Land Law – Regularisation of Occupation – Section 123(2) U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act – Legal fiction and non-obstante clause – Agricultural labourers belonging to SC/ST built houses on land before cut-off date 30.06.1985 – Land deemed to be settled with such house owners irrespective of consent of tenure holder – Held, statutory deeming provision operates notwithstanding declaration under Section 143 – Civil Appeal dismissed [Paras 2, 4.5, 8-10].

Declaration under Section 143 – Conversion of agricultural land to residential use – Scope and effect – Declaration excludes application of Chapter VIII but does not bar application of Chapter VII including Section 123 – Does not remove land from definition under Section 3(14) – Private respondents not parties to Section 143 proceedings – Declaration not binding on them – Proceedings under Section 123 held valid [Paras 4.3, 8-9].

Possession – Admission by Appellants – Respondents in forceful possession since 1976-1977 – Houses existing prior to 30.06.1985 as per Tehsildar’s report – Nature of possession (authorised or unauthorised) immaterial for statutory settlement – Legislature did not exclude trespassers if otherwise eligible – Deeming settlement upheld [Paras 4.4, 4.5, 8].

Transfer by Sale – Rights of purchaser – Appellants purchased land in 1984 when occupants already in possession – Purchase subject to statutory rights of occupants under Section 123 – Purchaser cannot defeat statutory regularisation by relying on title or subsequent declaration – Relief of eviction not available [Paras 8-9].

Jurisdiction – Article 227 – High Court’s suo motu power – After recognising statutory ownership of occupants from 30.06.1985, continuation of civil suits for eviction amounts to abuse of process – High Court justified in quashing pending suits – Findings affirmed [Para 4.6].

Supreme Court – Limited interference under Article 136 – Findings of fact regarding possession and eligibility concurrent – No ground to interfere – Civil Appeal dismissed – Special Leave Petitions also dismissed in view of findings confirming regularisation and disentitlement of petitioners to eviction [Paras 10; SLP Paras 1-3].

Decision: Civil Appeal No. 4587 of 2009 dismissed – Judgment of High Court dated 07.09.2007 affirmed – S.L.P. (C) Nos. 3822-3823 of 2023 dismissed – No interference warranted.

Criminal Law – Murder – Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC – Double homicide – Four eye-witnesses consistently deposed that accused armed with deadly weapons assaulted deceased Bulaki Mandal and Hriday Mandal till death – Minor inconsistencies immaterial – Motive established from prior altercation over grazing of crops – Concurrent findings of Sessions Court and High Court upheld – Appeal dismissed [Paras 2-3, 6, 10].

Evidence – Related Witnesses – Credibility – Eye-witnesses related to deceased – Mere relationship not ground to discard testimony if otherwise trustworthy – Presence at scene natural and mutually corroborative – Cross-examination failed to elicit material contradictions – Ocular evidence found reliable [Para 6].

Recovery of Weapon – Non-recovery not fatal – Investigating Officer failed to recover weapons allegedly used – Held, recovery of weapon is not sine qua non for conviction when credible ocular evidence corroborated by medical evidence establishes assault – Omission in investigation cannot override reliable testimony – Conviction sustainable despite non-recovery [Paras 7-8].

Section 313 CrPC – Examination of Accused – Similar/general questions – Requirement of prejudice – Though questions put in general terms and similar to all accused, incriminating circumstances were put – No material prejudice demonstrated – Non-specific questioning does not ipso facto vitiate trial – Fair trial principle balanced with overall evidence – Contention rejected [Para 9].

Defence – Plea of Alibi – Not substantiated – Defence witnesses examined but Courts below found prosecution evidence cogent and trustworthy – Concurrent appreciation of evidence not warranting interference [Paras 3, 6, 10].

Supreme Court – Scope of Interference – Concurrent findings of fact – Prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt – No perversity or miscarriage of justice shown – Conviction and life sentence affirmed [Para 10].

Decision: Criminal Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC upheld.

