Facts:

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission ("NCDRC") disposed of the consumer complaint filed by flat purchasers.

The possession, as per the flat purchase agreement, was to be handed over by 31 January 2014, but the developer breached its contractual obligations.

The occupation certificate was received on 10 February 2016, and possession letters were issued from May 2016.

The NCDRC awarded compensation for delayed possession until 31 July 2016 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

Issues:

The adequacy of compensation and the duration of interest awarded by the NCDRC.

Held:

The NCDRC's conclusion that the stipulated compensation of INR 3 per sq. ft. per month was insufficient was upheld. The flat purchase agreement's terms did not provide just compensation. (Para 9)

The delay in possession was acknowledged, and interest at the rate of 6% per annum was deemed reasonable and justified. (Para 11)

The NCDRC's decision to award interest only up to 31 July 2016 was found inappropriate. Possession had not been handed over to all purchasers, and the liability to pay interest continued until possession was offered. (Para 17-18)

Facts:

The respondent's father, employed with the petitioner-bank, died on 11.11.2004.

Request for compassionate appointment made on 03.03.2005.

Government instructions on 14.07.2004 led to the framing of a new scheme for ex gratia payments.

Petitioner-bank approved the ex gratia scheme on 04.08.2005, abolishing the previous compassionate appointment scheme.

Issues:

Whether the application for compassionate appointment, made under the old scheme, can be considered after the introduction of the new scheme focusing on ex gratia payments?

Held:

The decisions of two-judge Benches provide conflicting views.

The petitioner argues that the governing scheme during application consideration prevails.

The respondent contends that the scheme in force at the time of the claim takes precedence.

Inconsistency in principles necessitates consideration by a larger Bench.

Decision: The matter is referred to the Chief Justice of India for the constitution of a larger Bench of at least three Hon'ble Judges to resolve the conflicting principles and provide clarity on the applicable scheme.

Facts:

The Municipal Corporation issued an office order for regularizing tubewells causing unauthorized activities of discharging waste water into the main sewer. The Corporation claimed user charges for the discharge of waste water into Municipal drains. The schools, initially agreeing to regularize the discharge, later disputed the levy, arguing that it contravened Sections 87 and 88 of the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994.

Issues:

Whether the Corporation had the right to levy user charges for the discharge of waste water into Municipal drains.

Whether the levy of user charges falls within the ambit of Section 88 of the Act.

Whether the demand for user charges contravenes any provisions of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the Municipal Corporation was justified in levying user charges for permitting the schools to discharge waste water into Municipal drains. The demand did not contravene Section 87 or 88 of the Act. The Court emphasized that the charges were for using Municipal services for the discharge of waste water and were not a tax or fee as contemplated under the Act. The appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's orders, and the writ petitions were dismissed.

Facts:

The respondent was convicted for an offense under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

The trial court sentenced the respondent to six months of rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 500/-.

Issues:

The appeal challenges the High Court's decision to sentence the respondent to the term already undergone but enhancing the fine from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 3000/-.

Held:

The High Court, upon the appeal, maintained the conviction but modified the sentence to the extent of the term already undergone by the respondent. The fine imposed by the trial court was enhanced to Rs. 3000/-.

The Court observed that when minimum sentence is prescribed by law, Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to reduce the sentence, as it would be against the statutory mandate.

The Court referred to the case of Narendra Champaklal Trivedi v. State of Gujarat (2012) 7 SCC 80, emphasizing that in cases where a minimum sentence is provided, it is inappropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 to reduce the sentence based on mitigating factors. Corruption, in particular, was highlighted as a crime that should not receive leniency.

The judgment reiterated the principle that when the legislature prescribes a minimum sentence without discretion, the courts cannot reduce it. The imposition of a minimum sentence is mandatory and leaves no discretion to the court.

The Court cited State v. Ratan Lal Arora (2004) 4 SCC 590, stating that when a specific enactment prescribes a minimum sentence after the enactment of another statute (Probation of Offenders Act, in this case), the latter cannot be invoked to grant relief.

The judgment also referred to Mohd. Hashim v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2017) 2 SCC 198, emphasizing that the discretion to reduce a sentence cannot be equated with a provision prescribing a minimum sentence.

Facts:

The case centers around a dispute regarding the classification of a specific property as Wakf or non-Wakf. The primary concern is whether the Wakf Tribunal has the authority to adjudicate on this matter.

Issues:

The interpretation of sections 83, 85, 6(1), and 7 of the Wakf Act, 1995. The court is tasked with determining the extent of the Wakf Tribunal's jurisdiction and the applicability of the limitation period outlined in the proviso to section 6(1).

Held:

Section 83 Jurisdiction: The court elucidates that the restriction on the Civil Court's jurisdiction is confined to matters mandated to be decided by the Tribunal under the Wakf Act, 1995. It does not extend beyond this stipulated scope.

Wakf Property Dispute: Section 6(1) establishes that if there's a question regarding whether a property in the Wakf list is Wakf property or not, a suit can be initiated in the Tribunal. The court underscores that this provision encompasses anyone wishing to dispute the list, excluding those not served notice under section 4(1) of the Act.

Proviso to Section 6(1): The proviso, imposing a one-year limitation from the publication date of the Wakf list for filing a suit, is applicable to individuals interested in the property, provided they were given a fair opportunity to present their case during the relevant inquiry under section 4.

