Surrogacy Law – Retrospective Application – Age Restrictions – Section 4(iii)(c)(I), Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 – Prospective Operation Only – Intending couples (petitioners) commenced surrogacy procedures prior to 25.01.2022 and had frozen embryos before the Act came into force – They were later denied eligibility certification on ground of crossing age limits prescribed (50 years for female, 55 for male) – Held: The Act does not operate retrospectively – Couples who had completed fertilisation and freezing of embryos prior to enforcement of the Act had a vested and constitutionally protected right to continue surrogacy – Retrospective application would unreasonably extinguish their reproductive autonomy under Article 21 – Section 4(iii)(c)(I) to apply prospectively only [Paras 13.8–15.10, 16–18].

Reproductive Autonomy – Right under Article 21 – Reproductive choice includes right to procreate through surrogacy where medically indicated – Prior to enforcement of the Act, no age bar existed; hence intending couples had an unfettered right to exercise reproductive autonomy – Such vested right cannot be retrospectively curtailed by statute unless expressly stated [Paras 12.5–12.7, 13.8–13.9].

Statutory Interpretation – Presumption Against Retrospectivity – Unless expressly provided or necessarily implied, legislation is presumed prospective – Retrospective application of Section 4(iii)(c)(I) would impair vested rights and impose new disability, hence impermissible – Rule against retrospectivity invoked to preserve rights of intending couples who had commenced surrogacy procedures prior to enforcement [Paras 15.2–15.10].

Meaning of ‘Commencement’ of Surrogacy Procedure – ‘Commencement’ for purpose of exemption from age bar occurs when intending couple completes extraction and fertilisation of gametes and freezes embryos with intent of implantation – Freezing of embryos marks crystallisation of right to pursue surrogacy – Couples at this stage prior to 25.01.2022 protected from age restrictions [Paras 14.1–14.4].

Transitional Provision – Section 53 – Scope – Ten-month transitional protection applies to existing surrogate mothers, not intending couples – However, this does not authorise retrospective deprivation of vested reproductive rights of intending couples who had completed embryo creation before the Act [Paras 11–12, concurring opinion].

Decision: Writ petitions and application allowed – Section 4(iii)(c)(I) held to operate prospectively – Petitioners exempted from age qualification for certification under the Act provided other statutory conditions are met – Similarly placed couples may approach jurisdictional High Courts for relief [Paras 17–19].

Contract Law – Specific Performance – Agreement to Sell – Appeal against rejection of specific performance on ground of illegality – Plaintiff-bank entered into agreement to purchase 8 flats to be constructed on a 300 sq. yd. plot for ₹32.07 lakhs – Plaintiff paid ₹28.86 lakhs (about 90%) – Construction not completed – Plaintiff filed suit for specific performance – Trial Court decreed the suit, allowing performance to the extent possible under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act – Division Bench reversed, holding the agreement to be void for being contrary to building laws – Supreme Court upheld Division Bench’s view – Held: Construction of 8 flats was the essential object of the agreement – Since such construction was impermissible under prevailing building bye-laws, agreement was illegal and void – Courts cannot reframe or rewrite contracts to make them lawful – Specific performance rightly denied [Paras 1, 3.1, 5.2, 7.2, 11–13, 14–18, 19–25].

Illegality of Contract – Violation of Building Bye-laws – Agreement contemplated construction of 8–10 flats on 300 sq. yd. plot where only 2.5 units were permissible under 1983 Building Bye-laws – Both Trial Court and High Court found such construction illegal – Trial Court erroneously attempted to enforce the agreement by allowing construction of only 3 flats – Supreme Court held that courts cannot enforce a contract whose object is prohibited by law – Such agreement is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act – Held: Trial Court erred in modifying agreement and granting partial performance – Division Bench rightly reversed [Paras 5.2, 8.1, 8.2, 15–18, 23–25].

