Facts:

The appellant-assessee claimed input tax credit on purchases but initially couldn't do so due to the lack of tax invoices.

Subsequently, the appellant filed revised returns claiming input tax credit upon receipt of the tax invoices from the dealer.

Issues:

Whether Section 19(11) violates Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and whether it's inconsistent with Section 3(3) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006.

Whether Section 19(11) is a directory provision, and if non-compliance can be a ground for denial of input tax credit.

Whether assessing authorities could extend the period for claiming input tax credit beyond what is prescribed in Section 19(11) of the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006.

Held:

The Court found that Section 19(11) does not violate constitutional rights and is consistent with the overall scheme of the Act. It provides an additional benefit to dealers for claiming input tax credit within an extended period.

The conditions for claiming input tax credit must be strictly construed. Section 19(11) mandates a specific time period for making claims, which cannot be extended beyond what is prescribed .

There is no provision in the Act empowering authorities to extend the period for claiming input tax credit beyond what is provided in Section 19(11). Taxing statutes must be strictly construed, and benefits are to be extended only as per the restrictions outlined therein.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, upholding the validity of Section 19(11) and affirming that the prescribed conditions and timelines for claiming input tax credit must be adhered to under the Tamil Nadu VAT Act, 2006.

Facts:

Contracts were entered into between Vedanta Ltd (Appellant) and Shenzhen Shandong Nuclear Power Construction Co Ltd (Respondent) for the construction of a power plant.

Disputes arose, leading to the termination of contracts by the Respondent.

The disputes were referred to arbitration, and the arbitral tribunal awarded various amounts to the parties.

Vedanta Ltd filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act before the Delhi High Court, which were rejected.

Vedanta Ltd filed an appeal under Section 37 of the Act before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, which was also dismissed.

Vedanta Ltd filed a Special Leave Petition to challenge the judgment of the Division Bench, primarily focusing on the interest rate awarded by the arbitral tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the interest rate awarded by the arbitral tribunal was justified.

Whether the imposition of a higher interest rate after 120 days was arbitrary.

Whether the interest rate on the EUR component should be based on LIBOR + 3 percentage points.

Held:

The interest rate of 15% post-120 days on the entire sum awarded was deleted.

A uniform rate of 9% interest was applied to the INR component until realization.

For the EUR component, interest was to be calculated based on LIBOR + 3 percentage points on the date of the award until realization.

The appeal was disposed of in accordance with the modifications made to the interest rate awarded by the arbitral tribunal.

Facts:

The appellant, Uppala Bixam @ Bixmaiah, was convicted under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. The case rested on circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of the deceased's body and the sale of sheep allegedly belonging to the deceased by the appellant.

Issues:

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court held: "The circumstance of recovery of the dead body allegedly based on the alleged confessional statement may raise a suspicion against the appellant-accused that he might be involved in the incident but mere suspicion itself cannot take itself the evidence of proof. In our view conviction under Section 302/201 I.P.C. cannot be sustained, more so, when the motive attributed for the murder has been theft of the sheep, and the accused-appellant has been acquitted of the charge of theft."

Therefore, the Court set aside the previous conviction and acquitted the appellant of all charges, ordering their immediate release unless required in another case. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which was inserted by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018. The dispute centers on whether this section is retrospective in nature. Additionally, the case delves into the application of the Limitation Act, 1963 to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Issues:

Whether Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is retrospective.

Whether the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.

Held:

The Court held that Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must be construed as retrospective. This is because the section is clarificatory of the law and procedural in nature. Construing it as retrospective is essential to serve its object, as otherwise, applications attempting to resurrect time-barred claims would not be governed by the law of limitation.

Referring to the Insolvency Law Committee Report of March 2018, the Court emphasized that the legislature did not intend to enable creditors to revive claims that had become time-barred. The Code cannot be triggered for debts that were time-barred, as it could lead to absurd consequences, such as the removal of the present Board of Directors of the corporate debtor and potential liquidation. Thus, the expression "debt due" in the Code refers only to debts that are not time-barred.

The Court clarified that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications filed under Sections 7 and 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code from its inception. Article 137 of the Limitation Act is attracted, and the right to sue accrues when a default occurs. Applications filed beyond three years from the date of default are barred under Article 137, except where Section 5 of the Limitation Act may be applied to condone the delay.

Decision: The Court remanded the appeals to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) for further proceedings consistent with the interpretation provided in this judgment.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by Pradeep Bisoi against his conviction under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code.

The incident pertains to an attack on the brother of PW-1, the informant, by the appellant-accused, resulting in the victim's death later in the hospital.

The appellant contended that the statement of the injured-deceased, recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be treated as a dying declaration since his death occurred after more than three months.

Issues:

Whether a statement recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC can be treated as a dying declaration after the death of the person who made the statement.

Held:

Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 deals with cases where statements of relevant facts by a deceased or unavailable person are relevant. Sections 161 and 162 of the CrPC deal with the examination of witnesses by police and the use of statements made to the police in evidence, respectively.

