Criminal Law – Murder and Dowry Death – Circumstantial Evidence – False Defence – Conviction Restored – Deceased Pushpa found dead inside matrimonial home – Accused (father-in-law) lodged false report alleging electrocution – Medical evidence proved death by strangulation; burn injuries were post-mortem – Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in discarding cogent evidence and misapplying settled principles – False explanation by accused regarding cause of death formed an additional link completing the chain of circumstances – Conviction under Sections 302, 498-A, and 201 IPC restored [Paras 3–7, 16–21].

Dowry Death – Cruelty and Demand – Corroboration by Relatives – Testimony of deceased’s parents (PW-2 and PW-19) and uncle (PW-4) consistent regarding persistent cruelty and dowry demands – Minor delay in recording statements not fatal when corroborated by medical and circumstantial evidence – High Court erred in treating delay as fatal to prosecution [Paras 8, 10, 18].

Evidence Act – Section 106 – Burden of Proof – Facts Especially Within Knowledge of Accused – Death occurred inside house exclusively occupied by accused – Explanation that deceased was electrocuted while ironing found false – Once prosecution established homicidal death inside house, burden shifted to accused to explain circumstances – Failure to discharge such burden strengthens prosecution case [Paras 13–14, 19].

Circumstantial Evidence – Chain of Circumstances – Completeness Test – Prosecution proved (i) death by strangulation, (ii) occurrence within accused’s house, (iii) false report of electrocution, (iv) prior cruelty and dowry harassment – Each circumstance formed a continuous chain pointing unerringly to guilt of accused, excluding any hypothesis of innocence – High Court’s contrary finding perverse [Paras 16–19].

Appeal Against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – Misappreciation of Evidence – High Court ignored material testimony and medical findings, and failed to address reasons given by Trial Court – Supreme Court held that though presumption of innocence strengthens post-acquittal, interference warranted where findings are perverse or contrary to evidence [Paras 15, 20].

Fabrication of Evidence – Lodging of False Report – Section 201 IPC – Accused filed false report of accidental electrocution to mislead police – Such conduct establishes guilty mind and attracts Section 201 IPC for causing disappearance of evidence and furnishing false information [Paras 4, 17, 21].

Result – Appeal Partly Allowed – Conviction Restored – High Court’s judgment dated 06.04.2010 set aside – Trial Court’s conviction and sentence of accused under Sections 302, 498-A, and 201 IPC restored – Accused to be taken into custody forthwith to serve remainder of sentence [Paras 21–23].

Criminal Law – Bail after Conviction – Section 319 CrPC – Appellant not named in FIR nor chargesheeted after investigation – Later summoned under Section 319 CrPC based on testimony of PW1 and PW2 and convicted under IPC Sections 307, 149, 147, 148, and 506 – High Court rejected suspension of sentence – Supreme Court noted that appellant had initially been exonerated by police and was implicated only later through witness testimony – Held: Actual role of appellant is a matter to be adjudicated in pending appeal – Continued detention not warranted – Bail granted [Paras 3, 5, 6, 9]

Criminal Law – Threat to Witnesses – Objection by Complainant – Respondent-State and complainant opposed bail citing threats to complainant and family – Court allowed bail with stringent conditions including regular police attendance to ensure complainant’s safety – Held: Apprehension of threat addressed through conditions imposed on bail, not by continued incarceration [Paras 7, 10–11]

Section 319 CrPC – Scope – Appellant brought into trial only after initial exoneration – FIR and investigation did not implicate him – Conviction based on later statements of PW1 and PW2 – Court held that this late implication and lack of overt act directly attributable to appellant justified reconsideration of custody during appeal [Paras 5, 9]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Appellant enlarged on bail pending appeal – Sessions Court to impose appropriate and stringent conditions, including twice-a-week police attendance [Paras 11–12]

Criminal Law – Voice Sample – Magistrate’s Power – High Court order setting aside Magistrate’s direction to obtain voice sample of a witness reversed – Supreme Court held Magistrate is empowered to order voice sample despite absence of explicit provision in Cr.P.C. – Held: Judgment in Ritesh Sinha (2019) 8 SCC 1 applies – Use of term “person” includes both accused and witness – Rule against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) not violated by furnishing voice sample – Appeal allowed, Magistrate’s order restored [Paras 1, 3-10]

