Arbitration – Enforcement of Consent Award – Indemnity Obligation – Trigger Point – Appellant-companies enforcing a Consent Award dated 01.03.2019 passed by SIAC, incorporating a Deed of Compromise whereby Respondent-Promoters undertook to defend specified litigation and ensure no liability was recovered from Appellants – High Court deferred enforcement holding obligation arose only upon confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal – Held: High Court committed error in restricting operative effect to the fifth limb of Paragraph 32(a) alone while rendering the fourth limb otiose – Liability crystallised upon court-directed deposit of Rs. 15,86,17,808/- by Appellants – Enforcement Petition allowed – Promoters directed to pay/deposit the said amount within 30 days [Paras 8–29].

Contract of Indemnity – Absolute vs. Contingent Obligation – Construction of Paragraph 32(a) – Fourth limb of the Consent Award imposed an unconditional obligation on Promoters to "ensure that no liability in regard to the said litigation is recovered from VPS/Medeor by the Forum" – Word "ensure" combined with the broad contractual definition of "Forum" pointed to an absolute obligation – Fifth limb providing for discharge within 30 days after confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal was a backstop guarantee for extreme scenarios, not the primary trigger – Treating fifth limb as the sole operative obligation converts a performance timeline into the indemnity trigger, contrary to established principles of contractual construction – Held: Where liability incurred is absolute, indemnity holder is entitled to call upon indemnifier without awaiting confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal [Paras 19–26].

Contractual Construction – Consent Award – Rules of Interpretation – Consent Award is equivalent to a Consent Decree, being a contract between parties with the court's seal super-added – Courts must give effect to every limb of the contract and cannot render any part otiose – Literal rule of construction to be applied first; purposive construction permissible only where literal reading produces absurdity – High Court's purposive construction ignored the clear and immediate obligation in the fourth limb and produced a paradox whereby Promoters could escape liability entirely by choosing not to appeal to the Supreme Court – Held: Plain reading of all five limbs together yields an immediate enforceable obligation; purposive construction unavailable where literal reading is clear [Paras 17, 20–28].

Internal Self-Contradiction in Impugned Judgment – High Court rejected Promoters' argument that "Forum" meant only the Highest Court of Appeal, yet adopted the same conclusion that liability was payable only after confirmation by the Highest Court of Appeal – Such self-contradiction within the same paragraph rendered the impugned judgment erroneous – Further, High Court ignored the already-crystallised liability arising from its own direction to Medeor to deposit the full award amount for a conditional stay [Paras 16.1–16.5].

Reliance on Precedents – Commercial Contracts – Strict Construction – Promoters' reliance on Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. v. Garg Sons International and Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills (P) Ltd. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. held misplaced – Both decisions support VPS/Medeor, as they mandate that in commercial contracts courts must give paramount importance to the exact words used and are prohibited from adding, deleting, or substituting words under the guise of interpretation – High Court's departure from the plain terms of the Consent Award was contrary to the ratio of these very decisions [Para 27].

Decision: Civil Appeal allowed – Impugned Judgment set aside – Enforcement Petition allowed – Promoters granted 30 days to pay or deposit Rs. 15,86,17,808/- for the benefit of VPS/Medeor – Amount subject to outcome of pending proceedings between EY and Promoters – No order as to costs [Paras 29–30].

Criminal Law – Section 319 CrPC – Summoning of Additional Accused – Appellant-complainant filed application under Section 319 CrPC for summoning Respondents 2–6 after recording of statement of PW-1 (Surender), an injured witness – Trial Court rejected the application relying on the DSP's report which accepted the plea of alibi of the proposed accused – High Court affirmed the same – Held: Trial Court, while deciding an application under Section 319 CrPC, must form its opinion on the basis of evidence adduced before it and cannot be swayed by the opinion of the investigating officer or the chargesheet – Rejection of application on the pretext of possible defences cannot be countenanced – Order set aside and application allowed [Paras 8–10].

Section 319 CrPC – Scope and Principles – Power of Trial Court to add accused not charge-sheeted – Power under Section 319 CrPC is exercisable at any stage of proceedings on the basis of evidence adduced before Court – It is not controlled by naming or not naming of a person in the FIR or by submission of chargesheet – Even a person dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence of involvement emerges before Court can be summoned – Satisfaction of the investigating officer is not determinative and cannot frustrate the purpose of Section 319 [Para 7].

