Tenancy Law - Commercial Tenancy – Heritability – Delhi Rent Control Act – Civil Court Jurisdiction – Decree a Nullity – Civil court passed ejectment decree against heirs of tenant holding tenancy not heritable – Subsequently, Constitution Bench in Gian Devi Anand held commercial tenancy heritable – Held: Civil courts lacked inherent jurisdiction, as eviction jurisdiction exclusively with Rent Controller under Sections 14 and 50 – Decree passed was nullity, inexecutable – Objection to execution validly raised under Section 47 CPC [Paras 9-11, 18-23].

Doctrine of Prospective Overruling – Inapplicability – Law declared by Supreme Court relates back to enactment – Gian Devi Anand only interpreted existing law, did not create new rights – High Court erred in applying prospective overruling – Absence of Supreme Court’s direction for prospective application means ruling applies retrospectively [Paras 12-17, 23].

Nullity of Decree – Executability – Decree by court lacking jurisdiction is coram non judice – Such decree is non est, invalidity can be raised at any stage including execution – Principle of res judicata not applicable – Hardship to decree-holder cannot validate a decree without jurisdiction [Paras 18-21, 24].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Orders of High Court and executing court set aside – Decree of ejectment held nullity and inexecutable – Parties directed to bear own costs [Para 24].

Motor Vehicle Accident Claim – Transfer of Vehicle – Liability of Insurer – Sections 94, 95, 95(5), 97 and 103-A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Insurer Held Liable to Third Party – The deceased’s parents claimed compensation for death caused by negligent driving of motorcycle – Vehicle transferred without intimation to insurer under Section 103-A – Tribunal held insurer not liable; compensation awarded against transferee-owner – High Court dismissed appeal – Held: Insurance against third-party risk is compulsory under Sections 94 and 95 – Liability of insurer to third party/victim does not cease even if transfer of vehicle is not intimated to insurer – Policy continues to protect third-party rights irrespective of breach between insured and insurer – Insurer directed to pay compensation with right to recover from insured or transferee [Paras 2-7].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Orders of Tribunal and High Court set aside – Insurer directed to pay compensation with 11% interest p.a. from date of incident, recoverable from insured or transferee – No order as to costs [Para 8].

Taxation Law - Telecommunication Rentals – U.P. Trade Tax – DoT as Dealer – Appeals Allowed – DoT challenged assessment of trade tax on telephone rentals contending it was providing a service and not transferring right to use goods – High Court accepted that view – Supreme Court held: DoT is a “dealer” within Section 2(c)(iv) & (viii), U.P. Trade Tax Act – Telephone instruments, lines, exchange connections constitute “goods” – Providing telephone access amounts to “transfer of right to use goods” under Article 366(29-A)(d) – Extended meaning of “sale” applies – High Court erred – Appeals allowed [Paras 2–18, 23–33, 44–47].

Definition of Dealer – Government as Dealer – Sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(c) covers government selling, supplying or transferring goods whether in course of business or otherwise – Insertion of sub-clause (viii) by U.P. Act 31 of 1995 was by way of abundant caution, not exclusion – Hence DoT liable even prior to 1995 amendment – Position clarified with reference to Vrajlal Manilal and Kanwar Raj Nath – [Paras 14–22].

Goods – Telephone Connection and Accessories – Wide Definition – Includes tangible and intangible objects – Telephone instruments, wiring, and access to exchange constitute “goods” – Electricity recognised as goods in MP Electricity Board case, hence intangible systems like telecom also goods – [Para 23].

Service vs. Sale – Substance of Transaction Test – Though termed “service”, provision of telephone connection involves transfer of right to use goods (instrument + access) – Terminology not decisive – Activity may be service for one Act but sale for sales tax purposes – [Paras 24–30].

Possession and Control – Not Sine Qua Non – Transfer of right to use goods complete once connection allotted and access to exchange enabled – Physical possession/control of exchange with DoT irrelevant – Constitution Bench in 20th Century Finance followed – [Para 31].

Composite Contract – Telephone Service – Cannot be split – Analogy of hotel/service contracts not applicable – Providing telephone connection inherently involves transfer of right to use goods, not merely incidental to service – Hence exigible to sales tax – [Paras 34–43].

Effect of Service Tax – Finance Act, 1994 introduced service tax on telecom services but that does not exclude States’ competence to levy trade tax on transfer of right to use goods – Two levies operate in different fields – [Para 32].

Decision – High Court judgment set aside – DoT held liable to trade tax on telephone rentals under U.P. Trade Tax Act – Earlier contrary views in ECIL case (AP HC) and Union of India v. State of Haryana (P&H HC) overruled – Demands remitted for fresh assessment after DoT files returns within three months – Appeals allowed with costs [Paras 44–47].

