Facts:

The case involved Cheran Properties Limited (Appellant) v. Kasturi and Sons Limited and Ors., where disputes arose between the parties regarding a business transaction. An agreement was entered into between various entities, including Kasturi and Sons Limited (KSL), Cheran Properties Limited (appellant), and others. The transaction involved the allotment of shares and subsequent disputes led to arbitral proceedings. An arbitral award was passed, directing certain actions, including the transmission of shares.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, who was not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, could be bound by the arbitral award?

Whether the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) had jurisdiction to order rectification of the register under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956?

Held:

The Court interpreted Section 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which provides that an arbitral award is final and binding not only on the parties directly involved but also on persons claiming under them. The doctrine of 'claiming under' extends the scope of those who can be bound by the award to include entities deriving their capacity or position from a party to the proceedings.

In this case, the appellant, though not a signatory to the arbitration agreement, was found to claim under a party to the agreement. It was aware of the terms of the agreement and had sought to purchase shares in accordance with it. Therefore, the appellant could be bound by the arbitral award.

The Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the NCLT to order rectification of the register under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956, to effectuate the transmission of shares as mandated by the arbitral award.

The enforcement of the arbitral award was found to be equivalent to the enforcement of a decree of a civil court under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, the award could be enforced in the same manner as a court decree.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, affirming the enforcement of the arbitral award against the appellant and the jurisdiction of the NCLT to order rectification of the register under the Companies Act, 1956.

Facts:

B.L. Passi filed an income tax return claiming a deduction under Section 80-O for income received from Sumitomo Corporation, Japan, for providing specialized industrial and commercial knowledge about the Indian automobile industry.

The Income Tax Department disallowed the deduction, leading Passi to appeal through various levels of adjudication, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether Passi was entitled to the deduction under Section 80-O of the Income Tax Act.

Held:

The court analyzed the nature of the services provided by Passi and the relevant provisions of Section 80-O. It noted that Passi claimed to have provided blueprints and information about the Indian automobile industry to Sumitomo Corporation, but failed to produce evidence such as the blueprints to substantiate his claim before the lower authorities.

The court emphasized that technical services, as per Section 80-O, involve the use of tools and machinery, which may not include managerial services. Since Passi couldn't prove the technical nature of the services provided or the basis for the alleged payment by Sumitomo Corporation, the court dismissed his appeal.

Additionally, the court affirmed the High Court's finding of a principal-agent relationship between Passi and Sumitomo Corporation, further supporting the denial of the deduction under Section 80-O.

Facts:

Bharat V. Patel, Chairman and Managing Director of Procter and Gamble (P&G) India, received an amount on redemption of SARs issued by P&G USA.

Assessment proceedings were conducted under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, determining Patel's total income.

Patel appealed to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and then to the Tribunal.

The High Court upheld Patel's appeal, dismissing the Revenue's appeal.

The Revenue appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the amount received on redemption of SARs is taxable as capital gains or as a perquisite under Section 17(2)(iii) of the IT Act.

Whether the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 1999, regarding taxation of specified securities has retrospective effect.

Held:

The Court held that the amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 1999, did not have retrospective effect. Hence, Patel's transaction falls outside its purview.

The Court emphasized that unless a benefit is made taxable by law, it cannot be regarded as income. Therefore, the amount received by Patel cannot be taxed as perquisite or under capital gains.

The Court rejected the Revenue's argument regarding the applicability of Section 28(iv) of the IT Act, as it pertains to business or profession-related transactions, which was not the case here.

Facts:

The judgment arises from a reference made by a three-judge bench to a larger bench concerning the interpretation of Regulations 9(IV) and 9(VII) of the Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000. The petitions before the court sought declarations regarding the power of states to provide a separate source of entry for in-service candidates seeking admission to postgraduate medical courses. The primary contention was whether Regulation 9 prohibits states from providing such a separate source of entry.

Issues:

Whether states have the authority, under Entry 25 of List III, to provide a separate source of entry for in-service candidates seeking admission to postgraduate medical courses, despite Regulation 9 of the Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000.

Whether the interpretation of Regulation 9 in the case of Dinesh Singh Chauhan holds precedent and restricts states from providing reservations or a separate source of entry for in-service candidates.

Held:

The court refused the prayer for interim relief sought by the petitioners, as the interpretation of Regulation 9(IV) in the case of Dinesh Singh Chauhan remains valid. The court emphasized that Regulation 9 is a self-contained code regarding admission procedures for medical courses, and states cannot undermine these procedures. The decision in Dinesh Singh Chauhan construes Regulation 9 as prohibiting reservations or a separate source of entry for in-service candidates in postgraduate degree courses.

Therefore, any attempt to provide such reservations would impinge upon Entry 66 of List I and the regulatory powers vested under central legislation.

Facts:

The case involves a petition challenging the validity of a no-confidence motion against the 'Pramukh' (chairperson) of a Kshetra Panchayat in Uttar Pradesh. The motion was moved by 39 elected members, but the petitioner contested its validity, arguing that only 26 members had properly signed it. The dispute revolved around the status of 13 elected members who allegedly did not take their oath of office.

