Criminal Law – Discharge – Section 227 CrPC – Discharge granted – Appellant accused of restraining complainant from entering a property during a civil dispute and capturing her photos – High Court upheld dismissal of discharge – Supreme Court held that strong suspicion necessary for framing charges must be based on legally admissible material – Observed that complainant refused to make any judicial statement – Chargesheet lacked supporting evidence – Held: Allegations did not constitute offences under Sections 341, 354C, or 506 IPC – Discharge allowed [Paras 14-27].

Criminal Law – Section 354C IPC – Voyeurism – Ingredients not satisfied – No allegation in FIR that complainant was engaged in a ‘private act’ as defined under statute – FIR and chargesheet silent on essential ingredients – Held: Allegation of photographing complainant in public space without consent does not meet threshold for voyeurism [Paras 19-21].

Criminal Law – Section 506 IPC – Criminal intimidation – FIR lacked any specific threat or utterance of injury to person or property – No statement recorded from complainant or witnesses – Held: Bare allegation of intimidation without details cannot attract offence under Section 506 IPC [Para 22].

Criminal Law – Section 341 IPC – Wrongful restraint – Complainant failed to establish any legal right to enter the premises – No evidence of tenancy – Complainant was only a prospective tenant – Obstruction by accused made in good faith under protection of civil court’s injunction order – Held: Offence under Section 341 IPC not made out [Paras 23-26].

Criminal Justice System – Abuse of Process – Filing of Chargesheets without Strong Suspicion – Court cautioned against mechanical filing of chargesheets and framing of charges where no prima facie case exists – Emphasised need to avoid clogging judicial system with trials destined for acquittal – Held: Prosecution must have reasonable prospect of conviction to proceed – Otherwise, fair process compromised [Paras 27-29].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment set aside – Appellant discharged from G.R. Case No. 223 of 2020 arising from FIR No. 50 of 2020 – No offences under Sections 341, 354C, 506 IPC made out.

Criminal Law – Section 313 CrPC – Improper Examination – Vitiation of Trial – Appeals allowed – Conviction Set Aside – Matter Remanded – Appellants convicted for murder and other offences under IPC – Trial court and High Court upheld conviction – Supreme Court found serious procedural irregularities in the recording of accused persons’ statements under Section 313 CrPC – Questions put to the accused were general, vague, and identical – Failure to put each material circumstance specifically to each accused – Court noted lack of prosecutorial diligence and judicial oversight – Held: Trial stood vitiated due to non-compliance with mandatory procedural safeguard under Section 313 CrPC – Appeals allowed and matter remanded to Trial Court for re-trial from the stage of recording Section 313 statements [Paras 5–10].

Fair Trial – Right of Accused – Compliance with Section 313 CrPC – Mandatory Nature – Court reiterated that Section 313 CrPC is not a mere formality but a fundamental safeguard ensuring the accused's right to respond to incriminating material – Statements recorded must reflect individualized, circumstance-specific questioning – Held: Carbon copy responses from accused show mechanical compliance and result in denial of fair opportunity to defend [Paras 6–9].

Prosecutorial Conduct – Role of Public Prosecutor – Duty to Assist Court – Public Prosecutor failed to ensure meaningful compliance with Section 313 – Court stressed that the prosecutor is not just a State’s lawyer, but an officer of the Court with a duty to aid justice – Sole focus on securing conviction cannot override fair trial requirements [Para 9].

Remand – Scope – Only for Appellants – Findings Against Other Accused Unaffected – Court clarified that remand is limited to the three appellants before it – Convictions of other co-accused, not before the Court, remain unaffected by this judgment [Para 10].

Judicial Direction – Expedite Retrial – Four-Month Timeframe – In view of pendency and lapse of time since the incident in 2016, Trial Court directed to complete fresh proceedings within four months from receipt of the order [Para 10].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Conviction and sentence of appellants set aside – Matter remanded to Trial Court for fresh proceedings from Section 313 stage – Registrar (Judicial) directed to communicate this judgment to Trial Court via High Court of Patna.