Specific Relief – Section 12 of Specific Relief Act – Partial performance – Applicability – Plaintiff invoked Section 12 and expressed willingness to accept modified performance (lesser number of flats) – Trial Court accepted and decreed partial performance – Supreme Court held that Section 12 does not permit enforcement when essential terms (construction of 8 flats) are removed – Construction was central to the contract – Courts cannot enforce only the lawful part if it involves removing core obligations – Such re-writing of contract is impermissible [Paras 6, 7.2, 19–22, 24–25].

Public Authority Conduct – Public Sector Bank – Due Diligence and Legality – Plaintiff being a nationalised bank was expected to act lawfully – Agreement entered into was contrary to law and in contravention of building bye-laws – Court observed that state instrumentalities are expected to avoid camouflage agreements and uphold legality – No equitable relief can be granted to a party engaged in illegal contractual arrangement, even if it is a public authority [Paras 8.2, 27].

Contract Interpretation – Essential Terms – Construction of Flats – Supreme Court emphasized that the core object of the agreement was construction and delivery of 8 flats – Clause 6 of agreement explicitly stated that Plaintiff was interested in acquiring the flats, not merely rights over land – Such construction being legally impermissible, the contract could not subsist – Held: Essential terms cannot be severed or ignored – Agreement not enforceable without its primary object [Paras 11–13, 24].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment of Delhi High Court Division Bench affirmed – Specific performance rightly denied – Plaintiff not entitled to relief under Section 12 – Agreement declared unenforceable – Plaintiff entitled only to refund with interest as per contract – Each party to bear its own costs [Paras 26, 28].

Service Law – Termination – Eligibility Criteria – Vocational Subject Marks – Rules 4 and 21 of Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 – Termination of teachers on the ground of not securing 40% in Intermediate Examination and invalidity of graduation certificates – Held: Rule 21 governs merit list preparation and not eligibility – Rule 4 prescribes eligibility to appear in Teacher Eligibility Test and contains no bar on inclusion of vocational marks – Marks in vocational subjects, as per marksheet guidelines, are to be added to aggregate for determining overall percentage – Exclusion of such marks erroneous – Appellants were eligible and termination unsustainable [Paras 25–29, 36–37].

Principles of Natural Justice – Violation – Termination Without Fresh Notice – Show-cause notices alleged candidates failed to secure 45% marks, but termination based on exclusion of vocational marks reducing percentage below 40% – Held: Finding of guilt on a charge not contained in notice violates natural justice – Department’s action arbitrary and illegal – Termination vitiated [Paras 31–35].

Recruitment Rules – Interpretation – Rule 4 v. Rule 21 – Distinct Fields – Rule 4 (Eligibility) applies for determining who may appear in TET – Rule 21 (Merit List) applies post-TET for ranking – Both operate in separate spheres – Department and High Court erred in applying Rule 21 for eligibility determination [Paras 26–28].

Administrative Law – Procedural Fairness – Where an employee successfully rebuts charges in a show-cause notice, authorities cannot alter the basis of termination without issuing a fresh notice – Violation renders order void [Paras 32–34].

Relief – Reinstatement – Continuity of Service – Arrears – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) deemed in continuous service from initial appointment (December 2015) – Entitled to full arrears of pay and seniority benefits – However, period out of service not to count for experience-based promotion – Deceased appellant Surendra Munda’s termination quashed; heirs entitled to full arrears till date of death and eligible for compassionate appointment under scheme, if applicable [Paras 37–42].

Administrative Fairness – Government Conduct – State acted arbitrarily and without due process in terminating teachers despite clear eligibility and valid degrees—Court strongly deprecated such action [Para 38].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgments of the Jharkhand High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 83/2019, 332/2021, and 331/2021 set aside – Termination orders dated 07.10.2016 quashed – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) reinstated with continuity and arrears – Legal heirs of deceased appellant (Surendra Munda) entitled to arrears till date of death and consideration for compassionate appointment – Compliance directed within three months.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Dishonour of Cheque – Complaint Against Trustee Without Trust as Party – Maintainability – Sections 138, 141, NI Act – Question whether complaint under NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/Trustee of a Trust without arraying the Trust as an accused – Held: A Trust is not a juristic person capable of suing or being sued – It is an obligation, not an entity – Trustees alone are owners of trust property and must maintain and defend suits – Complaint maintainable directly against the Trustee who issued the cheque – No requirement to implead the Trust [Paras 23–29, 40–41].