Service Law - Disability Pension – Attributability to military service – Regulation 53, Pension Regulations – Respondent, a Colonel in Army, retired on superannuation – Claimed disability pension for 60% disability (heart disease 40% and glaucoma 20%) – Medical Board held diseases constitutional, not attributable to or aggravated by military service – Held: Regulation 53 applies only where disability is attributable to or aggravated by service – Opinion of Medical Board binding unless challenged – Respondent not entitled to disability pension [Paras 2, 7, 10].

Entitlement Rules, 1982 – Rule 4 – Scope – Rule applies only when invalided out of service – Respondent superannuated and not invalided – Held: Rule 4 inapplicable to officer retiring on age – Finding of Single Judge extending Rule 4 to such cases erroneous – Division Bench also did not rely on Rule 4 – Appeal Court affirms Rule 4 not attracted [Paras 4-6].

Administrative Sanction by President – Tentative nature – Payment of disability pension sanctioned by President post High Court’s order – Expressly made “without prejudice” to final outcome of appeals – Sanction not binding as final recognition of entitlement – Respondent cannot claim vested right on basis of tentative sanction [Paras 8-9].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Orders of Single Judge and Division Bench set aside – Respondent not entitled to disability pension under Regulation 53 or Rule 4 – Disability pension already paid not to be recovered – No order as to costs [Para 10].

Civil Law - Partition Suit – Compromise Decree – Whether preliminary or final – Decree dated 13.02.1978 allotted properties by metes and bounds under compromise – Held: Though described as preliminary, the decree was in substance a final decree since no further inquiry remained – Engrossment on stamp paper on 24.05.1979 was only procedural – Legal effect related back to 13.02.1978 – Co-sharers validly acquired title on 13.02.1978 itself [Paras 9-12].

Gift by Co-sharers – Validity – Gift deed executed on 22.03.1979 by Rameshwar Singh and wife in favour of daughter-in-law and grandsons – Challenge on ground that title perfected only after final decree dated 24.05.1979 – Held: Even assuming no perfected title on 22.03.1979, subsequent final decree cured defect – Doctrine of feeding the estoppel applies – Title passed to donees – Transfer upheld [Paras 13-15].

Doctrine of Feeding the Estoppel – Recognition – Even if donor lacked full title at time of transfer, subsequent acquisition enures to benefit of transferee – Section 43, Transfer of Property Act illustrative of doctrine though not directly applicable to gift – Principle of equity applies – Respondents had no locus to dispute validity once donors themselves could not deny title [Paras 13-15].

High Court Judgment – Legally unsustainable – Misconstrued compromise decree as merely preliminary and denied validity of gift deed – Supreme Court held decree dated 13.02.1978 to be final in nature and gift valid – High Court judgment set aside, First Appellate Court decree restored [Paras 16-18].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Judgment of High Court set aside – First Appellate Court decrees decreeing eviction and rent restored – Parties to bear their own costs [Paras 18-19].

Freedom Fighters’ Pension – Date from which payable – Appeals Allowed in Part – High Court granted pension from date of application relying on Mukundlal Bhandari – Supreme Court held that under the M.P. Rules, 1972, in view of Rule 3(6) (inserted with effect from commencement of the Rules), pension is payable from the date of sanction order – Mukundlal Bhandari (Central scheme without a specific rule) distinguished – High Court orders set aside to that extent – Entitlement to pension otherwise affirmed [Paras 3–10].

Interpretation of M.P. Rules, 1972 – Rule 3(6) – Retrospective operation – Rule 3(6) expressly provides that a “Freedom Fighter will be entitled to claim the benefits of Samman Nidhi from the date of passing the order” and that the amendment shall come into force from the date of commencement of the Rules – Full Bench of M.P. High Court in Jagannath Prasad correctly held Rule 3(6) has retrospective effect – Applied and approved [Paras 5–9].

Distinction from Central Scheme – Mukundlal Bhandari v. Union of India – Central Freedom Fighters’ Pension Scheme had no provision specifying the start date – hence benefits granted from date of application – Not applicable where a State rule (Rule 3(6)) expressly fixes the start date as the date of sanction – High Court’s reliance on Mukundlal Bhandari unsustainable [Paras 4–6, 9].

Scope of Interference – Findings on eligibility – No interference with High Court’s factual findings granting pension on merits (e.g., Avadesh Prasad Shukla’s case) – Only the commencement date of payment modified to the date of sanction in terms of Rule 3(6) [Paras 3, 10].

Decision – Appeals allowed in part – High Court judgments set aside only insofar as they direct payment from the date of application – Pension payable from date of sanction order – No disturbance to findings of eligibility – Costs easy [Para 10].

Criminal Law – Murder - High Court Acquittal Set Aside – High Court acquitted accused without considering testimony of three injured eyewitnesses and ignored consistent medical corroboration – Held: Failure to examine eyewitness testimony amounts to gross miscarriage of justice – Appellate Court bound to consider evidence on record before reversing conviction – Acquittal set aside, conviction restored [Paras 7, 19].

