Execution of Decree – Compromise Decree – Jurisdiction of Executing Court – Modification of Decree – Parties entered into a compromise in a suit for specific performance resulting in a decree dated 14.07.2017 dividing 51R of land equally at 20.5R each with 10R as common land – Executing Court in Execution Petition No. 21 of 2018 passed order dated 19.07.2021 varying the areas allotted to the parties on the ground that constructions on the extreme western side were not as per sanctioned plan and that part of the area had been sold to a third party – Review petition allowed on 26.08.2021 modifying the decree further – High Court upheld the orders in writ petition – Held: Executing Court acted in excess of jurisdiction; orders set aside – Executing Court directed to execute the decree in its terms and tenor [Paras 14–16, 30–31].

Executing Court – Jurisdiction – Section 47, CPC – Settled Law – Executing Court is empowered only to decide questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree – It must execute the decree as it stands without altering or substituting its own view in place of that expressed in the decree – The Executing Court cannot assume the role of a trial court – Exception only where decree is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction, which was not the case herein [Paras 24–27].

Executing Court – Reciprocal Obligations – Identity of Land – Where compromise decree clearly and unequivocally describes the portions of land falling into the shares of each party, no dispute as to identity of land arises – Fact that exchange of certain portions may be impracticable due to constructions not conforming to sanctioned map or part of land having been sold is immaterial and does not empower the Executing Court to vary the decree – Reliance placed by respondent on Jai Narain Ram Lundia v. Kedar Nath Khetan rejected; said decision only permits the Executing Court to resolve disputes as to identity of the specific thing to be given under reciprocal obligations and does not authorise variation of decree terms [Paras 28–30].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Orders dated 19.07.2021 and 26.08.2021 passed by the Executing Court and consequential order dated 11.10.2021 set aside – Executing Court directed to execute the compromise decree in its terms and tenor.

Civil Law – Title Suit – Burden of Proof – Pujari vs. Owner – Plaintiff Must Succeed on Own Title – Respondent-plaintiffs, a registered society and its members, claimed ownership of an ancient temple "Moorti Swarup Shri Govardhan Nath Ji" at Rampura Bazar, Kota, and sought removal of the appellant-defendant who asserted private ownership through a line of successive adoptions – Trial Court and High Court concurrently held that the appellant's predecessors were merely appointed pujaris and decreed the suit for possession – Held: Courts below misdirected themselves by shifting focus from plaintiff's proof of title to infirmities in defendant's case; respondent-plaintiffs failed to produce any deed of dedication, document of endowment, or legally admissible evidence of ownership – Suit must fail for want of proof of plaintiff's own title – Appeal allowed; suit dismissed [Paras 12–21].

Burden of Proof – Sections 101, 102 and 110, Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – In a suit for declaration of title and consequential relief, the burden lies squarely upon the plaintiff to establish clear and cogent title – Plaintiff cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendant's case – Reliance placed on Union of India v. Vasavi Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269 – Even assuming the defendant failed to conclusively establish his title through the claimed chain of adoptions, the same does not enure to the benefit of the plaintiffs – Held: Respondent-plaintiffs have not discharged this burden [Paras 12–13, 17–18].

Management vs. Ownership – Religious Institution – The documents of 1926 and 1951 relied upon by the courts below, evidencing appointment of pujaris by the respondent-society, are at best indicative of management arrangements and do not constitute documents of title – Mere supervisory or managerial functions over a temple, including participation in appointment of pujaris, do not ipso facto confer title upon the society – The distinction between management of a religious institution and ownership of its properties is well recognised in law and the two cannot be conflated [Paras 15–16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment of the High Court dated 28.09.2007 in S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 36 of 1988 set aside – Suit dismissed – Pending applications disposed of.