Sub-section (2) of Section 162 of the CrPC provides an exception to what is laid down in sub-section (1). The statement recorded by the police under Section 161, falling within the provisions of clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, is relevant and admissible. In this case, the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer on December 5, 1990, was found to be relevant and admissible by both the trial court and the High Court.

The injuries on the body of the deceased fully supported the prosecution's case. The statement made by the deceased on December 5, 1990, was corroborated by the injuries on his body and the sequence of events as claimed by the prosecution.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the judgment of the trial court as well as the High Court in relying on the statement of the injured-deceased recorded by the Investigating Officer. The evidence presented, including the statement and the injuries, supported the prosecution's case.

Facts:

Respondent No.1 filed a Civil Suit against the appellants for cancellation of sale deeds and relief of permanent injunction.

The suit was decreed against the appellants, who subsequently filed an appeal.

The appeal was allowed by the First Appellate Court, remanding the matter back to the trial court.

Respondent No.1 filed a Writ Petition against the appellate court's order, which was dismissed after nearly fifteen years.

Despite several opportunities, the appellants did not appear in the trial court, and the suit was decreed ex-parte.

The appellants filed an appeal against the decree, seeking condonation of a delay of 349 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Issues:

Whether the delay of 349 days in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Whether the appellants had full knowledge of the proceedings and the disposal of the Writ Petition.

Held:

The Court held that the delay in filing the appeal could not be condoned due to the appellants' negligence and incorrect facts presented in their application. Both the First Appellate Court and the High Court had correctly refused to condone the delay. The Court noted that the appellants had full knowledge of the proceedings and the disposal of the Writ Petition, as evidenced by the order sheets and other materials on record. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the appellant and eight other accused who were tried for various offenses including criminal conspiracy, murder, and other sections of the IPC. The incident arose from threats made through posters found in Coimbatore, leading to the murder of an individual named Siva.

Issues:

Whether the appellant was rightly convicted for the offense of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the evidence presented by the prosecution, particularly the testimony of two witnesses, PW-3 and PW-4, who provided crucial information about a meeting held at the appellant's house where the plan to kill Siva was discussed.

The Court discussed the legal principles related to criminal conspiracy as defined under Section 120-A and Section 120-B of the IPC. It was established that the appellant was a member of the conspiracy to murder Siva, as evidenced by the meeting held at his house where the plan was formulated.

The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the testimony of the witnesses was unreliable due to alleged contradictions, finding their evidence consistent and credible. The Court emphasized that the appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses but failed to do so, undermining his ability to challenge their testimony on appeal. Based on the evidence presented, the Court concluded that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was part of the criminal conspiracy to kill Siva.

The Court upheld the appellant's conviction and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the IPC. The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments.

Facts:

Appellant, a developer, entered into a development agreement with the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents for constructing a building on the respondents' land.

Respondents denied execution of the agreement.

Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the contract against the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the conditions stipulated in Section 14(3)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 are fulfilled for maintaining a suit for specific performance against the owner.

Interpretation of Section 14(3)(c)(iii) in the context of suits by developers against property owners.

Held:

The Court examined the conditions laid out in Section 14(3)(c)(i) and (ii) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

It found that the agreement between the parties lacked clarity regarding the extent of work and obligations, failing to fulfill the conditions of Section 14(3)(c)(i).

The Court also analyzed the requirement under Section 14(3)(c)(ii) and observed that the alleged losses incurred by the developer could be quantified and compensated with money, thus not satisfying this condition.

Regarding the interpretation of Section 14(3)(c)(iii), the Court noted an anomaly arising from a literal interpretation and advocated for a purposive interpretation to ensure equitable application of the provision.

By giving a purposive interpretation to Section 14(3)(c)(iii), the Court aimed to rectify the anomaly and ensure that both owners and developers could avail of the remedy of specific performance under the Act.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed as the developer failed to satisfy the conditions for specific performance as stipulated under the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Facts:

The Government of India, after a hearing, decided to debar the college due to deficiencies.

The Supreme Court directed the Medical Council of India (MCI) to consider the college's application for renewal of permission for the academic year 2017-18.

MCI conducted another inspection and found gross deficiencies, recommending against renewal for the academic year 2018-19.

Despite the college filing successive writ petitions, no fresh inspection was requested.

The High Court directed the Central Government to make a decision within a specified timeframe.

Issues:

The interpretation of Regulation 8(3)(1)(a) and whether the college should be granted further opportunities for compliance despite gross deficiencies being found.

Held:

The Court clarified that its previous order intended for a fresh inspection but did not imply bypassing Regulation 8(3)(1)(a) in case of gross deficiencies.

The college, being aware of its deficiencies and the regulatory provisions, was not entitled to further opportunities for compliance.

Given the nature of deficiencies and the college's history, no further indulgence was warranted, especially in view of Regulation 8(3)(1)(a) .

The High Court's decision was set aside, and the order of the Government of India not to grant renewal for the academic year 2018-19 was upheld.

Decision: The judgment and order passed by the High Court are set aside, and the order of the Government of India not to grant renewal for the academic year 2018-19 is upheld.