Taxation – Classification of Goods – Fruit Drink vs Residuary Entry – “Sharbat Rooh Afza” containing 10% fruit juice and herbal distillates – Assessee classified under Entry 103 Schedule II Part A (4%) – Revenue classified under Schedule V residuary entry (12.5%) – Held: Product classifiable as “fruit drink / processed fruit product” under Entry 103 – Residuary entry inapplicable [Paras 32, 38-40].

Common Parlance Test – Expression “fruit drink” not defined under UPVAT Act – In absence of statutory definition, product must be understood as per commercial and popular sense – Regulatory classification under Food Products Order not determinative for fiscal classification – High Court erred in substituting licensing norms for market perception [Paras 15-20, 22].

Burden of Proof – Classification under Residuary Entry – Onus lies on Revenue to establish that goods do not fall within specific entry – No trade enquiry, consumer survey, or market evidence produced – Mere reliance on licence description as “non-fruit syrup” insufficient – Revenue failed to discharge burden [Paras 21-22].

Essential Character Test – Composite goods to be classified based on component imparting essential character – Though invert sugar syrup constitutes 80%, it acts merely as carrier and preservative – Fruit juice and flavouring components impart beverage identity – Quantitative predominance not decisive – Essential beverage character derived from fruit constituents [Paras 23-25].

Inclusive Entry – Interpretation – Entry 103 uses expression “including” and covers processed or preserved fruits including fruit drink and fruit juice – No minimum fruit content prescribed – Court cannot read quantitative threshold into entry – Inclusive entries to be construed expansively [Paras 27-28].

Sharbat – Statutory Recognition – Chapter Note 3, Chapter 21, Central Excise Tariff defines “sharbat” as non-alcoholic sweetened beverage containing not less than 10% fruit juice or flavoured with traditional bases – Legislative understanding recognises sharbat as beverage preparation and not mere sugar solution [Para 26].

Residuary Entry – Scope – Recourse permissible only when product cannot reasonably be brought under specific entry – If product has reasonable claim to specific entry, it cannot be consigned to residuary clause – “Orphanage of residuary clause” principle reiterated [Paras 30-31].

Inter-State Uniformity – Evidentiary Value – Same product classified as fruit drink under similarly worded VAT entries in Delhi, Gujarat, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh – Though not binding, such uniformity evidences commercial understanding and bona fide interpretation – Supports assessee’s contention [Paras 33-36].

Ambiguity in Tax Entry – Where two plausible interpretations exist, view favourable to assessee to be adopted – Classification under Entry 103 sustainable and reasonable [Paras 37-38].

Error of Law – Concurrent findings of authorities based on misapplication of classification principles – Not insulated as pure findings of fact – Interference warranted under appellate jurisdiction [Para 39].

Decision: Appeals allowed – “Sharbat Rooh Afza” held classifiable under Entry 103, Schedule II Part A of UPVAT Act – VAT payable at 4% during relevant period – Impugned judgments set aside – Consequential relief including refund/adjustment to be granted in accordance with law – No order as to costs [Paras 40-41].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Civil dispute dressed as criminal offence – Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) for property development – Allegations of false representation, non-refund of security deposit, suppression of litigation and forged document – Court must examine FIR along with admitted documents to assess whether cognizable offence made out – Where dispute essentially contractual and civil in nature, continuation of criminal proceedings amounts to abuse of process – FIR quashed [Paras 15-16, 29-30].

Cheating – Section 420 IPC – Requirement of dishonest intention at inception – JVA contained no specific representation that no litigation was pending – Assurance limited to absence of restraint order and attachment – No allegation that such representation was false – FIR lodged after 11 years of agreement – No material to show dishonest intention from inception – Offence of cheating not made out [Paras 20, 25-27].

Criminal Breach of Trust – Section 406 IPC – Security deposit under Clause 5 of JVA – Deposit not refundable but adjustable against first party’s share from sale proceeds – Non-refund per se gives rise to civil consequences and not criminal liability – Ingredients of criminal breach of trust absent [Paras 21-22, 28].