NDPS Act – Sections 20, 25 and 29 – Separate Punishment – Legislation by Reference and Incorporation – Appellant convicted along with co-accused for possession and transportation of 4 kg 100 gms of commercial quantity of charas found in a vehicle — Special Judge sentenced both convicts to 12 years rigorous imprisonment under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C) and 25 read with 29 of the NDPS Act — High Court reduced substantive sentence to 10 years but otherwise confirmed the conviction and sentence — Appellant challenged the imposition of separate punishments, contending that Sections 25 and 29 do not prescribe an independent sentence and merely provide for punishment of "the offence" — Held: Sections 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act are instances of legislation by reference and also by incorporation — Punishment prescribed under Section 20 is referred to and read into Sections 25 and 29 — Both sections contemplate independent and separate offences and hence separate punishment is permissible [Paras 5–7.2].

Section 25 – NDPS Act – Occupier of Conveyance – Knowing Permittance – Appellant sat on the front seat of the car owned by co-accused from beneath which commercial quantity of charas was recovered — Argued that appellant, not being the owner, could not have "knowingly permitted" the vehicle's use — Held: Section 25 expressly covers "occupier" and person having "use of conveyance" — Appellant being the occupier of the car falls within the ambit of Section 25 — Conviction under Section 25 is valid; in any event, conviction under Section 29 independently sustains [Para 5.5–5.5.1].

Section 29 – NDPS Act – Criminal Conspiracy – Independent Offence – Section 29 of the NDPS Act expressly provides that notwithstanding Section 116 IPC, a person guilty of abetment or criminal conspiracy shall be punished with the punishment provided for the offence — Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence — Fetter of Section 116 IPC as to one-fourth term is done away with under Section 29 — Held: Separate punishment under Section 29 is independently contemplated and permissible [Paras 5.7–5.8.2].

Concurrent Sentence – Fine – Section 53 IPC – Double Punishment – Appellant sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- separately under each of the two sets of offences — Sentences ordered to run concurrently — Held: Fine is a "punishment" under Section 53 IPC — When sentences are directed to run concurrently, fine also operates concurrently and the convict cannot be made to pay double amount of fine — Imposition of double fine when imprisonment runs concurrently would amount to double punishment, which is impermissible — Default imprisonment under fine sentence is a penalty for non-payment and not a sentence proper, as held in Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan [Paras 9–9.3].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed — Conviction and substantive sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment confirmed — Appellant held not liable to pay double fine as sentences run concurrently — Appellant, having already undergone 11 years of imprisonment including default imprisonment as of January 2026, directed to be released forthwith unless required to be detained in any other case.

Civil Law – Impleadment – Writ Proceedings – Proper Party vs. Necessary Party – Punjab Unified Building Rules, 2025 – Interim Order – Appellant, owner of a hotel property in Jalandhar, was subjected to sealing and demolition action by Municipal Corporation on the basis of an interim order passed in a writ petition challenging the 2025 Rules, to which it was not a party – Applications for impleadment and clarification/modification of the interim order dismissed by the High Court on the ground that the Appellant had no lis before it – Supreme Court held that a person demonstrably and directly affected by the operation of an interim order passed in writ proceedings cannot be excluded merely because they were not an original party – Appellant was at the very least a proper party whose presence would enable fuller and fairer consideration of the consequences of the court's own interim order – High Court's order dismissing impleadment set aside – Appeals allowed [Paras 7–10, 17–18].

Impleadment – Principles – Writ Jurisdiction – Order I Rule 10 CPC – Though writ proceedings are not governed by the strict technicalities of pleadings applicable to civil suits, the principles underlying Order I Rule 10 CPC continue to furnish sound guidance – A necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be passed – A proper party is one whose presence enables the Court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all questions involved – Where an interim order passed by the High Court in writ proceedings is being invoked by authorities to the direct detriment of a third party, such third party cannot be treated as a stranger to the controversy and must be permitted to be impleaded at least as a proper party – Reliance placed on Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v. Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited, (2010) 7 SCC 417 [Paras 7–9].

