Land Acquisition – Compensation Agreement – Interest – The parties entered into a negotiated agreement under Section 7(2) of the 1997 Act fixing compensation for acquired land – High Court, while recognising the finality of the agreement, erroneously granted interest under Section 12 from the date of acquisition notice – Held: Once compensation is fixed through agreement, statutory provisions like Section 12 are excluded – Statutory interest cannot be claimed post-agreement [Paras 5–8, 21–22].

Contract Law – Concluded Agreements – Estoppel – Landowners having voluntarily agreed to compensation and accepted payments without protest are estopped from later invoking statutory rights inconsistent with the contract – Held: Doctrine of approbate and reprobate applies – A party cannot accept benefits under a contract and later challenge its terms [Paras 13, 23–24].

Writ Jurisdiction – Contractual Matters – The High Court erred in invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to rewrite terms of a voluntarily concluded contract – Held: Power under Article 226 is discretionary and cannot be used to override settled contractual terms [Para 24].

Precedents – Finality of Consent Awards – Relying on previous decisions, including Ranveer Singh, NOIDA v. Ravindra Kumar, and others – Supreme Court held that a consent award or agreement extinguishes rights under the Act unless expressly reserved – Acceptance without protest bars further claims for interest or enhanced compensation [Paras 24–25].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s judgment to the extent of awarding interest under Section 12 is set aside – Held that no interest is payable where compensation was fixed by consent – No order as to costs.

Constitutional Law – Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 – Validity – Reenactment of Struck Down Provisions – Challenge to Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 on grounds of violating judicial directions issued in MBA (IV) and MBA (V) – Court found that impugned provisions in the 2021 Act merely replicated those in the 2021 Ordinance which had already been struck down – Age bar of 50 years, truncated tenure of 4 years, requirement of two-name panel for selection, and equivalence with civil servants in terms of HRA and status – All these were held to undermine judicial independence and violate Articles 14 and 50 – Held: Legislature cannot nullify binding judgments without curing the defects – Repetition of invalidated law amounts to legislative override and violates constitutional supremacy [Paras 87, 90, 93, 103, 104, 116, 124, 126, 132, 140, 141, 142].

Separation of Powers – Judicial Independence – Legislative Encroachment – Court reiterates that separation of powers and judicial independence are part of the basic structure – Parliament’s attempt to reintroduce invalidated provisions by non obstante clauses struck down – Repeated re-enactment of unconstitutional provisions criticised – Judicial scrutiny into structure and functioning of tribunals warranted heightened review – Held: The legislature cannot repackage the same unconstitutional provisions under a new label to bypass court rulings – Doing so is a direct intrusion into the judicial sphere [Paras 89, 94, 124-128, 134, 141-142].

Constitutional Supremacy – Parliament cannot neutralise binding judicial directions issued under Articles 141 and 142 by mere re-enactment – Legislature may cure defects but cannot resurrect invalidated provisions without addressing constitutional infirmities – Directions in MBA (IV) were mandamus, not advisory; contrary statutory provisions void [Paras 84, 110-120, 135-142].

Minimum Age Requirement – Section 3: Bar on appointment below 50 years arbitrary – Discriminatory & violative of Article 14 – Contrary to MBA (IV) which restored 10 years’ practice rule for advocates – Excludes capable candidates and frustrates tribunal independence – Struck down [Paras 72, 84, 96-103].

Tenure – Section 5: Four-year term with maximum ages 70 (Chairperson) and 67 (Members) unconstitutional – Earlier judgments mandated minimum five-year tenure to ensure independence – Legislature cannot reintroduce invalid tenure model – Struck down [Paras 39-40, 68, 90-91].

Appointments – SCSC – Section 3(7): Requirement of recommending panel of two names per post invalid – Reintroduces provision struck down in MBA (IV) – Judicial primacy required – SCSC must recommend one name + one waiting list candidate only [Paras 35-36, 87-89].

Executive Delay – Provision allowing the Government to act “preferably within three months” on SCSC recommendations unconstitutional – Causes vacancies, undermines rule of law and access to justice [Paras 61, 75, 89].

Service Conditions – Sections 7 & provisos: Executive equivalence of allowances with civil servants contrary to judicial directions – Attempts to reverse MBA (IV)’s HRA directions impermissible – Second and third provisos struck down [Para 85].

Housing Allowance – Enhancement of HRA as directed in MBA (IV) upheld – Legislature cannot reduce by amendment – Judicial independence requires dignified conditions of service [Paras 70, 86].

