Facts:

The original plaintiff, Sucha Singh, filed a suit for permanent injunction against the respondent, alleging threats of dispossession from the property. Subsequently, he withdrew this suit and filed another suit for specific performance of an agreement regarding the same property.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent suit for specific performance was barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC.

Whether the plaintiff needed specific permission to file the subsequent suit after withdrawing the first one.

Held:

The Court analyzed the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC and emphasized the distinction between causes of action for different reliefs. It held that the subsequent suit for specific performance was not barred under Order 2, Rule 2 because the causes of action for claiming permanent injunction and specific performance of an agreement are independent. The Court referred to relevant sections of the Limitation Act to support its interpretation. Additionally, the Court held that the plaintiff's statement at the time of withdrawal, coupled with the court's permission, satisfied the requirement for filing a fresh suit. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court, and dismissed the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC. The original civil suit for specific performance was restored to be tried on its merits, with directions for expeditious disposal by the Trial Court.

Facts:

Shiva Kant Jha, a retired pensioner and CGHS beneficiary, submitted medical bills for reimbursement for treatment received at non-empaneled hospitals for cardiac and cerebral ailments.

Despite multiple attempts and representations, a significant portion of the claims was denied by the CGHS.

The petitioner sought relief under Article 32 of the Constitution, asserting violations of Articles 14 and 21, and requested the Court's intervention to protect his fundamental rights.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner was unfairly denied medical reimbursement under the CGHS.

Whether the CGHS procedures and guidelines were properly followed in the petitioner's case.

Whether the actions of the CGHS officials violated the petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court held that the petitioner was unfairly denied medical reimbursement despite genuine emergency conditions and the lack of options for empaneled hospitals at the time of treatment. It emphasized the entitlement of government employees to medical facilities during and after their service, without undue restrictions. The Court criticized the mechanical approach of CGHS officials and directed the respondent-State to pay the balance amount owed to the petitioner.

Furthermore, the Court instructed the establishment of a Secretary level High Powered Committee to ensure timely disposal of similar cases and mandated the formation of a grievance redressal committee for retired pensioners. These measures aimed to streamline the process and ensure hassle-free disposal of claims within a specified timeframe.

Facts:

Appellant and respondent companies entered into an agreement in 1982.

Disputes arose regarding import of materials, leading to arbitration.

Arbitrators couldn't reach a consensus, resulting in the appointment of an umpire.

Appellant sought de novo proceedings before the umpire, but request was dismissed.

Umpire passed an award in favor of respondent, challenged by appellant in High Court.

High Court upheld the award, leading to present appeal in Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether umpire must conduct de novo hearing from stage of disagreement between arbitrators.

Whether appellant's conduct amounts to waiver of right to de novo hearing.

Held:

The court held that the umpire, when appointed due to disagreement between arbitrators, should conduct a de novo hearing, but not necessarily from scratch. The term "de novo hearing" implies a fresh hearing based on existing pleadings, evidence, and documents. However, the appellant's conduct, in delaying its request for de novo hearing until a late stage, amounted to waiver of its right to such a hearing.

Therefore, the umpire was not obliged to entertain the appellant's request for de novo proceedings. The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decisions of the lower courts.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of sections 84 and 86 of the Electricity Act 2003 concerning the appointment of Chairpersons and Members of Central and State Regulatory Commissions.

Issues:

Whether it is mandatory to appoint a High Court Judge as the Chairperson of the State Commission.

What are the qualifications required for the appointment of Chairpersons and Members of State Commissions.

How should statutory provisions be interpreted in determining the requirements for appointments to regulatory bodies.

Held:

The judgment clarified that Section 84(2) of the Electricity Act 2003 is an enabling provision, and it is not mandatory to appoint a High Court Judge as the Chairperson of the State Commission.

However, it is mandatory to have a person of law as a Member of the Commission, possessing qualifications equivalent to those required for a High Court Judge or a District Judge, due to the adjudicatory functions of the State Commission.

The judgment emphasized that while interpreting statutory provisions, both the golden rule and literal rule of statutory construction must be applied. It's not the court's role to read into the statute something not provided, but the real intention of the legislature can be ascertained by considering the entire scope of the statute.

The functions of the State Commission under Section 86 of the Act were analyzed, concluding that while regulatory functions predominate, there are also limited adjudicatory functions. Therefore, it's not imperative for the Chairperson to be a judicial member.

The judgment dismissed challenges to appointments made to the Tamil Nadu State Commission and the exercise of suo moto powers by the Commission, finding no evidence of financial bias and stating that appointments were made following due process .