Multiplicity of Proceedings – Interconnected but Distinct – Overlap not same as Identity – Where multiple proceedings before the High Court arise from closely related facts and share a common legal backdrop, courts must distinguish between proceedings that are interconnected and those that are truly interdependent – Pendency of a parent writ challenging delegated legislation does not automatically require that independent remedies such as Letters Patent Appeal or Civil Revision challenging specific administrative and demolition actions be held in abeyance – Courts must lean in favour of preserving, and not stultifying, available remedies, particularly where consequences are continuing and immediate – Requiring the Appellant to await final disposal of CWP No. 38742 of 2025 before LPA No. 760 of 2026 and CR No. 2579 of 2026 could be heard would make available remedies illusory in practical terms [Paras 12–16].

Status Quo and Liberty – Directions – Appellant impleaded as party respondent in CWP No. 38742 of 2025 – High Court at liberty to proceed with CWP No. 38742 of 2025 independently of LPA No. 760 of 2026 and CR No. 2579 of 2026 – LPA No. 760 of 2026 and CR No. 2579 of 2026 to be heard together and decided independently on their own merits – Parties directed to maintain status quo with respect to the property until disposal of LPA No. 760 of 2026 and CR No. 2579 of 2026 – No opinion expressed on merits of rival claims in any of the pending proceedings – All questions kept open [Paras 19–22].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Order dated 26.02.2026 set aside – C.M. No. 2967-CWP-2026 (impleadment application) allowed; Appellant impleaded as party respondent in CWP No. 38742 of 2025 – C.M. No. 2968-CWP-2026 (clarification application) disposed of – LPA No. 760 of 2026 and CR No. 2579 of 2026 to be heard and decided together, independently of CWP No. 38742 of 2025 – Status quo on property to be maintained until disposal of LPA No. 760 of 2026 and CR No. 2579 of 2026.

Service Law – Pension – Voluntary Abandonment vs. Voluntary Retirement – SBI Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 – Eligibility under Rule 22(i)(a) and Rule 22(i)(c) – Appellant, a confirmed Clerk in State Bank of India, remained absent without leave from 24.01.1998 to 11.12.1998, failed to respond to show-cause notices, and was declared to have voluntarily abandoned service on 12.12.1998 – After returning from abroad in 2004, sought rejoining and subsequently claimed pension – Labour Court dismissed claim under Section 33C(2) of ID Act for want of pre-existing right – Single Judge and Division Bench of Madras High Court upheld dismissal – Supreme Court proceeded to examine merits – Held: Appellant completed only 19 years, 9 months and 25 days of confirmed service (reckoned from date of confirmation, not appointment, as per Rules 7 and 20), falling short of the mandatory 20-year threshold – Cessation of service was voluntary abandonment, not voluntary retirement, rendering Rule 22(i)(c) inapplicable – Appellant had also not attained 50 years of age at the relevant time, rendering him ineligible under Rule 22(i)(a) – Appeal dismissed [Paras 17–32].

Pensionable Service – Computation – Reckoning from Date of Confirmation – Rules 7 and 20 of SBI Pension Fund Rules make clear that pensionable service is reckoned from the date of confirmation, not from the date of appointment – Appellant's appointment was on 17.08.1978 but confirmation was only on 17.02.1979 – Calculating service from date of confirmation to 12.12.1998 yields less than 20 years, thereby disqualifying the appellant from pension eligibility – Even if probation period were included (as argued relying on Rugmini Ganesh), appellant remained ineligible under Rule 22(i)(a) for non-attainment of 50 years of age [Paras 23–24, 30–31].

Voluntary Retirement vs. Voluntary Abandonment – Rule 22(i)(c) – Inapplicability – Rule 22(i)(c) confers pension rights upon an employee who, after completing 20 years of pensionable service, retires at his own written request – Appellant neither completed requisite service nor was he granted voluntary retirement – His services were declared voluntarily abandoned following prolonged unauthorised absence despite show-cause notices – Reliance on Radhey Shyam Pandey (supra) held misplaced as that case involved employees who had undisputedly retired under a recognised VRS and the controversy was confined to interpretation of pension rules, whereas in the present case, the very entitlement to pension was in dispute [Paras 25–28].