Forgery – Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC – Allegation regarding letter of Tehsildar certifying no dispute over property – Mere non-traceability of document in official records after years does not establish it as a “false document” within meaning of Section 464 IPC – No specific allegation that title documents were fabricated or dishonestly made – Offence of forgery not disclosed [Paras 23-24].

Scope of High Court’s Power – Quashing at threshold – While ordinarily allegations in FIR to be taken at face value, Court may consider admitted documents referred to therein – If FIR discloses only civil cause of action, criminal proceedings should not be permitted to continue – High Court erred in dismissing writ petition in limine without examining nature of dispute [Paras 15, 30].

Arbitration Clause – Existence of arbitration clause in JVA – Though not by itself a ground to quash criminal proceedings, relevant in assessing nature of dispute – Dispute arising from contractual terms to be resolved through civil/arbitral remedies [Paras 10, 25, 27].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court dated 30.07.2021 set aside – FIR No. 0112 of 2021 and all proceedings emanating therefrom quashed – Pending applications disposed of.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Admission of Application – Scope of Inquiry – NCLT and NCLAT dismissed Section 7 petition on premise that 18 months moratorium had come into effect pursuant to restructuring discussions between corporate debtor and one debenture holder – Held: For admission under Section 7, Adjudicating Authority only to satisfy itself that financial debt exists and default has occurred – Concept of “pre-existing dispute” irrelevant in Section 7 proceedings – Once debt and default established, application must be admitted [Ref: Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank – Para extracted; Paras discussing Section 7 scope].

Debenture Trust Deed (DTD) – Modification of Terms – Restructuring – Binding Nature – Corporate debtor contended that e-mails exchanged with one debenture holder (ECLF) resulted in restructuring and moratorium till September 2023 – Held: Clause 33 of DTD mandates prior written consent of debenture trustee and debenture holders through “approved instructions” passed by Special Resolution – No such meeting, approval or written modification executed – In absence of compliance with DTD procedure, no amendment or variation could be inferred – NCLT and NCLAT erred in ignoring binding contractual terms [Clauses 33, Schedule 2; Paras on modification].

Contract Law – Novation – Section 62, Contract Act – All parties to original contract must agree to substitution – Admittedly, debenture trustee and other debenture holders were neither privy to nor consenting parties to restructuring discussions – No written agreement evidencing novation – Plea of novation untenable [Paras on Section 62 discussion].

Waiver and Estoppel – Express Waiver Clause – Clause 37 of DTD stipulates no implied waiver and that waiver must be in writing – No written waiver produced – Mere correspondence with one debenture holder cannot bind others – Plea of estoppel and legitimate expectation rejected [Paras on waiver and legitimate expectation].

Authority of Single Debenture Holder – Whether ECLF could bind other debenture holders – No material to show express authorization – Other debenture holders were distinct legal entities – Bald assertion that group entities acted collectively insufficient – Restructuring proposal addressed only to ECLF – Could not bind entire body of debenture holders [Paras discussing lack of authorization].

Release of Security – Clause 28.3 of DTD – Release of additional property upon payment of ₹50 crore towards redemption – Release of Bandra property construed by NCLT/NCLAT as evidence of restructuring – Held: Release relatable to contractual clause 28.3 and not to restructuring proposal – No nexus between release and alleged moratorium [Paras on Clause 28 analysis].

Perversity – Concurrent Findings – Supreme Court ordinarily slow to interfere with concurrent factual findings – Exception when findings are perverse and contrary to record – Present case falls within exception – NCLT and NCLAT reframed contractual terms on surmises and conjectures – Ignored binding civil court order refusing interim relief in commercial suit – Findings held glaringly perverse [Paras on perversity].

Commercial Suit – Bombay High Court refused interim injunction restraining enforcement under DTD – Held that no modification of DTD in accordance with Clause 33 – Order attained finality – NCLT/NCLAT erred in brushing aside civil court’s findings [Paras referring to Bombay High Court order dated 13.09.2022].