Facts:

The appellant filed an application for an Agricultural Electricity Service Connection on 06.12.2010, which was initially returned due to a missing signature.

Upon resubmission on 21.03.2011, no action was taken by the respondents.

A writ petition was filed, and the Single Judge directed consideration of the application after necessary conditions were fulfilled.

The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order, stating that the 2017 application should be considered if found to be in order.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's application for an agricultural electricity service connection should be considered from the date of initial submission or resubmission.

Whether the non-deposit of the registration fee constitutes a valid reason for rejecting the application.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the application should be considered from the date of resubmission, 21.03.2011, as the defect of non-payment of the registration fee was not communicated by the respondents initially.

The respondents cannot benefit from their lapse in not communicating the defect, and thus the appellant's application cannot be rejected solely on the grounds of non-payment of the registration fee.

The respondents are directed to consider the application from 21.03.2011 and the appellant to resubmit the demand draft.

The respondents are given three months to process the application and notify any further requirements.

Facts:

The appellant, Suvarnamma, filed a claim for compensation after her husband was killed in a motor accident involving a tractor. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal awarded compensation to the appellants, holding both the Insurance Company and the owner of the tractor jointly and severally liable. The Insurance Company challenged this decision before the High Court, which ruled in its favor, exonerating it from liability. Dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

The liability of the Insurance Company in the motor accident claim.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that there was no dispute regarding the negligent driving of the tractor at the time of the accident.

The Court noted the testimony of an independent eyewitness supporting the claim that the deceased was a pedestrian walking on the footpath at the time of the accident.

Despite this evidence, the High Court presumed that the deceased was unlawfully traveling on the tractor.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's decision was erroneous as it was based on presumptions and conjectures rather than reliable evidence.

Since there was no credible evidence to support the claim that the deceased was unlawfully traveling on the tractor, the Court upheld the Tribunal's decision.

The respondents, including the Insurance Company, were directed to jointly and severally pay compensation to the appellants.

The appeal was allowed, affirming the judgment of the Tribunal.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a direction issued by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh regarding alleged violations of previous court judgments and interim arrangements.

The respondents alleged that certain policy guidelines dated February 17, 2014, violated the spirit of an earlier judgment dated May 17, 2012, and interim arrangements made by the court.

The appellants challenged the High Court's findings in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the guidelines framed and notified in accordance with court directions violated previous judgments and interim orders.

Whether the contempt proceedings initiated by the High Court were justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that once guidelines were framed and notified, the interim order to maintain status quo lapsed. The Court emphasized that contempt jurisdiction is limited to instances of willful disobedience of court directions.

The High Court's finding of violations of the earlier judgment and its subsequent contempt proceedings were not justified.

The impugned order dated May 28, 2015, was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Civil Appeal No. 9310 of 2016 and SLP (C) No. 1865 of 2016 were disposed of in accordance with the judgment.

Facts:

The petitioner, a member of the Bar, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, claiming to be a "public spirited person." He raised grievances regarding the constitution of Benches in the Supreme Court and the Allahabad High Court. The petitioner sought various reliefs, including the evolution of a set procedure for constituting benches in the Supreme Court and the establishment of separate divisions within the Court.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the petitioner's allegations against the bench of the Allahabad High Court.

The validity of the petitioner's suggestions regarding the constitution of benches and establishment of separate divisions in the Supreme Court.

The authority of the Chief Justice in constituting benches and allocating cases in both the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

Held:

The Court expressed disapproval of the petitioner's unwarranted allegations against the bench of the Allahabad High Court. It emphasized the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Justice in constituting benches and rejected the petitioner's proposals for specific bench compositions and establishment of separate divisions in the Supreme Court.

The Court upheld the authority of the Chief Justice in allocating work and forming benches in both the Supreme Court and the High Courts.

Finally, the Court dismissed the petition, finding no merit in the petitioner's claims, and cautioned the petitioner to be more responsible in future filings.

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction regarding joint ownership and possession of ancestral property. They alleged fraud in the execution of a registered sale deed by the respondents.

Issues:

Whether the suit was barred by limitation, as contended by the respondents under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the CPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the Trial Court, holding that the issue of limitation was a triable issue and should not lead to the rejection of the plaint at the threshold. The Court emphasized that only the averments in the plaint should be considered at this stage and criticized the High Court for basing its decision on assumptions rather than analyzing the content of the plaint. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal and restored the order of the Trial Court.