Facts:

The appellants were appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judges (Fast Track Courts) from the Bar on an ad-hoc basis.

They were relieved from their positions and subsequently filed writ petitions seeking pension and other retiral benefits.

The High Court dismissed their petitions, leading to the appeal.

Issues:

Whether the appellants, as ad-hoc appointees, are entitled to pension and other retiral benefits.

Whether the nature of their appointment can be deemed contractual or ad-hoc.

Held:

The appellants were part of the Judicial establishment of the district and were paid from the same sources as other Judicial Officers. Their appointment was deemed to be in a "pensionable establishment."

The nature of their appointment was not contractual but rather ad-hoc, as appointments were made against existing posts, and the appointments were not contractual in nature.

The appellants met the criteria for qualifying service for pension entitlement.

All the appellants had qualifying service of more than ten years, making them eligible for pension benefits.

Some appellants were entitled to superannuation pension, while others were entitled to compensation pension due to the discontinuation of their posts.

The appellants were entitled to gratuity, granted to government servants who have completed five years of qualifying service.

The appellants were entitled to encashment of earned leave at the credit, subject to a maximum of 240 days, in accordance with the Tamil Nadu Leave Rules, 1933.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgment of the High Court, and granted the appellants pension, gratuity, and encashment of earned leave in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations.

Facts:

The appellant claimed to belong to the "Thakar" caste and sought a declaration to that effect. Despite submitting numerous documents supporting his claim, both the Committee concerned and the High Court dismissed his claim.

Issues:

The evaluation of the evidence presented by the appellant regarding his caste status. The appellant contended that certain documents supporting his claim were not properly considered by either the Committee or the High Court.

Held:

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of both the Committee and the High Court. It remanded the case back to the Committee for fresh consideration. The Court emphasized the importance of thorough evaluation of all evidence presented by the parties and instructed the Committee to reconsider the appellant's case strictly in accordance with the law, providing him an opportunity to present his case. The Committee was directed to dispose of the case within six months.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between Ved Pal (deceased) through legal representatives (appellants) and Prem Devi (deceased) through legal representatives (respondents).

The High Court of Punjab & Haryana disposed of a second appeal in terms of a compromise between the parties and decreed the suit.

The appellants filed a review application against this order, which was dismissed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court properly considered the appellants' plea regarding the disposal of the second appeal based on compromise.

Whether the appellants have the right to challenge the compromise reached in the suit or appeal under the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.

Held:

The Court partially allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. The Court directed the appellants to file an application before the High Court to amend their review petition, raising all grievances against the disposal of the second appeal based on the compromise.

The Court emphasized that the High Court was the proper forum to reexamine the issue, considering it disposed of the second appeal. The Court refrained from examining the factual and legal issues in detail and left them for the High Court to decide afresh on merits.

Facts:

The case involved disputes over a piece of land in Chennai.

The respondents (plaintiffs) filed four civil suits for permanent injunction against the appellants (defendants).

The Trial Court dismissed the suits.

The respondents appealed, seeking to introduce additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The appellate court admitted the additional evidence and ruled in favor of the respondents, causing prejudice to the appellants.

The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the appellate court's decision.

Issues:

Whether the appellate court's consideration of additional evidence without affording the appellants an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence constituted a jurisdictional error?

Whether the appellate court failed to follow proper procedure in disposing of the appeals?

Held:

The appellate court committed two jurisdictional errors by considering additional evidence without giving the appellants an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence and by failing to follow proper procedure.

These errors prejudiced the appellants, and thus, the appellate court's judgment could not be sustained legally on merits.

The High Court also failed to notice these errors.

The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the case to the Trial Court for retrial.

The parties were allowed to amend their pleadings and present additional evidence.

The Trial Court was instructed to decide the suits afresh on merits within one year, without being influenced by any previous orders or judgments.

Facts:

The appellant, K S Rajan (now deceased), owned land in the District of Kottayam, Kerala.

The State of Kerala acquired land, including the appellant's, for a development scheme.

Various legal proceedings ensued, involving determination and challenges to compensation rates.

Issues:

Whether the compensation rates determined by the lower courts for different types of land were just and proper.

Whether discrepancies in compensation rates compared to those awarded to other landowners in similar acquisition proceedings warranted modification.

Held:

The Court found that the compensation rate for wet land awarded by the High Court was unjustified.

Referencing a previous determination by the Reference Court, where wet land was valued higher for other landowners in the same acquisition proceedings, the Court modified the compensation for wet land.

Compensation rates for dry and chira land were upheld.

The appellant was entitled to statutory compensation as per the revised rates.

The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeals, modifying the High Court's order regarding compensation for wet land, and upheld the compensation rates for dry and chira land.

Facts:The original applicant claimed that the project proponent had undertaken construction activities in violation of the Environmental Clearance granted for the project and various municipal laws. Subsequently, the National Green Tribunal (NGT) directed the project proponent to pay environmental compensation costs. An appeal was made against this order. Meanwhile, the project proponent filed a review application challenging the NGT's order, which was decided by a different Bench.

Issues:

Whether the review petition should have been heard by the same Bench that originally decided the matter.

The implications of not hearing a review petition by the original Bench.