Role of Debenture Trustee – Duty to protect interests of debenture holders – NCLAT’s adverse remarks alleging collusion and coercive design to push corporate debtor into insolvency held unsustainable – Trustee acted in accordance with contractual obligations – Adverse remarks set aside [Paras on trustee’s duty].

Indus Biotech Principle – Corporate debtor may show that debt is not due or no default occurred – However, such defence cannot be indirect attempt to raise pre-existing dispute in Section 7 proceedings – In present case, restructuring not validly effected – Debt remained due and payable – Default established [Paras referring to Indus Biotech].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders dated 03.02.2023 (NCLT) and 16.04.2025 (NCLAT) set aside – Company Petition (IB) 922/MB/C-I/2022 restored – NCLT directed to admit application under Section 7 of IBC by separate order and proceed in accordance with law – Adverse remarks against debenture trustee set aside.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Conflict of Special Statutes – Jurisdiction of NCLT – Appeals against NCLAT affirming NCLT’s refusal to entertain challenge to provisional attachment under Benami Act – Whether NCLT can examine legality of attachment by invoking Section 60(5) IBC – Held: Benami Act is a complete code providing exclusive adjudicatory and appellate mechanism – Proceedings under Benami Act are in public law domain involving sovereign confiscatory action in rem – NCLT cannot exercise judicial review over orders passed under Benami Act – IBC cannot be used as a parallel appellate forum – Harmonious construction mandates that each statute operate within its allotted sphere – Appeals dismissed with exemplary costs [Paras 20.1, 20.6, 29, 37, IV Conclusions].

Jurisdiction – Section 60(5) IBC – Scope and Limits – Whether residuary jurisdiction extends to reviewing attachment and confiscation orders under penal statute – Held: Section 60(5) confined to questions arising out of or in relation to insolvency resolution – Disputes arising dehors insolvency, particularly involving sovereign statutory powers, must be agitated before competent authority under concerned statute – NCLT cannot be elevated to status of constitutional court exercising judicial review over administrative action – Benami proceedings fall outside insolvency framework [Paras 20.6, 29, 37, 74].

Moratorium – Section 14 IBC – Applicability to Benami Proceedings – Whether provisional attachment during CIRP is hit by moratorium – Held: Moratorium intended to shield corporate debtor from creditor recovery actions – Does not interdict sovereign proceedings for attachment/confiscation of tainted property under penal statute – Attachment under Benami Act not in nature of debt recovery but statutory forfeiture in public interest – Hence Section 14 not attracted [Paras II Second Finding, IV Analysis].

Liquidation Estate – Section 36 IBC – Benami Property – Whether property declared benami forms part of liquidation estate – Held: Liquidation estate comprises only assets beneficially owned by corporate debtor – Benamidar holds property in fiduciary capacity without beneficial interest – Upon adjudication and confiscation under Section 27 Benami Act, property vests absolutely in Central Government free from encumbrances – Such property never forms part of distributable estate under Section 53 IBC – Insolvency cannot convert property held for another into asset for creditors [Paras IV – Section 36 discussion].

Section 32A IBC – Immunity from Attachment – Scope – Whether Section 32A nullifies attachment under Benami Act – Held: Section 32A is event-based and triggered only upon approval of resolution plan or completion of liquidation sale to unconnected third party – Does not cure defective title or legitimise benami property – Does not override confiscatory mechanism under Benami Act prior to such event – Hence no assistance to appellants [Paras IV – Section 32A discussion].

Overriding Clauses – Sections 238 IBC and 67 Benami Act – Principles of Interpretation – Where two special statutes contain non obstante clauses – Held: Later enactment does not automatically prevail – Dominant purpose and subject matter to be examined – Benami Act governs identification and confiscation of tainted property – IBC governs insolvency resolution of lawfully owned assets – No basis to allow IBC to trench upon public law domain of Benami Act – Harmonious construction preferred [Paras 20.1, 20.6].