Trusts Act – Legal Status of a Trust – Sections 3 and 13 – Trust lacks independent legal personality – Operates only through Trustees – Obligation to maintain and defend suits lies on Trustees, not the Trust – Trust cannot be equated with a “company” or “association of individuals” within the meaning of Section 141 NI Act – Trustees are answerable for acts done on behalf of Trust [Paras 22–27].

Vicarious Liability – Signatory of Dishonoured Cheque – Section 141 NI Act – Signatory of dishonoured cheque is directly responsible for the act and covered under Section 141(2) – No specific averment necessary regarding responsibility where accused is signatory or holds position analogous to Managing Director – Principle affirmed per SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 [Paras 17–20].

Juristic Person – Trust v. Company – Distinction – A Trust cannot be treated as equivalent to a company or corporate body for the purposes of NI Act – Trustees are liable in their individual capacities – Contrary High Court rulings equating Trusts with companies are erroneous and overruled [Paras 34–38].

Precedent – Co-equal Benches – Judicial Discipline – Later coordinate Benches cannot disregard earlier decisions of equal strength – If disagreement exists, reference must be made to larger Bench – Later Kerala HC ruling in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala (2023) held incorrect for ignoring binding coordinate decision in K.P. Shibu v. State of Kerala (2019) – Restatement of law from National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh v. J&K National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140 [Paras 32–33, 42–44].

Pending Reference – Effect of Larger Bench Referral – Though Pratibha Pratisthan v. Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712 is under reference to a Larger Bench (Tara Bai Desai Charitable Ophthalmic Trust Hospital v. Supreme Elevators India (P) Ltd., (2025) 3 SCC 80), it continues to hold the field till the Larger Bench decides otherwise – High Courts must follow prevailing law unless directed to await reference outcome [Paras 42–44].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s order quashing complaint under Sections 138/141 NI Act set aside – Complaint restored against Trustee who issued cheque – Held: A Trust has no separate juristic existence; proceedings under NI Act maintainable directly against the Trustee/Chairman who signed the cheque. Directions issued for expeditious trial.

Criminal Law – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Anticipatory Bail – Bar under Section 18 – Applicability to Accused Added under Section 319 CrPC – Jurisdiction of High Court – Respondent added as accused under Section 319 CrPC in case involving offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act – High Court granted anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC – Held: Once summoned under Section 319 CrPC, the respondent assumes status of an accused for all offences in the case, including those under the 1989 Act – Bar under Section 18 on consideration of anticipatory bail applies – High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain or grant anticipatory bail in absence of a finding that no prima facie case under the 1989 Act was made out – Order granting anticipatory bail unsustainable [Paras 4–10].

Criminal Procedure – Section 319 CrPC – Effect of Summoning Order – Scope – Where the order summoning the accused under Section 319 CrPC was not under challenge before the High Court, its validity could not be tested incidentally in anticipatory bail proceedings – High Court erred in overlooking the binding nature of the summoning order [Paras 5, 10].

Judicial Review – Scope under Section 438 CrPC – Limits in presence of Statutory Bar – In offences under the SC/ST Act, anticipatory bail is impermissible unless the Court first records a finding that no prima facie case under the Act exists – Mere allegations of false implication insufficient to dilute the statutory bar [Paras 7, 10].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail set aside – Respondent at liberty to appear before Trial Court and seek regular bail, to be considered expeditiously in accordance with law [Paras 10–11].

Town Planning – OSR Charges – Sub-division prior to 1975 proved by registered gifts and separate pattas – Site area 2229 sq. m. squarely within Annexure XX “first 3000 sq. m. – Nil” slab – Demand set aside and refund with 8% interest upheld – No interference under Article 136 with concurrent, non-perverse findings [Paras 14–17, 20–21].