Delay in FIR – Not Fatal – Sections 154, 174 CrPC – FIR lodged next day after victims rushed 60 km to hospital, where one died and others sustained grievous injuries – Delay explained by urgent medical needs and sequence of events – Held: Delay by itself not a ground to doubt prosecution case unless fabrication shown – High Court erred in holding 26-hour delay fatal [Paras 9–10].

Inquest Report – Scope – Section 174 CrPC – Purpose limited to ascertaining apparent cause of death – Not required to detail manner of assault or names of accused – Omission of incident details in inquest report not fatal – High Court erred in drawing adverse inference [Paras 12–13].

Defective Investigation – Effect – Non-seizure of wire gauze and failure to send firearms for forensic analysis – Held: Investigative lapses cannot override direct evidence of injured eyewitnesses corroborated by medical testimony – Courts must examine case de hors such defects – Karnel Singh and Ram Bihari Yadav principles applied [Paras 14–15].

Number of Witnesses – Section 134 Evidence Act – Prosecution examined three injured eyewitnesses; non-examination of other injured not fatal – Law requires quality, not plurality, of witnesses – Vadivelu Thevar principle reaffirmed [Paras 16–18].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment of High Court dated 26.09.1991 set aside – Conviction and sentence imposed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur restored – Accused directed to surrender forthwith [Paras 19–20].

Tenancy Law - Rent Control – Default in Deposit of Rent – Section 13(4), Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act – No Power of Court to Condoned Delay – Tenant failed to deposit arrears within prescribed time – Application under Section 5 of Limitation Act filed for condonation – Rajasthan High Court Full Bench held Limitation Act applicable and word “shall” in Section 13(5) to be read as “may” – Held: Provisions plain and unambiguous – Court’s power strictly limited to three months’ extension under Section 13(4) – Use of “shall” makes provision mandatory – No power to condone delay beyond statutory limit – Equitable considerations irrelevant – Section 5 not applicable [Paras 11-15, 36-42].

Interpretation of Statute – “Shall” vs. “May” – Use of negative words and statutory consequences show legislative intent of mandatory compliance – Court cannot rewrite or dilute statutory mandate – Rent control laws balance tenant protection with landlord rights; benefits to tenant available only on strict compliance [Paras 14, 36-39].

Limitation Act – Section 5 – Scope – Not Applicable to Rent Deposit Default – Section 5 applies only to appeals/applications – Deposit of rent is statutory compliance, not an application – Failure attracts automatic statutory consequence of striking off defence – Limitation Act cannot extend time where special statute prescribes outer limit – Rajasthan Act excludes applicability of Section 5 by necessary implication [Paras 42-47].

Distinction from Other Rent Control Acts – Rajasthan Act mandatory – Unlike Delhi, MP, and West Bengal Rent Acts which confer discretion on courts to extend time – Bihar and Bombay Acts also distinguishable – Precedents under other statutes not applicable [Paras 25-34].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – Judgment of Rajasthan High Court set aside – Application under Section 5 of Limitation Act held not maintainable – No order as to costs [Paras 57-58].

Tenancy Law - Eviction – Default in Rent – Bihar Buildings Act – Appeal Dismissed – Landlord sought eviction on ground of default and personal necessity – Trial Court dismissed suit – First Appellate Court decreed eviction for default – High Court affirmed – Supreme Court held tenant must strictly comply with statutory obligation to pay rent within prescribed period – Acceptance of delayed rent does not waive landlord’s accrued right – Two earlier two-Judge Bench decisions (Gowali Charan and Satyanarain Kandu) not laying down binding law, expressly overruled – Full Bench view of Patna High Court affirmed – Appeal dismissed, no costs [Paras 3-14].

Eviction – Default in Rent – Section 11(1)(d), Bihar Buildings Act – Mandatory Compliance – Tenant failed to pay two months’ rent within statutory time – Landlord accepted delayed payment – Held: Acceptance of rent does not waive accrued right of eviction – Act does not use expressions “wilful” or “habitual” default, only “is in arrears” – Obligation statutory, requiring strict compliance – Cause of action arises on non-payment within time [Paras 3-5].

Rent Control Legislation – Beneficial Nature – Not solely for Tenants – Rent Acts intended to balance rights of landlords and tenants – Tenant can claim protection only on strict adherence to statutory requirements – Equitable considerations irrelevant in default cases [Paras 5-6].

Interpretation of Statutes – Mandatory vs. Directory – Statutory direction to private persons ordinarily mandatory – Rent Act prescribes time for payment, consequence of default being eviction – Compliance mandatory, not directory [Para 7].

Precedents – Gowali Charan (1987) and Satyanarain Kandu (1996 PLR 110 SC) – Not Correct Law – Gowali Charan lacked reasoning, did not notice precedents, not binding under Article 141 – Satyanarain Kandu decided under Article 142 as equitable relief – Both overruled – High Court’s reliance on Patna Full Bench in Raj Kumar Prasad upheld [Paras 9-12].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Eviction decree on ground of default sustained – No costs [Para 14].