Section 33C(2), Industrial Disputes Act – Maintainability – Pre-existing Right – Proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the ID Act are in the nature of execution proceedings and are maintainable only where a pre-existing right is established – In the present case, both the Labour Court and the High Court dismissed the claim at threshold on the ground that the appellant's entitlement to pension was disputed and hence no pre-existing right was made out – Supreme Court, however, elected to examine the case on merits rather than rest its decision on technical non-maintainability [Para 17].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Appellant held ineligible for pension under both Rule 22(i)(a) and Rule 22(i)(c) of the SBI Employees' Pension Fund Rules, 1955 – Orders of the Labour Court, Single Judge and Division Bench of the Madras High Court affirmed.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Sections 138, 141 – Director's Liability – Quashing of Summoning Order – Appellant, a Director of the accused Company, summoned in connection with dishonoured cheques issued by the Company – Both the revisional court and the High Court held that her signing of Board Resolutions established involvement in day-to-day affairs – Held: Signing of a Board Resolution does not, by itself, establish that a Director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the day-to-day business of the Company – Complaint lacked even a whisper of direct allegation against the appellant to satisfy the sine qua non of Section 141 NI Act – Summoning order quashed [Paras 3–8].

Section 141 NI Act – Essential Averment – Merely being a Director of a Company is insufficient to attract liability under Section 141 NI Act – It is necessary to specifically aver in the complaint that the accused was, at the time of the offence, in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the Company – Absence of such averment is fatal to the complaint against a Director – Board Resolution signed by a Director relates only to major directional decisions of the Company and cannot be equated with knowledge of or participation in everyday business transactions [Paras 6–8].

Section 482 CrPC – Scope and Availability – Interplay with Section 397 CrPC – High Court erred in holding that once a petition under Section 397 CrPC has been entertained, a subsequent petition under Section 482 CrPC on the same grounds is circumscribed to a narrower jurisdiction and liable to be dismissed – Held: Inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is not conferred by statute but is a paramount power of continuous superintendence that remains available even where revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 has been availed of – The two remedies are not mutually exclusive – Statement of law by the High Court on this point expressly set aside [Paras 9–11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Summoning order against the appellant Saroj Pandey quashed and set aside – Observations limited to the appellant's case only and shall have no bearing on the trial of co-accused persons – Pending applications disposed of.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Issuance of Process – Pre-Trial Stage – Legally Enforceable Debt – Statutory Presumption under Section 139 – Appellant's husband, through a mediator (second respondent), issued a cheque of ₹50 crores as security in an escrow arrangement under a settlement agreement – Cheque was dishonoured with remark "payment stopped by drawer" – Metropolitan Magistrate issued process under Section 138 upon finding prima facie ingredients satisfied – Sessions Court set aside the process holding that the cheque was not issued for a legally enforceable debt, as the underlying settlement agreement was not signed by the second respondent – Bombay High Court upheld the Sessions Court order – Held: At the stage of issuance of process, the only relevant considerations are issuance of cheque, its dishonour, service of statutory notice under Section 138, and filing of complaint within the prescribed period – Where the drawer does not dispute issuance of the cheque or his signature thereon, the statutory presumption under Section 139 is triggered and the burden shifts to the drawer to rebut it – This rebuttal can only occur during trial and not at the pre-trial stage – The Sessions Court erred in giving undue weightage to the unsigned settlement agreement and in ignoring the satisfied ingredients of Section 138 – Dismissal of complaint at pre-trial stage without affording the complainant an opportunity to lead evidence amounted to washing away the statutory presumption even before commencement of trial – Appeal allowed – Complaint restored for adjudication on merits [Paras 2, 6–11].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 139 – Statutory Presumption – Reverse Onus – Section 139 is a reverse onus clause enacted in furtherance of the legislative object of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments – The presumption includes existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability and is obligatory upon the Court to raise once the factual basis is established – The presumption stands activated when the drawer admits issuance of the cheque or the complainant proves issuance in his favour – Until the evidential burden is discharged by the accused during trial, the presumed fact must be taken as true – Disputed questions as regards existence of outstanding liability are questions of fact to be determined at trial on the basis of evidence [Paras 8–10].