Open Space Reservation (OSR) – Basis of Computation – Parent Tract vs. Independent Parcel – CMDA’s attempt to club respondent’s parcel with erstwhile 21-ground estate rejected – Documentary chain (1949 partition; 1972 & 1973 gift deeds; separate pattas; 1984 gift) shows long-standing, identifiable holding prior to 05.08.1975 – Fresh sub-division plea in 2008 termed ipse dixit and unsupported [Paras 14–16].

Revenue Records & Registered Instruments – Evidentiary Value – Separate pattas, though not title per se, corroborate possession/demarcation—read with unimpeached registered deeds, they establish a separate holding; once produced, burden shifts to authority to dislodge pre-1975 recognition—no contrary material produced [Para 15–16].

Regulatory Exemption – Annexure XX – “For the first 3000 sq. m. — Nil” – Respondent’s plot being 2229 sq. m. entitled to full exemption—Notional recombination with parent estate impermissible—Text of regulation cannot be defeated by retrospective enlargement of liability [Para 17].

Layouts vs. Individual Development – No layout formation by respondent—Provisions aimed at layout promoters inapplicable—Hospital construction on individual site cannot trigger layout-based OSR levy [Para 18].

Appellate Review – Article 136 – Interference confined to manifest illegality/perversity—Concurrent findings of Single Judge and Division Bench, resting on public documents and proper appreciation of evidence, warrant no interference [Para 20].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court’s direction to refund ₹1,64,50,000/– with 8% p.a. interest affirmed – Payment to be made within six weeks – No order as to costs – All pending applications disposed of [Para 21].

Electricity Act – Theft of Energy – Presumption under Section 39 – Use of Artificial Means Not Established – Reversal of Acquittal Unwarranted – Accused, a company director, was convicted by High Court under Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act on the basis of alleged tampering with the meter box and abnormal electricity consumption – Supreme Court held: Presumption under Section 39 arises only when existence of artificial means is proved – Evidence by prosecution witnesses including MSEB officials lacked certainty – Witnesses relied on approximations and inferences – No direct proof of tampering or dishonest abstraction of energy – Presumption under Section 39 not triggered – Conviction not sustainable [Paras 13–15].

Electricity Act – Meter Tampering – Section 44 – Insufficient Proof – Conviction Reversed – High Court invoked Section 44(c) against accused based on existence of holes in meter box – Supreme Court held: No evidence that holes were made or used by accused or his company – No witness saw accused or staff interfering with meter – No conclusive evidence of fraudulent alteration or use of energy – Charge under Section 44 not established beyond reasonable doubt – Benefit of doubt must go to accused [Paras 16–17].

Criminal Law – Reversal of Acquittal – Standards for Interference – High Court Must Show Perverse Findings or Miscarriage of Justice – Supreme Court reiterated that reversal of acquittal requires strong reasons such as perversity or grave miscarriage of justice – Trial Court had correctly evaluated lack of concrete evidence – High Court erred in reversing acquittal without compelling grounds – Appeal allowed, acquittal restored [Paras 11–12, 17].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court judgment dated 15/10/2010 convicting appellant under Sections 39 and 44 of the Electricity Act, 1910 set aside – Appellant acquitted – Bail bonds discharged – All pending applications disposed of [Para 17].

Stamp Duty – Nature of Instrument – Mortgage vs. Security Bond – The instrument executed by the appellant-company in favour of Meerut Development Authority (MDA) styled as a “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” held, in substance, to be a mortgage deed and not a security bond – Appellant transferred interest in specified plots (2,934.45 sq. m.) to MDA to secure performance of contractual obligations relating to colony development and payment of external development charges – On default, MDA entitled to sell mortgaged property to realise dues – Essential ingredients of a mortgage under Section 2(17) of the Indian Stamp Act satisfied – Substance prevails over form or nomenclature [Paras 14–17].