Self-Incrimination – Article 20(3) – Voice Sample Not Testimonial – Court reiterated principle from Kathi Kalu Oghad [AIR 1961 SC 1808] – Specimen signature, handwriting, fingerprints or voice sample do not amount to testimonial compulsion – Sample by itself is innocuous unless compared with incriminating material discovered during investigation – Furnishing such samples not protected under Article 20(3) [Paras 7-9]

Criminal Procedure – BNSS vs CrPC – Supreme Court held that it is immaterial whether Cr.P.C. or BNSS applies – Even under Cr.P.C., Magistrate is empowered by virtue of Ritesh Sinha judgment – Under BNSS, Section 349 now provides explicit statutory backing – Both paths support legality of Magistrate’s direction [Paras 8-9]

Judicial Discipline – Binding Precedent – High Court erred in disregarding binding precedent on the ground of pending reference – Supreme Court noted that the reference to Larger Bench in Ritesh Sinha had been closed – High Courts must follow binding decisions unless expressly overruled [Para 2, 4]

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court order set aside – Order of Magistrate restored – Respondent directed to comply with voice sample order. [Para 11]

Criminal Law – Crowd Crush Incident – CBI Investigation Ordered – 41 people died and over 100 injured in stampede during political rally held by Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) on 27.09.2025 – FIR No. 855/2025 registered under BNS and TNPP Act – Conflicting High Court orders on formation of SIT and refusal of CBI probe led to multiplicity of proceedings – Supreme Court held that public confidence in fairness of investigation is paramount – Interim direction issued to transfer probe to CBI for impartiality [Paras 1, 7-9, 17, 21-22, 31-32]

High Court Practice – Jurisdictional Conflict – Madurai Bench (Division Bench) refused CBI probe, while Main Seat (Single Judge) ordered formation of SIT without pleadings or parties present – Supreme Court criticised lack of judicial propriety – Held: Matters affecting public at large like SOP for rallies and disaster protocols should be treated as PIL and heard by Division Bench, not single judge [Paras 13-20, 22, 24]

Public Safety – SOP for Political Rallies – Supreme Court directed that pending writ on framing of safety guidelines (W.P. Crl. No. 884/2025) be transferred to Division Bench of High Court – All other related writs dismissed or harmonised to avoid forum shopping and duplication [Paras 14, 22, 39]

Judicial Oversight – Supervisory Committee Appointed – In addition to transferring investigation to CBI, Supreme Court constituted a three-member Supervisory Committee headed by Justice Ajay Rastogi (Retd.) – Committee to monitor CBI probe, suggest directions, and review progress – State to provide logistics and comply with recommendations [Paras 33-34]

Fair Investigation – Allegations of Bias – Senior police officials made press statements exonerating their subordinates before probe concluded – Court held this could erode public faith – Directed that only a neutral, independent investigation could restore justice for victims and their families [Paras 27-30, 32]

Decision: Investigation of FIR 855/2025 transferred to CBI – SIT and Enquiry Commission suspended – Supervisory Committee constituted – CBI to file monthly reports – Related SOP writ to be placed before Division Bench – Interim directions subject to final hearing [Paras 31-40]

Land Acquisition – Restitution of Acquired Land – Industrial Entity Not Entitled – Respondent, a private ceramic manufacturer, sought restoration of land and factory premises acquired in 2006 as part of Tata Motors’ Singur Project – Supreme Court held that its earlier decision in Kedar Nath Yadav quashing the acquisition and ordering restoration applied only to poor cultivators and vulnerable farmers – Relief intended to protect disadvantaged communities from dispossession, not commercial entities – Appeal allowed – High Court’s direction to restore land and structures to respondent set aside [Paras 12-18, 25-27]

Judicial Remedy – Scope of PIL Relief – Kedar Nath Yadav relief granted in PIL proceedings on behalf of poor agricultural workers – Court held that Respondent, a financially capable corporate house, was not similarly situated – Restoration under PIL judgment cannot be extended to parties who did not challenge acquisition or litigate – Strategic inaction cannot entitle post-facto benefit [Paras 15-18, 22-23, 26]