Injured Witnesses – Testimony – Specific Roles Attributed – Names of Respondents 2–6 figured in the FIR from the very beginning – Their specific roles were attributed in statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC as soon as injured witnesses were declared fit by the doctor – PW-1 reiterated these roles in testimony before the Trial Court – Delay in recording Section 161 statement was due to medical incapacity and not suppression – Under such circumstances rejection of the Section 319 application was not justified [Paras 3, 9–10].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Orders of the Trial Court and High Court rejecting application under Section 319 CrPC set aside – Application under Section 319 CrPC allowed – Respondents 2–6 directed to appear before the Trial Court on 27.04.2026; to be released on bail on appearance – Trial Court directed to frame charge and complete trial expeditiously, preferably within one and a half years.

EWS Reservation – Validity of Income and Asset Certificate – Financial Year Requirement – Appellants applied under EWS category for 9212 posts of Health Worker (Female) advertised on 15.12.2021 with last date of application 05.01.2022 – EWS certificates submitted were either issued prior to closure of the relevant financial year 2020-21 or related to a different financial year altogether – Commission rejected candidatures as certificates did not conform to the prescribed format and financial year – Single Judge directed issuance of fresh certificates and reconsideration – Division Bench reversed, holding certificates invalid – Held: EWS certificate must relate to the financial year prior to the year of application; certificates issued before closure of the relevant financial year or relating to a wrong financial year are invalid on the face and rejection of candidatures was justified – Appeals dismissed [Paras 18–27].

Prescribed Form – Compliance – Mandatory Nature – Clause 8.3 of advertisement required submission of EWS certificate in prescribed Form-I prior to the last date of application – Form-I mandates disclosure of the financial year for which the certificate is valid and a statement that family income is below Rs. 8 lacs for that financial year – Office Memorandum dated 18.02.2019 and Section 7 of the 2020 Act require that income be assessed for the financial year prior to the year of application – Certificates of several appellants were dated January–February 2021, i.e., before the advertisement dated 15.12.2021, and were thus obtained prior to the relevant financial year closing – Appellants could have obtained fresh certificates after publication of the advertisement but failed to do so [Paras 20–26].

Individual Certificates – Defects Examined – Poonam Dwivedi's certificate dated 12.01.2021 purportedly valid for FY 2020-21 when that year had not closed – Shanu Tiwari's certificate dated 21.01.2021 valid for FY 2019-20 instead of 2020-21 – Komal's certificate dated 06.01.2021 relating to FY 2019 – Archana Saxena's certificate dated 05.02.2021 valid for FY 2019-20 – Anuradha Srivastava's certificate dated 05.01.2021 for FY 2020-21 issued before year-end – Sunita Kumari's certificate dated 10.01.2022 relating to FY 2021-22 instead of FY 2020-21 – All certificates found defective; certificate of a different financial year goes to the root of eligibility [Paras 8, 16, 26].

Public Recruitment – Online Processing – Caution Against Routine Interference – In public recruitments involving large numbers of candidates where applications are submitted online with scanned documents processed by software, errors in applications necessarily result in rejection – Courts should not ordinarily entertain challenges to such rejections as they stall expeditious completion of recruitment, frustrating thousands of aspirants [Para 28].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – No order as to costs – Pending applications disposed of.

Tenancy Law – Khatedari Rights – Succession – Condonation of Delay – Appellant's suit for declaration of khatedari over 158.3 bighas, claimed by succession from deceased father whose name was mutated on 26.11.1961, was decreed on 16.08.1975 – First defendant appeared through counsel, filed written statement, examined two defence witnesses, applied for production of documents but failed to produce the sale deed set up as defence – Appeal filed in 2006 after gross delay of 31 years rejected by First Appellate Authority – Board of Revenue remanded on grounds of fraud and denial of opportunity; High Court affirmed – Held: Proceedings of the trial court belied all allegations of fraud and non-appearance; delay of 31 years cannot be condoned on such grounds; remand orders set aside and decree of Revenue Court restored [Paras 7–19].

Fraud – Pleadings – Improvement at Every Stage – Allegation before First Appellate Authority was merely that information about the decree was received through a lawyer on 15.02.2006, amounting to an admission of knowledge – Ground of fraud improved in second appeal to allege manipulation of vakalatnama – Such improvement of grounds at successive stages, unsupported by pleading of specific facts, cannot sustain a challenge to a decree passed after full contest – Proceedings of trial court recording appearances, filing of vakalatnama, examination of defence witnesses, and application for production of documents all belie the allegation of non-appearance and fraud [Paras 11–16].