Issues:

Whether the no-confidence motion against the 'Pramukh' was valid, considering the disputed status of 13 elected members who had not taken their oath of office.

The secondary issue involved the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats Adhiniyam, 1961, and related rules, particularly regarding the participation of members who had not taken their oath of office.

Held:

The judgment, delivered by Madan B. Lokur, J., addressed the validity of the no-confidence motion. It was concluded that the motion was numerically valid since it was signed by more than 50% of the elected members, even if the disputed 13 members were not considered for signing the motion.

The judgment also clarified the status of elected members who had not taken their oath of office. While it was acknowledged as illogical for these members to sign the motion without having the right to vote in the Panchayat, there was no legal challenge to their status as elected members. Therefore, they were deemed entitled to sign the motion.

Deepak Gupta, J., concurred with the conclusion regarding the validity of the motion. However, he emphasized the seriousness of taking the oath of office and suggested maintaining an official record of oath-taking to avoid future disputes.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the timing of filing applications for redetermination of compensation under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

The appellant sought redetermination of compensation based on a judgment of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the Act.

Issues:

Whether an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, can be filed within three months from the date of the judgment of the High Court or Supreme Court passed in appeal under Section 54 of the Act.

Held:

The Court clarified the scope and applicability of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and made the following decisions:

The redetermination under Section 28A is only available in respect of an "Award" passed by the "court" under Part III of the Act.

The appellate courts' judgments under Section 54 are not within the purview of Section 28A.

The entitlement to redetermination of compensation lies only in terms of Section 28A of the Act based on the award of the Reference Court, not on judgments of appellate courts.

The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and any pending applications were disposed of with no costs incurred.

Facts:

The appellant filed a complaint against the respondent, alleging abduction and assault. The incident occurred on the night of 6th to 7th September 2003, following a birthday party attended by both parties. The respondent allegedly forcibly took the appellant to his house, where he assaulted her and made unwanted advances.

Issues:

Whether the charge under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) is applicable to the facts presented.

Held:

The court observed that mere abduction does not automatically warrant a charge under Section 366 IPC. It must be proven that the accused abducted the woman with the specific intent outlined in the section, such as compelling her to marry against her will or forcing her into illicit intercourse. Despite the primary allegation of forcible abduction being present, the later claim of intent to marry or engage in illicit activities seemed tacked on and lacked evidence. The court emphasized that the accused's intent is crucial in determining the applicability of Section 366 IPC. Therefore, the charge under Section 366 IPC was deemed not maintainable.

The court upheld the lower courts' decisions, finding the charge under Section 366 IPC not applicable based on the evidence presented. Despite dismissing the appeal, the court directed the trial court to expedite proceedings, considering the protracted nature of the case. It clarified that its observations were limited to the applicability of Section 366 IPC and that the trial court should decide the matter on its merits.

Facts:

M/S TechSpan India Private Ltd., engaged in software development and human resource services, filed its return of income for the Assessment Year 2001-02 declaring a loss.

The Income Tax Officer issued a notice under Section 148 for re-opening the assessment, alleging that the deduction under Section 10A of the IT Act had been allowed in excess, leading to an income escape of Rs. 57,36,811.

TechSpan challenged the re-assessment notice in the High Court, which ruled in its favor, quashing the notice and subsequent re-assessment order.

Issues:

Whether the re-opening of the completed assessment is justified under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961?

Held:

The court emphasizes the requirement that the assessing officer must have a "reason to believe" that income has escaped assessment, which cannot be merely a change of opinion on the same facts and circumstances already considered during the original assessment proceedings.

The Court concludes in paragraph 14 that since the assessing officer had already considered the matter during the original assessment and the re-assessment was based on the same facts, it amounted to a mere change of opinion and not a valid ground for re-assessment.

Therefore, the appeal filed by the Income Tax Officer was dismissed.

Facts:

T. Jayachandran, a stockbroker, acted as a broker for Indian Bank in purchasing securities.

Indian Bank sought to save itself from high-interest rates by luring PSUs to make fixed-term deposits at higher interest rates.

Jayachandran purchased securities for Indian Bank at a prescribed price, including covering extra interest payable to PSUs.

Income Tax department raised a demand for additional tax, alleging that Jayachandran should be taxed on the sum payable to the PSUs as income.

Issues:

Whether the additional interest payable to PSUs could be assessed as the income of Jayachandran.

Held:

The court examined the nature of the relationship between Jayachandran and Indian Bank regarding the transactions. It considered evidence from criminal proceedings, including the findings of the CBI court, which acquitted Jayachandran and concluded that he acted as a broker for Indian Bank. Based on the evidence and conduct of the parties, including the acknowledgment by Indian Bank of demand drafts taken by Jayachandran, the court held that he acted as a broker and not as an individual dealer.

Therefore, the additional interest payable to the PSUs could not be considered his income.