gaining pecuniary or other advantages after the promulgation of MCOCA. This interpretation aligns with the requirements of Section 23 of MCOCA, which mandates proper application of mind by the competent authority before permitting registration of an FIR or granting prosecution sanction under MCOCA.

The acquittal of the respondents in previous cases indicated that they were not involved in the alleged offences after the enactment of MCOCA. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove the second ingredient required for an offence under MCOCA. Therefore, the High Court's decision to set aside the convictions was justified.

Based on the above, the appeals were dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to acquit the respondents.

Decided on : 24-07-2015

Arms Act, 1959 - Section 25, Section 4

Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 - Section 2, Section 23, Section 3, Section 3(1), Section 3(2), Section 3(4)

Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999—Section 3—Organised crime—Ingredients—Commission of offences prior to enactment of MCOCA does not by itself constitute offence under MCOCA—It is only if an organized crime is committed by accused after promulgation of MCOCA that he may be said to have committed offence under Section 3—Section 3 of MCOCA could not be invoked only on the basis of previous charge sheets for Section 3 would come into play only if respondents were proved to have committed offence for gain or any pecuniary benefit or undue economic or other advantage after promulgation of MCOCA—High Court was justified in allowing appeal and setting aside order of conviction passed by Trial Court.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

R.R. Deshpande, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Yuvraj Gaikwad, Prachiti Deshpande, Asha Gopalan Nair and Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, for the Appellant; J.P. Dhanda, Raj Rani Dhanda, Vineet Dhanda, N.A. Usmani and Irshad Ahmad, Advocates for the Respondent

Final Result : Dismissed

Facts:

Talukdar Singh, an ex-serviceman, was employed with Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. as a Turner in the Auto Division.

Singh was terminated following an incident where he slapped his colleague, Mr. Kunjumon, who had used harsh words and shoved Singh towards the door.

The Labour Court found Singh guilty of misconduct but deemed the punishment of dismissal as "shockingly disproportionate," awarding him a retrenchment compensation of Rs. 6,049/-.

Singh filed a writ petition, challenging both his dismissal and the inadequacy of compensation.

The High Court upheld Singh's dismissal but enhanced the compensation to Rs. 1,00,000/-, minus the amount already paid to Singh.

Issues:

Whether the compensation awarded by the High Court should be further enhanced.

Held:

The Court reviewed the case and agreed with the findings of both the Labour Court and the High Court regarding the misconduct and the disproportionate punishment.

However, considering Singh's years of service and the circumstances, the Supreme Court decided to further enhance the compensation.

The compensation was increased to Rs. 5,00,000/-, inclusive of the amount awarded by the High Court.

The respondent was directed to pay this amount within eight weeks, with an interest rate of 9% p.a. applicable in case of default.

Facts:

The case revolves around the constitutional validity of Order No. 10(14)06/D(Med) dated April 20, 2007, which introduced a fixed tenure for officers in the Armed Forces Medical Services (AFMS) holding the rank of Lt. General and its equivalent, including the Director General Armed Forces Medical Services.

Issues:

Whether the prescription of a fixed tenure for AFMS officers by Order No. 10(14)06/D(Med) dated April 20, 2007, is constitutionally valid.

Whether the Armed Forces Tribunal's decision regarding the ultra vires nature of the tenure rule is justified.

Held:

The principle that courts should exercise restraint in interfering with the prescription of retirement age in public service, unless the prescribed age is unreasonably low, rendering it arbitrary and irrational.

Establish the court's reasoning behind the constitutional validity of the fixed tenure rule. It highlights that the government has the authority to prescribe a tenure appointment for Lt. Generals and equivalent ranks within the AFMS. The tenure of two years is deemed constitutionally permissible, subject to certain conditions outlined in the judgment.

Concludes that the Armed Forces Tribunal erred in interfering with the government's provisions regarding retirement age and retirement orders issued by the competent authority.

Decision: The court upheld the validity of the fixed tenure rule for AFMS officers of the rank of Lt. General and its equivalent, subject to certain conditions, and overturned the decision of the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Facts:

The petitioner colleges were granted provisional affiliation for starting the MBBS course for the academic sessions 2014-15.

Surprise inspections by the MCI pointed out deficiencies in the colleges.

The MCI recommended disapproval of the colleges, and despite reconsideration directed by the Central Government, the MCI reiterated its decision not to recommend renewal of permission for the academic year 2015-16.

Issues:

Whether the petitions were appropriately filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.

Whether the rights claimed by the petitioners are fundamental rights.

Whether the findings of facts by administrative authorities can be challenged in a petition under Article 32.

Held:

The court held that the petitions were not appropriately filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, and the rights claimed by the petitioners are not fundamental rights. The court emphasized that Article 32 is primarily meant for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Furthermore, the court reiterated that it is not supposed to interfere with the findings of facts recorded by administrative authorities unless there is a clear violation of Fundamental Rights.