Adverse Inference – Failure to Produce Best Evidence – Defendant made an application before the trial court for production of the original sale deed but failed to produce it despite having the opportunity to do so – Court entitled to draw an adverse inference against a party who withholds the best evidence bearing on the issue in controversy [Para 13].

Voidable Transaction – Repudiation – Need Not be by Suit – Repudiation of a voidable transaction need not necessarily be by instituting a suit to set it aside; it may be effectuated by an unequivocal conduct – Decree obtained in the khatedari suit constitutes effective repudiation of the unregistered sale deed set up as a defence – No obligation on the plaintiff to seek a declaration of nullity of a document not available in the public domain [Para 14].

Condonation of Delay – Limitation – Delay of 31 years in challenging a decree cannot be condoned as an act of generosity where the defendant had fully contested the suit, adduced evidence, and the grounds projected for the delay are belied by the court record – Non-filing of execution does not raise a presumption that possession remained with the defendants after the decree [Paras 15–17].

Minor's Property – Sale Deed – Section 8(2), Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 – Sale deed produced by the respondents discloses the vendor to have been a minor of 12 years of age at the time of execution; no court permission obtained, rendering it hit by Section 8(2) – Subsequent sale deed of 2005 executed by the original defendant also does not contain any recital tracing her title, casting doubt on the claim of bona fide purchase [Para 18].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders of the Board of Revenue and the High Court set aside – Decree of Revenue Court in Revenue Case No. 94/1970 dated 16.08.1975 restored.

Criminal Law – Suspension of Sentence – Section 389 CrPC – Murder Conviction – Respondent No. 2 convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and Section 27(3) of the Arms Act and sentenced to life imprisonment after full trial, based on consistent ocular evidence of three eyewitnesses – High Court suspended sentence during pendency of appeal relying on specific role attributed to respondent being limited to holding the deceased, period of incarceration of about six years nine months, and pendency of appeal for seven years – Held: Upon conviction, presumption of innocence stands displaced; suspension of sentence in cases of conviction under Section 302 IPC can be granted only in rare and exceptional circumstances; High Court erred in selectively reappreciating evidence and granting suspension without any apparent or palpable infirmity in the judgment of conviction; impugned order set aside; respondents directed to surrender within two weeks [Paras 14–25].

Suspension of Sentence – Scope and Parameters – Section 389 CrPC – Distinction from Pre-trial Bail – Post-conviction suspension of sentence is qualitatively distinct from pre-trial bail; appellate court must record reasons in writing reflecting careful consideration of the nature of offence, manner of commission, gravity of findings of the trial court, and desirability of release – Appellate court should not reappreciate evidence or pick out lacunae at this stage; only where something palpable and apparent on the face of the record indicates the conviction may not be sustainable can suspension be considered – Long period of incarceration and pendency of appeal, while relevant, cannot be the sole or decisive ground for suspension in cases of serious offences [Paras 14–21].

Common Intention – Section 34 IPC – Constructive Liability – Absence of a specific overt act attributed to an accused does not dilute his culpability where common intention is established; each participant is equally liable for the act done in furtherance of common intention – High Court's reliance on the fact that the fatal shot was fired by a co-accused while respondent's role was limited to holding the deceased is misconceived at the stage of Section 389 [Para 19].

Criminal Antecedents – Threats to Complainant – Relevance at Bail Stage – Multiple prior cases registered against the convict including offences involving violence and use of arms constitute relevant factors in assessing propriety of suspension of sentence – Allegations of intimidation of the informant and his family by the convict, though denied, cannot be discountenanced at the interlocutory stage [Paras 22–23].

Decision: Both Criminal Appeals allowed – Impugned orders suspending sentences of Respondent No. 2 in Criminal Appeal (DB) Nos. 1180 and 1182 of 2018 set aside – Bail bonds cancelled – Respondents directed to surrender before the trial Court within two weeks.