Security Bond – Applicability of Article 57 – Article 57 confined to cases where deed is executed “by a surety to secure due performance of a contract” – Requires presence of three distinct parties: surety, principal debtor, and creditor – Not attracted where principal debtor itself executes the deed to secure its own obligations – Appellant-company being the principal developer executed mortgage in its own name; hence Article 57 inapplicable [Paras 21–25].

Contract of Guarantee – Tripartite Nature – Section 126, Contract Act – “Surety” means one who undertakes to discharge the liability of another in case of default – Contract of guarantee inherently tripartite – Absence of independent surety in the deed fatal to claim under Article 57 – Director signing on behalf of company cannot be treated as a distinct surety for purposes of stamp classification [Paras 22–25, 29].

Interpretation of Fiscal Statutes – Principle of Substance Over Form – It is settled that the nomenclature of a document is not decisive for determining stamp duty liability; courts must look to substance, recitals, operative clauses and legal effect – The “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed” created an enforceable security interest by way of mortgage, satisfying the criteria of Article 40 – Merely describing it as a “Security Bond” cannot alter its character [Paras 14–18, 27–28].

Mortgage Deed – Definition and Applicability – Section 2(17), Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Includes every instrument transferring a right over specified property to secure money advanced, a debt, or performance of an engagement – The appellant’s deed transferred rights in immovable property to MDA and to Allahabad Bank (in companion appeal) for securing payment and performance – Held: falls squarely under Article 40 of Schedule 1-B [Paras 16–17, 27–28].

Multiple Instruments – Consistent Interpretation – In both appeals (Meerut Development Authority and Allahabad Bank cases), the so-called “Security Bond cum Mortgage Deed”/“Security Bond or Mortgage Deed” involved direct security by principal debtor without a surety – Uniformly held to be chargeable under Article 40 – High Court orders upholding this view affirmed [Paras 27–30].

Fiscal Interpretation – Strict yet Rational Construction – Courts must adopt strict construction of charging provisions but may not disregard the legal effect of the instrument – Since the instrument transfers an interest in property to secure an engagement, its classification as a mortgage under Article 40 accords with both letter and spirit of the statute [Paras 18–20, 26].

Judicial Review – Limited Interference under Article 136 – Concurrent findings of stamp authorities and High Court that instrument chargeable under Article 40 found well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation of law – No manifest illegality or perversity shown – Appeals dismissed [Para 30].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Instruments executed by appellants chargeable under Article 40 of Schedule 1-B of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Findings of the High Court of Allahabad affirmed – No interference warranted under Article 136 – No order as to costs [Para 30].

Succession Law – Scheduled Tribes – Applicability of Hindu Succession Act – High Court's direction to extend inheritance rights under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to daughters in tribal areas of Himachal Pradesh – Held: Impermissible in law in absence of Central Government notification under Section 2(2) of the Act – Tribes remain governed by customary law unless notified – High Court's sweeping declaration lacked jurisdiction and was beyond scope of dispute – Direction expunged [Paras 3-6]

Tribal Custom – Judicial Overreach – Hindu Succession Act expressly excluded Scheduled Tribes unless notified otherwise – High Court's pronouncement was uncalled for as issue neither directly nor substantially involved in the appeal – Supreme Court reiterates settled position in Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 5 SCC 125, and State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (2001) 1 SCC 4 – Held: Law must evolve, but evolution must come via legislative process, not judicial fiat [Paras 4-5]

Article 342 – Constitutional Scheme – Notification Requirement – Scheduled Tribe status and de-notification must flow from Presidential notification – No such notification shown in present case – Courts cannot presume applicability of personal laws where exclusion is legislatively preserved [Paras 4]

Obiter Dicta – Binding Nature – High Court’s observations in paragraph 63 not founded on pleadings or issues framed – Held: Directions not sustainable – Supreme Court orders expunction of Paragraph 63 from the High Court judgment [Paras 5-6]

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – Direction in paragraph 63 of the impugned judgment dated 23.06.2015 expunged – No costs – Pending applications also disposed of.