Inordinate Delay Cannot Be Condoned Without Reasons: Supreme Court Slams Madhya Pradesh High Court for Casual Approach in Condoning 1612 Days’ Delay

“High Court Condoned Delay on Mere Asking – Judicial Discretion Must Be Informed by Law, Not Expediency”, In a clear rebuke to the casual approach adopted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court of India set aside an order condoning 1612 days’ delay in filing a First Appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh, holding that the delay was condoned without any application of mind or assignment of “sufficient cause” as mandated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Prasanna B. Varale termed the impugned High Court order as "legally unsustainable" and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.

“Duty to Record Sufficient Cause Is Not Optional – Judicial Discretion Cannot Be Mechanical”

At the heart of the matter was a condonation application (I.A. No.6849/2024) filed by the State in First Appeal No. 1515/2024, seeking to overcome an extraordinary delay of over four years. The High Court, by its order dated 1 September 2025, allowed the application without recording any cogent reasons or examining the grounds urged by the State.

The Supreme Court was categorical in its censure:

“We are dismayed to say from the tenor of the impugned order that the High Court condoned the delay of 1612 days on mere asking without highlighting the sufficient cause that might have been assigned by the State.” [Para 6]

The Court expressed surprise that the High Court overlooked settled law governing delay condonation under Section 5, and observed:

“Judicial discretion under Section 5 is not unfettered. It must be exercised based on legally recognized parameters. Casual condonation undermines the rule of law.” [Paras 6–8]

“Covid-19 Is No Carte Blanche – Pandemic Not Even Mentioned in High Court Order”

In defence of the delay, Additional Solicitor General Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, appearing for the State, tried to invoke the Covid-19 pandemic as a mitigating factor. However, the Supreme Court found this explanation completely absent in the High Court's reasoning and dismissed it outright:

“According to Ms. Bhati, the delay had occurred because of Covid-19 pandemic. However, we do not find a word in this regard in the impugned order of the High Court.” [Para 9]

The Bench reiterated that merely citing the pandemic without substantiating how and to what extent it impacted the filing cannot justify condonation, especially in the absence of any mention in the original order.

Court Cites Its Own Binding Precedents Ignored by High Court

In delivering its ruling, the Supreme Court pointedly referred to two binding precedents which lay down the contours of how discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be exercised:

1. Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489
2. Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969

These judgments clearly direct that condonation of delay must follow a reasoned analysis of the explanation offered, and that state litigants are not entitled to preferential treatment.

“We wonder if the High Court is aware of the following decisions...” the Court remarked, highlighting the judicial lapse and failure to apply binding authority. [Para 7]

Matter Remanded – High Court Directed to Reconsider Delay Application Afresh

Finding the High Court’s order legally flawed and unsupported by any evaluation of “sufficient cause,” the Supreme Court:

“Set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and remand the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration of I.A. No. 6849/2024.” [Para 10]

The High Court has been directed to hear both parties afresh and render a decision in accordance with law, after properly recording its reasons.

“The High Court shall hear the parties once again and pass a fresh order in accordance with law.” [Para 11]

Supreme Court Reasserts That “Delay Must Be Explained, Not Excused”

This judgment reaffirms the foundational principle that condonation of delay is not automatic, even for government litigants. The rule of law demands equal treatment, and judicial discretion must be disciplined by statutory requirements and precedent.

The Supreme Court’s verdict sends a strong signal to all High Courts and subordinate courts that delay condonation is a judicial function that cannot be exercised perfunctorily. The State, like any other litigant, must show good cause and credible justification—mere institutional inertia or stock excuses like “Covid-19” cannot override the mandates of limitation law.

Date of Decision: 5 December 2025