Decision: The writ petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution were dismissed.

Facts:

The agreement between the Gujarat Maritime Board and UCL allowed UCL to construct and maintain a jetty at its own cost for the purpose of loading and unloading goods.

The Gujarat Maritime Board collected wharfage charges from UCL, which were alleged to be subject to service tax under the 'port services' category.

Issues:

Whether any service was rendered by the Gujarat Maritime Board to UCL under the agreement for the construction and use of the jetty.

Whether the wharfage charges collected by the Gujarat Maritime Board constituted a service under the scope of the Finance Act, 1994.

Held:

The agreement explicitly states that it was entered into under Section 35 of the Gujarat Maritime Board Act, allowing UCL to construct and maintain the jetty at its own cost. The Gujarat Maritime Board did not render any service to UCL under this agreement.

While the Gujarat Maritime Board owns the jetty, it is the responsibility of UCL to keep it in a condition suitable for vessels to berth. Therefore, the Board does not provide any service to UCL under the agreement. The wharfage charges collected by the Board are not for services rendered but for expenses incurred in maintaining the jetty.

Under Section 32(1) of the Gujarat Maritime Board Act, the Board may authorize any person to perform services mentioned therein, including the landing of goods at wharves. However, such authorization was not present in the agreement with UCL. Additionally, Section 32(4) specifies that the authorized person may charge or recover sums for such services, which was absent in the agreement. Therefore, no service was rendered by the Gujarat Maritime Board or any authorized person, negating the levy of service tax.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the tribunal's decision. No service tax was deemed payable on the wharfage charges collected by the Gujarat Maritime Board from its licensee, UCL.

Facts:

The Delhi Development Authority (Appellant) invited applications under a housing scheme wherein the respondent, P.R. Samanta, deposited Rs. 15,000 as a registration amount.

The respondent later declined the flat offered and requested a refund of the registration amount along with a higher interest rate than the one specified in the scheme's brochure.

The Appellant refunded the registration amount along with 7% interest, as per the terms agreed upon by both parties.

The respondent filed a complaint before the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, seeking a higher interest rate of 15% per annum.

The Commission awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the registration amount and also awarded litigation charges of Rs. 5,000 to the respondent.

Issues:

Whether the rate of interest payable on the refund of the registration amount was reasonable.

Whether the Commission's decision to award interest at 12% per annum and litigation charges to the respondent was justified.

Held:

Considering the submissions advanced on behalf of the Appellant as well as the discussion and reasonings in the impugned order in respect of rate of interest, we find sufficient merit in the submissions advanced on behalf of the Appellant.

Accordingly, we find the impugned order of the Commission awarding interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the registration amount and also award of Rs. 5000/- towards litigation charges to be against law and unjustified. The impugned judgment and order is therefore set aside. The appeal stands allowed.

Decided on : 21-07-2015

Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 - Section 10, Section 36A, Section 55

Reasonableness of Rate of Interest Payable on Refund of Registration Amount—The Appellant chose to accept the proposal for cancellation of allotment made by the Respondent but it refunded the registration amount along with only 7% interest in terms of the offer document which had been accepted by the Respondent and was thus the rate finalized by agreement between the parties.—Respondent was that the interest paid on the registration amount is at a rate lower than the rate at which the applicants are to be charged in case of delay/default.—The applicant's main grievance is against the payment of the interest on the registration amount, which is less than the one charged from the applicants when in default. I find substantial force in this plea of the applicant and would award interest @ 12% per annum on the registration amount as against the one paid by the Respondent authority.—Accordingly, Court find the impugned order of the Commission awarding interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the registration amount and also award towards litigation charges to be against law and unjustified. The impugned judgment and order is therefore set aside.

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Manika Tripathy Pandey, for the Appellant

Final Result : Allowed

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the classification of Risograph machines under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.

Issues:

Whether Risograph machines should be classified as printing machines or duplicating machines under the Customs Tariff Act.

Held and Decision:

The court held that Risograph machines should be classified under Heading 84.43 of the Customs Tariff Act, which covers screen printing machines using a stencil screen band. This determination was based on the fact that the process of making a master in a Risograph, akin to the printing process, and the primary function of the machine is printing rather than duplicating.

Despite some similarities to duplicating machines, the court emphasized that the master made by a Risograph is created through printing technology principles, similar to printing plates in the printing industry. This distinction led to the classification of Risograph machines as printing machines.

The court drew parallels between the process of printing with a Risograph and screen printing, highlighting similarities such as the use of a master through which ink is pressed to reproduce the image or text, akin to the stencil and screen in screen printing.

Distinguishing duplicating machines from Risograph machines, the court explained the distinct processes involved in duplication, such as stencil duplicating and spirit duplicating. It emphasized that in duplicating machines, the stencil is created outside of the machine, whereas in a Risograph, the master is created within the machine through a printing process.