Acquiescence – Delay – Respondent accepted full compensation of Rs. 14.54 crores including for land and structures – Raised no challenge from 2006 till 2016 – Court held that such delay, coupled with voluntary acceptance of compensation, bars restitution claim – Respondent estopped from seeking reversal based on parity with cultivators [Paras 6-7, 21-22]

Procedural Relief – In Personam vs In Rem – Quashing of acquisition in Kedar Nath Yadav was based on procedural lapses in Section 5-A inquiries – Supreme Court held relief applied only to objectors who pursued litigation – Does not extend to commercial parties like Respondent who did not challenge proceedings at the time [Paras 19-21]

Practicality and Passage of Time – Nearly 20 years passed since acquisition – Land demarcated and restructured to restore to farmers post-Kedar Nath Yadav – Court held physical restoration to Respondent not feasible due to irreversible changes – Ordered removal of plant/machinery or public auction as alternative relief [Paras 24-25, 27]

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court orders set aside – Respondent not entitled to restoration – Directed removal or auction of existing structures – No further compensation or recovery [Paras 27-28]

Motor Accident Claim – Insurance – Liability of Insurer – Gratuitous Passenger – Policy Conditions Breached – Five-seater vehicle carrying nine passengers – Tribunal held insurer and owner jointly and severally liable – High Court absolved insurer based on breach of policy terms – Supreme Court held that insurer having collected additional premium for driver, conductor, and cleaner, may not be liable to cover gratuitous passengers – However, applying ‘pay and recover’ principle, insurer directed to pay compensation to claimant and recover from owner – Held: Even in case of breach of policy, insurer not to be completely absolved – Remedy lies in recovery from insured [Paras 4–12]

Pay and Recover Principle – Judicial Precedents – Even where insurance policy does not cover risk of a particular class of persons, and breach of conditions is established, courts have consistently applied the doctrine of ‘pay and recover’ to safeguard rights of third-party claimants – Reference made to Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297, Shamanna (2018) 9 SCC 650, and Rama Bai (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2067) – Held: Claimant should not be left remediless where insurance contract exists – Insurer to satisfy award and recover from owner [Paras 12–13]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Insurer (Respondent No.1) directed to satisfy the compensation award passed by the Tribunal – Insurer granted liberty to recover the amount from the vehicle owner (Respondent No.2).

Army Law – Possession of Ammunition – Substitution of Conviction – Scope of Tribunal’s Power under Section 15(6) of Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 – Appellant, a Colonel, was convicted by General Court Martial under Section 69 of the Army Act for unauthorised possession of ammunition and dismissed from service – Tribunal found no evidence to prove demand or acceptance of bribe and upheld acquittal for unexplained possession of cash – However, it held that possession of aged but live ammunition indicated neglect and failure to adhere to procedural norms – Held: Tribunal rightly substituted conviction to Section 63 of the Army Act (act prejudicial to good order and military discipline) under Section 15(6)(a) of the 2007 Act, as the same evidence lawfully sustained such finding – Punishment of compulsory retirement with full pensionary benefits held just and proportionate [Paras 19–26].

Armed Forces Tribunal – Jurisdiction – Power to Substitute Findings and Sentence – Tribunal under Section 15(6)(a) & (b) of the 2007 Act empowered to substitute a finding of guilty for any offence for which the accused could lawfully have been convicted by Court Martial and to pass a modified sentence – Provision analogous to Section 162 of the Army Act and Section 222 CrPC – Legislative intent clear that appellate forum can convict for a cognate or lesser offence based on same evidence – Tribunal acted within jurisdiction [Paras 20–22].