Abuse of Process – Forum Shopping – Liquidator’s conduct – Despite NCLT’s categorical finding of lack of jurisdiction, appellants pursued appeal before NCLAT and Supreme Court instead of availing statutory remedies under Benami Act – Held: Invocation of IBC mechanism to circumvent Benami procedure not bona fide – Appeals constitute abuse of process – Exemplary costs of Rs. 5 lakhs in each appeal imposed payable to SCAORA [Final Paras].

Decision: All Civil Appeals dismissed – NCLT/NCLAT orders upheld – NCLT lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate validity of attachment under Benami Act – Appellants directed to pay costs of Rs. 5 lakhs each to Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association within four weeks.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 – Scheme of Arrangement under Sections 391–394, Companies Act, 1956 – Whether pendency/approval of SOA bars initiation of CIRP – NCLAT kept Section 7 proceedings in abeyance till disposal of proceedings before High Court – Held: SOA of 2008 never came into force due to non-compliance with mandatory procedural requirements and gross delay – IBC proceedings cannot be stalled on ground of pending and inoperative scheme – Order of NCLAT set aside – CIRP to proceed [Paras 12–14, 20–21].

Scheme of Arrangement – Statutory Timelines – Rules 78, 79, 81 of Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 – First motion report taken on record on 25.07.2008 – No second motion filed within prescribed 7 days – Delayed second motion filed in 2009 – Sanction order passed only on 23.07.2019 – Order not filed with Registrar within 30 days as mandated – Filing in Form INC-28 done only on 06.07.2023 – Held: No pretense of compliance with statutory timelines – Scheme rendered redundant, inoperative and defunct – Passage of time and non-compliance made terms unenforceable [Paras 11–13].

Jurisdiction – Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 – Section 434(1)(c), Companies Act, 2013 – On 15.12.2016, second motion was pending and not reserved for orders – Such proceedings required to be transferred to NCLT – Sanction in 2019 passed without jurisdiction – Prima facie finding – Cannot be ground to stall IBC proceedings [Paras 17–20].

Overriding Effect – Section 238, IBC – IBC prevails over inconsistent provisions of other laws – Companies Act is general statute vis-à-vis IBC which is special statute for revival of companies – Even if SOA proceedings pending, Section 7 petition is independent and must be considered on its own merits – Reliance placed on A. Navinchandra Steels (P) Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. and other precedents [Paras 18–19, 25 extract].

Section 7 – Independent Proceeding – Pendency of winding up/SOA proceedings no bar – Unless corporate death is inevitable, revival through IBC to be preferred in larger public interest – IBC emphasises revival rather than winding up – Pre-existing scheme does not “trump” Section 7 proceedings [Para 25 extract; Paras 18–19].

Financial Rectitude vs Judicial Discipline – NCLAT invoked judicial discipline to defer CIRP – Held: Judicial discipline cannot be invoked by tardy litigants to stall insolvency process where public funds and economic interests are at stake – Financial probity and rehabilitation of industry of pre-eminent importance – IBC mechanism to be allowed to operate [Para 16].

SARFAESI and RDB Proceedings – Creditors had invoked SARFAESI Act and obtained Recovery Certificate under RDB Act during pendency of SOA – Respondent evasive on status of such proceedings – Indicates scheme was not acted upon and debt continued to mount – Supports finding of defunct SOA [Paras 13–14].

Compromise/Arrangement under Section 230, Companies Act, 2013 – Such compromise can also be entered into during IBC proceedings at appropriate stage – Hence consideration of arrangement not alien to IBC – No reason to halt CIRP for sake of earlier defective scheme [Paras 19–20].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of NCLAT keeping Section 7 proceedings in abeyance set aside – Order of NCLT admitting Section 7 petition restored – Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) entitled to proceed – Interim direction keeping management in loop vacated – Pending applications disposed of.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation – Deduction of Ex Gratia Financial Assistance – Haryana Compassionate Assistance Rules, 2006 – Whether amount received under 2006 Rules is deductible from compensation awarded under MVA – High Court in main order directed deduction but reversed position in clarification order – Held: Law laid down in Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma governs field – Only that portion of financial assistance which overlaps with loss of income (pay and allowances) is deductible to prevent double recovery – Other benefits such as pension, life insurance, provident fund etc. not deductible – Main Order restored directing deduction in terms of Shashi Sharma – Clarification order set aside [Paras 6.1, 6.3, Final Order].

