Facts:

The case involved the Uphaar Cinema tragedy.

The matter pertained to the determination of the appropriate quantum of sentence for the accused.

The recovery of a substantial amount through a fine to be utilized for a trauma center was a key consideration in enhancing punishment.

The discretion available to the Court under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was significant in the sentencing process.

Issues:

The appropriate punishment, considering the circumstances of the Uphaar Cinema tragedy and the objectives of deterrence and public interest.

Held:

The Court observed that the recovery of a significant fine for a trauma center was a crucial aspect in enhancing punishment, serving the purpose of deterrence and addressing recidivism. This was underscored by the wide discretion available to the Court under Section 304-A of the IPC.

It was clarified that the option of paying a higher fine for a reduced sentence did not conflict with the prescribed sentences under the IPC. The Court emphasized that its order should be considered as a whole and not dissected into separate sentences. Imposing a higher fine was not construed as an extra benefit for affluent individuals but rather based on their capacity to pay.

The review petitions challenging the judgment were dismissed, with the Court finding no illegality or impropriety warranting a review.

Facts:

The case revolves around the Karnataka Determination of Seniority Act, 2002, which provides for consequential seniority to government servants belonging to SC and ST categories promoted under reservation. The petitioners challenged the validity of this Act on the grounds that it violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

Issues:

The case include the validity of the Karnataka Act of 2002, the necessity of determining factors such as 'backwardness,' 'inadequacy of representation,' and 'overall efficiency' before granting consequential seniority, and the interpretation of Article 16(4A) of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that while enabling the State to do away with the 'catch up' rule was valid, the exercise of this power was subject to certain limitations, including the determination of factors such as 'backwardness,' 'inadequacy of representation,' and 'overall efficiency' (Para 15).

It was emphasized that the exercise of power under Article 16(4A) required the state to demonstrate the 'backwardness,' 'inadequacy of representation,' and 'overall efficiency' before granting consequential seniority (Para 20).

The court highlighted that the state must justify its decision with compelling reasons based on material, including studies ensuring that overall efficiency is not compromised. In the case at hand, the absence of such an exercise was noted (Para 26).

The provisions of the 2002 Act, which did away with the 'catch up' rule and provided for consequential seniority, were declared ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. This decision would affect those who have already retired, while financial benefits already availed would not be affected. Consequential promotions granted based on seniority benefit were deemed ad hoc and liable to be reviewed, and seniority lists were to be revised accordingly (Para 27).

Facts:

The case involves a delay of 28 years in filing a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the claim petition is reasonable.

Held:

The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, provided a six-month limitation period for raising a claim for compensation. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, initially maintained a similar limitation period under Section 166(3) but later introduced a bar on entertaining claim petitions after twelve months from the date of the accident. However, this limitation provision was completely removed from the Act on November 14, 1994.

Despite the absence of an explicit limitation period in the 1988 Act, claims must be raised within a reasonable time. The reasonableness of the time period depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In this instance, a delay of 28 years was deemed unreasonable, rendering the claim stale and dead.

A claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is considered genuine only if it is a live and surviving claim. Approaching the tribunal after such a significant delay cannot be deemed as a live and surviving claim.

Decision: The appeal is allowed. The claim petition filed after a delay of 28 years is dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the double murder of two individuals, one being a 12-year-old girl and the other a 50-year-old man, along with attempted murders of two other individuals. The accused was also charged with theft. The prosecution presented evidence including eyewitness testimonies, medical reports, and forensic evidence to establish the guilt of the accused.

Issues:

The correctness of the High Court's decision to acquit the accused despite evidence presented by the prosecution.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after careful examination of the evidence and reasoning provided by both the trial court and the High Court, held that the High Court's decision to acquit the accused was erroneous.

The Court identified various discrepancies and errors in the High Court's analysis, including its misinterpretation of medical evidence, disregard of crucial forensic evidence, and failure to consider dying declarations made by the injured parties.

Additionally, the High Court's reasoning was found to be internally inconsistent. Therefore, the Supreme Court declared the High Court's judgment as "perverse" and reinstated the conviction of the accused. The Court directed the concerned authorities to take the accused into custody to serve the remainder of the sentence imposed by the trial court.

Facts:

The case concerned the rehabilitation of 'project affected families' following the implementation of the Sardar Sarovar Project.

Various families were involved, some opting for cash compensation, while others sought land in lieu of compensation.