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Blanket Protection from Arrest – High Court, while refusing to quash FIR under Article 226, granted protection from arrest till filing of charge sheet – Held: Self-contradictory and impermissible – Once FIR is not quashed, High Court cannot mechanically grant anticipatory-bail-like protection in writ jurisdiction – Such directions prejudice investigation and violate settled law [Paras 5–7].

Article 226 – Scope – High Court’s power to grant pre-arrest protection is exceptional and must be exercised sparingly – Cannot be used to bypass statutory scheme of anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC – Persons seeking protection must approach Sessions Court first – Blanket orders of “no arrest/no coercive steps” are wholly impermissible, as reiterated in Neeharika Infrastructure [Paras 7–7.1].

Investigation – Judicial Interference – Directions restraining arrest during entire investigation, despite not quashing FIR, amount to unjustified interference – No rationale in protecting accused while simultaneously directing expeditious investigation – Orders undermine fairness and efficacy of investigation [Paras 5–6].

Remand – Fresh Consideration – Supreme Court sets aside High Court orders dated 16.06.2025 and 15.07.2025 – Matters remitted to High Court to reconsider quashing petitions on merits, uninfluenced by previous observations – Interim protection to continue until petitions are decided, to avoid prejudice [Paras 8–11].

Land Acquisition – Compensation under National Highways Act – Applicability of First Schedule of 2013 Act – NHAI sought fresh clarification on applicability of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 – Court held that its earlier clarification dated 23.09.2022 already conclusively applied sub-clause 4.6(iii)(b) of 2017 Guidelines to the landowners – No further clarification warranted; parties must abide by previous orders [Paras 5–6].

Scope of Clarification – When Prior Clarification Already Provided – Court reiterates that its 23.09.2022 order had unambiguously held that where award under Section 3G was passed before 01.01.2015 but amount was deposited after 01.01.2015, compensation must align with First Schedule of 2013 Act – Present application unnecessary and not maintainable [Paras 5–6].

Interpretation of 2017 Guidelines – Clause 4.6(iii) – Three sub-clauses cover distinct situations – They are not cumulative – Case of landowners squarely fell under sub-clause (b) (award issued earlier; full amount deposited later) – NHAI’s attempt to reopen settled clarification rejected [Para 5].

Binding Effect of Tarsem Singh Judgment – Benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2), 28 of the Land Acquisition Act extended to NH acquisitions – Section 3J declared unconstitutional to that extent – Earlier Supreme Court orders already directed statutory benefits to be given – No further adjudicatory exercise required [Para 5].

Decision: Miscellaneous Application dismissed – No further clarification required – Parties to strictly abide by Supreme Court’s earlier order dated 23.09.2022 – No costs [Paras 6–7].

Insolvency Law – IBC - Moratorium under Section 14 – Scope – Corporate debtor (developer) failed to commence or complete redevelopment project despite multiple extensions – Society terminated the Development Agreement and executed new agreement with another developer prior to initiation of second CIRP – Held: Section 14 does not protect development rights already terminated before CIRP – Such terminated contractual rights do not constitute “assets” under IBC [Paras 16.4–16.12, 21(ii)]

Termination of Development Agreement – Legality – Agreement dated 16.10.2005 and Supplementary Agreements of 2005 and 2014 terminated by society citing prolonged defaults in performance, including failure to pay rent, non-demolition and non-construction – Termination effected by notices in 2019 and 2021 – Held: Termination was lawful, not related to insolvency, and fell outside NCLT jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) – IBC cannot protect commercial indolence in projects of public welfare [Paras 15–15.14, 21(i)]

