Facts:

The case involves G.T. Venkataswamy Reddy and the State Transport Authority, among others.

The dispute centers around the increase in the number of trips of vehicles under existing permits upon the publication of an approved scheme.

Issues:

Whether the variation of a permit, specifically for increasing the number of trips or vehicles, can be granted after the publication of an approved scheme.

The interpretation of Sections 57(8), 68D, and 68FF in relation to the freezing effect on permits in areas covered by approved schemes.

Held:

A close reading of Section 57(8) mandates treating an application for the variation of a stage carriage permit, aiming to increase trips or vehicles, as an application for a new permit. Compliance with the rigorous procedures of sub-sections (1) to (7) is essential for such applications (Para 38, 39).

The requirement for public and personal hearings underscores the seriousness with which applications for variation should be considered, given their significant impact on the operation of vehicles in the relevant route (Para 40).

Section 68B establishes that Chapter IV-A supersedes inconsistent provisions in Chapter IV. Once a scheme under Section 68D is approved, Section 68FF freezes permits in the covered area or route, and any alteration or modification can only occur through Section 68E (Para 43).

The formulation of a scheme under Section 68D aims to provide an efficient, adequate, economical, and properly coordinated road transport service. Once approved, existing operators must adhere to the restrictions outlined in Section 68FF (Paras 44, 45).

Section 68FF restricts the grant of permits in areas covered by approved schemes, and any variation applied for must be considered within the framework of Section 68E. An increase in trips or vehicles under existing permits amounts to the grant of a new permit, not permissible under Section 68FF (Paras 46, 47).

Legal propositions affirm the superseding effect of Chapter IV-A, equating the grant of variation under Section 57(8) to a new permit. The freezing effect of Section 68FF prohibits the grant of new permits or variations in areas covered by approved schemes (Para 50).

Facts:

The case involved multiple appellants convicted at a single trial for various offenses. The central issue pertained to the application of Section 31 and the possibility of awarding consecutive life sentences.

Issues:

Whether consecutive life sentences could be awarded for a series of murders tried in a single trial.

Applicability of Section 31 in cases of life imprisonment.

Whether the court could direct life sentence and term sentences to run consecutively.

Held:

Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable only when a person is convicted at one trial for two or more offenses. The court can sentence the offender to punishments for the committed offenses, and these sentences can run consecutively unless the court directs otherwise. The section does not necessitate sending the offender for trial before a higher court solely based on the aggregate punishment.( Paragraph 7)

Imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the offender's life unless commuted or remitted by a competent authority. Section 31(1) allows consecutive running of sentences only if they are not life sentences. Consecutive life sentences would be anomalous and irrational, given that humans have only one life to live.( Paragraph 17)

Section 427(2) of the Cr.P.C. carves out an exception to the general rule, recognizing that in the case of life sentences for two distinct offenses separately tried and proved, the sentences cannot be directed to run consecutively.( Paragraph 20)

Section 31(2) deals with situations where the court awarding consecutive sentences is not competent to award the aggregate punishment. This provision is not applicable to cases tried by the Sessions Court, and it does not forbid a direction for consecutive running of sentences awardable by the Court of Session.( Paragraph 25)

The court has the power to direct the order in which sentences will run. It can legitimately direct that the prisoner undergo the term sentence before the commencement of his life sentence. However, the converse is not true, as directing the life sentence to start first would imply that the term sentence runs concurrently.( Paragraph 32)

Facts:

Pragati Mahila Mahavidyalaya appointed respondent No.1 as a part-time Lecturer in Geography on a temporary basis.

The appointment was for a fixed period, and a termination order was issued on 31.03.1998.

Respondent No.1 challenged the termination through legal proceedings.

Issues:

Whether the appointment was temporary and governed by the relevant statutes.

The legality of the termination and the nature of the appointment.

Held:

The Court, referring to the Hindustan Education Society case (1997) 5 SCC 152, emphasized the temporary nature of the appointment. The High Court's decision was deemed legally unsustainable as it failed to consider the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977. The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and reinstated the Tribunal's decision. The termination order dated 31.03.1998 was upheld as legal.

Facts:

The Court appointed a committee to inquire into the workings of the BCCI, with the committee recommending various reforms to enhance transparency and efficiency.

Issues:

The recommendations made by the committee, including changes to BCCI membership, upper age limits for office bearers, ineligibility of ministers and government officials, financial oversight, and other structural reforms.

