Facts:

The case revolves around the interpretation and application of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and Rules 96ZO(3) and 96ZP(3) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. These provisions deal with the determination of Annual Capacity Production (ACP) of factories for the purpose of levy and collection of excise duty.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of Rule 96ZP(3) are compatible with Section 3A(4) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

The validity and interpretation of Rule 96ZP(3) in comparison with Rule 96ZO(3).

The distinction between legal fiction and presumption in the interpretation of statutory provisions.

Held:

The court determined that Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, aims to address instances of duty evasion by deeming the ACP of a factory to be its annual production for the purpose of excise duty levy and collection.

Regarding the interpretation of legal fiction and presumption, the court clarified that Section 3A(2) creates a presumption rather than a legal fiction, and it allows the department to presume certain facts but doesn't create an artificial state of facts.

The court analyzed the provisions of Rules 96ZO(3) and 96ZP(3) and noted that both seek to eliminate the benefit of Section 3A(4) for assesses who opt for alternative procedures of duty levy and collection.

It was observed that the provisions of Rule 96ZP(3) limit the right of assesses to establish their actual production if they opt for the scheme under this rule, raising questions about its compatibility with Section 3A(4).

The court concluded that previous judgments on similar matters did not fully address the complexities and differences between the rules in question and referred the issue to a larger bench for further examination.

Facts:

The case involved the question of pensionary benefits for casual workers who obtain temporary status until their regular absorption into a post.

Issues:

Whether the entire service of a casual worker after obtaining temporary status should be reckoned for pensionary benefits or only 50% of such service.

The applicability of Rule 20 of the Railway Service (Pension) Rules, 1993, in cases where only temporary status is granted to casual workers without appointment against any post.

Held:

The Court held that only 50% of the period of service of a casual worker after attaining temporary status counts for pensionary benefits, as per Rule 31.

Rule 20 is not attracted in cases where only temporary status is granted to casual workers without appointment against any post.

The grant of temporary status of casual labor is not similar to appointment against a post and is covered by Rule 31, which specifies that half of the service paid from contingencies shall be taken into account for calculating pensionary benefits.

The judgment of the Delhi High Court, which held that the entire services of a casual laborer after obtaining temporary status should be reckoned for pensionary benefits, was set aside. Instead, half of the services should be reckoned as per Rule 31. However, the period of casual labor prior to the grant of temporary status must be counted to the extent of 50% for pensionary benefits.

Rule 107 empowers the Pension Sanctioning Authority to recommend for relaxation under deserving cases, providing flexibility in applying pension rules).

Decision: The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgment of the Delhi High Court and clarifying the calculation of pensionary benefits for casual workers who obtain temporary status.

Facts:

The appellant, Bhagirath Agarwal, appealed against the order of the City Civil Court at Calcutta denying him interest for the arrears of rent in an Ejectment Suit.

The City Civil Court permitted the tenant, M/S Simplex Concrete and Piles (I) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors, to pay the arrears of rent in installments but denied interest to the landlord.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the landlord, is entitled to interest for the arrears of rent despite the tenant being permitted to pay in installments.

Whether the City Civil Court's discretion to deny interest was valid under the statutory provisions.

Held:

The Court held that the appellant was indeed entitled to interest for the arrears of rent under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The Court emphasized that according to Section 17(2A) of the Act, when payment of rent, including arrears, is permitted to be paid in installments, the beneficiary (landlord) shall be granted interest. The entitlement to interest is statutory and not subject to the discretion of the court. Even if there are justifications or explanations for non-payment, the landlord is still entitled to interest.

The Court further noted that any claims regarding the landlord's refusal to provide amenities or expenses incurred for providing amenities could be considered for set off under Section 34 of the Act. However, since no such set off was granted by the trial court in this case, and the tenant was permitted to pay the dues in installments, the appellant was entitled to interest.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, granting the appellant the right to interest under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. No costs were awarded to either party.

Facts:

The appellants, a mother and son, filed a suit for ejectment of two katras on the grounds of personal need before the Munsif Court, Patna City. The Trial Court decreed the suit in their favor.

Issues:

The respondents challenged the decree in revision before the High Court, arguing misjoinder of parties.

The High Court set aside the decree, contending that the suit was liable to be dismissed due to misjoinder of parties.

Held:

The Supreme Court referred to Section 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prohibits the reversal or substantial variation of a decree on account of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. The Court held that this provision applies to both appeals and revisions, as per Section 141 of the CPC.

Therefore, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court were restored, and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. The appellants were granted time until September 30, 2017, to surrender vacant possession of the property, subject to filing a usual undertaking within six weeks. If the undertaking was not filed, the respondents would not be entitled to the extension of time for surrendering vacant possession.

The Court disposed of any pending applications and declared that there would be no orders as to costs.

Facts:

The appellants, Pranay Kumar Podder, challenged their ineligibility for admission to MBBS courses due to partial color blindness. The High Court of Tripura upheld the recommendations of the Medical Council of India (MCI), which emphasized the necessity of normal color vision for medical education and practice.