Urban Redevelopment – Nature of Rights – Developer under slum redevelopment does not acquire possessory or proprietary interest unless stipulated – Held: Appellant was a mere licensee, had no physical possession – Development rights were conditional and executory – Not enforceable assets under Section 3(27) IBC – Moratorium under Section 14(1)(d) not attracted [Paras 15.10–15.13, 16.6–16.9]

Writ Jurisdiction – Maintainability during CIRP – High Court passed directions under Article 226 to statutory authorities to process redevelopment approvals for new developer – Held: Constitutional courts’ jurisdiction not ousted by IBC – Public law remedies can coexist with CIRP where no interference in NCLT domain – High Court rightly ensured statutory duties were discharged [Paras 17.1–17.8, 21(iii)]

Natural Justice – Allegation of Procedural Violation – Appellants alleged denial of fair opportunity before High Court – Held: Appellants were represented by counsel, no adjournment sought, no prejudice shown – Writ petition did not seek direct relief against appellants – Directions were procedural and administrative – No breach of audi alteram partem rule [Paras 18–18.10, 21(iv)]

Redevelopment and Social Welfare – Balancing of Equities – Developer’s delay and inaction caused hardship to lower-income society members awaiting rehabilitation – Held: IBC moratorium cannot be used to frustrate urban renewal or delay housing projects – Social welfare of citizens must prevail over defunct contractual claims – Constitutional promise of dignified housing must be honoured [Paras 23–23.3]

Precedents – Gujarat Urja, TCS Ltd., Embassy Property, Rajendra Bhutta – Considered – Held: Moratorium protects only existing, subsisting and enforceable rights – NCLT jurisdiction confined to cases where contract is central to corporate survival and termination is linked to insolvency – In present case, contract was not central and was terminated for cause [Paras 15.5–15.8, 16.6–16.9, 17.2]

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Termination of developer agreement upheld – Development rights not protected under IBC – High Court’s direction to authorities affirmed – Redevelopment to proceed as per directions – Appellants at liberty to pursue remedies for expenditure claims.

Negotiable Instruments – Jurisdiction – Territorial jurisdiction under Section 142(2)(a) NI Act – Complaint under Section 138 is triable only in court where payee maintains the account – Explanation to Section 142(2)(a) creates legal fiction deeming cheque delivered at any branch as delivered at home branch – Held: Jurisdiction cannot be fixed at the place of cheque deposit for collection if different from payee’s bank branch where account is maintained – Ensures uniformity and clarity in trial jurisdiction post-amendment [Paras 54-58, 76]

Interpretation of Statute – Explanation to Section 142(2)(a) – Legal fiction – Deeming provision clarifies that delivery for collection at any bank branch shall be deemed delivery to payee’s home branch – Prevents forum shopping – Held: Interpretation must avoid circumvention of jurisdictional safeguards and uphold purpose of statutory reform under 2015 amendment [Paras 68-70, 73]

Precedent – Yogesh Upadhyay v. Atlanta Ltd. – Overruled – Yogesh Upadhyay interpreted Section 142(2)(a) to prioritise the place of cheque deposit – Court held such interpretation overlooks the Explanation and statutory fiction – Declared per incuriam – Clarified that delivery for collection is legally deemed to occur at home branch, not place of physical deposit – Reaffirmed Bridgestone India and distinguished reasoning in Sendhur Agro Industries [Paras 65, 67, 75]

Transfer of Pending Case – Section 145(2) NI Act – Complaint was originally filed before MM, Kolkata – Proceedings had reached stage of recording complainant's evidence before return of complaint for lack of jurisdiction post-amendment – Held: In line with Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod, complaints which reached evidence stage prior to amendment must remain with existing court to avoid prejudice – Re-transfer to MM, Kolkata directed to resume from pre-return stage [Paras 77-80]

Statutory Interpretation – Harmonious construction – Explanation must clarify, not override or distort main provision – Court emphasised that Section 142(2)(a) must be interpreted as per legislative purpose to provide specific jurisdiction and prevent jurisdictional misuse – Held: Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot override plain language of Explanation – Interpretation in Yogesh Upadhyay disregards Explanation and allows jurisdictional manipulation [Para 70(i)-(ii)]