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Sections 3 and 4 – Applicability to Fine-Only Sentences – Reformative Theory of Punishment – Appellants convicted under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced to fine only — Appellants did not press appeal on merits and sought benefit of Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 12 of the 1958 Act — State objected that since Appellants were sentenced to fine and not imprisonment, the expression 'release' in Section 4 has no application — Held: 'Punishment' under both Section 53 IPC and Section 4 BNS expressly includes fine — Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act govern acts committed in relation to specific punishments prescribed under IPC, BNS and any other law, and must naturally extend to sentences of fine — The word 'release' in Section 4 cannot be confined to release from custody alone; it must be read as releasing the offender from the obligation to serve the sentence, including a sentence of fine — Benefit of Section 4 of the 1958 Act is available to an offender sentenced solely to payment of fine [Paras 9–26].

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Object and Purpose – Beneficial Legislation – Purposive Interpretation — The 1958 Act is a beneficial legislation reflecting the reformative theory of punishment — Its object is to rehabilitate offenders and reintegrate them into mainstream society as reformed citizens, rather than to punish — If two or more views are possible in interpreting a beneficial legislation, the interpretation in favour of the beneficiary must be adopted — The 1958 Act seeks to harmonise deterrence and reformation, saving offenders from the stigma of conviction and imprisonment, and affording them an opportunity to return to social life with dignity [Paras 11–13].

Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Section 4 – Factors Governing Grant of Probation – Word 'Expedient' – The Court must consider: nature of the offence, circumstances of the case, character of the offender, age, antecedents, habits, economic conditions, occupation, fixed place of abode, familial responsibilities, origin of dispute, and whether the offence involves moral turpitude — The word 'expedient' in Section 4 must be construed in its widest amplitude to mean what is apt, suitable and appropriate to the end in view — The Court must record satisfaction that grant of probation would serve the reformative purpose — Probation officer's report, where available, must be considered before passing order under Section 4 [Paras 34–39].

Section 360 Cr.P.C. and Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Relationship – Divergent Views — In Sanjay Dutt v. State of Maharashtra (2013 SCC OnLine SC 252), it was held that the two frameworks cannot co-exist as they would lead to anomalous results — In Lakhanlal v. State of M.P. (2021) 6 SCC 100, a subsequent Division Bench held them to be mutually co-existent, noting that Section 360(10) Cr.P.C. expressly preserves the operation of the 1958 Act and that Section 4 of the 1958 Act contains a non obstante clause — Divergent opinions noted; issue left open — For present purposes, assistance drawn from Section 360 Cr.P.C. only to confirm that the reformative approach extends to fine-only sentences [Paras 28–33].

Section 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – Removal of Service Disqualification – Since all Appellants were extended benefit under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act, they shall not incur any disqualification affecting their service career arising out of the conviction — Fine amounts directed to be treated as compensation to the victim(s) [Paras 44–45].

Decision: Appeal disposed of — Conviction confirmed — A-1, A-2 and A-3 (convicted under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34 IPC, sentenced to fine only) granted benefit under Section 4(1) of the 1958 Act — Directed to be released on entering into a bond for one year before the jurisdictional Trial Court with sureties — Probation Officer to supervise and submit report once every three months — A-4 (convicted under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC) granted benefit under Section 3 of the 1958 Act — Directed to be released after due admonition — Fine amounts, if not deposited, to be paid within four weeks and treated as compensation to victim(s) — All Appellants exempted from service disqualification under Section 12 of the 1958 Act.

Service Law – Dearness Allowance and Dearness Relief – Differential Rates – Article 14 of the Constitution – State of Kerala enhanced DA for serving KSRTC employees by 14% (to 112%) and DR for pensioners by only 11% (to 109%) with effect from March 2021 – Pensioners challenged the differential rates as discriminatory – Single Judge dismissed the writ petitions holding serving employees and pensioners constitute different classes – Division Bench reversed, holding the differential rate violates Article 14 since the object of both DA and DR is to mitigate hardship caused by inflation which equally affects serving and retired employees – Held: Fixing different rates of enhancement of DA and DR, when both are linked to inflation and serve a common object, has no rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved and is arbitrary and discriminatory; High Court's finding upheld; appeals dismissed [Paras 20–29].

Equality – Article 14 – Twin Test of Classification – Classification is permissible only if (i) it is founded on an intelligible differentia distinguishing those grouped from others, and (ii) the differentia has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved – Where DA and DR both serve the common object of mitigating inflationary hardship, and inflation hits serving and retired employees with equal force, differentiation qua the rate of enhancement has no rational nexus to that object – Financial crunch may justify deferral of disbursement or separate implementation dates, but once a decision is taken to provide and increase DA/DR based on inflation, fixing a higher rate for serving employees than for pensioners is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 [Paras 22–28].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – High Court's judgment affirmed – No order as to costs.