Removal & Administrative Control – Excessive executive power over tenure, allowances, removals & rule-making violates independence of tribunals – Subordinate legislation cannot override judicial safeguards [Paras 33, 64-67, 110-120].

Reference to Larger Bench – Request rejected – No new substantial constitutional question; settled by long line of judgments from Sampath Kumar to MBA (V) – Belated request; reference would delay justice [Paras 105-109].

Validity of Impugned Act – Entire scheme of Section 184 as amended by 2021 Ordinance and the Tribunal Reforms Act held unconstitutional where it re-enacts struck-down provisions; valid only to extent conforming with MBA (IV)/MBA (V) [Paras 116-142].

Protection of Incumbent Members – Tenure of those appointed under earlier Acts & Rules protected – Appointments made prior to enforcement of the 2021 Act continue under old regime – Members appointed before commencement but notified later protected [Paras 129-138, 147-155].

National Tribunals Commission – Union directed to constitute NTC within four months – Will supervise appointments, administration & discipline of tribunals – Until then, Ministry of Finance to maintain independent Tribunals Wing [Paras 78-79, 152-153].

Final Directions – Impugned Act and offending amendments struck down – Appointments, tenure, salary, allowances, qualifications, reappointment & service conditions to be governed by MBA (IV) and MBA (V) until Parliament enacts valid legislation consistent with constitutional mandates [Paras 142, 151, 153].

Registration Act – Assignment of decree – Specific performance – Nature of decree – No interest in immovable property created – Decree only confers a right to seek sale deed execution – Assignment of such decree does not fall under Section 17(1)(e) – Registration not compulsory – Contrary view in K. Bhaskaram overruled – Held: Assignment deed of decree for specific performance does not require registration [Paras 18, 21–22, 26–28, 31–34].

Specific Relief – Assignment of Decree for Specific Performance – Requirement of Registration – Decree for specific performance does not create or assign any interest in immovable property – Assignment of such a decree does not require registration – Appeal dismissed – High Court judgment upheld – Held: Section 17(1)(e) of the Registration Act not applicable to assignment of such a decree [Paras 2, 14, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 34].

Civil Procedure – Execution of Decree – Order 21 Rule 16 CPC – Assignment of Decree – Assignment of decree in writing permitted – Assignee entitled to execute the decree as if he were the original decree-holder – No challenge raised regarding notice under Order 21 Rule 16 – Held: Assignment deed (Ex. B1) valid and enforceable – Registration not required [Paras 28, 29].

Property Law – Contract for Sale vs. Sale – Transfer of Property Act – Agreement for sale or decree for specific performance does not create any title or interest – Ownership passes only upon execution and registration of sale deed – Mere decree for specific performance does not confer ownership [Paras 20, 21, 22, 31].

Registration Act – Section 17(1)(e) – Scope and Applicability – Only applies if decree or order itself creates or declares rights, title or interest in immovable property – A decree for specific performance does not do so – Assignment of such decree is not compulsorily registrable [Paras 25, 26, 27, 30].

Legal Nature of Decree for Specific Performance – Decree does not extinguish the contract – Court retains control post-decree – Relief is equitable and does not automatically confer ownership – Execution required to complete sale [Paras 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24].

Case Law Referred – Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal – Suraj Lamp & Industries – Hungerford Investment Trust – Amol v. Deorao – Held: Passing of decree does not vest title – Registration not needed for assigning decree for specific performance [Paras 17, 21, 24, 27].

Incorrect Law Declared – K. Bhaskaram v. Mohammad Moulana – Held: Does not lay down the correct position in law regarding requirement of registration for assignment of decree for specific performance [Para 33].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Decree-holder validly assigned decree to Respondent No.1 – Assignment deed not compulsorily registrable – High Court judgment allowing execution rightly passed – No costs imposed [Paras 34, 35].

Land Acquisition – Compensation by Agreement – Statutory Interest – Estoppel – Once compensation is voluntarily and conclusively fixed through an agreement under Section 7(2) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997, the agreement becomes final and binding – Supreme Court held that such a concluded contract excludes the applicability of Section 12 (interest provision) – High Court erred in awarding interest despite holding the agreement was a “complete package” that foreclosed further claims – Interest cannot be claimed when the agreement does not contemplate it [Paras 3–8, 21–25].

Statutory Interpretation – Contract Superseding Statutory Entitlements – Section 12 applies only when possession is taken without prior payment or deposit – When compensation is determined by consent under Section 7(2), such consent ousts other provisions of the Act including Section 12 – Rights and liabilities are governed exclusively by the agreement, not by the statute once contract is concluded [Paras 5–8, 21–22].

Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate – Estoppel from Resiling – Landowners accepted 250% enhancement over guideline value through negotiation without protest – Later claims under Section 12 are hit by estoppel – Parties cannot accept benefits of a contract while repudiating its burdens – Equity principle bars selective adoption of contract terms [Paras 21, 23].

Writ Jurisdiction – No Interference in Concluded Contracts – Supreme Court reiterated that Article 226 cannot be invoked to rewrite voluntarily concluded agreements unless tainted by fraud or coercion – No such allegations were present – High Court wrongly used writ jurisdiction to disturb a binding settlement [Paras 22, 24].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court’s judgment set aside to the extent it directed payment of interest under Section 12 – Parties bound by terms of the agreement – No costs.

Judicial Service – Inter se Seniority in Higher Judicial Service – Annual 4-Point Roster – Loss of ‘Birthmark’ – Merit-cum-Seniority – Service in Lower Judiciary Not Relevant – Proposals for Extra Weightage / Quota for Promotees Rejected – Uniform Guidelines Issued Under Art. 142 – Directions to Amend State HJS Rules [Paras 38–52, 53–66, 70–86, 97–101].

Judicial Services – Inter Se Seniority – Higher Judicial Services (HJS) – Determination of Seniority – Issue concerning comparative seniority between Direct Recruits (DR), Regular Promotees (RP), and Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) recruits – Constitution Bench constituted to address imbalance and heartburn arising from divergent career progressions – Held: All officers lose the “birthmark” of recruitment source upon entry into HJS; Seniority must be determined through a uniform 4-point annual roster system – Merit, not length of service in lower judiciary, is key for further career advancement [Paras 1 to 3, 5, 6, 17, 31, 37, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 100(v), 100(x)].

Judicial Independence – Control over Subordinate Judiciary – Articles 233 to 235 of the Constitution – High Court’s primacy in regulating judicial service conditions acknowledged – However, Supreme Court empowered under Articles 32, 141, and 142 to lay down uniform principles for national consistency in judicial structure and functioning – Directions issued herein are binding and to be incorporated into statutory service rules by respective States in consultation with High Courts [Paras 18 to 20, 31 to 37, 36, 100(xiv), 101].

Service Law – Seniority – Judicial Cadres – Promotees’ Claim for Preferential Treatment Based on Longer Judicial Service in Lower Cadres – Rejected – Experience as Civil Judge (Junior or Senior Division) not a valid basis for preferential seniority in HJS – No intelligible differentia to justify separate classification – Past judicial service can justify entry into HJS through promotion or competitive recruitment, but cannot carry forward into HJS seniority – Any attempt to create such preference violates equality under Articles 14 and 16 [Paras 12, 13, 38 to 42, 47, 49, 64, 91 to 94, 100(vi), 100(vii)].

Roster System – Inter Se Seniority – Introduction of Uniform Annual 4-Point Roster – Two points for RPs, one each for LDCE and DR – Roster applicable per recruitment year – If recruitment from any source is delayed but completed within next year without overlapping new year’s appointments, such delayed appointees may claim placement in original year’s roster – Otherwise, seniority linked to actual year of appointment – Vacancies unfilled from LDCE or DR to be filled by RP but without claiming the diverted source’s roster position [Paras 66 to 80, 85, 86, 100(x) to (xiii)].

Judicial Promotions – Selection Grade and Super Time Scale – Basis for Advancement – Merit-cum-Seniority within HJS only – Length or performance in lower judiciary irrelevant – Promotions and administrative roles such as Principal District Judge depend on performance within HJS cadre – Earlier judicial service has no bearing after promotion or direct entry into HJS [Paras 47 to 49, 55, 64, 94, 100(vi)].

Recruitment Source – Irrelevance Post-Entry – 'Birthmark Theory' – Once officers from DR, RP, and LDCE enter HJS, their source of recruitment becomes immaterial – No classification based on source permitted – Relying on precedents including Roshan Lal Tandon, Triloki Nath Khosa, and Direct Recruit Class II Engineers Assn. – Seniority to be reckoned only within HJS based on date and roster position, not feeder service [Paras 53 to 63, 100(v), 100(vii)].

Bar Experience vs. Judicial Experience – Equivalence – Experience at the Bar and in Judicial Service both valued but neither considered superior – Decision in Rejanish K.V. clarified as recognising equivalence, not superiority of judicial service – Claim of DRs being unfairly advantaged rejected – DRs also face disadvantage due to mandatory ten-year minimum for HC elevation under R. Poornima [Paras 40 to 43, 100(i), 100(ii)].