The applicability of procedural rules, including Rule 22 of the National Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedure) Rules, 2011, and Order XLVII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Held:

The Court held that a review petition should ordinarily be heard by the same Bench that originally decided the matter. It should not be heard by any other Bench unless it is impossible or impracticable for the earlier Bench to hear the matter. In cases where a party contends that certain arguments were not considered, the review application should be heard by the original Bench.

It was emphasized that judicial authorities, including the NGT, are expected to address all contentions raised before them. If a party alleges that some contentions were not considered, it must file a review application, which should be heard by the same Bench that originally heard the matter.

Sub-rule (3) of Rule 22 of the National Green Tribunal (Practices and Procedure) Rules, 2011, provides for the disposal of review applications by circulation. Thus, there is no impediment to the matter being circulated before the same Bench that heard the original matter.

The power of review is distinct from appellate power and should be exercised only when there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Therefore, judicial discipline mandates that review applications be heard by the same Bench.

Order XLVII Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, suggests that reviews should normally be heard by the same Bench that passed the original order, for various reasons including maintaining consistency, appreciating the matter, and preserving judicial discipline. All the appeals are disposed of.

Facts:

The case involves Jaypee Infratech Limited (JIL), a real estate developer, defaulting on its dues to IDBI bank, leading to the initiation of a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against JIL. Home buyers, distinct from financial and operational creditors, raised concerns regarding the recognition of their interests in the CIRP. The Court was approached by the home buyers seeking pro-rata disbursement of funds deposited by JIL among buyers seeking refunds.

Issues:

Recognition of the rights of home buyers in the CIRP process.

Whether directing preferential payment to home buyers seeking refunds is legally permissible during CIRP.

Consideration of the interests of secured creditors and the overall resolution process under the IBC.

Validity and applicability of RBI's recommendations regarding the initiation of CIRP against JAL.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the legitimate grievances of home buyers seeking refunds but declined to grant their plea. It emphasized the legal impermissibility of directing preferential payments to a specific class of financial creditors during CIRP.

Furthermore, the Court highlighted the injustice to secured creditors and the lack of overall benefit to the resolution process if refunds were directed to a specific class of creditors. It noted the preference of a majority (92%) of home buyers for possession of their purchased homes.

The Court underscored the importance of protecting the interests of lenders, particularly banks and financial institutions, as intended by the IBC. It also accepted RBI's recommendation to initiate CIRP against JAL, considering its financial distress and the need for timely resolution.

Facts:

The case pertains to the implementation of reforms in the administration of cricket, as proposed by a committee chaired by Justice R. M. Lodha. These reforms were accepted by the Supreme Court in a previous judgment. The Committee of Administrators (CoA) was tasked with drafting a Constitution for the BCCI to implement these reforms. Various stakeholders provided suggestions on the draft Constitution, which were considered by the court.

Issues:

The court included membership criteria for the BCCI, representation of certain cricket associations, the number of selectors, the imposition of a cooling-off period for office bearers, and other administrative matters.

Held:

The court decided to restore full membership in the BCCI to three cricket associations each in the State of Maharashtra (Maharashtra, Mumbai, and Vidarbha) and in Gujarat (Gujarat, Baroda, and Saurashtra) due to their significant contributions to nurturing talent for cricket in India. However, the status of full members was not granted to the National Cricket Club and the Cricket Club of India.

Full membership was also granted to the Railway Sports Promotion Board (Railways), Services Sports Control Board (Services), and the Association of Indian Universities due to their notable contributions to Indian cricket. Representatives for Railways, Services, and the Association of Indian Universities should be former cricketers elected by respective associations of former players.

The number of selectors was increased from three to five to ensure a broader selection pool and better talent evaluation across the country. Selectors must meet specific criteria related to their cricketing experience.

The court mandated a cooling-off period of three years after an individual has held the post of an office bearer for two consecutive terms either in a State Association or in the BCCI or a combination of both. This is to prevent the concentration of power and encourage a wider body of experienced administrators.

The Apex Council is entrusted with professional management through appointed officers. Disqualifications clauses in the draft Constitution were approved with modifications, and any future amendments to the Constitution should be approved by the Supreme Court.

Facts:

PW-4 Sumeet Asthana lodged a complaint with the Vigilance Officer of Indian Airlines, alleging that he was asked to contact Babji (A-1) of M/s Varun Movies to arrange a confirmed flight ticket.

A-1 demanded Rs. 2,100/- for a confirmed ticket, which was higher than the actual fare of Rs. 1646/-.

The Vigilance Officer reported the matter to the Superintendent of Police, CBI Hyderabad, stating that A-1 and A-2 were cheating the public.

Based on the evidence of PW-4 and PW-2, the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, a decision confirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to establish the offence under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act?

Held:

In order to establish the offence under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it must be proven that the accused accepted gratification as a motive or reward for inducing a public servant to perform an official act.

The evidence presented by the prosecution was vague regarding the recipient of the money and whether they were a public servant.

Insufficient evidence was presented to demonstrate that the money was received to influence a public servant.

Without convincing evidence, the conviction under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted. The bail bonds of the appellant, who was on bail, were discharged.