Facts:

The government had established a permanent machinery for arbitration in 1989 to settle commercial disputes between public sector enterprises (PSE) and government departments.

The dispute between the parties was referred to the Permanent Machinery for Arbitration in 1993/1994.

An arbitrator made an award, which was challenged by MIS. NORTHERN COALFIELD LTD. through a filed suit.

Issues:

Whether the requirement of permission from the Committee on Disputes (COD) was necessary for the suit to proceed.

The dissolution of COD and its impact on the procedural requirements.

The legal character of a government-owned company and its right to seek redress.

Held:

Commercial disputes between public sector enterprises were settled through arbitration by government officers or empowered government agencies. The Permanent Machinery for Arbitration was established in 1989 outside the framework of the Arbitration Act, 1940.( Para 14)

The High Court rejected the appellant's suit based on the absence of permission from COD. However, the Supreme Court held that the dissolution of COD negated the necessity for such clearance, making the rejection unsustainable.( Para 23-24)

An arbitral award under the Permanent Machinery of Arbitration may not be legally enforceable in court if not accepted by both parties. In the present case, the appellant did not accept the award, and the dispute continued.( Para 25)

Remedies available to the government on the administrative side cannot substitute legal remedies. The right of the appellant to demand adjudication was recognized, leading to the referral of the matter to a sole arbitrator.( Para 27)

The matter is referred to a sole arbitrator for the adjudication of all outstanding disputes between the two corporations, considering the impracticality of a lengthy and expensive trial.( Para 25, 27)

In the result we allow this appeal.

FACTS:

The accident occurred on 16.09.2008 involving a three-wheeler and a truck.

Legal representatives of the deceased individuals filed claim petitions seeking compensation against the owner, driver, and insurer of the offending vehicle (truck).

The MACT awarded compensation, holding the insurance company liable as the driver had a valid driving license.

The High Court partially allowed the appeals, reversing the MACT's award, citing the absence of a valid driving license.

ISSUES:

Whether the insurance company is liable for compensation.

Validity of the driver's license and its admissibility as evidence.

HELD:

The High Court erred in exonerating the insurance company from liability. The Tribunal correctly held the insurance company liable as the driver had a valid license, and the vehicle was insured.( Paragraph 14)

The High Court failed to consider that the driver filed a photocopy of his license, which was proved without objection from the insurance company. The lack of evidence from the insurance company regarding the license's validity was highlighted.( Paragraph 15)

The Tribunal's finding that the driver possessed a valid license was correct, and the insurance company failed to prove otherwise. The High Court's reversal was unwarranted.( Paragraph 19)

The High Court should have acknowledged that the driver proved the validity of the license, and the insurance company, having not objected during the trial, had no right to raise concerns later.( Paragraph 22)

The insurance company is held liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and enhanced by the High Court, jointly and severally with the driver and owner of the offending vehicle.( Paragraph 23)

REFERRED CASES:

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Premlata Shukla, (2007) 13 SCC 476

Facts:

Kantilal Mohanlal Mehta entered into a lease agreement with the State of Gujarat for bauxite mining in 1964.

The state reserved and later de-reserved certain areas for bauxite mining in 1964 and 1978.

Conditions were sought by the state from the central government regarding mining, including setting up industrial units for captive consumption.

The Central Government granted permission for de-reservation and imposition of conditions in 1980.

The lessee applied for permission to sell/export bauxite, which was granted but subsequently rejected for non-compliance with conditions.

Legal proceedings ensued, involving the High Court and the Central Government.

Issues:

Whether the state has the power to impose conditions, including setting up a captive plant, at the time of renewing a mining lease.

Whether the central government's permission granted in 1980 is applicable to the respondent's mining lease.

The legality of the state's resolution dated 04.02.2005 regulating the sale/export of bauxite.

Held:

Power to Impose Conditions at Renewal: The renewal of a mining lease is a fresh grant, and the state has the power to impose conditions, including setting up a captive plant. The Central Government's permission obtained in 1980 supports this authority (Paragraphs 25-28).

Applicability of Central Government's Permission: The central government's permission for de-reservation and conditions in 1980 applies to the respondent's mining lease, even though their mines were not affected by the initial reservation. Any other interpretation would lead to discrimination (Paragraphs 30-32).

Legality of State's Resolution: The resolution dated 04.02.2005 regulating the sale/export of bauxite is valid and necessary to protect the state's interests. The lessees' focus on export without establishing captive plants jeopardizes the state's goals (Paragraph 14).

Facts:

The appellant and respondents entered into an MoU.

Disputes arose regarding the execution of the MoU.

Respondents sent a letter appointing an arbitrator as per the MoU.

Appellant did not respond; respondents filed an application under Section 11(5) and 11(6).

Appellant denied executing the MoU, alleging it to be forged.

Issues:

Validity and genuineness of the MoU.

Whether the Chief Justice or designate should decide the validity of the MoU or leave it to the arbitrator.