Accelerated Promotion – Multiple Career Pathways – RPs and LDCEs have equal opportunities to advance via LDCE or DR exams – Rejanish K.V. and Sixth AIJA enable fast-track promotions and broader eligibility – Additional benefit of competing in direct recruitment exams also acknowledged – Heartburn due to age or speed of DR entry not a valid ground for special treatment [Paras 42, 44, 51, 52, 100(ix)].

Uniformity vs. State Variations – High Courts’ Role – While High Courts may vary in service rules and implementation, overarching uniformity essential – Separate seniority lists or State-specific preference rules may cause inequality and are not permissible unless incorporated through valid statutory rules – Preferential treatment must be rational, reasonable, and rule-based [Paras 68 to 70, 65, 94, 100(xiv)].

Data – Not Reliable Basis – Disparities in data across States and recruitment years over three decades render statistical reliance untenable – Varying rules and eligibility for entry into judicial service over time make present moment unfit for granting additional weightage to RPs based on lower cadre experience – Performance in HJS alone should determine career progression [Paras 87 to 90, 93, 94, 100(ii) to (iv)].

Decision: Interlocutory Application dismissed – General and mandatory guidelines issued for determining inter se seniority in HJS to be incorporated into statutory rules within 3 months – Existing seniority not to be reopened – Subject to future reconsideration depending on the impact of Rejanish K.V. and Sixth AIJA [Paras 95 to 104].

Environmental Law – National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 – Section 16(h) – Limitation – Communication of Environmental Clearance (EC) – Multiple Duty Bearers – Held: The date on which EC is “communicated” is the starting point for limitation – Since the obligation to communicate lies with multiple duty bearers (MoEF&CC, Project Proponent, Pollution Control Boards), limitation commences from the earliest date on which communication is carried out by *any* of the duty bearers – The “principle of first accrual” applies; an aggrieved person cannot pick a later communication date to save limitation – Where MoEF&CC uploaded the EC on its website on 05.01.2017, the limitation period triggered on that date, rendering an appeal filed on 19.04.2017 time-barred [Paras 1, 6, 9-11, 14].

Interpretation of Statutes – “Any Person Aggrieved” – Communication in Rem – Interpretation of Section 16(h) of the NGT Act – The expression “communicated” must be interpreted liberally as environmental issues are public law concerns (in rem) rather than adversarial (in personam) – Communication is complete when the order is properly declared and easily accessible by any of the stakeholders required to publish it under the EIA Notification, 2006 – A clear and complete communication by one authority precludes reliance on subsequent communications by others for limitation purposes [Paras 6, 11, 13].

EIA Notification 2006 – Clause 10 – Publication in Newspapers – Sufficiency of Communication – Appellant argued that the Project Proponent failed to communicate effectively because the entire EC text was not published in newspapers – Held: Interpreting Clause 10 to require publication of the entirety of the EC in newspapers would be pedantic – It is sufficient compliance if the Project Proponent publishes the factum of the grant of EC and indicates the substance of conditions and safeguards, along with details on where the full text is available (e.g., website) – Absence of the full EC text in the advertisement does not invalidate the communication [Paras 19-20].

Facts – Appellant (Gram Panchayat) challenged EC granted to Respondent for limestone mining – EC granted and uploaded on MoEF&CC website on 05.01.2017 – Project Proponent advertised in newspapers on 11.01.2017 – Appellant filed appeal in NGT on 19.04.2017, claiming knowledge via RTI on 14.02.2017 – NGT dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation (beyond 30 days + 60 days condonable) – Supreme Court affirmed NGT’s decision, holding that the uploading of EC on 05.01.2017 constituted valid communication triggering the limitation period [Paras 2, 15-18, 21-22].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment of the National Green Tribunal affirmed.

Criminal Law – Discharge – Forest Fire Incident – Trekking Tragedy – Appellant, a Forest Officer, arraigned for offences under Sections 304 (Part II), 326, 338 and 304A IPC for deaths and injuries caused to trekkers during Kurangani forest fire – Allegation that appellant permitted trekking and received trekking fees – Trial Court and High Court refused discharge – Held: Deaths occurred due to forest fire, an act of vis major – No criminal intent, knowledge or negligence attributable to appellant – Continuation of prosecution unsustainable [Paras 16–17].

Vis Major – Forest Fire – Criminal Liability – Trekking group engulfed by sudden forest fire caused by natural forces – Held: Forest fire constituted an unforeseeable natural event – Deaths occurred by sheer accident – Criminal liability cannot be fastened on forest officials or organisers in absence of rashness, negligence, intention or knowledge [Paras 10, 16].

