Facts:

The appellant, an employee of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (DESU), was accused of demanding an illegal gratification for facilitating the installation of an electric connection.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant demanded Rs. 4000 from the complainant and directed him to pay the money to a co-accused.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act based on the testimony of a shadow witness.

The appellant appealed to the High Court, which upheld the conviction. Subsequently, the appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the prosecution proved the demand and acceptance of bribe money by the appellant.

Whether the acquittal of the co-accused from conspiracy charges extends to the appellant.

Held:

The prosecution failed to establish both the demand and acceptance of bribe money by the appellant.

Since the charge of conspiracy against the appellant and co-accused was not proved, and the co-accused was acquitted of all charges under the PC Act, the appellant should also be acquitted.

The appellant's conviction under the PC Act was not legally sustainable.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges.

Facts:

The appellant, Suzuki Parasrampuria Suitings Pvt Ltd, was an assignee of debt by the Industrial Finance Corporation of India Ltd (IFCI) for the outstandings of M/s. Mahendra Petrochemicals Ltd (MPL).

The appellant sought substitution as a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act, but the Company Judge rejected the application.

The appellant then filed for recall/review of the order, contending that they only desired to be adjudged as a transferee of an actionable claim under Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act (T.P. Act).

The recall/review application was also rejected by the Company Judge.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was entitled to substitution as a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act.

Whether the appellant's request for recall/review of the order was justified.

Held:

The Court held that the appellant initially sought substitution as a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act, as evidenced by their own submissions and pleadings before the Company Judge. The Court found that the appellant's attempt to shift their stance after the rejection of their claim was impermissible. The Court cited legal precedents emphasizing that a litigant cannot take contradictory stands in the same case.

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower court's decision. The appellant's request for substitution was found to lack merit.

Facts:

Hindustan Antibiotics Limited (HAL), a Government of India Undertaking, is engaged in manufacturing life-saving drugs, including PenicillinG.

HAL entered into a joint venture with a foreign company for manufacturing PenicillinG, but the venture failed, leading to rehabilitation under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Protection) Act, 1985.

HAL owns land in Pune, some of which is unused. Disputes arose between HAL and the State, represented by Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA), regarding the disposal of this land.

HAL filed a writ petition in the Bombay High Court seeking directives regarding the disposal of specific portions of the land.

The High Court dismissed HAL's writ petition, suggesting that the proper remedy for HAL would be to file a suit in the civil court rather than pursuing the matter through a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

Issues:

Whether HAL's remedy lies in filing a suit in the civil court or pursuing the matter through a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The Supreme Court intervened to promote an amicable resolution to the disputes between HAL and MHADA regarding land ownership and disposal. The Court decided to appoint an arbitrator to resolve the disputes. The decision is outlined in the following paragraphs:

Since all parties to the appeal are either Public Undertaking or/and the State and its agencies (MHADA), the matter should be amicably settled by the parties concerned sitting across the table rather than to drag the dispute(s) in the Court.

We are of the considered opinion that the various disputes which have arisen between the parties including the one which is the subject matter of the writ petition/appeal be referred to the sole Arbitrator for his decision.

We, accordingly, request Mr. Justice R.V. Raveendran former Judge of this Court to act as a sole Arbitrator for deciding the dispute(s), which have arisen between the parties to this appeal.

The appeal stands accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved ArcelorMittal India Private Limited (AMIPL) and its resolution plan, along with that of Numetal, being challenged under Section 29A(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues:

Whether the resolution plans submitted by AMIPL and Numetal were affected by Section 29A(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Held:

The Court noted that both resolution plans submitted by AMIPL and Numetal were indeed affected by Section 29A(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, as neither entity had cleared their respective non-performing assets (NPAs).

The Court, considering the interest of complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, granted both resolution applicants an additional opportunity to clear the NPAs of their related corporate debtors within two weeks from the date of the judgment.

If the NPAs were paid within the specified period, both resolution applicants were permitted to resubmit their resolution plans to the Committee of Creditors. The Committee of Creditors was given eight weeks from the date of the judgment to accept, by the requisite majority, the best among the resubmitted plans, including the resolution plan submitted by Vedanta.

However, if none of the plans received the requisite majority approval from the Committee of Creditors, the corporate debtor, i.e., ESIL, would proceed into liquidation.

Decision:The appeals were disposed of based on the directives mentioned above.

Facts:

Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank dismissed Narendra Kumar Sinha from service based on three charges of misconduct.

Sinha challenged his dismissal through writ petitions.

The Single Judge initially remanded the case to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration.

The Division Bench modified the Single Judge's order, remanding the case to the Disciplinary Authority instead.

Both the appellant bank and the respondent employee appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the remand by the Single Judge and Division Bench was appropriate.

Whether all charges against Sinha were adequately considered.

What action should be taken regarding the appeals filed by the bank and the employee.

Held:

The Court set aside both the Single Judge's and Division Bench's orders. The Court found errors in both decisions, noting that the Single Judge failed to consider all charges individually before remanding the case, and the Division Bench erred by remanding the case to the Disciplinary Authority instead of addressing the writ petition on its merits.

