Facts:

The case involved writ petitions seeking the quashing of repeated imposition of police orders under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which declared the Central Delhi area as a prohibited area for holding public meetings, dharnas, and peaceful protests. The petitions also sought the quashing of an order of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) prohibiting demonstrations at Jantar Mantar road. Additionally, the petitioners requested the issuance of a writ of mandamus laying down guidelines for holding public meetings and dharnas.

Issues:

Whether the repeated imposition of section 144 orders and the NGT's order amounted to a violation of the fundamental right to protest.

Whether there exists a need to balance the rights of protestors with the rights of residents and the larger public interest.

Whether regulations and guidelines should be formulated to govern protests and demonstrations effectively.

Held:

The right of people to hold peaceful protests and demonstrations is a fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India.

The court emphasized the need to balance the rights of protestors with the rights of residents and the larger public interest.

Certain categories of peaceful protests and demonstrations should be allowed in a regulated manner to enable protestors to exercise their rights without causing inconvenience to residents.

The Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, in consultation with other concerned agencies, is directed to devise proper guidelines for regulating protests and demonstrations in Jantar Mantar and Boat Club area.

The court reiterated that while the right to protest is fundamental, it is subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in the interest of sovereignty, integrity, and public order.

Decision: The court disposed of the matters by directing the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi, to formulate guidelines for regulating protests and demonstrations in Jantar Mantar and Boat Club area, ensuring that protests are conducted without causing inconvenience to residents or disrupting public order.

Facts:

The Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC) did not approach the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) for tariff determination despite the enactment of the Electricity Act of 2003. The case revolves around the interplay between the provisions of the 1948 Act and the 2003 Act regarding tariff determination.

Issues:

The applicability of certain provisions of the 1948 Act for tariff determination, the interpretation of the fourth proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and the recognition of the social responsibilities of the DVC in tariff determination.

Held:

The grant of a transitory period for tariff determination is justified considering the statutory functions and social responsibilities mandated for the Damodar Valley Corporation.

The establishment and purpose of the Damodar Valley Corporation under the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948 are discussed.

The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2004, although statutory, are considered subordinate delegated legislation. The court upholds the relevance of the 1948 Act in light of the legislative history and principles of law.

The fourth proviso to Section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003, is interpreted as a substantive provision providing for the continued application of certain provisions of the 1948 Act not inconsistent with the 2003 Act.

Sections 18 and 19 of the 1948 Act are analyzed to determine their relevance in the context of licensing provisions. The court emphasizes the intention behind the fourth proviso to Section 14 of the 2003 Act.

The legislative history behind the enactment of Section 173 and the provisions of Section 14, including its fourth proviso, are considered to understand the Parliament's intention in providing partial exemption to the DVC.

The court confirms the relevance of Section 40 of the 1948 Act concerning depreciation rate and sinking fund. It also approves the debt-equity ratio adopted by the DVC.

The Appellate Tribunal's decision to allow the recovery of the entire pension and gratuity fund through tariffs from consumers is upheld.

The court agrees that recovery of costs incurred in connection with socially beneficial activities of the DVC from the common fund generated by tariffs is not inconsistent with the provisions of the 2003 Act.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, and the findings of the Appellate Tribunal are affirmed, recognizing the unique social responsibilities of the Damodar Valley Corporation and the need to balance them with tariff determinations.

Facts:

The case involves a boundary dispute between Assam and Nagaland. During the examination of PW 9 Md.Shafiqur Rahman from the Survey of India, the State of Assam sought the production of additional topographical maps to support its case. These maps were not in Assam's possession but were maintained in the Head Office of the Survey of India at Dehradun. Nagaland objected to the production of additional maps, citing a previous order allowing only certain maps to be produced.

Issues:

Whether the Court should allow the production of additional topographical maps requested by Assam, considering the objection raised by Nagaland based on a previous order permitting only certain maps.

Held:

The Court, after considering arguments from both parties, held that the production of the requested maps should be allowed. It emphasized that the documents were not in Assam's possession earlier, and the previous order did not preclude Assam from seeking production at this stage. However, the Court clarified that it did not address the relevance or admissibility of the documents, leaving it open for Nagaland to raise objections. Therefore, the application for production was allowed, and the Interlocutory Application was disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The disputes between Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd. and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. were referred to arbitration concerning the price for the supply of goods. The arbitrator fixed the price and awarded pre-reference, pendente lite, and future interest at a rate of 18% per annum.

Issues:

Whether the arbitrator had the power to award pre-reference, pendente lite, and future interest.

Whether clause 16 of the General Conditions of Contract barred the payment of interest.

Whether there was any delay in payment on the facts of the case.

Held:

The Arbitration Act, 1940, grants arbitrators the power to award pre-reference interest under the Interest Act, 1978, as well as pendente lite and future interest. However, this power is constrained by an express bar in the agreement between the parties. Clauses that bar interest payments are subject to strict construction by the court. Unless there is a clear and express bar, the arbitrator can award pre-reference or pendente lite interest.

Clause 16 of the General Conditions of Contract, which only addresses delays in payment, does not explicitly refer to the arbitrator's power to grant interest. Thus, it cannot bar the payment of pendente lite interest. Furthermore, clause 16 is narrower than clauses considered in previous cases, such as the Second Ambica Construction Case and Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Ltd.

Factually, there was no delay in payment in this case, as the higher price became payable only from the date of the award. Thus, even if clause 16 were to apply, both pre-reference and pendente lite interest are not barred.

The reduction of interest from 18% to 10% was solely based on the status of ONGC as a Public Sector Undertaking, which is insufficient to set aside the arbitrator's discretion. Since there was no finding that the arbitrator exercised discretion perversely, the grant of interest at the rate of 18% for pre-reference and pendente lite interest is upheld. ONGC is directed to pay the differential amount of interest at 8% until specific dates and future interest at a reduced rate thereafter.