Issues:

Whether candidates with color vision deficiency (CVD) can be deemed ineligible for admission to medical courses.

The extent to which international practices and principles of equality and non-discrimination apply to the issue.

Held:

The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of adequate color vision for certain aspects of medical practice but also considered principles of equality and non-discrimination for persons with disabilities.

The Court directed the MCI to constitute an expert committee to comprehensively review the issue, including international practices, diagnostic tests, prosthetic aids, and suitable areas of practice for individuals with CVD in the medical field. The committee was given a deadline to submit its report to the Court. The case was scheduled for further hearing after the submission of the expert committee's report.

Facts:

On 04.07.2009, at about 3:00 a.m., the deceased Rameshbhai Prajapati, who was the Taluka President of Shivsena, was assaulted in his sleep with a large knife by the accused persons. The motive for the assault was allegedly due to the marriage of the deceased's younger brother with a woman from the community of the accused. The deceased died on the spot, and his wife witnessed the incident. The accused fled the scene after the attack.

Issues:

Whether the accused are guilty of various offences under the IPC based on the evidence presented.

Held:

After considering the evidence and arguments presented by both parties, the Supreme Court held as follows:

The Court noted that although the murder was proved, the ingredients of the unlawful assembly were not established as the minimum requirement of five persons was not met. However, the common object of the accused was proved by the prosecution.

The Court also noted discrepancies in the evidence and acquitted accused No. 4 due to reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the judgment of the High Court, and upholding the conviction and sentence of accused Nos. 1 to 3 for their involvement in the murder with a common object.

Facts:

The Central Government, through Rule 7 of the SCST Rules, vested investigative authority for offenses committed under the SCST Act with an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP). However, the appellant-State issued a notification allowing the investigative process to be carried out by officers three ranks below the rank of DSP. The validity of this notification was challenged.

Issues:

Whether the notification issued by the State Government, relaxing the provision of Rule 7, is valid.

Whether the power vested with the State Government under Section 9 of the SCST Act allows it to override Rule 7 of the SCST Rules.

Held:

The power vested with the Central Government to require the investigative process to be conducted by an officer not below the rank of DSP, as per Rule 7 of the SCST Rules, is upheld.

Section 9 of the SCST Act grants expansive powers to the State Government, allowing it to delegate investigation authority to any officer it deems necessary, irrespective of whether they belong to the police department or not.

The non-obstante clause in Section 9 empowers the State Government to exercise its authority irrespective of the provisions of the SCST Act or SCST Rules, thus allowing it to relax the provisions of Rule 7.

The notification issued by the State Government, relaxing the requirement of investigation by officers not below the rank of DSP, is upheld.

Decision: The court upholds the validity of the notification issued by the State Government, allowing investigation by officers below the rank of DSP, and affirms the expansive powers granted to the State Government under Section 9 of the SCST Act.

Facts:

The appeal stemmed from a dispute over a lease agreement entered into by Parsi Lying-in Hospital (PLIH) with Krimson Health Ventures Private Limited (KHPL) to renovate a hospital.

Some trustees of Bombay Parsi Punchayet (BPP) challenged the legality of the agreement, leading to litigation.

During the litigation, KHPL terminated the agreement.

The Supreme Court was called upon to decide the validity of the agreement and subsequent termination.

Issues:

The legality and validity of the lease agreement between PLIH and KHPL.

The effect of KHPL's termination of the agreement on the ongoing litigation.

Held:

The Supreme Court declined to examine the legality of the agreement due to its termination. The Court directed that the terminated agreement would not be given effect to. PLIH/BPP were given the liberty to enter into any other arrangement in the interest of the Trusts/beneficiaries, subject to necessary approvals.

The Court emphasized the duty of trustees to fulfill the object and purpose of the Trust and to act in the interest of the Trust and its beneficiaries. No costs were imposed on any party due to the Court's decision not to examine the issues on merits.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 30th January 1990, stemming from a dispute related to a Panchayat election. This resulted in violence, leading to the death of Ismail Khan. The trial court acquitted all seventeen accused, citing difficulties in identification due to darkness, a hostile witness, presence of injuries on both sides, and doubts regarding the presence of a key figure, the Sarpanch. The High Court, however, reversed the trial court's decision, convicting all accused of murder.

Issues:

The correctness of the trial court's decision to acquit all accused versus the High Court's decision to convict them.

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed the trial court's reasoning and found it to be a "possible view" rather than erroneous. It emphasized the reasonableness of the trial court's conclusions given the circumstances. Criticizing the High Court for substituting its view, the Supreme Court set aside its judgment and acquitted all accused.

The Court stressed the importance of considering all evidence and circumstances before reaching a verdict, and highlighted the principle that a trial court's decision, if based on a reasonable view, should not be overturned lightly by higher courts.