Facts:

The respondent, Gram Panchayat of village Kalehri, filed a suit against the State of Haryana claiming ownership of a piece of land.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent.

The State of Haryana appealed, but both the first appellate court and the High Court upheld the Trial Court's decision.

The High Court, while dismissing the second appeal, held that there were no substantial questions of law to be determined.

Issues:

Ownership rights over the disputed land.

Proper interpretation of documents (exhibits) to prove ownership rights.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after hearing the appeal, disagreed with the High Court's decision and held that issues related to ownership rights and the interpretation of documents constitute substantial questions of law. The High Court's order was set aside, and the case was remanded for the second appeal to be decided afresh on its merits.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court should admit the appeal, frame substantial questions of law, and decide the appeal finally on merits, considering the nature of the controversy and the issues involved. Additionally, the Court highlighted that Order 27, Rule 5B of the Civil Procedure Code requires the Court, in suits against the Government, to assist parties in arriving at a settlement.

In this case, no such endeavor was made, and the Court should have attempted settlement before deciding the case on merits. The High Court was requested to decide the second appeal finally on merits within six months, taking into account the issues raised and the observations made.

Facts:

The case involves a free fight between two sets of relatives, leading to the death of Zile Singh and injuries to others.

Appellant (Jagdish) was convicted by the Trial Court, and the High Court upheld the decision.

Issues:

The appellant challenged the conviction on various grounds, including the lack of evidence, improper appreciation of evidence, absence of blood stains at the spot, and alleged absence of the appellant from the scene.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized that it cannot appreciate the entire evidence de novo routinely when the conviction is based on concurrent findings of two courts.

The appellant's counsel's arguments were rejected, and the Court found no merit in the grounds raised for appeal.

Three eyewitnesses consistently testified about the incident, and the courts below were justified in accepting their evidence.

The appellant was found to be armed with a lathi and responsible for the death of Zile Singh.

The absence of blood stains at the spot was deemed insufficient to negate the occurrence of the incident.

The appeal was dismissed, and the bail granted earlier was canceled, directing the appellant to surrender before the Trial Court.

Facts:

Provide an overview of the case, including the murder of a young bride within six months of marriage, the gruesome disposal of the body, and the witnesses claiming to have seen one of the accused throwing the body in the park.

Issues:

The circumstantial evidence presented, the common intention of the accused, and the burden of proof in a murder case committed in secrecy within a house.

Held:

Outlines the principles for establishing circumstantial evidence, emphasizing the need for a complete chain of circumstances leading to the guilt of the accused. Paragraphs 30 and 31 detail the specific circumstances proven against the appellants, including the homicidal nature of the death, the murder in the appellants' house, and the disposal of the body. The court concludes that the chain of circumstances against the appellants is complete.( Paragraph 18)

Discusses the burden of proof in cases of murder committed in secrecy inside a house, citing Section 106 of the Evidence Act. It emphasizes the lighter burden on the prosecution and the corresponding duty on the accused to provide a credible explanation. The accused's failure to explain the death within their knowledge adds to the chain of circumstances.( Paragraph 22)

Highlight the importance of the accused's false explanation, considering it an additional link in the chain of circumstances. The defense's version that the deceased went to her relative's place is contradicted by the established facts of the murder within the appellants' house.( Paragraphs 25, 26, and 29)

Decision: The appeals of the husband and father-in-law are dismissed, affirming their conviction based on the complete chain of circumstances and the false explanations provided by them.

Facts:

The suit involves a dispute between the landlord (appellant) and the tenant (respondent) over a property in Bharuch, Gujarat.

The appellant inherited the property through a will and sought eviction of the tenant based on non-payment of rent and personal need for residence.

The trial court passed a money decree and eviction order in favor of the landlord.

The appellate court affirmed the findings of the trial court, dismissing the tenant's appeal.

The tenant filed a civil revision in the High Court, challenging the findings of the appellate court.

The High Court set aside the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case for fresh consideration.

Issues:

Applicability of the Bombay Rents Act to the suit property.

Legality of findings on merits.

Justifiability of the High Court's decision to remand the case.

Held:

The High Court erred in remanding the case, as the appellate court had already examined all relevant issues, including the applicability of the Act, and rendered findings in favor of the landlord.

The High Court should have focused on the legality of the findings on merits instead of remanding the case.

The respondents were granted three months to vacate the property, provided they deposited the entire decreetal amount within one month. Failure to comply within the specified time would entitle the appellants to execute the eviction decree.

Facts:

Information received about Charas transportation in a jeep.

Search and seizure conducted in the presence of a gazetted officer.

Appellant, Mahiman Singh, arrested and convicted under Section 20 of the NDPS Act.

Appellant challenged the conviction, citing lack of evidence and non-compliance with NDPS Act requirements.

Issues:

Sufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction.