Facts:

The deceased, Ashok Kumar, died as a result of an accident on 31 March 1994, while alighting from a bus belonging to the Chandigarh Transport Undertaking. The accident caused by the sudden movement of the bus resulted in his death the following day.

The heirs filed a claim petition seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT). The MACT awarded Rs. 50,000 towards no-fault liability but found no negligence on the part of the bus driver.

On appeal, the High Court awarded a total compensation of Rs 3,98,500, drawing an adverse inference due to the non-examination of the bus driver. However, it reduced the rate of interest from 12% to 6% per annum.

Issues:

Whether future prospects should be considered in computing the income of the deceased.

The correctness of the deduction of one-third towards personal expenses.

Justification for reducing the rate of interest from 12% to 6% per annum.

Held:

The High Court erred in not considering future prospects in computing the income of the deceased. Referring to the judgment in National Insurance Company Ltd. v Pranay Sethi, the Court held that an addition of 40% towards future prospects is warranted, considering the age of the deceased.

The deduction of one-third towards personal expenses was deemed proper.

Total compensation was computed at Rs 6,41,200, considering the deceased's income, loss of dependency, loss of consortium, loss of estate, and funeral expenses.

Interest was allowed at 9% per annum from the date of the petition until payment.

The appeal was allowed accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant-wife and respondent No. 2-husband had solemnized their marriage as per Sikh rites and Hindu Vedic rites in New Delhi, followed by a civil marriage in the USA.

The parties had a daughter named M.

After the marriage, the appellant fled to India with M and filed for divorce in Delhi.

The respondent filed for custody in the US.

The Delhi High Court granted custody to the respondent, directing the appellant to return M to the US.

Issues:

Whether the custody of the minor girl child should remain with the appellant in India or be returned to the US.

Determination of the jurisdiction for deciding custody proceedings.

Held:

The Court emphasized the paramount importance of the best interest of the child in custody disputes.

Considering the totality of facts and circumstances, the Court held that there was no compelling reason to direct the return of the minor child to the US. The child's stay in India with her mother, maternal grandparents, and extended family was deemed not prejudicial to her well-being.

The Court observed that custody with the biological mother is not unlawful, and the appellant's custody of M in India is lawful.

It was directed that M's custody would remain with the appellant until she attains the age of majority or until a competent court decides otherwise.

The Court suggested that proceedings for custody should be expedited in the Family Court, New Delhi.

Jurisdictional issues were not conclusively determined, but the Court suggested that the Family Court in New Delhi should decide the matter promptly.

Both parties were instructed to ensure the prompt resolution of custody proceedings in India.

Decision: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and disposed of the writ petition, affirming custody with the appellant in India until further order or until M reaches adulthood.

Facts:

Indian Bank initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act to enforce security interest in agricultural land.

High Court of Madras declared these proceedings null and void, citing non-applicability of the SARFAESI Act to agricultural land.

The property in question included agricultural land, for which a security interest was created by Yelagiri Dairy Farm to secure a term loan.

Issues:

Whether the SARFAESI Act is applicable to security interest in agricultural land.

Whether the classification of land as agricultural in revenue records is conclusive in determining its applicability under the SARFAESI Act.

Held:

The Court found that the Madras High Court failed to adequately determine whether the land in question was genuinely agricultural. As a result, it set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the proceedings for reconsideration. The High Court was instructed to make a fresh determination based on the totality of facts.

The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside. The case was sent back to the High Court for reevaluation. No costs were awarded in this case.

Facts:

Hetchin Haokip, the appellant, challenged the order of preventive detention issued against her husband, Jangkhohao Khongsai, by the District Magistrate of Bishnupur, Manipur.

The detention was based on allegations of involvement in criminal activities related to being a member of the KLA organization and possession of firearms.

The appellant contended that the District Magistrate failed to report the detention to the State Government "forthwith," as required under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980.

Issues:

Whether the delay in reporting the detention to the State Government by the District Magistrate violated the requirement of reporting "forthwith" under Section 3(4) of the National Security Act, 1980.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that "forthwith" under Section 3(4) means within a reasonable time and without undue delay.

While acknowledging that "forthwith" does not mean instantaneous action, any delay must be justified by unavoidable circumstances beyond the authority's control.

In this case, the District Magistrate took five days to report the detention to the State Government without providing any justification for the delay.

The Supreme Court found this delay unjustified and ruled that it vitiated the detention order.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and nullified the detention order.

Facts:

Currency Note Press & Anr (appellants), wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, employed the respondents at their printing press in Nashik, Maharashtra.

Respondents, former employees, filed applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, claiming overtime wages for the period from 1986 to 1990.

The Labour Court initially dismissed the applications, prompting the respondents to file a writ petition before the High Court, which set aside the Labour Court's order and granted monetary relief to the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in granting monetary relief to the respondents by setting aside the Labour Court's order regarding overtime wages claimed for the period 1986 to 1990.

Held and Decision:

In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Court mentioned five factual reasons for dismissing the appeal:

All respondents were no longer in service, having either retired or passed away.

The amount involved was not substantial.

The period in question was from 1986 to 1990.

The amount had already been paid to the respondents pursuant to the High Court's order.

The overtime work claimed by the respondents was admitted to have been done while on duty.

The Court further stated in paragraph 12 that, considering these factual reasons, it declined to examine the legal issues raised by the appellants regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948, and the Factories Act, 1948. These issues were left open for consideration in a different case.

Therefore, in view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to grant monetary relief to the respondents for overtime wages.