The Court remanded the case back to the Single Judge for a fresh consideration of the writ petition on its merits, instructing the Judge to examine each charge independently and make findings on all charges in accordance with the law.

The Court also emphasized expeditious handling of the matter, urging the Single Judge to decide the writ petition preferably within six months.

Facts:

The case revolves around the constitutional validity and interpretation of the Goods and Services Tax (Compensation to States) Act, 2017.

Issues:

Whether the Compensation to States Act, 2017 is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament?

Whether Compensation to States Act, 2017 violates Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016 and is against the objective of Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016 and Whether the Compensation to States Act, 2017 is a colourable legislation?

Whether levy of Compensation to States Cess and GST on the same taxing event is permissible in law?

Whether on the basis of Clean Energy Cess paid by the petitioner till 30.06.2017, the petitioner is entitled for set off in payment of Compensation to States Cess?

Held:

The Compensation to States Act, 2017 is not beyond the legislative competence of Parliament. The Act falls within the powers granted to Parliament under Article 246A and Article 270.

The Compensation to States Act, 2017 does not violate the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, and is not a colorable legislation. It aligns with the objectives of the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016.

The levy of Compensation to States Cess alongside GST on the same taxable event is permissible in law. They are considered separate imposts.

The petitioner is not entitled to set off Clean Energy Cess against Compensation to States Cess. The two serve different purposes, and the legislative scheme does not provide for such set off.

Decision: The appeals are allowed, and the transferred cases are dismissed.

Facts:

The case revolves around the allocation of subordinate judicial officers between the newly formed states of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh after the reorganisation of Andhra Pradesh.

Initially, the Union of India proposed guidelines for allocation, which were later modified by the High Court to consider factors such as seniority and preference for the state in which the district of service falls.

Issues:

The validity and fairness of the guidelines for the allocation of subordinate judicial officers between Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.

The case also addressed the interpretation of relevant sections of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, and the constitutional provisions regarding domicile-based preferences in public employment.

Held:

The court emphasized that final allocation orders for judicial officers were to be issued by the Central Government after consultation with the High Court, as per the provisions of Sections 77 and 80 of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014.

It was reiterated that guidelines for allocation should ensure fair and equal treatment to all affected individuals, in line with constitutional principles of equality.

The court clarified that domicile-based preferences may not apply to appointment of judicial officers, as per the constitutional scheme and the express provisions of Article 371D.

The right of option for judicial officers to choose their cadre state was upheld, with seniority being a significant factor in accepting such options.

The modified guidelines aimed to balance the right of option for judicial officers while ensuring fairness in allocation.

After reviewing the options exercised by judicial officers and finding that all officers from Telangana had opted for Telangana, the court concluded that the modified guidelines were legally sound and directed their implementation.

Decision: The court concluded that the modified guidelines for the allocation of judicial officers between Telangana and Andhra Pradesh were acceptable and ordered the finalization of options for all judicial officers as per these guidelines.

Facts:

The appellant, employed as a Peon in a bank, was accused of misappropriating funds entrusted to him.

He allegedly made fake credit entries, forged signatures, and pocketed money from depositors.

The prosecution relied on confession statements made by the appellant during a preliminary enquiry conducted by senior bank officials.

The appellant contested the voluntariness of these confessions, alleging coercion and inducement.

Issues:

Whether the confession statements made by the appellant were voluntary.

Whether there was evidence of coercion or inducement by investigating officers.

The admissibility and evidentiary value of confession statements in the case.

Held:

The court examined the circumstances surrounding the confession statements and found no evidence of coercion or inducement.

Mere allegations of threat or inducement are not sufficient; there must be evidence of reasonable belief in the accused's mind.

The court confirmed the appellant's conviction under Section 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Sections 409 and 477-A of the IPC.

However, considering the passage of time and the circumstances of the case, the court reduced the appellant's sentence of imprisonment under Section 409 IPC from five years to three years.

The conviction and sentences under other sections were upheld.

The appeals were partly allowed, confirming the appellant's convictions but reducing the sentence. The appellant was directed to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

The case arose from a contract for the planning, design, development, construction, and maintenance of a Monorail system in Mumbai.

Disputes emerged between Larsen and Toubro Limited, along with SCOMI Engineering Bhd (the Consortium), and Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), leading to an arbitration petition filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

The petition cited Section 2(1)(f)(ii) of the Act, which deals with arbitration involving parties incorporated in different countries.

Issues:

Whether the Consortium should be treated as separate entities or an unincorporated association for arbitration purposes.

Whether central management and control were exercised in India, making the dispute ineligible for international commercial arbitration under Section 2(1)(f)(iii) of the Act.

Held:

The Court considered arguments presented by both parties, including a previous judgment by the Bombay High Court regarding the Consortium's treatment as a single entity.

The Court analyzed the provisions of Section 2(1)(f)(iii) and the rationale behind the deletion of the phrase "a company or" from the provision.

It concluded that the dispute did not qualify as international commercial arbitration under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act.

The Court dismissed the arbitration petition, allowing the petitioner to pursue the matter in the relevant court without considering it as a case of international commercial arbitration.