Held:

The committee's task was inquisitorial, involving hearing stakeholders and making recommendations for the improvement of BCCI without adjudicating on any final rights. The court found the committee's procedures adherent to principles of natural justice and no legal flaw in the process.( Para 44-45)

The court clarified that Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right to form associations, is applicable only to citizens, and the committee's recommendations did not interfere with the composition of State Associations.( Para 52-53, 60-61)

The court upheld the "One State One Vote" recommendation, converting certain clubs to associate membership, considering it necessary for the structural streamlining of BCCI.( Para 62-63)

Regarding the "One State One Vote" recommendation for Maharashtra and Gujarat, the court proposed a rotational membership approach to balance historical perspectives and regional representation.( Para 64-65)

The court found the recommendation for an upper age limit of 70 for office bearers reasonable, citing alignment with the National Sports Development Code of India.( Para 66-68)

The court upheld the committee's recommendation that ministers and government officials should be ineligible for posts in State Associations or the BCCI, emphasizing the need to prevent conflicts of interest.( Para 69-72)

The court accepted the committee's recommendation for nominees of the Accountant General and the Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG) to bring transparency and financial oversight into State Associations and the BCCI.( Para 74-76)

The court supported the formation of a Players' Association, including financial support, as a reasonable idea to involve players in the management of the game.( Para 79-80)

The court suggested that bringing BCCI under the Right to Information Act and legalizing betting in cricket should be examined by the Law Commission.( Para 82-83)

The court addressed concerns about commercial exploitation in broadcasting and recommended that the BCCI ensures an uninterrupted broadcast for viewers.( Para 84-86)

The court referred back to the Committee to re-examine the induction of IPL franchisee nominees in the Governing Council due to potential conflicts of interest.( Para 87-88)

The court found reasonable the committee's recommendations for term limits, cooling-off periods, and disqualification grounds for office bearers.( Para 89)

The court supported the committee's recommendation to overhaul existing committees for institutionalizing administrative affairs.( Para 90-91)

Facts:

Respondent No.3, Shirish Dhopeshwarkar, filed O.P. No.552 of 1988 before the Special Tribunal, Ranga Reddy District, for declaration of title and recovery of land.

Special Tribunal allowed the application but dismissed the claim for compensation.

Appeals were filed, leading to a remand for fresh disposal and further proceedings.

Issues:

Title disputes involving Respondent No.3 and appellants.

Allegations of land grabbing under the Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

Appellants' failure to implead themselves in the Special Court proceedings.

Claims of procedural lacunae by the appellants.

Held:

The Special Tribunal and Special Court concurred in establishing the title of Respondent No.3.

Appellants failed to present adequate evidence of their title and possession.

Appellants did not implead themselves in a timely manner, and their claim of procedural lacunae was rejected.

High Court upheld the decisions of the lower forums, dismissing the writ petition and review petition filed by the appellants.

The ground of non-compliance with procedural requirements was considered inconsequential to the merits of the case.

These appeals are accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The insertion of Section 12(1B) in the SEBI Act on January 25, 1995, led to the creation of two categories of persons: proviso and non-proviso.

The proviso category involved those who commenced activities before January 25, 1995, while the non-proviso category consisted of those who hadn't commenced activities by that date.

The Collective Investment Regulations came into force on October 15, 1999.

Issues:

Interpretation of Section 12(1B) and its implications on individuals falling into the proviso and non-proviso categories.

Compliance with the Collective Investment Regulations, specifically Regulation 5 and other relevant sections.

Held:

The court held that the non-proviso category was barred from commencing collective investment activities without obtaining a certificate of registration from 'the Board'.

The court emphasized the mandatory nature of Section 12(1B) and the penal consequences of its contravention.

The court clarified the distinctions between the proviso and non-proviso categories, specifying the obligations and permissions for each.

Decision: The court concluded that the proceedings initiated against certain respondents were flawed, citing deficiencies in the complaint, lack of disclosure of offense particulars, and improper categorization of the accused. The court quashed the proceedings against the respondents.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the selection process for the post of Principal in Degree Colleges and Post Graduate Colleges in Uttar Pradesh. The Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980, and the corresponding Regulations, especially Regulation 6, govern the selection procedure. The Commission is accused of non-compliance with Regulation 6, altering selection norms, and potentially favoring certain candidates.

Issues:

Alleged non-compliance with Regulation 6 by the Commission.

