Facts:

A suit was filed claiming a sum of Rs. 6,94,63,114 on 10.03.2017. The defendant was served with summons on 14.07.2017. The court allowed a grace period of 120 days for filing a written statement, and an Order 7, Rule 11 application was rejected. A subsequent application sought to rely on recent changes in the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issues:

The interpretation of the amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Order 8, Rules 1 and 10, and whether the consequences of not filing a written statement within the stipulated time frame are mandatory.

Held:

The court, after considering the recent amendments and various precedents, held that the consequences outlined in the amended provisions are indeed mandatory. Beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant forfeits the right to file a written statement, and the court has no power to extend this time. The court rejected the argument that inherent powers could be invoked to circumvent these provisions.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, resulting in the removal of the written statement of Defendant No.1 from the record.

Facts:

The Trial Court convicted 11 accused persons under various sections of the IPC, including Sections 148, 302/149, 323/149, and 506/149. The High Court acquitted 8 accused persons under Section 302/149 IPC and upheld the conviction of 3 accused persons under Section 302/34 IPC. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, one of the appellants (No. 1) expired.

Issues:

Validity of the alteration of charges from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 302/34 IPC.

Applicability of Section 149 IPC after the acquittal of 8 co-accused.

Justification for sustaining the conviction of the three appellants.

Held:

Once eight co-accused were acquitted under Section 302/149 IPC, the charge under Section 149 IPC collapsed against the three appellants as there could be no unlawful assembly consisting of less than five accused persons. In other words, the appellants (3 in number) could not be charged with the aid of Section 149 IPC for want of numbers.( Para 55)

The High Court had the jurisdiction to alter the charge from Section 149 IPC to Section 34 IPC, but in the absence of evidence of common intention among the three appellants, their conviction under Section 302/34 IPC is not legally sustainable.( Para 56)

The prosecution did not set up a case that all 11 accused persons shared a common intention under Section 34 IPC. The High Court failed to give any reasons in support of the altered conviction, and the invoking of Section 34 IPC at the appellate stage cannot be upheld.( Paras 62 and 63)

The post-mortem report indicated that both assaults by appellant Nos. 2 and 3 caused simple injuries to the victim, not resulting in her death.( Para 67)

In a case of this nature, where there is a fight between two groups and the State does not pursue the plea of Section 149 IPC against the acquitted eight accused, and no evidence is relied upon for the charge of Section 34 IPC against the three accused, the two appellants are entitled to claim the benefit of entire scenario.( Para 68)

Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could, at best, be convicted for an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.( Para 69)

Facts:

The case involved a challenge to Rule 24(i-eeee) of the Haryana Liquor License Rules, 1970, which provided for a single L-1BF license for the entire state to deal in imported foreign liquor. The contention was that this rule was ultra vires the powers of the Financial Commissioner under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914.

Issues:

The delegation of powers, specifically whether the Financial Commissioner had the authority to amend the rules regarding the number of licenses for the entire state, a power exclusive to the State Government.

Held:

The State Government, under Section 8 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, has general superintendence and control of Excise Administration. The power to regulate the number of licenses for a local area is exclusively vested in the State Government under Section 58(2)(e).

The delegation of this power by the State Government to the Financial Commissioner is prohibited by Section 13(a). The amendment to Rule 24(i-eeee) by the Financial Commissioner is ultra vires the powers of the latter and is struck down.

The expression "local area" in Section 58(2)(e) implies the power of the State to place restrictions on the number of licenses within a specific local area. The power to regulate the sale of liquor, including the number of licenses, is within the purview of the Financial Commissioner under Section 59.

Rule 24(i-eeee) as amended by the Financial Commissioner is upheld, and the Financial Commissioner has the power to decide the number of licenses for the entire state.

Decision: The Court, by majority, held that Rule 24(i-eeee) as amended by the Financial Commissioner is ultra vires the powers of the Financial Commissioner and is therefore struck down.

Facts:

The appellant was charged under Section 20(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act for carrying "charas" on his scooter in gunny bags. The Trial Court acquitted him citing non-compliance with Section 100(4) of Cr.P.C., and the High Court reversed the acquittal based on the production of seals and chemical examiner's report.

Issues:

Validity of the seizure under NDPS Act.

Compliance with Section 100(4) of Cr.P.C.

The role of the informant being the investigating officer.

Held:

The Trial Court's conclusion on non-production of the seal in court was deemed perverse, as two specimen seal impressions were marked as Exhibits PH and PK, and there was no evidence of tampering.( Para 6)

Section 50 of NDPS Act had no application since the recovery was from gunny bags on the scooter, not the person. The independent witness, PW-5, turned hostile but was duly confronted with his earlier statements.( Para 7)

The appellant's defense of false implication lacked evidence regarding his complaint against the C.I.D. department, as noted by the Trial Court. No reason found to differ from the High Court's conclusion.( Para 8)

The only surviving issue was the informant (PW-10) also being the Investigating Officer. The ground was not raised earlier and not pleaded in the appeal.( Para 9)

The court held that the law in Mohan Lal (regarding informant and investigating officer being different) cannot be a springboard for acquittal, considering societal interest and the history of the appellant's previous convictions.( Para 18)

Facts:

IMTRAT personnel filed writ petitions seeking parity between BCA and FA.