Decision: Criminal Appeal allowed – Orders of the Sessions Court dated 30.12.2022 and the Bombay High Court set aside – Complaint CC1831/SC/2022 restored for adjudication on merits – Observations in the judgment not to be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

Service Law – Reservation – Horizontal Reservation – PWD-LV under Unreserved Category – Filling of Vacancy – The core issue concerned whether a vacancy reserved for UR (PWD-LV) could be filled by a more meritorious OBC-A candidate who also belonged to the PWD-LV category, in preference to a less meritorious unreserved PWD-LV candidate – Recruitment notification stipulated that in case of non-availability of a qualified UR (PWD-LV) candidate, the vacancy would be filled by PWD candidates of other categories as per merit – Appellant authority offered appointment to Respondent No. 3 (OBC-A/PWD-LV, 66.667 marks) over Respondent No. 1 (UR/PWD-LV, 55.667 marks) – Single Bench upheld this; Division Bench reversed, holding that the unreserved PWD-LV candidate must be preferred if available – Held: Division Bench erred; the Unreserved category is not a communal or social category but an open field available to all, and merit is the sole and inseparable criterion for appointment to any Unreserved post – A more meritorious PWD-LV candidate from any reserved social category is entitled to be appointed against a UR (PWD-LV) vacancy by virtue of the principle of migration – The recruitment notification condition merely states the obvious and cannot be read to create an absolute bar against meritorious reserved candidates when an unreserved candidate is available – Such an interpretation would be arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution [Paras 2–3, 10–18, 36–44, 49].

Reservation Law – Vertical and Horizontal Reservations – Distinction and Interplay – Vertical reservations pertain to social categories (SC/ST/OBC) and are inviolate pools; horizontal reservations are interlocking, cut across vertical categories, and are to be filled by adjustment on merit – Under the Unreserved/Open category, horizontal reservation for a special category like PWD-LV remains open to all social categories, with the only condition being that the candidate must belong to the same special horizontal category – The principle of migration from reserved to unreserved applies equally in the context of horizontal reservations under the Unreserved category – A post of UR (PWD-LV) is thus open to any PWD-LV candidate, whether SC, ST, OBC or Unreserved, and is to be filled on the basis of merit alone [Paras 20–32, 38–40].

Reservation Law – Compartmentalised vs. Overall Horizontal Reservation – The recruitment notification in question reflects compartmentalised reservation, where horizontal reservation slots are distributed among vertical social categories and are not inter-transferable – However, since the vacancy in question pertains to horizontal PWD-LV reservation under the Unreserved/Open category, the principle of open competition and merit governs, distinguishing it from PWD-LV vacancies within specific social categories such as OBC-A, SC or ST, which can only be filled by candidates of that particular social category possessing the horizontal attribute [Paras 6–7, 23–24, 33–34, 40].

Reservation Law – Relaxation of Qualifications – Unreserved Category – A reserved category candidate seeking appointment against an Unreserved post must not have availed any relaxation in the essential eligibility criteria applicable to the unreserved post – Any relaxation availed would disqualify such candidate from being treated as eligible for the Unreserved vacancy – In the present case, nothing was brought on record to show that Respondent No. 3 had availed any such relaxation [Paras 46–48].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and order dated 07.05.2024 of the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta in MAT 69/2024 with CAN 1/2024 set aside – Decision of the Single Bench dated 11.12.2023 restored – Pending applications disposed of.

Banking Law – Fraud Classification – Natural Justice – Personal/Oral Hearing – Whether Mandatory – RBI Master Directions 2016 and 2024 – Two borrower-companies' loan accounts classified as "fraud" by appellant-Banks after issuance of show cause notices, receipt of replies, and passing of reasoned orders – High Courts of Calcutta and Delhi, relying on State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal, directed grant of personal hearing and supply of full Forensic Audit Reports before classifying accounts as fraud – Held: Rajesh Agarwal (supra) did not recognise any right in the borrower to a personal/oral hearing before classification of account as fraud – Procedure of issuing detailed show cause notice, furnishing evidentiary material, eliciting written representation, and passing a reasoned order fully satisfies the requirements of natural justice – Personal hearing is not an incident of natural justice in administrative proceedings except where expressly prescribed or in proceedings before courts of law – High Court orders directing personal hearing set aside [Paras 60–109].