Jurisdiction Post-Amendment – Conflict between pre-amendment judgments and amended law resolved – Court explained that 2015 Amendment intended to overcome accused-centric interpretation in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod – However, intention was not to reintroduce misuse potential under Bhaskaran – Held: Legislative design balances convenience of payee with fairness to accused through deeming fiction [Paras 39, 56-58, 70]

Doctrine of Per Incuriam – Applied to Yogesh Upadhyay – Judgment declared per incuriam for failing to consider binding Explanation to Section 142(2)(a) and misreading legislative intent – Clarified that subsequent courts are not bound by decisions that overlook express statutory provisions [Paras 75, 68]

Decision: Petition allowed – Complaint and all related proceedings under Section 138 NI Act transferred back to Metropolitan Magistrate, Kolkata – Proceedings to resume from stage prior to return order dated 28.07.2016 – All connected transfer petitions also disposed of accordingly.

Civil Law - Order 38 Civil Procedure Code (CPC) – Attachment Before Judgment – Fraudulent Transfer – Registered sale deed executed prior to institution of suit – Held: Attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC cannot extend to property already transferred before the suit – Attachment is a protective mechanism, not a tool to defeat completed transactions – Claim petition under Order XXXVIII Rule 8 CPC is maintainable in such circumstances – Courts below erred in treating the attachment proceeding as a trial under Section 53 of the T.P. Act [Paras 11.1, 13, 20(a)-(d), 21]

Transfer of Property – Section 53 T.P. Act – Burden of Proving Fraud – The burden to prove fraudulent intent lies on the party alleging fraud – Mere suspicion, partial cash payments or prior dealings do not suffice – Bona fide purchaser for consideration is protected under the proviso to Section 53 – Sale deed supported by prior agreement, registered documentation, and delivery of possession – No material to prove collusion or intent to defraud [Paras 14-16]

Equitable Principles – Prior Agreement to Sell – Rights of Attaching Creditor – Agreement dated 10.05.2002 followed by registered sale deed on 28.06.2004 – Property no longer vested in judgment debtor at time of suit – Attachment cannot override contractual obligations created by prior agreement – Consideration partly adjusted against existing debts valid under Section 25 of the Contract Act [Paras 16-17]

Adjudicatory Limits – Order XXXVIII Rule 8 and Order XXI Rule 58 CPC – Scope – Proceedings under Rule 8 CPC incorporate Rule 58 of Order XXI – These are procedural and intended to safeguard third-party rights – Cannot substitute a substantive adjudication under Section 53 T.P. Act – Courts below erred in exceeding this scope by declaring the transfer fraudulent in claim proceedings [Paras 11.2, 13, 20(d)]

Binding Precedents – Applicability – Supreme Court reiterated principles from Hamda Ammal v. Avadiappa Pathar, Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Balakrishnan, and Rajender Singh v. Ramdhar Singh – Held: Attachment cannot prevail over a prior registered sale deed – Title of bona fide purchaser not affected by post-transfer attachment [Paras 17-19]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Sale deed dated 28.06.2004 declared valid – Attachment before judgment held inapplicable – Orders of trial court and High Court set aside – Claim petition under Order XXXVIII Rule 8 CPC allowed

Criminal Law – Dowry Death – Cancellation of Bail – Respondent No. 1 (husband) accused of poisoning wife within four months of marriage after dowry harassment – Post-mortem showed ante-mortem abrasion and FSL confirmed aluminium phosphide poisoning – Dying declaration made to family members disclosed forcible administration of toxic substance – Held: High Court erred in granting bail without considering statutory presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act and gravity of offence – Bail order found to be perverse and legally unsustainable – Annulled by Supreme Court [Paras 1, 5–6, 12–17, 22–24].