Held:

The Court held that the High Court erred in not deciding the validity and genuineness of the MoU itself. Referring to previous judgments, the Court emphasized that the Chief Justice or designate must decide the existence of an arbitration agreement, and this question should not be left to the arbitrator. The direction for the arbitrator to decide the legality and validity of the MoU was set aside. The case was remanded for the designated Judge to decide these questions based on pleadings and evidence. The appeal succeeds and is allowed.

Facts:

The Law Commission of India, in its 14th Report dated 26th September 1958, advocated a restrained approach towards granting special leaves to appeal. Subsequent reports and cases addressed the need for structural reforms, including the establishment of a Constitutional Division within the Supreme Court. The petitioner sought a mandamus to consider the representation and implement the suggestion of the Constitution Bench in Bihar Legal Support Society's case for establishing National/Regional Courts of Appeal.

Issues:

The liberal grant of special leave affecting the prestige of High Courts, the need for Constitutional Division, the increasing burden on the Supreme Court, and the suggestion of setting up National/Regional Courts of Appeal.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged the need for structural reforms and referred the questions to a Constitutional Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

The Court emphasized the importance of exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 with caution and discretion.

The possibility of establishing Regional Courts of Appeal, as suggested by the petitioner, was considered in the context of improving access to justice and reducing the burden on the Supreme Court.

The Court recognized the challenges posed by the increasing backlog of cases and the need for comprehensive re-appraisal of the role of the Supreme Court.

The Court refrained from making a final decision on the proposed reforms and recommended further examination by a Constitutional Bench.

Facts:

Mulin Sharma, the appellant, was employed as an Assistant Teacher in Rangsina High School, Karbi, Anglong District, Assam.

Allegedly, due to differences with the Headmistress, the appellant was forced to sign a resignation letter under compulsion and was not paid salary from 23.05.1998.

The appellant filed a series of representations and a Writ Petition seeking action against the forced resignation.

The Deputy Commissioner held the resignation was voluntary, and it was accepted with effect from 16.10.2003.

The appellant's plea for back wages and denial of service led to litigation.

Issues:

Whether the resignation was voluntary.

Entitlement of back wages.

Wrongful denial of service.

Reinstatement and consequential benefits.

Held:

The resignation tendered by the appellant was not voluntary.

The appellant is not entitled to back wages due to lack of evidence proving unemployment during the relevant period (23.05.1998 to 16.08.1999).

The appellant should be reinstated in service and granted all consequential benefits.

The appellant is awarded Rs. 25,000 for the wrongful denial of service.

The discretionary power of awarding back wages is emphasized, and it is noted that each case depends on its own facts.

Facts:

The appellant, R.R. Parekh, a judicial officer, faced disciplinary proceedings related to his conduct in two criminal cases.

Charges were brought against Parekh for awarding sentences below the prescribed minimum in cases involving offences under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962.

The Disciplinary Committee initially exonerated Parekh but, upon reconsideration, found him guilty of misconduct, leading to his dismissal.

Issues:

Whether the charges of misconduct against the appellant were valid.

Whether the punishment of dismissal was proportionate to the established misconduct.

Held:

The High Court upheld the finding of misconduct, noting that the appellant, being an experienced judicial officer, should have been aware of statutory provisions and failed to provide convincing explanations for his actions. However, the Supreme Court, while confirming the finding of misconduct, substituted the punishment of dismissal with compulsory retirement, considering the appellant's unblemished service record.

Facts:

The case involves a government contract and tender process for the construction of a dam in the State of Jharkhand.

The government, citing lack of competition, decided to cancel the tender and invite fresh tenders to enhance competitiveness.

The highest bidder challenged the decision in court, arguing that the cancellation was arbitrary.

Issues:

Whether the cancellation of the tender was arbitrary and against public interest.

Whether the government had the authority to reject tenders without assigning specific reasons.

Held:

The court held that the government's decision to cancel the tender was within its rights, emphasizing the lack of a vested right for the highest bidder until the bid is accepted. The court highlighted the importance of judicial restraint in administrative matters, stating that the court's role is to review the decision-making process for any infirmity, mala fide, unreasonableness, or arbitrariness. It reiterated the government's right to refuse the lowest or any tender and the freedom of contract for the government.

Facts:

The second respondent sought a mandamus to stop the operation of Saniem Sacorda Iron Ore Mine and compensation for environmental damage.

Appellant initially granted environmental clearance for mine expansion for two years (25.11.2005 to 25.11.2007).

Subsequent order (18.10.2007) deleted the two-year restriction.

High Court held the clearance valid for five years, directing the appellant to seek an extension within three months.

Issues:

Validity of environmental clearance beyond the initial two-year period.

Alleged illegal mining activity after clearance expiration.

Adherence to environmental protection laws and public interest.

Held:

In considering the validity of the environmental clearance, the Division Bench observed that the order dated 18.10.2007 lacked due regard for environmental protection and public interest. The Court set aside the High Court judgment and directed the first respondent to reconsider the clearance, adhering to relevant procedures, including notifying State Level Authorities, conducting public hearings, and considering the hydrogeological report. The entire process was to be completed within three months. The Court clarified it did not delve into the merits of the contentions. The Transfer Petition (No. 1843/2013) was deemed not to survive in light of the Supreme Court's judgment and was transferred and dismissed.