Rent Control – Eviction – Unlawful Sub-letting – Reconstitution of Partnership as Cloak – Appellant's predecessor-in-interest, a long-term lessee, sub-let commercial premises to Respondent No. 1 firm under a registered lease deed dated 22.02.1985 prohibiting sub-letting without written consent – Original tenant-partner (Respondent No. 4) found to have retired, with Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (strangers to the tenancy) in exclusive possession – Trial Court allowed eviction petition under Sections 27(2)(b)(ii) and 27(2)(p) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 – High Court in revision set aside the eviction order by reappreciating evidence – Held: High Court exceeded revisional jurisdiction; eviction order of trial Court restored; respondents granted three months to vacate [Paras 2–15].

Revisional Jurisdiction – Scope and Limits – Section 46, Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 – Revisional power is supervisory and cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction – High Court cannot reappreciate oral and documentary evidence or substitute its own findings for those of the trial Court merely because another view is possible – Interference permissible only where findings are perverse, based on no evidence, suffer from misreading, or result in gross miscarriage of justice – High Court's reappreciation of depositions, partnership documents, and rent receipts to arrive at independent conclusions amounts to impermissible exercise of appellate power under the guise of revision – Legislature having consciously provided a separate appellate remedy under Section 26, revisional jurisdiction cannot be expanded to bypass or substitute that mechanism [Paras 12.1–12.9].

Sub-letting – Burden of Proof – Shifting of Onus – Initial burden to prove unlawful sub-letting lies on the landlord, discharged by establishing (i) exclusive possession of a third party, and (ii) absence of the original tenant from possession – Upon such proof, a presumption of sub-letting arises and onus shifts to the tenant to explain the nature of such possession – Direct proof of monetary consideration not indispensable and may be legitimately inferred from surrounding circumstances – In the present case, landlord discharged initial burden by establishing exclusive possession of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 who were strangers to the lease; respondents failed to rebut the presumption by producing cogent evidence of valid partnership or landlord's consent [Paras 13.1–13.8].

Partnership – Sub-letting through Partnership Device – Lifting of Veil – A partnership firm is not a separate legal entity; firm name is merely a compendious description of its partners – Mere induction or retirement of partners does not amount to sub-letting so long as the original tenant retains legal possession and control – However, where partnership is used as a cloak to conceal an impermissible transfer, courts are entitled to lift the veil and find the real nature of the transaction – Determinative test is whether the original tenant continues to retain legal possession and control – Where original tenant has retired and ceased to have any role, and alleged reconstitution deed is unregistered, unproved, and unsupported by original partnership deed, the arrangement amounts to unlawful sub-letting under Section 27(2)(b)(ii); continued occupation by strangers without lawful right attracts Section 27(2)(p) [Paras 14.1–14.10].

Decision: Civil Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court dated 23.05.2023 in House Rent Revision Petition No. 56 of 2017 set aside – Order of trial Court dated 14.07.2017 in H.R.C. No. 63 of 2016 directing eviction restored – Respondents granted three months to vacate and hand over vacant possession – No order as to costs.

Family Law – Divorce – Cruelty and Desertion – Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib), Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Respondent-husband filed divorce petition alleging persistent mental and physical harassment, use of abusive language towards his parents, and irretrievable breakdown of matrimonial relationship – Family Court granted divorce upon finding cruelty and desertion established – High Court affirmed, relying on undertaking given by appellant acknowledging misconduct, testimony of the parties' son supporting cruelty allegations, and appellant's own statement expressing disinterest in custody of children – Parties living separately since 2018; prolonged separation indicating matrimonial bond broken beyond repair – Held: Findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence; no perversity warranting interference; decree of divorce affirmed [Paras 5–10].

Maintenance – Quantum – Modification in Interest of Complete Justice – Family Court awarded lump sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- as maintenance to the appellant-wife – Held: Having regard to the need to ensure continued financial support, respondent directed to pay Rs. 10,000/- per month to the appellant from the date of this order in substitution of the lump sum awarded [Para 11].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Decree of divorce affirmed – Maintenance modified to Rs. 10,000/- per month payable from the date of the order.