Cabinet decision dated 30.11.1999 regarding the removal of depression on BCA and imposition of charges for free facilities.

Ministry of Defence order dated 20.09.2005 implemented the cabinet decision prospectively.

High Court allowed writ petitions on 22.11.2005, setting aside the Ministry of Defence order to the extent it gave relief prospectively.

Issues:

Interpretation of the term "civilian counterparts."

Validity of the clarification made in the impugned judgment dated 07.05.2007, affirming parity between BCA and FA.

Held:

High Court not justified in concluding a legitimate case for parity. Differences in requirements and entitlements outlined.

IMTRAT and MEA personnel have distinct terms of appointment and conditions of service, negating the case for parity.

Clarification beyond the scope of the original order. No valid grounds for granting parity. Original order directions fully complied with.

Decision: Partly allowing the appeal, the Court held that there was no valid ground for parity between BCA payable to IMTRAT personnel and FA payable to MEA personnel. The clarification in the impugned judgment exceeded the scope of the original order, and the differences in requirements and entitlements between the two groups were emphasized.

Facts:

Faquirey was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Trial Court.

The High Court converted the conviction to an offense under Section 304 Part I, IPC, and sentenced Faquirey to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The incident involved Faquirey shooting the deceased due to a grudge, stemming from the deceased's past conduct regarding Faquirey's wife.

Issues:

Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC was rightly converted to Section 304 Part I, IPC by the High Court.

Application of Exception I to Section 300 IPC in the context of provocation.

The voluntariness of the provocation and its relevance to the accused's liability.

Held:

The shot fired by Faquirey was a result of a grudge against the deceased, and the High Court erred in converting the conviction.

Exception I to Section 300 IPC was discussed, emphasizing that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender is deprived of self-control by grave and sudden provocation.

The First Proviso to Exception I highlights that the provocation should not be voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for harming another person.

The court concluded that the provocation in this case was voluntary on Faquirey's part, and he cannot claim exemption under Section 304 Part I, IPC.

The High Court's conversion of the conviction was deemed a serious error, and the judgment of the Trial Court convicting Faquirey under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to life imprisonment was restored.

Despite Faquirey having served 10 years, he was directed to surrender within four weeks to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission ("NCDRC") disposed of the consumer complaint filed by flat purchasers.

The possession, as per the flat purchase agreement, was to be handed over by 31 January 2014, but the developer breached its contractual obligations.

The occupation certificate was received on 10 February 2016, and possession letters were issued from May 2016.

The NCDRC awarded compensation for delayed possession until 31 July 2016 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

Issues:

The adequacy of compensation and the duration of interest awarded by the NCDRC.

Held:

The NCDRC's conclusion that the stipulated compensation of INR 3 per sq. ft. per month was insufficient was upheld. The flat purchase agreement's terms did not provide just compensation. (Para 9)

The delay in possession was acknowledged, and interest at the rate of 6% per annum was deemed reasonable and justified. (Para 11)

The NCDRC's decision to award interest only up to 31 July 2016 was found inappropriate. Possession had not been handed over to all purchasers, and the liability to pay interest continued until possession was offered. (Para 17-18)

Facts:

The respondent's father, employed with the petitioner-bank, died on 11.11.2004.

Request for compassionate appointment made on 03.03.2005.

Government instructions on 14.07.2004 led to the framing of a new scheme for ex gratia payments.

Petitioner-bank approved the ex gratia scheme on 04.08.2005, abolishing the previous compassionate appointment scheme.

Issues:

Whether the application for compassionate appointment, made under the old scheme, can be considered after the introduction of the new scheme focusing on ex gratia payments?

Held:

The decisions of two-judge Benches provide conflicting views.

The petitioner argues that the governing scheme during application consideration prevails.

The respondent contends that the scheme in force at the time of the claim takes precedence.

Inconsistency in principles necessitates consideration by a larger Bench.

Decision: The matter is referred to the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of a larger Bench of at least three Hon'ble Judges to resolve the conflicting principles and provide clarity on the applicable scheme.

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation issued an office order for regularizing tubewells causing unauthorized activities of discharging waste water into the main sewer. The Corporation claimed user charges for the discharge of waste water into Municipal drains. The schools, initially agreeing to regularize the discharge, later disputed the levy, arguing that it contravened Sections 87 and 88 of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994.

Issues:

Whether the Corporation had the right to levy user charges for the discharge of waste water into Municipal drains.

Whether the levy of user charges falls within the ambit of Section 88 of the Act.

Whether the demand for user charges contravenes any provisions of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the Municipal Corporation was justified in levying user charges for permitting the schools to discharge waste water into Municipal drains. The demand did not contravene Section 87 or 88 of the Act. The Court emphasized that the charges were for using Municipal services for the discharge of waste water and were not a tax or fee as contemplated under the Act. The appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's orders, and the writ petitions were dismissed.