Precedents – Harmonious Reading – Shashi Sharma and Birender – Allegation of per incuriam – Held: No inconsistency between decisions – Shashi Sharma lays down substantive principle as to what is deductible – Birender clarifies procedural stage and evidentiary requirement for deduction – Deduction cannot be made on mere assumption of eligibility – Compensation to be determined in full, subject to later adjustment upon proof of receipt/entitlement – Both decisions operate in same conceptual framework [Paras 6.2, 6.3].

Compensation – Double Recovery – Just Compensation – Tribunal must ensure that claim towards loss of income is not compensated twice – Financial assistance equivalent to “pay and allowances” last drawn by deceased government employee liable to be excluded from MVA compensation – However, loss of future prospects and other non-overlapping benefits remain claimable under MVA [Extract Para 26 of Shashi Sharma; Paras 6.1–6.3].

High Court – Clarification Application – Scope – Whether substantive modification of compensation permissible under guise of clarification – Held: No independent procedural mechanism for “clarification” under MVA – Power traceable only to Sections 151 and 152 CPC – Section 152 confined to clerical or arithmetical errors or accidental slips – Cannot be used to alter substantive findings or quantum of compensation – Inherent powers under Section 151 cannot override express provisions – Substantive alteration amounts to review and must satisfy requirements of Order XLVII CPC – High Court exceeded jurisdiction in modifying deduction through clarification [Discussion on Sections 151, 152 CPC; Final Holding].

Procedure – Safeguards for Deduction – Claimants directed to file affidavit before Tribunal indicating amount received or receivable under 2006 Rules – Tribunal to compute appropriate deduction and order disbursal – If no amount received/receivable, entire compensation under Main Order payable – Interest as awarded by Tribunal to remain unchanged from date of institution of claim petition [Final Directions].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Order in Review set aside – Main Order restored – Amount received/receivable under 2006 Rules towards pay and allowances to be deducted from compensation as modified by Main Order – Claimants to file affidavit before Tribunal – Disbursal to be made within six weeks of Tribunal’s order – No order as to costs.

PCPNDT Act – Quashing of Complaint – Illegal Sting Operation vs. Admissibility of Seized Evidence – A qualified radiologist-appellant was alleged to have conducted ultrasonography on a decoy pregnant patient without filling mandatory Form F, disclosing sex of foetus, or maintaining any record as required under Rules 9 and 10 – The sting operation was directed solely by the Civil Surgeon acting as Chairperson of the District Appropriate Authority, without associating the other two members of the authority – Appellant was previously discharged in the FIR proceeding, whereupon the District Appropriate Authority separately lodged a complaint under Sections 4, 5, 6 and 29 of the PCPNDT Act – High Court dismissed the quashing petition – Held: Though the search was illegal being ordered by a single member of the District Appropriate Authority, the evidence and material seized during such search is not rendered inadmissible and can be relied upon subject to the rules of relevancy and admissibility – Criminal complaint cannot be quashed – Appeal dismissed [Paras 2-58].

Illegal Search Under PCPNDT Act – The Rule in Ravindra Kumar Applied, But Distinguished on Its Consequences – Under Section 30(1) of the PCPNDT Act, the decision to authorize a search must be that of the District Appropriate Authority collectively, and not of any single member including the Chairperson – The communication/order dated 17.09.2015 was issued solely by the Civil Surgeon without associating the District Programme Officer and the District Attorney, the other two members of the District Appropriate Authority – "If a single member of the appropriate authority authorizes a search, it will be completely illegal being contrary to sub-section (1) of Section 30" – Following the ratio in Ravindra Kumar vs. State of Haryana, the search carried out at Vatika Medicare was held to be illegal – Held: However, the ratio of Ravindra Kumar extends only to the illegality of the search and not to automatic quashing of the complaint where independent evidence of statutory violations exists [Paras 41, 41.1, 44, 45, 50].