Appellate Interference – Limited Scope – Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Section 30 of the 2007 Act confined to examining whether Tribunal’s decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious – Tribunal’s order based on concurrent factual findings and proper exercise of discretion – Held: Tribunal acted within statutory powers and fairly balanced service discipline with individual fairness – No interference warranted [Paras 23, 27].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Tribunal’s substitution of conviction under Section 63 of the Army Act and modification of punishment to compulsory retirement affirmed – No costs [Para 28].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Dishonour of Cheque – Complaint Against Trustee Without Trust as Party – Maintainability – Sections 138, 141, NI Act – Question whether complaint under NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/Trustee of a Trust without arraying the Trust as an accused – Held: A Trust is not a juristic person capable of suing or being sued – It is an obligation, not an entity – Trustees alone are owners of trust property and must maintain and defend suits – Complaint maintainable directly against the Trustee who issued the cheque – No requirement to implead the Trust [Paras 23–29, 40–41].

Trusts Act – Legal Status of a Trust – Sections 3 and 13 – Trust lacks independent legal personality – Operates only through Trustees – Obligation to maintain and defend suits lies on Trustees, not the Trust – Trust cannot be equated with a “company” or “association of individuals” within the meaning of Section 141 NI Act – Trustees are answerable for acts done on behalf of Trust [Paras 22–27].

Vicarious Liability – Signatory of Dishonoured Cheque – Section 141 NI Act – Signatory of dishonoured cheque is directly responsible for the act and covered under Section 141(2) – No specific averment necessary regarding responsibility where accused is signatory or holds position analogous to Managing Director – Principle affirmed per SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 [Paras 17–20].

Juristic Person – Trust v. Company – Distinction – A Trust cannot be treated as equivalent to a company or corporate body for the purposes of NI Act – Trustees are liable in their individual capacities – Contrary High Court rulings equating Trusts with companies are erroneous and overruled [Paras 34–38].

Precedent – Co-equal Benches – Judicial Discipline – Later coordinate Benches cannot disregard earlier decisions of equal strength – If disagreement exists, reference must be made to larger Bench – Later Kerala HC ruling in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala (2023) held incorrect for ignoring binding coordinate decision in K.P. Shibu v. State of Kerala (2019) – Restatement of law from National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh v. J&K National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140 [Paras 32–33, 42–44].

Pending Reference – Effect of Larger Bench Referral – Though Pratibha Pratisthan v. Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712 is under reference to a Larger Bench (Tara Bai Desai Charitable Ophthalmic Trust Hospital v. Supreme Elevators India (P) Ltd., (2025) 3 SCC 80), it continues to hold the field till the Larger Bench decides otherwise – High Courts must follow prevailing law unless directed to await reference outcome [Paras 42–44].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s order quashing complaint under Sections 138/141 NI Act set aside – Complaint restored against Trustee who issued cheque – Held: A Trust has no separate juristic existence; proceedings under NI Act maintainable directly against the Trustee/Chairman who signed the cheque. Directions issued for expeditious trial.

Juvenile Justice – Claim of Juvenility – Retrospective Application – Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000 – Petitioner convicted for murder committed in 1981 when he was aged 12 years and 5 months – Sessions Court had extended benefit under the Children’s Act, 1960 and sent him to a children’s home – His conviction restored by Supreme Court in 2009 after High Court acquittal – Petitioner re-arrested in 2022 and in custody for more than 3 years and 10 months – Held: By virtue of Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000, the claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage even after final disposal – Petitioner entitled to benefit of the 2000 Act as per Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan – Detention beyond 3 years is contrary to Section 15(1)(g) and violative of Article 21 [Paras 3, 9–13].

Children’s Act, 1960 – Section 24 – Joint Trial of Child and Adult Accused – No justification shown by the State for breach of Section 24 which prohibits joint trial of a child with non-children – Court notes that legislative safeguards under the Children’s Act were ignored by the trial court [Para 8].

Juvenile Justice – Period of Detention – Illegal Custody – Once the petitioner is found to have been a juvenile on the date of offence, continued incarceration beyond three years amounts to deprivation of liberty not in accordance with procedure established by law – Detention beyond permissible period illegal [Paras 8, 13].

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Protection of Personal Liberty – Continued custody of a person entitled to juvenile justice protection is unconstitutional – Breach of fundamental right to life and liberty warrants immediate release [Para 13].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Petitioner directed to be released immediately if not required in any other case – Jail authorities to act on downloaded copy of judgment without insisting on certified copy [Paras 14–16].