Facts:

The appellant, Pawan Kumar Agarwala, was accused of involvement in filling a loan application for a borrower and influencing another branch manager to sanction a loan, despite knowing that the borrower had previously taken a loan from his own branch.

In the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant received a harsher penalty of dismissal compared to the minor penalty imposed on the manager of the other branch.

The appellant challenged this decision through a writ petition, citing unfairness in the inquiry process due to the lack of provision of witness lists and document copies.

Issues:

The fairness of the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant, including whether there was a violation of procedural requirements and principles of natural justice.

Held:

The Court found that there was a denial of fair opportunity to the appellant, in gross violation of procedural requirements and principles of natural justice.

The inquiry officer's finding on the charges was vitiated due to non-compliance with statutory rules.

The order of reinstatement without full back wages was deemed unjustified due to insufficient evidence.

The High Court should have deducted the amount of pension received by the appellant from the back wages for the relevant period.

Consequently, the order of the Division Bench was set aside, and the order of the single judge was restored, with modification to award full back wages upon reinstatement.

Decision: The Court held that the appellant was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages due to the denial of fair opportunity and procedural violations in the disciplinary proceedings.

Facts:

The Court delivered a judgment on April 10, 2015, convicting Respondent No. 1 under Section 376(1) of the Indian Penal Code and imposing a seven-year imprisonment term along with a fine. However, the Court confirmed Respondent No. 1's acquittal for another offence.

Despite repeated notices, no representation was made on behalf of Respondent No. 1 during the appeal proceedings.

The Court appointed an amicus to represent Respondent No. 1.

Neither the State nor the Appellant informed the Court that Respondent No. 1 had passed away before the appeal hearings.

It later came to light that Respondent No. 1 had died on October 14, 2012.

Issues:

Whether the judgment delivered on April 10, 2015, could be implemented given the subsequent revelation of Respondent No. 1's death before the appeal was heard.

Held:

The Court recalled the judgment and order dated April 10, 2015, upon learning about Respondent No. 1's death prior to the appeal proceedings. The Court stated that since this fact was not known during the hearings and was not brought to the attention of the Court by any party, including the State, the judgment could not be implemented.

Consequently, the appeal was deemed to have become abated. The Court dismissed the criminal appeal based on this information.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal concerning the maintainability of a second revision entertained by the State Government under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Issues:

Whether the State Government has jurisdiction as the supreme revenue authority in revenue matters under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Whether the State Government can entertain a second revision despite the decision of a subordinate revenue officer.

Held:

The State Government is established as the supreme revenue authority in revenue matters under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. The language and wording of Section 257 of the Code indicate that its jurisdiction is concurrent with that of other revenue officers in deciding revisions. Therefore, even if one party seeks revision from the Commissioner, the State Government can still be approached under Section 257 for revision.

Revenue officers, including the Commissioner, are appointed by the State Government and are subject to its superintendence, direction, and control as per Section 11 of the Code. Additionally, Section 5 of the Code further emphasizes the State Government's authority over revenue officers. The State Government also has the power under Section 259 of the Code to call for and examine the record and proceedings of subordinate officers, even if their decisions are considered final.

There is no restriction in the Code suggesting that if revisional powers are exercised by a Revenue officer with jurisdiction, they cannot be further exercised by a superior Revenue officer or the State Government. Thus, if revisional powers are initially exercised by a Revenue officer, further revisional power can be exercised by a superior officer or the State Government.

In the present case, it was deemed within the jurisdiction of the State Government to entertain the second revision to assess the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Revenue Officer.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the authority of the State Government to entertain the second revision under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

Facts:

The case involves a Will executed in 1920 by 'SR', in which he outlined his family composition and described his properties. He specifically provided for his third wife, 'V', to enjoy a certain tiled house for her lifetime, along with access to water from a well. The Will acknowledged 'V's pre-existing right to maintenance.

Issues:

Whether 'V's limited right under the Will became an absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

Held:

The court observed that under Hindu Law, a husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife, and if he possesses properties, his wife is entitled to maintenance out of those properties. This entitlement is not a mere formality but a valuable and moral right. The Hindu Married Women's Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946, gives statutory recognition to this right (Para 15).

The court further noted that the genuineness of the Will and 'V's continuous possession of the property were not disputed. 'SR' recognized 'V's right to maintenance, his own physical weakness, and the likelihood of his death. Therefore, he decided to distribute his properties among family members, including 'V'. Since no one disputed the arrangements made in the Will, and 'V' continued to enjoy the property, her limited right under the Will became an absolute right by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (Paras 21, 31 to 34).

Decision: Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding 'V's absolute right to the suit property, considering her pre-existing right to maintenance and the arrangements made in the Will by 'SR'.

Facts:

An agreement was entered into between Cochin Shipyard Ltd. (Appellant) and Apeejay Shipping Ltd. (Respondent) on 29.11.1980 for the construction and delivery of a cargo ship.

Disputes arose between the parties leading to arbitration, and an award was passed by a former Judge of the Supreme Court as the arbitrator/sole umpire on 15.07.2009.

The Respondent filed an application under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereafter "the 1940 Act") seeking to set aside the award.

The Respondent sought permission to examine the arbitrator and the General Manager of the Respondent as witnesses, which was rejected by the lower court but granted by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether examination of witnesses is permissible in proceedings under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act?

