Facts:

The complainant alleged that on March 29, 2007, the accused formed an unlawful assembly, trespassed into the complainant's land, cut and removed the wheat crop, and abused the complainant and his family.

Issues:

The trial court acquitted the appellants, finding a dispute over land possession and lack of cogent evidence. The High Court reversed the acquittal, leading to the appeal.

Held:

The Trial Court carefully analyzed the testimony, highlighting discrepancies in the complainant's account and the absence of independent witnesses. It concluded that the offense was not established.

The High Court's judgment lacked an application of mind to the basic facet that it was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. No perversity of approach by the Trial Judge was found. The well-considered findings of the Trial Court were maintained, and the judgment of acquittal was upheld.

Facts:

Appellant unit's industrial effluents, after partial treatment at another company (JETL), are let into the Water Supply and Sewerage Board's sewer line.

The Board levies sewerage cess on the appellant based on Section 55 and Clause 16 of the agreement between the appellant and the Board.

Issues:

The appellant contests the levy, arguing it is not directly connected to the Board's sewer line.

The appellant claims it is covered under the proviso to Section 55.

Held:

Section 55 of the Act contemplates the levy of sewerage cess on the occupier, irrespective of whether the area is served by the Board's sewerage system.

The appellant, being an occupier of a "non-domestic premise," is liable to pay sewerage cess as it discharges sewage effluents into the Board's sewer line.

The agreement with JETL is an internal contractual arrangement, and the appellant remains liable for statutory sewerage cess.

The appellant's effluents, after partial treatment at JETL, are ultimately let into the Board's sewer line, justifying the imposition of sewerage cess.

The proviso to Section 55 does not exempt the appellant, as its premises are ultimately connected to the Board's sewer system.

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, upholding the levy of sewerage cess on the appellant.

The appellant is directed to pay any arrears of sewerage cess with interest as per the stipulated period.

Facts:

The Income Tax Department acquired a property under Section 269UD of the Income Tax Act. After the property was auctioned, the highest bidder (respondent) obtained a sale deed. The respondent sought conversion of leasehold rights to freehold rights from Delhi Development Authority (DDA), depositing conversion charges. DDA demanded additional payment for unearned increase, which was contested.

Issues:

Validity of DDA's demand for unearned increase.

Nature of rights transferred through auction.

Interpretation of Sale Deed and auction notice.

Applicability of the principle of merger.

Held:

The auction was based on the market value, and the Income Tax Department had already paid unearned increase. DDA's demand for unearned increase was unwarranted. The High Court rightly rejected DDA's claim.( Para 1 - 12)

The Sale Deed indicated a leasehold residential plot, supported by details in the auction notice. The bid was for leasehold rights, and the terms of the auction were binding.( Para 15 - 19)

Clause 3 of the Sale Deed explained the rights granted and harmonized with Clauses 1 and 2. The auction notice specified leasehold rights, influencing the interpretation of the Sale Deed.( Para 20 - 22)

Considering Section 269UE, Clause 3 of the Sale Deed was in line with the statutory mandate, conveying that all rights were not transferred to the petitioner.( Para 24 - 25)

The principle of merger, being a government grant, wasn't highly relevant. The Sale Deed did not convey all rights, diminishing the impact of the principle of merger.( Para 27)

The petitioner was not entitled to a refund of conversion charges. DDA was directed to process the conversion application for leasehold to freehold rights.( Para 29)

Facts:

The deceased and accused were friends who traveled together.

The deceased was injected with a drug leading to overdose and subsequent death.

Prosecution alleged murder and conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence.

Issues:

Lack of direct eyewitnesses; reliance on circumstantial evidence.

Failure of prosecution to establish a clear motive for murder.

Inconsistencies in medical evidence regarding the cause and time of death.

Allegations of the accused injecting the deceased with the drug.

Held:

The court emphasized the importance of proving each circumstance separately in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

Last seen together: Room No. 203 was hired by all involved, suggesting no premeditated murder plan by the accused.

Medical evidence: The prosecution failed to link the accused to the death, and inconsistencies in medical reports raised doubt.

Motive: Alleged motive of a love triangle not proven, and the introduced motive four years later lacked credibility.

Chandru being a medical student: Inference of his involvement in the crime was unfounded.

Inconsistency in statements: Discrepancies in statements cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence.

Delay in filing the private complaint: Lack of protest during the investigation against the accused raised questions about the credibility of the complainants.

Clean hands doctrine: The complainants did not come to court with clean hands, as the motive was introduced after four years.

FACTS:

On 26.07.1989, the State Government made a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for resolving disputes.

The appellant did not appear before the Industrial Tribunal and suffered an adverse ex parte award.

The Industrial Tribunal decided the reference ex parte against the appellant.

The Single Judge set aside the award in a writ petition filed by the appellant.

The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the respondent's appeal and set aside the Single Judge's order in the appellant's absence.

The review petition filed by the appellant was dismissed.

ISSUES:

Whether the appellant, having not appeared before the Industrial Tribunal, is entitled to contest the reference on merits.

Whether there was a sufficient cause for the appellant's absence before the Industrial Tribunal.

HELD:

The appellant did not receive an opportunity to contest the reference before the Industrial Tribunal.

The cause shown for the appellant's absence constitutes a sufficient cause, entitling them to claim an opportunity to contest the reference on merits.

The appellant did not appear before the Tribunal from the inception, thus having no opportunity to contest the matter.

Every party has the right to contest the case on merits, and no exception disentitled the appellant.

Substantial justice demands an opportunity for both parties to contest the case on merits.

The appeals are allowed, setting aside the impugned orders and the ex parte award. The case is remanded to the Industrial Tribunal.

