Mere Delay in Execution Cannot Defeat Specific Performance Decree: Supreme Court Restores Buyer’s Right Despite 87-Day Delay

“Hyper-technical approach defeats substantive justice”, Supreme Court set aside a judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court that had dismissed the execution of a decree for specific performance merely due to delay in deposit of balance sale consideration. The Apex Court, emphasizing the discretionary and equitable nature of relief under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, held that “the non-payment of balance sale consideration within the time period fixed by the Trial Court does not amount to abandonment of the contract.”

The decision has clarified the scope of powers vested in courts at the execution stage and rejected the rigid application of technical timelines in decrees for specific performance, especially where conduct of the decree-holder reflects bona fide intent.

"Doctrine of Merger renders only one decree executable – executing courts must act on final appellate decree"

The bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manoj Misra concluded that the time-stipulation of two months in the original Trial Court decree cannot be viewed in isolation once the decree has been affirmed in second appeal. “At one point in time, only one decree can subsist,” observed the Court, invoking the Doctrine of Merger to hold that the operative decree is that which emerges from the final appellate decision. “The decree of the Trial Court would merge with the final decision of the High Court,” the Court ruled, citing Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh and Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala.

Execution Dismissed Due to Delay in Deposit, High Court Applied Rigid View

The dispute arose from an agreement to sell land in Panchkula, entered into on December 11, 2004, for a consideration of Rs. 9,05,000/-, with Rs. 1 lakh paid as earnest money. The buyer, Dr. Amit Arya, filed a suit for specific performance which was decreed by the Trial Court on May 14, 2011. The Court directed execution of the sale deed within two months on payment of the remaining Rs. 8,05,000/-.

The decree was initially set aside by the First Appellate Court, but later restored in second appeal by the High Court on February 8, 2016, finding that the appellant remained “ready and willing” to perform his part.

However, when the appellant filed the execution petition on July 4, 2016 — 87 days after the expiry of the two-month window — and deposited the balance amount in two instalments (Rs. 7,39,700/- on August 26, 2016 and Rs. 65,300/- on December 13, 2016), the judgment-debtor objected. The objections were dismissed by the Executing Court, but the High Court, in its judgment dated August 8, 2022, reversed that finding and held the decree inexecutable due to delay and absence of an application for extension of time.

The Supreme Court framed the core legal question as whether mere delay in filing an execution petition or depositing balance sale consideration, without a formal application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, would render the decree inexecutable.

On Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act:

The Court clarified that Section 28 expressly empowers courts to extend time even at the execution stage. “The court retains power to extend time even at execution stage – Non-payment within stipulated time does not ipso facto amount to abandonment or rescission of contract,” the Court held, aligning with the precedent in V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan, (1999) 4 SCC 702.

On the Readiness and Willingness of the Decree Holder:

Crucially, the Apex Court highlighted that the issue of readiness and willingness had attained finality in second appeal. Citing Ramankutty Gupta v. Avara, (1994) 2 SCC 642 and the recent Ram Lal v. Jarnail Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 584, the bench held that “the real test must be to see if the conduct of the plaintiff will amount to a positive refusal to complete his part of the contract,” and not to penalize mere procedural delays.

In the instant case, the buyer's conduct of eventually depositing the full amount, despite the delay, showed his intent to perform, thereby sustaining his right to execution.

On Powers of the Executing Court:

Referring to Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan, (2019) 11 SCC 419, and Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724, the Court held that an executing court “cannot go behind the decree” and is bound to give effect to the operative final decree, not to independently assess readiness or enforceability based on interim time-limits in trial court decrees.

The Apex Court reprimanded the High Court for interfering with the order of the Executing Court and for applying a hyper-technical approach that, in effect, defeated the substantive relief.

Equitable Enforcement Favoured Over Procedural Rigidity

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the order of the Executing Court, directing it to proceed with the execution of the decree for specific performance. The Court’s ruling reaffirms the principle that equity and intent must prevail over procedural hyper-technicalities in enforcement of specific performance decrees.

“Dismissal of execution petition on technical grounds defeats substantive justice,” the Court observed, noting that procedural rules are intended to facilitate, not frustrate, the administration of justice.

Date of Decision: December 19, 2025