Whether the High Court's grant of permission to examine witnesses was justified?

Held:

The Court held that examination of witnesses in court is impermissible to establish legal misconduct on the part of the arbitrator under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act. The ground of legal misconduct must be discernable from the arbitral proceedings themselves, and evidence cannot be adduced in court to substantiate such a challenge. The Court directed the Civil Judge to requisition the records from the arbitrator and allowed the Respondent to press the issue of misconduct based on those records. The appeal was partly allowed insofar as it granted permission to examine witnesses in court.

Facts:

The appellant completed B.Sc. with Forestry as a major subject and obtained an M.Sc. in Forestry from Garhwal University, Uttarakhand.

He also passed the National Eligibility Test (NET) in Forestry.

The J & K Forest Service (Gazetted) Recruitment Rules, 1970, prescribed the eligibility qualification as "B. Sc. Forestry or its equivalent from any University recognized by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR)."

The appellant was declared ineligible by the JKPSC for the post of Range Officer Grade-I (Forest) on the grounds of not possessing the prescribed qualification.

The appellant challenged this decision through a writ petition, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the appellant met the eligibility criteria for the post of Range Officer Grade-I (Forest) despite not possessing a B.Sc. specifically in Forestry.

Whether the interpretation of the eligibility criteria by the lower courts was correct.

Held:

The court held that the appellant possessed the prescribed qualifications for the post of Range Officer Grade-I (Forest). The appellant's B.Sc. with Forestry as a major subject and M.Sc. in Forestry fulfilled the eligibility criteria mentioned in the J & K Forest Service Recruitment Rules.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, the impugned orders were set aside, and the writ petition filed by the appellant was allowed. The court directed the respondents to issue the necessary appointment order in favor of the appellant for the said post within one month from the date of receipt of the judgment.

Facts:

The respondents (plaintiffs) filed a suit under Sections 34 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking a declaration regarding property rights.

The appellant (defendant) sought to lead secondary evidence in the form of a letter of disclaimer executed by Justice Tek Chand.

Issues:

Whether the trial court was justified in allowing the appellant to lead secondary evidence.

Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the trial court's order.

Held:

The court held: "After considering the entire facts of the case and the evidence adduced by the Appellant for the purpose of admission of the secondary evidence, we are of the view that all efforts have been taken for the purpose of leading secondary evidence.

The trial court has noticed that the photocopy of the Exhibit DW-2/B came from the custody of DEO Ambala and the witness, who brought the record, has been examined as witness. In that view of the matter, there is compliance of the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. Merely because the signatures in some of the documents were not legible and visible that cannot be a ground to reject the secondary evidence. In our view, the trial court correctly appreciated the efforts taken by the Appellant for the purpose of leading secondary evidence."

Regarding the final decision, it's stated: "For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained in law. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside."

Facts:

The appellants, private recognized institutions, sought permission to conduct college-level counseling to fill up vacant seats for B.Ed. and M.Ed. courses in Madhya Pradesh for the academic session 2015-16. They contested that the Higher Education Department's alleged arbitrary decision left seats vacant. The respondent department restricted admissions to students who appeared in the entrance examination conducted by Vyapam, rather than opening it to all students meeting the minimum eligibility criteria. The appellants argued that this violated mandatory provisions of the Admission Rules 2008 framed by the State Government.

Issues:

Whether the appellants should be granted permission to conduct college-level counseling to fill vacant seats, despite the restrictions imposed by the respondent department.

Held:

The Court dismissed the applications of the appellants, affirming the decision of the respondent department. The Court found no reason to grant any interim relief for conducting college-level counseling and admitting students who had not appeared in the entrance test. It cited the exhaustion of the student pool who participated in the Vyapam examination and the lack of interest among students in the appellant colleges.

The Court's decision upheld the respondent's actions, denying the appellants' request for permission to conduct college-level counseling. This decision was based on the understanding that the available student pool had been exhausted and there was no justification to allow further counseling beyond the rounds already conducted.

Facts:

The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 primarily focuses on regulating paper lotteries. However, online lotteries were not contemplated when the Act came into force. Kerala, in exercise of its power under Section 5 of the Act, imposed a ban on online lotteries within its territory.

Issues:

Whether the State of Kerala has the authority to discriminate between paper lotteries and online lotteries.

Whether the ban imposed on online lotteries by Kerala is constitutionally valid.

Whether the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 empowers States to regulate and ban online lotteries.

Held:

The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 primarily focuses on regulating paper lotteries, and online lotteries were not contemplated when the Act was enacted. The Act empowers States to prohibit a particular type of lottery, which includes online lotteries. The Court acknowledges the potential risks associated with online lotteries, such as rapid draws leading to financial losses for consumers.

The legislative power to regulate lotteries is vested in the Parliament under the Constitution of India. However, the Act delegates the power to regulate lotteries to States. This delegation of power is valid and does not amount to an abdication of legislative power by the Centre. States have the authority to ban lotteries, including online lotteries, within their territories.

Kerala's ban on online lotteries is upheld as valid. The principles laid down in previous cases apply to online lotteries as a separate class. If a State decides to prohibit a particular type of lottery, the prohibition must be applied uniformly to all lotteries of that type, including those from other States.