IPC Sections 304A and 338 – Rash or Negligent Act – Applicability – Supreme Court in earlier case quashed proceedings against co-accused (organiser) holding no negligence – Held: Same reasoning applies to appellant – Facilitation of trekking or performance of official duties does not amount to rash or negligent act causing death or grievous hurt [Paras 10, 14–16].

IPC Section 304 Part II – Knowledge of Likelihood of Death – Essential Ingredients – Held: No material to show appellant acted with knowledge that his act was likely to cause death – Forest fire not attributable to any act of appellant – Section 304 Part II wholly inapplicable [Para 16].

IPC Section 326 – Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt by Dangerous Means – Held: Provision applies only where grievous hurt is voluntarily caused by weapons, fire or other dangerous means – Injuries and deaths in present case caused by forest fire and smoke inhalation, not by any voluntary act of appellant – Section 326 wrongly invoked [Para 16].

Discharge – Section 227 CrPC – Standard of Evaluation – Where basic ingredients of alleged offences are absent on admitted facts – Courts ought to discharge accused instead of compelling trial merely on basis of official position – Held: Sessions Court and High Court erred in refusing discharge [Paras 16–17].

Parity with Co-Accused – Effect of Earlier Supreme Court Judgment – Proceedings against co-accused organiser quashed on ground that forest fire was vis major – Held: Reasoning squarely applicable to appellant – Prosecution cannot distinguish appellant merely by invoking graver sections without factual foundation [Paras 14–16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of High Court dated 03.06.2025 and Sessions Court dated 28.10.2024 set aside – Appellant discharged from all offences – Criminal proceedings in S.C. No. 70 of 2019 quashed qua appellant – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 17–19].

Civil Law – Vakalatnama – No Instruction Pursis – Not Withdrawal – Counsel for defendant filed pursis claiming no instructions without formally withdrawing Vakalatnama – Trial Court decreed suit without issuing notice to litigant – Appellate Court held that absence of clear withdrawal or proof of non-service of RPAD notice cannot be grounds for remand – High Court erred in accepting pursis as withdrawal and remanding suit [Paras 7, 23-26].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Article 227 – Scope and Limitations – High Court interfered with well-reasoned appellate court order based on procedural misinterpretation – Held: Article 227 jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to substitute one plausible view for another – Interference unwarranted unless jurisdictional error or failure of justice is established [Paras 22-26].

Evidence – Defendant's Conduct – Absence of Effort to Engage Counsel – Defendant did not deny receipt of counsel’s letter nor attempted to contest suit after pursis filed – Appellate Court held defendants cannot benefit from own negligence – High Court’s remand disregarded factual findings of Appellate Court [Paras 5-8, 14-23].

Practice and Procedure – Withdrawal of Counsel – Requirement of Notice – Civil Manual Clause 660(4) and Bombay HC Rules require 7 days' prior notice and court’s leave for withdrawal – However, such formalities do not apply where Vakalatnama is not withdrawn and litigant fails to act despite communication – Held: Trial Court was justified in proceeding with decree [Paras 10-13, 23-26].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s remand order set aside – Order of Trial Court decreeing suit, as affirmed by Appellate Court, restored – Writ Petition dismissed [Paras 24-25].

Land Acquisition – Compensation – Parity with Similar Landowners – Appellants’ lands acquired for setting up MIDC Jintur in the 1990s – Compensation originally fixed at ₹32,000 per Acre – Reference Court enhanced it but High Court reversed enhancement – Supreme Court held appellants similarly situated to those in Manohar v. State of Maharashtra – Held: Compensation enhanced to ₹58,320 per Acre with statutory benefits [Paras 4-14, 16(iv)-(v)]

Comparable Sale Instances – Deduction for Small Plots – Reference Court had rightly considered ten sale exemplars from Jintur town – Court upheld 20% deduction from highest exemplar rate (₹72,900/Acre) – Held: Enhanced rate ₹58,320 per Acre applicable to appellants – Location near highway and N.A. potentiality validated by documentary evidence [Paras 10-13]

Non-Agricultural Potential – Evidence of Proximity – Land found near Nashik–Nirmal State Highway, adjacent to Jintur town, with irrigation and water sources – Claims of remoteness by MIDC rejected – Held: High Court erred in reversing Reference Court's award [Paras 10-12]

Delay in Appeal – Interest Denied for Delay Period – Though appeal allowed, interest on enhanced compensation not granted for period of delay in filing SLPs as per earlier notice orders [Paras 15-16(v)]

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court and Reference Court judgments set aside – Compensation enhanced – Statutory benefits under Land Acquisition Act to follow – Interest denied for delay period [Paras 16(i)-(v)]