Presumption under Section 113B Evidence Act – Applicability – Marriage took place on 22.02.2023, death occurred on 05.06.2023 – Evidence indicated cruelty and harassment soon before death – Prosecution’s burden to establish proximity and causal link satisfied – Statutory presumption of dowry death against accused attracted – High Court failed to apply mandatory presumption under Section 113B – Interference justified [Paras 17–20].

Bail Jurisprudence – Distinction between Grant and Cancellation – Annulment permissible where bail granted ignoring material facts or settled principles – Appellate court may interfere even without post-bail misconduct – Law laid down in State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, Puran v. Rambilas and Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. followed – Personal liberty cannot override societal interest in serious offences like dowry death [Paras 11, 18].

Maintainability – Complainant’s Right to Challenge Bail – Appellant (father of deceased) held to have locus standi – Cited precedents R. Rathinam v. State and Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna Jaiswal – Victim’s family may seek cancellation of bail even in absence of state appeal – Appeal maintainable [Paras 10–10.3].

Dowry Death – Societal Impact – Observations on the rising menace of dowry-related violence – Court noted misuse of marriage as a transactional arrangement and emphasized deterrent response to such gender-based offences – Judiciary cannot remain passive or lenient in face of institutional violence against women [Paras 25–25.3].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Bail granted to Respondent No. 1 by High Court cancelled – Respondent No. 1 directed to surrender forthwith – Trial to proceed independently and uninfluenced by this judgment.

Arbitration Law – Section 11(6) – Judicial Review – High Court, having appointed arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act, later reviewed and dismissed the same petition on ground of invalidity of Clause 25 – Held: Such review impermissible – Section 11(6) does not confer any revisional or appellate power to re-adjudicate issues already settled – High Court became functus officio after appointment – Review jurisdiction wrongly invoked to revisit settled interpretation [Paras 11.1–11.15]

Arbitration Agreement – Existence and Validity – Clause 25 of contract between parties provided for dispute resolution through arbitration with a specific appointment procedure – Held: Clause 25 satisfied the requirements of Section 7 of the A&C Act – Arbitration agreement valid and binding – Prior arbitration between same parties under same clause further established existence of valid arbitration mechanism – Subsequent dispute over extended period arbitrable under same clause [Paras 12.1–12.8, 12.17]

Unilateral Appointment Clause – Validity and Severability – Clause 25 vested appointment power solely in Managing Director and stated arbitration would not proceed if appointment not made – Held: Such unilateral clause violates principles of neutrality, equality and Article 14 – Portion of clause disabling arbitration to be severed – Doctrine of severability invoked – Core arbitration agreement preserved, appointment process corrected under Section 11(6) [Paras 12.9–12.16]

Section 29A Extension – Waiver by Conduct – Respondents joined in multiple applications under Section 29A to extend mandate of arbitrator – Held: Though Section 12(5) requires express post-dispute written waiver, participation and joint applications under Section 29A amount to waiver under Section 4 – Respondents estopped from challenging arbitrator’s mandate after years of participation [Paras 13.1–13.13]

Precedential Value – Dismissal of SLP – High Court relied on earlier case (Kashish Developers) said to be “affirmed” by SC due to SLP dismissal – Held: Dismissal of SLP without reasons does not amount to law declared under Article 141 – Does not bind other benches – Reliance on such dismissal misplaced – Precedent value confined to that case alone [Paras 14–14.3]

Public Contracts – Model Litigant Conduct – Respondent PSU delayed appointment, resisted arbitration after years of participation – Held: Conduct unjustified – State entities must act fairly and promptly – Warning issued to Managing Director – Caution against future recurrence of administrative apathy in contractual obligations [Paras 19–19.2]

Relief – Appeal Allowed – Impugned judgment set aside – High Court directed to appoint substitute arbitrator within two weeks – Proceedings to resume from stage at which they were interrupted – De novo hearing avoided in interest of efficiency and fairness [Paras 18, 20]