Compliance with NDPS Act requirements - Sections 42, 43, and 50.

Consideration of the accused's statement and an affidavit.

Held:

The two Courts below rightly held that the prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence adduced was sufficient to warrant the appellant's conviction. Compliance with relevant sections of the NDPS Act was upheld, and the accused's statement and affidavit were not considered as evidence. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

Facts:

Appellant was awarded a contract in 1998 and completed the work in 2000.

Final payment was received on April 10, 2001.

Appellant claimed the payment covered only the undisputed part and raised disputed claims in a notice sent in 2005.

Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the appellant's application under Section 11.

Issues:

Whether the claim raised by the appellant was a live claim or time-barred.

Jurisdiction of the Chief Justice in deciding preliminary aspects under Section 11.

Held:

The Chief Justice has the right to decide preliminary aspects, including the existence of a live claim, when deciding an application under Section 11.

The Chief Justice can reject an application only if the claim is evidently and patently time-barred without the need for detailed consideration of evidence.

The claim raised in 2005 was not evidently time-barred, and the Chief Justice should have left it for the decision of the arbitrator.

The appellant's assertion that the final payment covered only the undisputed part was supported by additional materials.

The order dismissing the application was set aside, and the case was remitted to the High Court for the appointment of an arbitrator.

Facts:

Madura Coats filed a winding-up petition against Modi Rubber, alleging an inability to pay undisputed debts.

After adjournments, the Company Court passed a winding-up order on March 12, 2004.

Modi Rubber appealed, claiming a reference to BIFR under SICA.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of SICA prevail over the Companies Act when a reference is made to the BIFR.

Held:

Different situations discussed, including pending winding-up proceedings with a BIFR reference.

Emphasis on SICA's primacy over the Companies Act and the stay of proceedings under the Companies Act during BIFR proceedings.

A winding-up order under the Companies Act is not the culmination but the commencement of the dissolution process.

No error found in the High Court's decision, and Madura Coats' participation in BIFR proceedings highlighted.

The appeal dismissed, considering the academic nature of the exercise.

Facts:

The plaintiff-appellant, a public limited company, entered into a hire-purchase agreement on 20.09.1983, financing an amount of Rs. 1,47,000 for a commercial vehicle.

The hirer, the first defendant, defaulted on payments from 20th May 1984.

The plaintiff seized the vehicle on 9th February 1985 and demanded settlement within 10 days.

The vehicle was sold on 30th May 1985, and the plaintiff sought the balance of Rs. 40,138.

The plaintiff filed a suit on 25.05.1988, which was dismissed by the trial court as barred by limitation.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation?

Determination of the accrual of the right to sue under Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Held:

The trial court and the High Court correctly held that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The breach of the agreement occurred when the hirer defaulted on payments on 20th May 1984. The plaintiff's right to sue accrued at the time of the default, and the suit filed beyond three years from that date was rightly dismissed.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the limitation period should begin from the date of the sale of the vehicle or the last date of payment of the installment. The case was distinguished from situations involving statutory powers akin to Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. The Court emphasized that the rights of the parties were governed by the terms and conditions of the agreement. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.

Facts:

The case involves MIS Umesh Goel (Appellant) against Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. (Respondent). The dispute centers on the ban imposed under Section 69 of the Partnership Act, specifically focusing on whether this prohibition extends to arbitral proceedings.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act, determining whether the ban against unregistered firms applies to arbitral proceedings. The court explores the scope and ambit of the provision, considering the expressions "other proceedings" and their intrinsic connection with suits.

Held:

The court holds that the ban imposed under Section 69(3) does not extend to arbitral proceedings or arbitration awards, distinguishing them from civil proceedings or suits.[Para 10 and 11]

Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 69 are impliedly incorporated into subsection (3), and a claim of set off or other proceedings must be intrinsically connected to the initiation of a suit.[Para 20]

The condition precedent for the ban to operate is the initiation of a suit in a court by an unregistered firm or a person claiming to be a partner, coupled with a claim for set off or other proceedings intrinsically connected with the suit.[Para 13 and 14]

Specific exclusions in sub-clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (3) clarify that certain proceedings, even if intrinsically connected with a suit, are not affected by the ban.[Para 15]

The term "Court" in the Partnership Act is not defined, and the court refers to Section 2(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for clarification.[Para 21 and 26]

Arbitral proceedings are not treated as civil proceedings under Section 69(3), and interpretations under the Limitation Act, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, or Interest Act are deemed inapplicable.[Para 32]

Importing the definition clause of "Court" from the Interest Act to apply Section 69(3) is considered inappropriate.[Para 33]

The court rejects the notion that Sections 35 and 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, equate arbitral proceedings to civil court proceedings for the purpose of Section 69(3).[Para 34]

Decision: The court allows the appeal, determining that the ban under Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act does not apply to arbitral proceedings.