Issues:

Determination of compensation for families not fully compensated.

Addressing the situation of families duped by middlemen despite receiving compensation.

Held:

The Court held that Families not fully compensated were entitled to compensation at a rate of Rs. 60 lakhs per family.

Families duped by middlemen, despite receiving compensation, were further compensated with Rs. 15 lakhs per family.

The concerned authority was directed to ensure timely implementation of compensation payments.

All occupants were instructed to vacate the submergence area by a specified date, with potential forcible removal after.

Gujarat and Maharashtra were directed to conclude resettlement and rehabilitation activities within three months.

All pending litigations arising from the recommendations of the Jha Commission's report were ordered to come to an end.

Disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Facts:

The case involved an appeal brought before the Supreme Court challenging certain directions issued by a Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. The High Court had directed the State Government to amend the provisions of Section 118 of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, within a period of ninety days.

Issues:

The Supreme Court was whether the directions issued by the High Court for amending the legislation were constitutionally permissible, considering the limitations on the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the directions issued by the High Court for amending the legislation were unconstitutional and exceeded the limitations of judicial review under Article 226.

The Court emphasized the principle of separation of powers and reiterated that the judiciary cannot mandate the enactment or amendment of laws, as this power lies solely with the legislature. The Court referred to various precedents to support its decision and concluded by setting aside the directions issued by the High Court. No costs were awarded in the matter.

Facts:

Tarun Tyagi was accused of stealing the 'source code' of a software named 'Quick Recovery' and selling it under a different name.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) seized certain documents and material, including hard disks, from Tyagi's premises during investigation.

Tyagi requested copies of the seized hard disks under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, asserting his need for them to prepare his defense effectively.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, Tyagi, is entitled to receive copies of the seized hard disks under Section 207 of the Code.

How to balance Tyagi's right to access evidence for his defense with the need to prevent potential misuse of the seized material.

Held:

The court recognized Tyagi's right to receive documents relied upon by the prosecution for a fair trial, as per Section 207 of the Code. However, concerns about potential misuse of the seized hard disks were also acknowledged. To address these concerns while ensuring fair trial rights, the court laid down specific conditions for supplying the hard disks to Tyagi. These conditions included recording the contents of the CDs in court in the presence of both parties, and Tyagi providing an affidavit undertaking not to use or misuse the source code contained in the CDs. The court referenced a similar case where the prosecution had accepted the court's directions to supply hard disks under similar circumstances, subject to similar undertakings from the accused.

Decision: The court allowed the appeal on the condition that the seized hard disks would be supplied to Tyagi under the specified conditions outlined in paragraphs 12 and 13.

Facts:

The respondent-landlord filed for eviction of the appellant, who was the brother of the deceased tenant, Lalita, from a property in Dehradun. Lalita had been the tenant after her father-in-law and husband.

Issues:

Whether the appellant qualified as a legal heir or representative of Lalita and whether he was entitled to continue as a tenant in the disputed property.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined relevant provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act and the Hindu Succession Act to determine the appellant's inheritance rights and tenancy status.

It concluded that the appellant did not meet the criteria to be considered a legal heir or representative of Lalita under the relevant laws. The Court upheld the eviction order, directing the appellant to vacate the premises within four weeks. Failure to comply would result in the appellant being liable for contempt of court.

Facts:

The appellants, along with four other individuals, were charged with offenses under Sections 148, 302, 302/149, and 307/149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The case stemmed from an incident where the accused, armed with rifles and weapons, attacked the complainant's family, resulting in the death of one individual and injuries to others.

Issues:

The interpretation and application of Section 149 of the IPC, which holds every member of an unlawful assembly accountable for offenses committed by any member in furtherance of the common object.

Held:

After analyzing the evidence, including witness testimonies and medical reports, the court upheld the convictions of the appellants and other accused. The court emphasized the principle of vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC, stating that once an individual's case falls within the scope of this provision, their personal involvement in the offense becomes immaterial. The court noted the consistent and credible testimonies of eyewitnesses, corroborating the prosecution's case, and highlighted the presence of the accused at the scene armed with weapons, indicating a common objective to commit violence.

The court referred to the precedent set in Lalji v. State of U.P., reiterating the principles governing Section 149 IPC and emphasizing that mere presence in an unlawful assembly can lead to vicarious criminal liability. Therefore, finding no merit in the appeal, the court dismissed it accordingly.