Tribunal's Role: In the specific case (CA No. 92 of 2019) where the query arises about whether the suit property is Wakf property or not, it falls under the specific provisions of sections 6 and 7 of the Wakf Act, 1995. Consequently, the Tribunal is the appropriate body to decide this matter, and the jurisdictional bar under section 85 is applicable to the Civil Court.

Decision: The court concludes that the suit in which the question of the property's Wakf status arises should be adjudicated by the Wakf Tribunal. The perspective that the rights of a non-Muslim in Wakf property cannot be jeopardized is deemed contrary to the statutory framework delineated in Section 6 of the Wakf Act, 1995.

Facts:

The arbitration proceedings involved Jaiprakash Associates Ltd. (JAL) and Tehri Hydro Development Corporation India Ltd. (THDC). The dispute centered around the arbitrator's authority to grant pendente-lite interest, with objections raised based on clauses 50 and 51 of the General Conditions of Contract.

Issues:

Whether the arbitral tribunal had jurisdiction to award interest in contradiction to clauses 50 and 51 of the General Conditions of Contract.

The applicability of the Principle of ejusdem generis in the interpretation of statutes.

Held:

Right from the arbitration proceedings to the High Court, it was consistently interpreted that clauses 50 and 51 of GCC barred the arbitral tribunal from awarding interest. Despite this, the tribunal awarded interest, relying on the Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta case. The High Court rightly noted the shift in legal position clarified in the Sayeed Ahmed and Company case, emphasizing that the earlier judgment was under the 1940 Act.

The Harish Chandra case, under the 1940 Act, was explained and distinguished in the Sayeed Ahmed and Company case. The court held that there was no reason to deviate from the construction given by the arbitral tribunal and the High Court, especially considering the consistent application of the Sayeed Ahmed and Company case's ratio.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision to quash the award limited to interest. The key point was that clauses 50 and 51 of GCC barred the arbitral tribunal from awarding interest, and the legal position clarified in the Sayeed Ahmed and Company case was paramount.

Facts:

The Election Commission of India (ECI) had accepted the claim of respondent Nos.4 to 6, stating that the group led by respondent No.4-EM was entitled to use the name and symbol of the original registered and recognized state political party. This decision was challenged by the SLP petitioner (EKP) espousing the cause of the group led by EM.

Meanwhile, elections in the State of Tamil Nadu were announced, prompting respondent No.1 to move an interim application before the High Court seeking permission to use a suitable name for political activities. The High Court allowed this by an order dated March 9, 2018.

The SLP petitioner (EKP) contested this decision, leading to the disposal of the SLP with the direction that the ECI shall not pronounce its order until further notice.

Respondent No.1 filed the instant Application due to the election schedule published by the ECI, despite the SLP ostensibly being disposed of.

Issues:

Preliminary objection on the maintainability of the application.

Whether a faction represented by respondent no.1, which claims to be the real party, must register itself as a political party before setting up a claim for allotment of a reserved symbol.

The powers of the Election Commission (ECI) to allocate common symbols when the dispute is pending.

Held:

The court rejected the preliminary objection, stating that respondent No.1 had no other option but to present the application due to the election schedule published by the ECI.

The court held that, during the pendency of the writ petition, the High Court was right in issuing directions to allot a common symbol to the faction represented by respondent No.1. This ensured a level playing field in the political sphere, considering the dispute's pending status.

The court acknowledged the plenary powers of the ECI and held that providing for an equitable arrangement during the pendency of the dispute was just and fair, ensuring free and fair elections.

Facts:

The appellants, owners of a property, sought eviction of the respondent under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, asserting a bona fide need for their business operations in the tenanted premises.

Issues:

Whether the tenancy is solely for residential, commercial, or composite purposes.

Maintainability of the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act.

Held:

The respondent did not raise the plea of maintainability before the Prescribed Authority. Consequently, the Prescribed Authority rightly did not decide this issue. The respondent also did not raise the plea before the First Appellate Court, and, therefore, it was not decided.( Para 18-20)

It is a settled law that a plea not raised in pleadings cannot be introduced in later stages of litigation. The nature of the tenancy (residential, commercial, or composite) is a question of fact requiring proper pleading and evidence.( Para 22-23)

If the tenancy is for a composite purpose, the landlord has the right to seek eviction for either residential or commercial needs.( Para 25)

The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering in the concurrent findings of fact without examining their legality and correctness. The findings were based on evidence and not subject to interference in writ jurisdiction.( Para 27-28)

The impugned order is not legally sustainable. The appeals are allowed, and the orders of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Court are restored. The respondent is granted three months to vacate, subject to conditions.( Para 29-30)

Facts:

The appellant filed a Criminal Complaint against the respondent for dishonoring a cheque issued towards repayment of a "friendly loan." The cheque was presented twice and returned unpaid on both occasions.

Issues:

Whether prosecution based on a second or successive default in payment is permissible without a statutory notice after the first default.

Whether the payee is entitled to the presumption under Section 139 despite a fiduciary relationship between the parties.

Held:

The court held that there is no impermissibility in prosecuting based on a second or successive default, even without a statutory notice after the first default.

The presumption under Section 139 applies, and even a blank cheque voluntarily signed by the accused attracts the presumption unless proven otherwise.

The High Court erred in reversing the concurrent factual findings without a jurisdictional error. The burden is on the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 139.

The High Court's finding that the appellant's case was doubtful or not beyond reasonable doubt was erroneous.

The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is confirmed, and the respondent is sentenced to a fine of Rs. 16 lakhs as compensation to the appellant.