RBI Master Directions 2024 – Clause 2.1.1.1 to 2.1.1.4 – Correct Understanding of Rajesh Agarwal – The RBI in its Master Directions of 15.07.2024 correctly understood the scope of Rajesh Agarwal (supra) – The Master Directions-2024 duly incorporated the procedure of detailed show cause notice, reasonable time for reply, examination of response, and passing of a reasoned order – This procedure strikes a fair balance between promptitude and fairness and duly comports with principles of natural justice – No right of personal hearing conferred on borrowers under the Master Directions-2024 either [Paras 100–103].

Natural Justice – Flexibility of Concept – Personal Hearing vs. Written Representation – Natural justice is a flexible concept, and as to which of its facets applies depends on the facts and circumstances, the framework of law, and the nature of the enquiry – Personal hearing is not a universal right of a noticee and its grant is ordinarily in the discretion of the authority – Oral hearing is bound to convert the swift internal administrative process of fraud classification into a protracted one, enabling recalcitrant borrowers to dissipate assets, destroy evidence, or abscond – Multiple directors seeking multiple personal hearings would throw banking operations into disarray and defeat the 180-day timeline under Master Directions – Classification of fraud account is, in broad sense, an internal housekeeping due diligence to trigger mandatory reporting, asset preservation, and risk mitigation [Paras 76–96].

Disclosure of Forensic Audit Report – Rule and Exceptions – Supply of forensic audit report to the borrower before classification of account as fraud is mandatory, not optional – Furnishing only the findings and conclusions of the forensic audit report does not satisfy the requirements of natural justice since reasons and context in the body of the report are integral to a complete understanding of the conclusions – The rule is full disclosure; the exception arises only where the bank, for recorded reasons, establishes that disclosure of any specific part would affect the privacy or rights of third parties, in which case only those portions may be withheld – Supply of report in digital form constitutes valid compliance – Banks must not unreasonably use the power of redaction [Paras 110–125].

Doctrine of Merger – Precedent – Scope of Rajesh Agarwal – The operative holding in Rajesh Agarwal (supra) is what the Supreme Court stated in its own judgment and not what the High Court of Telangana had directed in the judgment upheld on appeal – Under the doctrine of merger, it is the decree of the superior court that is the final operative decree – Rajesh Agarwal (supra) did not, throughout its ninety-eight paragraphs, use the expression "personal hearing" as part of the Court's own holding – Words "reply and representation" in Para 75 of Rajesh Agarwal (supra) did not contemplate two separate stages of written reply and oral hearing but referred only to written representation in reply to show cause notice – High Court judgments taking a contrary view overruled [Paras 104–109].

Statistics – Alarming Scale of Bank Frauds – RBI Annual Report 2024-25 discloses that total fraud cases in FY 2024-25 were 23,953 involving Rs. 36,014 crores; as on March 31, 2025, as many as 783 fraud classifications amounting to Rs. 1,12,911 crores were withdrawn by banks due to non-compliance with principles of natural justice as per Rajesh Agarwal (supra) – These statistics underscore the critical importance of an efficient, time-bound administrative fraud classification process [Para 23].

Decision: Civil Appeal Nos. 4243-4244 of 2026 partly allowed – Direction of Division Bench granting personal hearing to respondent-borrower set aside; direction to furnish forensic audit reports upheld – Fraud Identification Committee of appellant-Bank directed to furnish forensic audit reports, elicit fresh reply, and pass fresh orders in accordance with Master Directions-2024 – Civil Appeal No. 4245 of 2026 partly allowed – Direction granting personal hearing set aside; direction to furnish forensic audit reports upheld – Appellant-Bank directed to furnish reports, elicit representation, and pass fresh orders in accordance with Master Directions-2024 – No order as to costs.