Illegal Search Does Not Render Seized Evidence Inadmissible – The Indian Evidence Act Permits Relevancy as the Only Test – The Court declined to discard all evidence collected during the illegal search, invoking the principle that "illegality of the search does not vitiate the seizure" – Relying on the Constitution Bench decision in Pooran Mal vs. Director of Inspection (Investigation), New Delhi, it was held that the Indian Evidence Act does not exclude relevant evidence on the ground that it was obtained under an illegal search or seizure – Courts retain a discretion to admit such evidence; "unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in law, evidence obtained as a result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out" – The seized records, Form F non-compliance and registration lapses are admissible and can be acted upon subject to the rules of relevancy [Paras 50, 51, 52, 53].

Form F – Mandatory Character Under the PCPNDT Act – Non-Maintenance Is Not a Mere Clerical Error – Section 4(3) proviso read with Rules 9(4) and 10(1A) mandates every person conducting ultrasonography to keep complete records of the procedure in the prescribed Form F, and "any deficiency or inaccuracy found therein shall amount to contravention of the provisions of Sections 5 or 6" of the PCPNDT Act – The burden of proving contrary rests on the person conducting the ultrasonography – Reaffirming Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) vs. Union of India, the Court held that "non-maintenance of record is the springboard for commission of offence of foeticide, not just a clerical error" and "complete contents of Form F are held to be mandatory" – Appellant's failure to sign Form F or make any entry of the patient in the register constitutes a prima facie offence under Section 23 of the PCPNDT Act [Paras 32, 33, 38, 39, 40, 56].

Discharge in Police Case – No Bar to Independent Complaint by District Appropriate Authority – The appellant was discharged from the FIR proceedings by the trial court upon an application by the police itself, which noted absence of evidence of actual sex determination while flagging discrepancies in record maintenance – Appellant contended the subsequent complaint was not maintainable as it was based on identical facts – Held: This contention is misconceived – Section 28(1)(a) of the PCPNDT Act mandates that courts shall take cognizance of offences under the Act only upon a complaint by the Appropriate Authority, and Rule 18A(3)(iv) directs authorities not to involve police in investigating PCPNDT cases – "Discharge of the appellant in the police case would be of no consequence" to the independent statutory complaint [Paras 46, 54].

Composition of District Advisory Committee – Rule 18A(2)(ii) Applies Only to Investigating Machinery – Appellant argued that Dr. Saryu Sharma, a member of the raiding party, was also made a member of the District Advisory Committee, thereby vitiating the proceedings – Rule 18A(2)(ii) prohibits a person "who is part of the investigating machinery in cases under the PCPNDT Act" from being nominated as a member of the advisory committee – Held: Dr. Saryu Sharma, as Deputy Civil Surgeon and part of the health enforcement team, was never part of any investigating machinery within the meaning of the Rule – Further, the guidelines in Rule 18A are directory in nature and a violation would render a proceeding irregular, not illegal – No contravention of Rule 18A(2)(ii) was established [Paras 37.2, 55].

Object and Purpose of the PCPNDT Act – Protection of the Girl Child Under Article 21 – The Court reaffirmed that the PCPNDT Act is a social welfare legislation enacted to combat the skewed sex ratio in India and to protect the right to life of the girl child under Article 21 of the Constitution – "Female foeticide is a crude manifestation of such a social malady" – "Discrimination against women, more particularly against the girl child, is widely prevalent across several parts of the country" – Courts must be slow to quash complaint proceedings at the threshold on hyper-technical grounds, as doing so would weaken enforcement at the grassroot level and undermine the legislative intent to protect the girl child [Paras 15, 17, 18, 56].

Decision: Criminal Appeal dismissed – Complaint bearing No. COMA/116/2018 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gurugram is not quashed – No order as to costs – However, the Court expressly clarified that no opinion has been expressed on the merits of the allegations, and all contentions as to the reliability and admissibility of evidence are kept open for determination at trial [Paras 57, 58].