Changes in selection norms, potentially favoring certain candidates.

Adherence to the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980.

Held:

The Regulation 6 grants the Commission substantive power to call for interviews and determine the ratio of candidates to vacancies. The Commission initially set norms but later altered them, allowing all candidates to participate. Serious allegations of favoritism were made, casting doubt on the integrity of the selection process.

The Commission's varying of cut-off index norms raised serious concerns, leading to the participation of ineligible candidates in the interview process. The High Court rightly frowned upon such inconsistent practices by the Commission, emphasizing the need for an honest approach in selection matters.

The High Court found serious discrepancies in the selection process, including the induction of Commission members with questionable qualifications. The Commission's deviation from consistent norms and the participation of ineligible candidates raised substantial doubts about the overall fairness of the selection.

The Court rejected the contention that withdrawal of earlier writ petitions without reservation should estop the petitioners from filing the present writ petition. The withdrawal occurred before the interview, and subsequent challenges were permissible after the declaration of results.

The High Court's detailed examination of qualifications and experience of certain candidates led to a factual finding that they did not fulfill the minimum requirements. The Court dismissed the appellant's contention that further examination of documents was necessary, upholding the High Court's findings.

The High Court, considering serious breaches of regulations and discrepancies in the selection process, set aside the entire selection. The application of the rule of reservation by the Commission, contrary to this Court's precedent, was also noted as a flaw in the selection.

Facts:

The appellants were charged with committing a bank robbery.

Identification of the appellants by eyewitnesses was a crucial aspect of the case.

The appellants were tried by a Court Martial and were convicted.

Issues:

Credibility of the identification by eyewitnesses (PW-14 and PW-18).

Validity of the evidence provided by the Fingerprint Expert (PW-15).

Applicability of the benefit of doubt to one of the appellants (DK Singh).

Claim for reinstatement by the acquitted appellant (DK Singh).

Held:

Identification of Appellants: The tribunal disbelieved the identification of appellants AK Singh and UK Singh by PW-14 and PW-18, but the Supreme Court differed, finding that the bank personnel could have seen the culprits during the robbery and accepted the identification.

Fingerprint Evidence: While there were lapses in the prosecution regarding the recovery of weapons, the Supreme Court held that these lapses should not result in acquittal and upheld the fingerprint evidence presented by PW-15, linking AK Singh and UK Singh to the crime.

DK Singh's Acquittal: The tribunal acquitted DK Singh due to doubts about identification and the recovery of weapons. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the acquittal was not an honorable one, especially considering the credible identification of DK Singh by PW-14 and PW-18.

Reinstatement Claim by DK Singh: The Supreme Court emphasized that acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle reinstatement, particularly if the acquittal is based on the benefit of doubt. DK Singh, having been granted the benefit of doubt, cannot claim reinstatement or other consequential benefits.

Facts:

The petitioner alleged that Mis. Utsav violated the Supreme Court's order by outsourcing the manufacturing of HSRPs. The petitioner further claimed that the scheme was not implemented in its true spirit.

Issues:

The alleged violation of the Supreme Court's order, outsourcing of manufacturing, and non-implementation of the HSRP scheme.

Held:

The court took cognizance of the contempt petition based on the petitioner's claims of Mis. Utsav outsourcing HSRP manufacturing, which was in violation of the Supreme Court's order.( Paragraph 14)

Mis. Utsav had secured tenders for manufacturing HSRPs in multiple states by forming Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) with entities like Mis. Linkpoint and Mis. Rosmerta.( Paragraph 22)

The judgment discussed the Type of Approval Certificate (TAC) and Conformity of Production (CoP) requirements for HSRP manufacturers, emphasizing compliance with Rule 50 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.( Paragraph 23)

The court highlighted the lack of certification for Mis. Rosmerta's manufacturing unit in Assam and identified a prima facie violation of Rule 50 and court orders.( Paragraph 25)

The contempt proceedings against Mis. Utsav were not pursued, leaving it to the respective states to take action for any violations. The State of Madhya Pradesh terminated the Concessionaire Agreement, and the Delhi Government issued a show cause notice to Mis. Rosmerta.( Paragraphs 27-28)

Concerns were raised about Mis. Utsav's control over the HSRP manufacturing process and the illegal sale of HSRPs by consortium partners. Directions and guidelines were issued for the proper implementation of the HSRP scheme.( Paragraphs 30, 34)