The appellant is granted an opportunity to file a written statement, and parties can amend statements, file documents, and present oral evidence.

The Industrial Tribunal is directed to decide the reference within six months from the date of appearance.

Facts:

The landlord, initially a minor on tillers day, filed an application under Section 31(3) for personal cultivation upon attaining majority. The application was dismissed, leading the tenant to initiate proceedings under Section 32G. The original authority rejected the tenant's claim, citing non-compliance with Section 32F(1A). The appellate authority reversed this finding, but the Tribunal upheld the original authority's decision. The tenant's writ petition in the High Court was dismissed, and the review petition faced a similar fate.

Issues:

Whether the tenant, upon rejection of the landlord's application under Section 31, attains the status of a deemed purchaser under Section 29 r/w Section 32.

Whether compliance with the provisions of Section 32F(1A) is necessary for a tenant who has acquired deemed status.

Held:

The First Proviso to Section 32(1) along with Section 29 establishes that if a landlord's possession application is rejected, the tenant is deemed to have purchased the land. Section 32F, however, entitles the tenant to purchase, especially in cases involving a minor landlord attaining majority.( Para 52)

Sections 29, 32, and 32F deal with two mutually exclusive situations. If a tenant has a deemed status under Section 29 r/w Section 32, there is no need for the tenant to apply for purchase under Section 32F. The two scenarios are distinct.( Para 53)

In the present case, if the landlord invoked Section 29 r/w Section 32, and the application was rejected, the tenant would acquire deemed status. In such cases, Section 32F need not be invoked.( Para 54)

The appellant, being a tenant of the first respondent, acquired deemed status with the rejection of the landlord's application. No further action, such as sending intimation under Section 32F(1A), was required.( Para 65)

Despite discrepancies in dates, the appellant produced orders by the Appellate Authority and the Tribunal, showing that the landlord litigated the matter at multiple levels. Discrepancies should not be a basis for adverse findings against the appellant.( Para 64)

Facts:

The appellant convicted for murdering Smt. Ruby by acid attack.

Additional convictions under IPC sections for injuring other family members.

Appeal against the death sentence confirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Validity of the death sentence in light of the circumstances.

Consideration of special reasons for the imposition of the death penalty.

Connection between the present crime and a prior murder conviction.

Held:

The appellant rightly convicted for causing the death of Smt. Ruby. Dying declaration of the victim and consistent witness accounts establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.( Para 5)

The evidence of the appellant fleeing the crime scene, fingerprints matching on the acid container, and the Dying Declaration hold strong probative value. The conviction is well-founded.( Para 6)

Consideration of the imposition of the death sentence. Special reasons required. Appellant committed the crime while on bail for a prior murder conviction. However, the earlier case is unrelated to the present incident.( Para 8)

Appellant's disappointment in his relationship with the deceased led to the attack. The choice of acid suggests an intention to injure or disfigure rather than premeditated murder.( Para 9)

No special reasons found to warrant a death sentence. Reference to Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 and Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 for sentencing guidelines.( Para 10)

The death sentence imposed by the High Court is set aside. Appellant to undergo imprisonment for life.( Para 12)

Facts:

A suit was filed claiming a sum of Rs. 6,94,63,114 on 10.03.2017. The defendant was served with summons on 14.07.2017. The court allowed a grace period of 120 days for filing a written statement, and an Order 7, Rule 11 application was rejected. A subsequent application sought to rely on recent changes in the Code of Civil Procedure.

Issues:

The interpretation of the amended provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically Order 8, Rules 1 and 10, and whether the consequences of not filing a written statement within the stipulated time frame are mandatory.

Held:

The court, after considering the recent amendments and various precedents, held that the consequences outlined in the amended provisions are indeed mandatory. Beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant forfeits the right to file a written statement, and the court has no power to extend this time. The court rejected the argument that inherent powers could be invoked to circumvent these provisions.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, resulting in the removal of the written statement of Defendant No.1 from the record.

Facts:

The Trial Court convicted 11 accused persons under various sections of the IPC, including Sections 148, 302/149, 323/149, and 506/149. The High Court acquitted 8 accused persons under Section 302/149 IPC and upheld the conviction of 3 accused persons under Section 302/34 IPC. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, one of the appellants (No. 1) expired.

Issues:

Validity of the alteration of charges from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 302/34 IPC.

Applicability of Section 149 IPC after the acquittal of 8 co-accused.

Justification for sustaining the conviction of the three appellants.

Held:

Once eight co-accused were acquitted under Section 302/149 IPC, the charge under Section 149 IPC collapsed against the three appellants as there could be no unlawful assembly consisting of less than five accused persons. In other words, the appellants (3 in number) could not be charged with the aid of Section 149 IPC for want of numbers.( Para 55)

The High Court had the jurisdiction to alter the charge from Section 149 IPC to Section 34 IPC, but in the absence of evidence of common intention among the three appellants, their conviction under Section 302/34 IPC is not legally sustainable.( Para 56)

The prosecution did not set up a case that all 11 accused persons shared a common intention under Section 34 IPC. The High Court failed to give any reasons in support of the altered conviction, and the invoking of Section 34 IPC at the appellate stage cannot be upheld.( Paras 62 and 63)

The post-mortem report indicated that both assaults by appellant Nos. 2 and 3 caused simple injuries to the victim, not resulting in her death.( Para 67)

In a case of this nature, where there is a fight between two groups and the State does not pursue the plea of Section 149 IPC against the acquitted eight accused, and no evidence is relied upon for the charge of Section 34 IPC against the three accused, the two appellants are entitled to claim the benefit of entire scenario.( Para 68)

Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 could, at best, be convicted for an offence punishable under Section 324 IPC based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.( Para 69)